An investigative report into the social and economic causes of the 3.14 incident in Tibetan areas
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admin’s note
Over the past year, we have had many heated debate on issues related to Tibet. Little has been discussed, however, on how to move things forward. To me, it is more important to address grievances of the common Tibetan people than to win historical or political debates. Furthermore, it should be recognized that the discontent of Tibetan people are genuine and the current governmental policies are at least partially responsible. Sticking one’s head in the sand or blaming the all the troubles on outside forces will not solve any real problems in Tibet.
I am the person who believes communication, dialogue and mutual understanding are the best route to solve complicated ethnic issues. So it gives me great hope that Gongmeng, a Chinese NGO, took the initiative to provide an in-depth analysis of the social and economical challenges faced by Tibetans. I think this report will signal the beginning of a new bottom-up approach to solve the mistrusts demonstrated on both sides. The initial steps will be small and the progress will probably be slow, but, let’s get started!
Finally, I want to express my deep appreciation to Khechog’s friend, Ben, who translated the complete report (it is also posted on the ICT site), and others who gave feedback. The report is over 20,000 words long and I break it down into multiple pages. A previous post on this report has already generated a lot of interest, and I hope this full report will lead to a great discussion.
Contributors, Table of Contents, and Notes
Gongmeng Law Research Center
Contributors: Li Kun, Huang Li, Li Xiang
Research: Li Kun, Huang Li, Li Xiang, Wang Hongzhe
Contents
Foreword
I: Economic and social changes in Tibetan areas amid a process of rapid modernization
a) The centrally-directed rapid process of modernization
b) The social consequences arising from a process of rapid modernization under a specially formulated path
II: Hardships faced by young Tibetans born in the 70s and 80s
a) Serious problems in basic education
b) Vocational education and the lack of social opportunity
c) The sense of relative deprivation while living in a more open process of modernization as a catalyst for strengthening nationalist sentiment
d) The loss and forgetting of one’s nationality’s traditional culture and history
III: The main problems with structures of governance in Tibetan areas
a) The evolution of structures of governance in Tibetan areas
b) Problems in power structures within regional autonomy in Tibetan areas
IV: The government’s errors in handling the follow-up to the 3.14 incident
V: Problems of Tibetan religion and culture during this current complex phase
VI: Conclusion and recommendations
Appendices: [not available]
1) A review of the background history and culture in the Amdo and U-Tsang regions
2) Changes and modifications to the state’s nationality policies and legislation in Tibetan areas
3) Compilation of research and interview materials
4) Contact information for the subjects of this research
Translator’s notes
[1] U-Tsang, sometimes rendered as Central Tibet, is the Tibetan region roughly equivalent to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), which was established as a provincial-level administration in 1964; Amdo is the name of another Tibetan region mainly comprising modern-day Qinghai, as well as being the name a prefecture within the TAR. Throughout this report, the terms Tibet (Xizang), Tibetan areas (zangqu), and Tibetan regions (diyu), etc., have been used inconsistently and interchangeably, but it would appear that generally, the report broadly refers to Tibet as covering the various Tibetan autonomous jurisdictions as demarcated by the Chinese state.
[2] “3.14” refers to March 14, 2008, the date when peaceful protests over several previous days in Lhasa turned violent.
[3] The Hui are a Chinese-speaking Muslim people indigenous to large areas of northwest China.
[4] The ‘Two Basicallys’ (liang ji) is a centrally-led policy to ‘basically’ universalize nine-year compulsory education, and ‘basically’ eliminate adult illiteracy.
[5] The term menlu – using the characters for door and road – implies an advantage gained by nepotism or favor, and is very similar in meaning to the more commonly heard term guanxi literally meaning connection – or houmen – meaning back door.
Foreword
Foreword
From March to April of 2008, a series of mass violent incidents occurred in the Lhasa, Gannan [Tib: Kanlho, in Gansu province] and Aba [Tib: Ngaba, in Sichuan province] regions of our country. The locations of these incidents were the two Tibetan regions of U-Tsang and Amdo.[1] More than a thousand local youths and monks participated in the destruction of government offices, shops and other public installations, and even resorted to violent attacks against innocent people. What could have made the youths in these Tibetan areas – including monks – become protagonists in these violent incidents? Was it, as the propaganda tells us, a set of violent political and religious demands, or was it a concentrated release of discontent with life in this society? Chinese and western media have been engaging in a heated debate with each other using all manner of ideological approaches to explain these incidents including “Tibetan independence,” “human rights” and “cultural genocide.”
The 3.14 incident[2] of course had its external causes, such as the political and religious demands from groups of Tibetans in exile overseas, and the influence of the Dalai Lama abroad. However, such a large social contradiction could not have been created solely by external factors; there must have been internal causes, but the news reports gave little detailed consideration to exposing the social roots of these violent incidents. Under the influence of nationalist sentiment, there were some reports that even broadened mistrust and mutual criticisms between the nationalities. The lack of field research into the living conditions of Tibetans has been detrimental to clearly understanding the nature of social contradictions in Tibetan areas on a theoretical level, and has been detrimental to resolving problems on a practical level. What is the current state of education and employment in Tibetan areas? What are the lives and thoughts of ordinary people? The strong motivation for Gongmeng to undertake this research is an attempt to analyze the social roots of the background to this “sudden” incident, and by means of local research and interviews understand in a relatively objective way Tibetan areas in a state of change, to deepen understanding and inclusiveness between the nationalities, and to promote harmonious relations between the nationalities.
Since reform and opening up, enormous changes have occurred in the mechanisms of China’s social power and wealth distribution. In a society undergoing such dramatic changes and opening up ever quicker to the outside world, all nationalities in our country are facing entirely new developmental needs and directional choices, and relations between the nationalities are evincing a complex intertwining of old and new contradictions. The original intention and core aim of our survey is to “understand,” with the theme being “The social origins of the Tibet problem and changes to social life in Tibetan areas in recent years.” As the times change, the lives of each of the ethnic peoples also change. Choosing the perspective of “change” enables covering the old people who have experienced “serfdom to land reforms to reform and opening up,” but even more it is hoped attention thus can be focused on those Tibetan youths who were born during and after the 70s and who have grown up in Tibetan areas facing the impacts of globalization and modernization. As the future of Tibetan areas, the circumstances and perspectives of their lives are very different to those of their parents, and there is now a new frame of reference for measuring reality. No longer is it the serf society of before, but a modern life where one stands alone in the throng of the world; and no longer is it a self-sustaining Tibet protected by the natural environment, but a realm which whether actively or passively is intimately connected to all of China and the rest of the world. In the intense process of evolutionary social reform, the problems and challenges faced by society in Tibetan areas seem even more severe and pressing because of their special nature.
This survey chose as its research locations Hezuo city [Tib: Tsoe] and Xiahe [Tib: Labrang] county in Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in the Tibetan region of Amdo, and Lhasa City and Naidong [Tib: Nedong] county, both in the Tibetan region of U-Tsang. Gannan autonomous prefecture in the Tibetan region of Amdo is an important source of the Tibetan people’s culture and art. Over the course of a long history, the Tibetan region of Amdo has been at the frontline of cultural exchange and intermingling between Tibetan and Han peoples. This region is a classic model for researching Tibetan people’s social changes. Lhasa and Shannan in the Tibetan region of U-Tsang are the ancestral lands of Tibetan culture and the ancient political and cultural centers of Tibet. Since reform and opening up, both U-Tsang and Amdo have been experiencing a rapid process of modernization. External factors continue to impact upon and alter their appearance. The reason for choosing these two regions is also because both have differing historical traditions and structural characteristics. The differences and similarities between them highlight the complexity and difficulty of the problems in Tibetan areas. Based on the sourcing and compilation of documentation, the panel visited scholars and specialists, monks, farmers, nomads, artists, entrepreneurs and migrants in the above-described locales, and it is hoped that by means of coming into personal contact with these voices that a more clear and objective outline of ordinary people’s living conditions in Tibetan areas can be gained.
In light of previous experiences and limited research times, structured interviews and questionnaires are not suited to the low levels of education locally, in addition to language and cultural differences on the actual circumstances of the research. Unstructured interviews acquired rich social material to the greatest degree, and were able to adapt flexibly to the interviewees’ situations. Therefore, the panel adopted a combination of participatory observation and unstructured interviews as a social research methodology, combining general observations of the social situation with individual case analyses. The two eventual methodologies were in-depth interviews and small group discussions.
We consider that the problem of nationalities in the context of globalization is the most important matter in the political life of an ethnic country [a multi-ethnic state]. Based on the principles of understanding and respect, the protection and amelioration of relations between all nationalities should receive even greater attention. For a long time, the “Tibet Question” has been one of the hottest and most complex nationality issues. In recent years, contradictions and conflicts in Tibetan areas have taken an ugly turn, which on the one hand has been due to theoretical blind spots created over a long period due to ideological considerations, and on the other hand because there has not been enough attention paid to the new and prominent problems and contradictions that have emerged as a result of change.
Under present conditions, if contradictions and problems in ethnic autonomous areas such as Tibetan regions are to be fundamentally resolved, it is most important that there be thorough investigations into the thinking, economics and living conditions of those regions’ masses. Understanding is a precondition for discussion, unity and development. If the promotion of healthy development in Tibetan areas is truly desired then there must be a change in thinking and an adjustment in thinking behind the current nationality theories and policies; the transformation must be from being a state of nationalities [a multi-ethnic state] concerned about nationalities from a macro perspective to one which is concerned with real problems such as the basic livelihoods of ethnic minorities in the nationality areas, the protection of their rights and interests, and the fostering of civic awareness and long-term social development.
We call for more to take the standpoint of the Tibetan people and non-Han and non-politicized ideologies in order to seek out a path of development which respects Tibetan social characteristics and motivations, and constructs a harmonious society with Tibetan characteristics. In reality, in facing traditional contradictions and the conflicts of modern development, the Han and Tibetan people are facing the same problems, and need the wise appreciation of each other and to learn from and encourage one and other. We hope that by means of our report, the central government and Chinese people outside of Tibetan areas will be able to deepen their understanding of social change in Tibetan areas, and it is hoped that on the basis of mutual trust that a truly healthy and harmonious Tibet can be established.
I: Economic and social changes in Tibetan areas amid a process of rapid modernization
Research remains focused on the true situation of social structures and the 3.14 incident. Even though research was carried out in the field for only a month, we deeply sensed the popular discontent and anger behind the incidents, and the complexity of their social roots. All of the various contradictions that arose during the incident have their historical sources, and there is no way to avoid reasons of religious sentiment and ethnic identity, nor the profound reality of problems of conflicts of interest. Our research can only touch upon the broader questions, but attempting to go into the topic of the process of rapid modernization in Tibet should elicit more attention and deeper discussion of this question. Of course, the rapid process of modernization in Tibetan areas was not the cause or fuse that directly led to the 3.14 incident, and indeed that is not necessarily the nature and core of the Tibet question. However, we hope that it will provide a background for an understanding to changes in Tibetan society and offer an avenue for appreciating the thoughts and actions of the masses in Tibetan areas today.
In just a few short decades, the Tibetan people’s world has changed from tradition to modern against the background of a great and unified China’s rise, and the renaissance of a modern China on a rapid path of marketization. From a relatively closed and traditional religious society with a tribal culture, it has moved toward being a modernized and open society; from the simple life of farming and herding it has moved toward marketization and a commoditized modern economy; and from a life of deeply held religious convictions toward a modern values system in conflict with religious sentiment. In a nationalities state [a multi-ethnic state] and in other modern systems of legal discourse, the Tibetan people face multiple schisms and dislocations including their status as citizens, their status as an ethnic people and their religious status. Any nationality or people facing such hurried and imposed changes would inevitably feel ill at ease and full of contradictions. Objectively speaking, this hurried process of modernization and the path it has taken are not the result of choices made by Tibetans of their own volition; there were very many powerful external forces at play. Changes to economic and social structures and the legacies of history in Tibetan regions have all become interwoven. In the course of researching and interviewing, we saw on more than one occasion the schisms, bitterness and hardships being faced in Tibetan areas today.
Following 3.14, as far as Han people and the government were concerned there was a lot of misunderstanding and even recrimination against Tibetans: the state has given so much support and assistance to Tibetans and Tibetan areas and so why were they “making trouble”. But as far as Tibetans are concerned, the sole standard for modernized lives and the various “developments” shouldn’t just be the standard of prosperity. The assistance and “development” brought by the Han is often accompanied by forced change and conflicts, and the wishes of the Tibetan people themselves are not respected. “A Tibetan’s prosperity is more about freedoms such as religious belief, a respect for people, a respect for life, the kind of prosperity you get from extending charity to others.” (Interviewee, Longbu [Tib: Norbu].) “Reform and opening up brought with it new values for the Tibetan people […] forcing people to accept ‘development as the last word,’ and forcing them to accept ‘consumption as the last word’. In this process […] of transforming a people who had originally based their values on faith – at the same time as transforming Tibet itself by means of modernization – the lives of the people there were also transformed.” (Interviewee, Li Xiaoshan.) From the level of actual benefits, the current rapid process of modernization has not given the ordinary Tibetan people any greater developmental benefits; indeed, they are becoming increasingly marginalized.
An important perspective for interpreting the 3.14 incident is that it was reaction made under stress by a society and people to the various changes that have been taking place in their lives over the past few decades. The notion that appears impossible to understand is the implication that reasonable demands were being vented, and this is precisely what we need to understand and reflect upon.
I, a) The centrally-directed rapid process of modernization
The scholar Andrew Martin Fischer points out in his book “State Growth and Social Exclusion in Tibet: Challenges of Recent Economic Growth,” that since the establishment of the new China, Tibetan areas have undergone an entirely new modernization process. This process has been carried out under the direction of the new China. On the one hand this process of modernization has transformed Tibetan areas from traditional to modern, greatly improving the fundamental appearance of Tibetan areas and raising the standards of living for the Tibetan people. But this process of development – the logic of development and the path and speed of development – has also had adverse impacts upon Tibetan areas. Tibetans in Tibetan areas are being increasingly socially marginalized. Mel Goldstein describes his understanding of the 1989 incident in his book “The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet and the Dalai Lama”. He considers that it was not solely due to historical reasons, and that one must also look at the contradictions and problems created by rapid modernization and planned economic development. Since the 90s onwards, the rapid process of modernization (marketization) in Tibet and the thinking behind the “development” policies has not in truth helped Tibetan regions realize a smooth transition to modernization, and in fact in many fields (economics, society, culture, recognition of ethnic identity) structures have been created which marginalize Tibetans, and which have intensified a series of contradictions. This is also why that before the 80s and 90s even though the levels of social and economic development in Tibetan areas were more lagging than they are today, compared to today the stability was far better. This derives from the inevitability of fierce conflict between traditions in Tibetan areas and among Tibetan people and the process of modernization; and to a certain degree it derives from the Tibetan people’s own inability to guide and control with any true significance the path and speed of the modernization process. First, there follows an overview and brief analysis of the main stages of the modernization process in Tibetan areas promoted by the Center.
Establishing a new modernization process for Tibet has been the main theme of decisions on the fate of Tibet and the Tibetan people since the 20th century. From the 50s onwards the central people’s government has promoted comprehensive reforms in Tibetan areas, breaking away from traditional social, political and economic structures to establish new social foundations. This modernization movement has important political significance aimed at promoting the establishment of a new legitimacy; and at the same time as impacting profoundly upon the political, economic and social structures in Tibetan areas it has also impacted upon such deep-rooted core issues in Tibetan areas as religion and culture. And therefore, since the founding of the new China the central government’s policies on the process of modernization in Tibet can be roughly divided into two phases: the first phase is the reforms in Tibetan areas from the founding of the new China until the Cultural Revolution, and the second phase continues on with reform and opening up and the process of marketization across all of China, and the rapid process of modernization that started in the 80s and 90s.
I, a) (1) The first phase: comprehensive reform of the original Tibetan political structures and economic forms, and the establishment of a systematized foundation.
After the new political regime was established in China in 1949, “political integration” was promoted throughout the entire country in order to clarify power relations between the Center and the localities, and to renew local power structures. In ethnic minority regions the system of ethnic autonomy was established based on the demarcations of “nationalities” and their recognition, modeled on the Soviet system. By means of the “gradual” establishment of different levels of government in nationality areas, and by abolishing the privileges of religious leaders and tribal chiefs, and then moving on to abolishing theocratic systems and tribal systems, an effective means of governance over the ethnic minority regions was established by the central government. Due to some historical and particular differences in the Center-local power relations, in political and religious relations, and in Han-Tibetan relations, U-Tsang showed more complexities and passivity than Amdo when changing from a theocratic system to a system of local regional ethnic autonomy under the central leadership. However, whether in the region of Amdo or U-Tsang, the systematic changes were a process of destroying the old and establishing the new.
On the economic front, starting from the end of the 50s the Center promoted land reforms in the regions of U-Tsang and Amdo, abolishing such basic economic systems and structures as the monastery and tribal economies, abolishing feudal serfdom and bonded indenture, and distributing the fundamental means of production such as the land and livestock among the farmers and nomads. Following reforms to the fundamental means of production, the farmers and nomads acquired production materials and there was a large rise in the standard of living for the entire Tibetan people. At the time, the core industries in Tibetan areas were agriculture and basic handicrafts. Changes to this economic foundation brought great changes to the people’s standards of living in Tibetan areas, and to a certain degree successfully established a new legitimacy and approval in Tibetan areas. (The research panel saw during visits to the homes of many of the farmers and nomads that portraits of Chairman Mao were on display.) Under the system of the planned economy, Tibetan areas started receiving a large amount of human, material and financial support from the Center. On a systematic level, changes to the political system and the economic foundations put all Tibetan areas on a par with Han areas. At the same time, changes were occurring to social structures throughout all Tibetan areas.
I, a) (2) The process of modernization against the background of comprehensive marketization in the 1980s and 1990s.
With the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the Center’s policies on Tibetan areas entered a new phase. This phase was a period of the Center comprehensively resuming and refocusing its work in Tibetan areas in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. In the early 80s, even though there was now systematic “unity,” the overall state of society and the economy in Tibetan areas and the living conditions for the Tibetan people still lagged far behind those in Han areas. Furthermore, when the Center was reflecting on Cultural Revolution-era policies in Tibet, they hoped they would be able to regain their prestige among people in Tibetan areas by means of focusing on economic development and people’s standards of living. At the heart of the new policies was the rapid development of the economy in Tibetan areas with an even greater degree of support from the Center, promoting stability by means of development and promoting development by means of stability. With a further increase in speed in the process of modernization raising the standard of living for the Tibetan people, it was hoped to further change the traditional political, economic, cultural and identity structures in Tibetan areas, and establish and strengthen the legitimacy and recognition of long-term stability in Tibetan areas. This basic spirit is fully reflected in the last two decades of Tibet work. Policies in the new phase have on the one hand been a continuation of those started by the Center in 1959, the progress of which was interrupted by the Cultural Revolution in Tibetan areas, and on the other hand a clear promotion of the comprehensive and deep changes in Tibetan areas brought by modernization and directed by the Center.
In March 1984, the Center convened the Second Tibet Work Forum, and in the summary pointed out: on the basis of the new situation of continuous development, revise concrete policies to promote reforms to the economic body, placing the economy without any shadow of a doubt on top, and making the Tibetan people prosperous as soon as possible. The Center invested in the construction of more than 40 large-scale infrastructural projects, providing enormous support for constructing a modern economy in Tibetan areas, particularly in the Tibet Autonomous Region. In October 1989, the “Summary of the Central Politburo Standing Committee’s Forum on Tibet Work” emphasized: two main issues must be firmly grasped in Tibet work, namely stability in the political situation and economic development. From June 25 to 27, 2001, the Party Center and the State Council convened the Fourth Tibet Work Forum, where it was decided to extend cadre’s Aid Tibet work to 20 years, at the same time as being made to comprehensively cover all counties, cities and prefectures in Tibet.
With regard to agricultural areas in Tibetan regions, the main policy changes took place in the 80s and at the start of the 90s. Tibetan areas promoted the household contract responsibility system. In farming areas, the promoted policy was the “long-term right to use and independently operate land by individual households”; in nomadic areas the promoted policy was “the long-term policy of individual households’ ownership, raising and management of livestock.” This promoted the farmers and nomads’ enthusiasm for production.
In the course of industrialization and urbanization, the state used financial preference to speed up investment in the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects such as road and rail, driving economic development in the entire region, improving communication conditions and the investment environment in Tibetan areas, and driving related industrial development including the tourism industry and various natural resource extraction and service industries. Some industrial projects and industrial development was consciously supported in Tibetan areas, promoting the development of the service industry and tourism industry. At the same time, and starting in the mid-90s, non-Tibetans were allowed [yunxu] into Tibetan areas (mainly in the Tibet Autonomous Region) to start their own businesses.
In the area of social welfare, core regions in Tibetan areas (mainly important cities such as Lhasa) were given major funding to provide free education and various other social benefits and public undertakings. Impoverished agricultural areas were given state support and funding for poverty relief. In the area of grass-roots power structures, attention was paid to non-Tibetans who had a good education going into Tibet in order to further stabilize the local power structures. In the fields of culture and education, a new Tibetan elite was nurtured by means of basic education in Tibetan areas and the establishment of Tibetan schools and Tibetan classes in the interior.
The direction of the new policies in fact contained two levels. One was a focus on the development of a modernized economy and social welfare, and the other, reflecting on errors during the Cultural Revolution, was to concentrate upon and respect “Tibetan” characteristics in Tibetan areas, supporting local Tibetan officials and paying attention to cultural and educational undertakings in Tibetan areas in order to carry on and recover Tibetan cultural and religious life and encourage use of the Tibetan language. This was manifested within two important trends, one was marketization and the other was a revival of religious life.
The new systematic structures in the first phase changed the nature of the relationship between the Center and Tibetan areas – both the Tibetan regions and localities. The system’s uniformity and direct rule meant that the development of Tibet and of all China was directly bound together. In the 80s and beginning of the 90s while all of China was starting to feel its way into a development phase of rapid and comprehensive marketization, development in Tibetan areas was consciously integrated into the rapid modernization process across all of China. Economic development and the marketization and modernization of all social life in Tibetan areas became the core thinking for resolving problems in Tibetan areas.
After the Cultural Revolution, the Center’s Tibet policies went through a process of recovery and relaxation. This was manifested to a certain degree in hopes for policies that would respect the characteristics of “Tibetans and Tibetan areas.” But these relaxations did not overcome the fundamental demands for political legitimacy and stability. With regard to the contradictory attitude toward religion in Tibetan areas, at the end of the 80s a period of instability in Lhasa and calls for dialog with the Dalai Lama which were repeatedly frustrated, inevitably made the Center unwilling to cede any more ground. The core of policies throughout all Tibetan areas increasingly fell into the logic of “development” – a focus on economic development and a process of modernization led by the “Han nationality.”
The engine for this “development” taking place was the direct transfer of large amounts of finance and the construction of basic infrastructure. This preferential treatment demonstrated a strong intent to pour money into Tibet’s ethnic minority regions (with Lhasa as the center). Tibet’s own economy, based on traditional agriculture, had not truly developed or become dynamic. Throughout the entire process, too little attention was paid to truly understanding Tibetan areas, the characteristics of development in Tibetan areas or the broader needs and desires of the Tibetan masses.
I, b) The social consequences arising from a process of rapid modernization under a specially formulated path
Specially formulated policies and development logic and specially formulated development paths and speeds of development have all given rise to specially formulated social consequences, which have created various characteristics in economic forms, social structures and social psychology in Tibetan areas.
I, b) (1) Economic life in Tibetan areas under the “diffusion” model of economic development
From the start of the 50s and 60s Tibetan areas underwent two distinct phases of modernization and change. Several scholars have already noted the internal logic of this modernization process. Professor Ma Rong pointed out in “Tibet’s economic form and its changes” that changes to Tibetan areas’ economic form manifest a “diffusion model” of modernization, where the social structures and economic structures in the central areas “diffuse” out toward the outlying regions. This “diffusion” has been carried out under the guidance and promotion of the central government, making it impossible to escape the demands for consistency toward the concept of “unity” and the narrow Han view of development.
The process of modernization in Tibetan areas is first and foremost built on the foundations of the “great destruction and great reconstruction” of political, economic and social structures in Tibetan areas, with the complete overthrow of former structures and systems replaced by a new “unified” system implanted into Tibet. This process has served the establishment of a new political legitimacy. Secondly, the maintenance and promotion of this process of modernization to a certain degree relies upon the external support and aid of the central government. Thirdly, the choice of path for modernization can never escape the effects of political stability and the logic of ideology, which exposes an internal contradiction between “development” and “stability”.
Research by scholars such as Professor Ma Rong into Tibet’s economic structures, particularly in the Lhasa area, has shown that a process of rapid urbanization is directly concomitant with financial support from the Center. In view of natural and social conditions in Tibet, “implanting” processes of industrialization have all ultimately failed. With the help of high welfare and government purchasing, Lhasa has created a consumer economy. But as far as ordinary agricultural areas are concerned, they invariably face the same difficulties as China’s interior countryside – natural weaknesses in the modernization process of a poor and primitive agriculture industry. In the last 20 years (or more accurately, in the last 30 years), there have been great changes in urbanization, basic infrastructure construction, the degree of activity in the market economy in Tibetan areas and even the degree of closeness in economic ties with Han areas.
In this process of modernization, agriculture – as the traditional industry – is in a vulnerable position, and evidently restricted by poor natural conditions. As representative of a traditionally agricultural area, Gannan prefecture is located in a relatively vulnerable place. During our research in Gannan, Gannan autonomous prefecture was still a nationally designated poverty relief area. The economic structures based on animal husbandry have left Gannan’s Tibetan areas relatively poor, and the standard of living for ordinary farmers and nomads is below the subsistence level. Aside from investing in production, the normal farmer and nomad’s disposable income each year does not amount to much. When researching in Xiahe, local scholars told us that aside from basic agriculture, local industrial systems are practically absent. Former processing industries surrounding agriculture, such as weaving and slaughtering operations, have all closed. And the tourism industry, based around Labrang monastery in Xiahe, only has an open season for around six months between May and October of each year. Restricted by specially formulated industrial structures and natural conditions, the majority of regions in Tibetan areas are always in a vulnerable position within the modernization process, whereas those developed areas with Lhasa at the center receive welfare and important supplementary payments under the preferential support from the Center. Starting in the 90s, the large amounts of preferential financial support to the local government, the large investments in basic infrastructure construction and the high benefits for urban residents all rapidly changed the appearance of Lhasa, and drove a thriving commodity economy. Levels of income among Tibet’s permanent residents reached the same levels as developed regions such as Beijing and Shanghai, far above and beyond normal farmers and nomads in Tibetan areas. As a modern city, Lhasa has all the signs of prosperity. Through our interviews we sensed that Lhasa’s position and appearance as the central metropolis of Tibetan areas started to gain pace in the late 90s, and that after 2000 this formation became rapid. By coming into contact with the research of former scholars and people from the city of Lhasa itself, we discovered that Lhasa’s urban standard of living, the income of its permanent residents and its modern lifestyle is no less than in any city found in the developed Han areas. This is in stark contrast to Tibetan areas outside the central area, such as Amdo (where agriculture is the main industry). When comparing Tibetan areas and Han areas amid the process of rapid modernization and hastened marketization, different regions within Tibetan areas and urban and rural areas within Tibetan areas all demonstrate a relentless trend of growing disparities.
Additionally, under major government policies such as the “Western Development Campaign” and strategies for the rapid development of Tibetan areas, as well as other enormous investment projects, the development of the urban commodity economy and with the thriving tourist industry, there has been a constant stream of people from the interior flooding into Tibetan areas looking for economic opportunity. New economic opportunity is stirring population movement within Tibetan areas, as well as drawing in large-scale populations of incomers into the middle of Tibetan areas. Lhasa is a prominent example of such economic migrants. All along, the government has had a policy of not interfering in this process.
I, b) (2) The increasing marginalization of Tibetans in the modernization process
Starting in 1959, there was an evident development in agricultural production in Tibetan areas, but fundamentally there were no changes to the economic structures centered around agriculture. With the deepening of the modernization process, the weakness in the position of agriculture became ever more evident, and there was a variety of reasons for the stagnation of agriculture’s modernization process. At the same time, leading industries in urban areas failed to be set up from the start, and the state’s continued support and investments in fact led to large-scale losses. The same modernization path in the interior when implemented in Tibetan areas was impractical, irrational, and lacked the social basis for success. The Center’s strong support only made Tibetan areas overly dependant upon the central government, and a “dependency model economy” evolved. Gannan local government’s fiscal income amounts to an extremely small part of the total annual finances (often less than one tenth), with the source of most finances being central funding. This same sort of situation exists in the Tibet Autonomous Region. Even though the state injects a great deal each year, the funds are actually of very little help to the independence of the local economy. Due to the lack of any core superior industries, agriculture is still in an elementary phase, and the motivation for a commoditized economy in the central areas comes from the non-Tibetan masses. The modernization process throughout all Tibetan areas has no vitality of its own, and cannot bring any benefit to ordinary Tibetan people.
The state’s major preferential policies and support have not been of any effective benefit to the main body of Tibetan people. Tibetan people have no way of quickly entering the comprehensive modernization process, and genuine support and protection for each individual is in fact lacking. A marker of the modernization process is people escaping from traditional arrangements to engage in the progress of modernization. This is related to the question of opportunity and is also connected to the question of skills. With regard to Tibetans, there are enormous problems in these two areas in the current process modernization in Tibetan areas.
First is the problem of opportunity. If it is said that the 50s and 60s changed the lives of ordinary Tibetans and brought benefits to the majority of Tibetans, then what is possibly being brought by the current rapid process of modernization is Tibetan areas becoming disparate, and a gap growing between rich and poor. The specially formulated modernization process and the logic of the policies and preferential support have been divisive in consequence and created a sense of relative deprivation which is in need of examination.
In our interviews we discovered among ordinary Tibetans (particularly those Tibetan masses who experienced the 50s and 60s) a high degree of reverence for Mao Zedong. Following the “Liberation of the Serfs” and the thorough smashing of the former economic and social structures in Tibetan areas, changes to the grass-roots government and the economic foundations as well as the conflict between the new ideology and tradition in Tibetan areas actually favored Tibetan individuals. A lot of people recalling the Chairman Mao era said it was good and very fair. Many local intellectuals admitted that they had been raised to their current positions and lives because of Chairman Mao and the government.
Following the 90s a trend emerged of Tibetan areas becoming increasingly disparate and less equal. The state’s support and various assistance programs were all focused on cities, on large-scale infrastructure construction, and on servicing the urban populations. There has been far from adequate guidance and investment in agriculture – the main industry in Tibetan areas; and there has been inadequate attention on the production and enterprise of ordinary farmers and nomads. When interviewing farmers and nomads in Xiahe county in Gannan a lot of farmers and nomads told us that they didn’t have the funds to expand production and could only maintain a certain scale of production. If they wanted to raise more sheep or cattle they were restricted by limitations on pasture and funds. They wanted to open a store but had no capital. There were in fact very few Tibetan stores along the most thriving local streets, where most were run by Hui[3] people. And these operators had been running for more than 10 years and their families were relatively well off. When we asked if there were any local assistance programs such as small loans where they lived, they all said it was extremely difficult to borrow money without capital. It was discovered during the interviews that because a lot of people had no opportunity to develop locally (no livestock, land or no capital to start any other enterprise), they were considering leaving to find work. On the one hand they are restrained by the production characteristics of traditional agriculture and the demands of labor, and on the other hand they are restrained by language and skills, and have very few true opportunities. Furthermore, the opportunities and long-term prospects presented by agriculture are limited. Many young Tibetan migrant workers who leave in search of work head for the cities where they either engage in petty trade or do the most unskilled laboring work on building sites, relying on introductions by people from their hometowns who had previously left and found work.
When interviewing teachers in Tibetan areas, they all said that Tibetan children who received an education were all unwilling to return home and do farm work. Having been educated and seen the outside world via all kinds of media they tended toward the outside world but had no way of getting there, but there was no way back either. A lot of young people congregate is some towns, where they see their own lack of attainments and feel a sense of powerlessness through not being able to participate, as well as experiencing exclusion to various degrees (in terms of language and in terms of opportunity).
Following the large-scale development of urban infrastructures, tourism and service industries in Lhasa, the economy has increasingly flourished, and the state has adopted a completely open strategy on economic development opportunities and employment opportunities in Tibetan areas. Large numbers of Han and Hui have been drawn into small businesses, food services and tourism industries. The people drawing the greatest benefits from the thriving economy are the incomers, the non-Tibetans; and because Tibetans lack capital and skills, this is contributing to them becoming increasingly marginalized. In Lhasa, there are Sichuan restaurants everywhere, run by people from Sichuan. Taxi drivers are mainly non-Tibetan outsiders from Henan, Sichuan, Hunan and Shaanxi. Travel agencies are nearly all owned by outsiders, and the tourist souvenir and handicraft trade in the stores around the Barkhor are mostly owned by Hui from Gannan and Qinghai, and not Tibetans. Many items of Tibetan handicrafts come from Yunnan, they come from Zhejiang, and they come from Nepal. A professor in art history from Tibet university told us it was painful to see that most of the purely local handcrafts in the streets were shipped in, and a lot of the “fake Tibetan jewelry” had been made by traders from Zhejiang in workshops in the suburbs of Lhasa.
And secondly is the question of skills and mentality. In the larger modernized cities such as Lhasa, participating in large-scale infrastructure construction and the urban economy and social development that it drives requires the individual to have the necessary skills, capital and levels of education. And these are what Tibetan people lack. We discovered during our visit to Gannan that seeing as the majority of young Tibetans born in the 80s were only educated to the level of elementary school, the levels of education among young people of our own generation are far lower than in Han areas. Even three to five years ago, the drop-out rate in elementary schools in Tibetan areas was as high as 30%, and the average education was only elementary school-level. (Problems of education and Tibetan youth are detailed below.) In interviews with numerous Tibetan youths, they all said leaving to search for work was not easy. One of the main problems was language, because they can’t communicate fluently in Chinese. In Lhasa, being able to speak Chinese doesn’t mean being able to find a job. A lot of people are unwilling to employ Tibetans because they consider them to be “lazy”. This lack of skills coupled with a lack of “enthusiasm” for commercial concepts makes it difficult to compete for work with non-Tibetan labor from the interior and surrounding areas. To a large extent, non-Tibetans control all major aspects of the local economy. Economically, in terms of skills and in terms of adapting to value systems, Tibetans have no way of competing with non-Tibetans in the modernization process.
In the ever faster process of modernization, Tibetan areas are becoming increasingly disparate. The differences between Lhasa, which is cast in the role of a window onto a “modern Tibetan city,” and normal Tibetan pastoral areas in terms of their social and economic structures and basic appearance are getting bigger by the day. Why should attention be paid to the question of this “split Tibet”? Because we discovered in the interviews that Tibetan people’s feelings and understanding for modernization don’t come directly from Han areas but from Lhasa. Many of the ordinary Tibetans we interviewed in Gannan said they had been to Lhasa looking for work, on business, or visiting friends and family in Lhasa. As the center of the Tibetan people’s religion and ethnic identity, at the same time as being a modernized center, Lhasa has an extremely important influence on how Tibetans see their people and themselves within the process of modernization. And furthermore, via mass media and the experiences of friends and family who have left to find work, differences in development in Tibetan areas and non-Tibetan areas are being experienced daily by Tibetans.
“People in the 60s and 70s, people who went through the Cultural Revolution, that generation of people’s faith in the Communist Party is 100%, including people in the nomadic areas. But people in their thirties and under, especially people who graduated from upper-middle and lower-middle school and have traveled, or people who know a little about Tibetan history, they’re actually quite radical. […] The 80s and 90s seemed to be a turning point, and the Tibetan birth-rate was higher. But they couldn’t get into higher education and an awful lot of them remain idle at home. […] They know a lot about the outside world and have very active minds. They think, why is everyone so developed and why are we so poor, why are we sitting on dirt and tending flocks.” (Interviewee, researcher Dongzhi [Tib: Dhundup].)
I, b) (3) The Tibetan people’s sense of panic and powerlessness amid rapid modernization
A taxi driver in Lhasa described to us a scene he saw when he first arrived in Lhasa in 03: A Tibetan was urinating into the gutter by the side of the road. As an outsider, the taxi driver didn’t know what to make of what he was seeing. And as far as Tibetans are concerned, they feel awkward and embarrassed when faced with such external conflicts. When the land you’re accustomed to living in, and the land of the culture you identify with, when the lifestyle and religiosity is suddenly changed into a “modern city” that you no longer recognize; when you can no longer find work in your own land, and feel the unfairness of lack of opportunity, and when you realize that your core value systems are under attack, then the Tibetan people’s panic and sense of crisis is not difficult to understand.
Taking the Tibetan monastic masses as an example: traditionally, monks were the most cultured and the most influential strata in all Tibetan society, they were the Tibetan intelligentsia, receiving broad reverence and esteem. As far as Tibetans are concerned, for whom religion is central, a religious life and the monks were the most important part of their lives. During the course of our interviews, practically all of the Tibetans maintained their religious lives, sometimes taking circumabulations, going to the monastery on the 15th day of the 1st month, and requesting prayers from the lama when they encountered hardships. They included old people and included young people and children. But what cannot be denied is that the process of modernization has been in constant conflict with the monks and the religious life in Tibetan areas.
The researcher [Tib: Tsatsa] (Deputy Director of the Xiahe Tibetology Institute) said when he received us for an interview, religious life in Tibetan areas and the monks are currently facing an enormous transition and conflict: the problem of how to face secularization. He thinks that young monks have a sense of crisis. This comes from the modernized life-style that more and more is seeping into society in Tibetan areas, and even into the lives of monks. Visiting many of the monks’ homes, we saw that they had DVD players and movies from Hong Kong and Taiwan. In the evening a lot of the monks rushed away to go online and chat using instant messaging. The younger monks knew even more about the outside world, and they’ve started magazines and love all things new and actively study English. We asked a lot of Tibetans what they thought of this, and the majority of Tibetans took a very lenient attitude, thinking that such things in themselves were not actually in conflict with pure faith. But there were also several scholars who said that this manifested the difference between the young monks and the older monks. When interviewing Renqing [Tib: Rinchen] lama at Hongjiao [‘red hat’, Tib: Nyingma] monastery, he said that the teachers there wouldn’t let them go to such places, that they’d beat them if they did, but they were actually powerless to do anything. Concern for the affairs of the world is a very important part of faith, but how to strike a balance between concern for the real world and the purity of faith is a difficulty faced by all monks, and indeed all Tibetans. With the steady infiltration of modernized values, it has become very important to the future of Tibetan areas how monks see themselves and their position in the changing Tibetan society. Having been through the Cultural Revolution, there’s now a gap in the ages of the inheritors of religious culture in Tibetan areas, with a lack of middle-aged monks leaving a weakness in influence and transmission from older monks to younger monks.
In the process of modernization, economic structures and political structures in Han areas and Tibetan areas have been made uniform. As “backward” areas, Tibetan areas had to catch up with “progressive” areas and keep up with the “modern”. But the Tibetan people have not had adequate opportunity or skills to respond. Large numbers of incomers and rapid social changes have brought conflicts to culture, lifestyles and even to values. In the past, contacts between Tibetan areas and the interior were often very limited, but the specially formulated development process opened up Tibetan areas in an instant, opening up for attack every single key area of nationalities’ life from the economy, power structure, religious life, lifestyle and population structures. When the Tibetan people have a sense of unfairness and loss in the economic and social changes resulting from the modernization process led by Han and by the state, this can strengthen yet further their ethnic identity and how they identify with their traditions, giving rise to conflict between the traditional and the modern, and conflict between the ethnicities.
In sum, to understand the 3.14 incident, the present in Tibetan areas must be understood, and close attention must be paid to the core question of the process of modernization in Tibetan areas. If it’s said that the modernization process of the Tibetan people is an irreversible historical trend, then how the Tibetan people and Tibetan areas progress toward modernization is worthy of in-depth consideration. The prominent contradictions and conflicts in Tibetan areas are not solely the remnants of history, they are also problems arising from the current situation in the path of modernization and the strength and manner of its implementation. From the 1989 incident until the 3.14 incident this year, an important dimension to social structures has been the adverse effects of the modernization process – the core of which is the marginalization of the Tibetan people and the discontent this has brought.
II: Hardships faced by young Tibetans born in the 70s and 80s
The main participants in the 3.14 incident were young 20- to 30-year olds, and the attitudes and behavior of these young people cannot escape our close attention and consideration. Young Tibetans born during reform and opening up had a far higher material standard of living that their parents’ generation, but they still harbor some extreme grievances which exploded out in violence. As described above, this new generation of young Tibetans has been living in a rapidly changing society, and their lifestyles and thinking is different from their parents’ generation. We discovered during our survey that young Tibetans face the following kinds of difficulties:
a) Serious problems in basic education
2007 statistics show: the average term of education in Tibetan areas is less than four years, and the high-school enrolment rate is extremely low. The employment problem is extremely protracted, with the poor levels of education among nationalities meaning they have no competitive advantage. Even those Tibetan university students in education are still mostly studying the arts and humanities, and less are studying engineering or the sciences; more are studying traditional topics, and fewer are studying new topics; more study theoretic aspects and fewer study practical areas which does not harmonize with the needs of education and society, and even creates a disconnect.
First, basic levels of education are extremely low, and the majority of adults at the grass-roots are illiterate.
Traveling in towns and the countryside in Tibetan areas, there’s a dizzying array of large-character banners propagandizing “universalize nine-year compulsory education,” and encouraging farmers and nomads to send their children to school. But it was learned from the local masses that these policies have only been implemented in the last three years, and even only in the past year. According to the “Gannan Prefecture ‘Two Basicallys’ Resolute Implementation Plan,”[4] the timetable for universalizing nine-year education is “Hezuo [Tib: Tsoe] city and Lintan [Tib: Lintan] county in 2005, Diebu [Tewo] county and Zhuoqu [Tib: Drugchu] county in 2006, Xiahe [Tib: Sangchu] county in 2007, Zhuoni [Tib: Chone] county in 2008, and Maqu [Tib: Machu] county and Luqu [Tib: Luchu] county in 2010 will universalize nine-year compulsory education, striving for basic nine-year compulsory education throughout the entire prefecture by 2010 and basically eradicating adult illiteracy.”
In the Sangke and Qingshui areas of Xiahe in Gannan we visited the homes of a dozen or so farming and nomadic families, where children under the age of 10 almost without exception were in school. Due to the large amount of subsidies issued by the government, a farming or nomadic family could send children to school without any further costs, and could even receive bonuses and awards. Parents are therefore naturally willing to send their children to school, and planned for children to stay in school until lower middle school.
However, the majority of children of farmers and nomads who are over the age of 15, and particularly those over the age of 20, hadn’t even graduated from elementary school and are even illiterate. While it is gratifying to see work on universalizing nine years of compulsory education in full swing, it is feared that the effects will only be seen 10 years from now, and the “problem as a remnant of history” of adult illiteracy is set to remain with us. The rate of adult illiteracy is enormous, which has its reasons in conditions of external deficiencies as well as its internal reasons.
There is a traditional view that the study of books has no use. Production structures among families in Tibetan areas are still based on raising livestock, and when children go to school they no longer have the time to help the family tend animals. When they finish their studies, it’s difficult for them to remain in the towns without the necessary contacts, but when they return to their old homes they’ve lost their animal husbandry and farming skills. There’s a sentiment gaining ground that “reading books is useless” where study is of no help in making ends meet for the family. At present, there have been no qualitative changes in family production structures in semi-nomadic and semi-arable Tibetan areas, and therefore there hasn’t been much change in families’ attitudes toward education. Sending children under the age of 10 to school is connected to a large extent to government policies – those who don’t send their children can be fined and those that do can be rewarded; but heads of families are still unclear about the benefits of education. During the interviews, heads of families often expressed that if children stayed in school until lower middle school as the policy demanded, then that was all that was needed – the family needs work hands to tend the animals. And youths around the age of 20 are not keen on receiving a basic education. Local governments in Tibetan areas have in recent years carried out illiteracy eradication work, but the policies are very to difficult to implement at the grass-roots level with all of the male youths having gone elsewhere to earn money, leaving no one willing to take part in the free training. When conducting interviews in the Qingshui region, the local villagers said that whenever the higher administrations came to inspect illiteracy eradication work, the township called the youths who had left to work back for 10 days of mandatory training. Ten days later they’re issued with an elementary school graduation certificate, and as such they’re counted during the inspection as having “escaped illiteracy”. In the nomadic areas, we only came across one student who had stayed in school through senior middle school in Xiahe, who was a girl by the name of Cairang Zhouma [Tib: Tsering Dolma]. Her cousin is the head of the village and her family is relatively well off. She has relatives in the town and was therefore able to study all the way through until senior middle school, but when she was asked whether any of the girls in her village were also able to go to school, she said “They all married young.”
In addition, the local quality of teachers and standards of education are low. The conditions in many grass-roots schools in Tibetan areas are extremely poor with backward education foundations, extremely difficult work, and it is very hard to attract basic-level teaching talent. In particular, there is a lack of high-level and highly educated teaching talent, and in remote areas there is even only “one school, one teacher.” The panel interviewed two graduate students, Yu and Wei, who had gone to Lhasa from the interior to help teach at the Tibet Teacher Training College in Lhasa, and they said: “We saw the lack of teachers in the mountainous areas, and even though we wanted to go there to help out, we just couldn’t – even our most basic living requirements couldn’t be met in places like that, never mind about teaching.”
In Xiahe county, we interviewed an elementary school teacher who was teaching in the countryside, and because there were so many students and so few teachers, each teacher worked more than 13 hours a day. After the “two basicallys” policy was implemented, remuneration for the students was good, but remuneration for the teachers did not improve and even got worse. According to this teacher, his salary had only risen by 500 yuan since 1998. Eighty percent of the teachers at the school wanted to change profession, and they were only continuing to teach because there was no other trade for them to turn to. Under such conditions, the teachers’ enthusiasm for their work can only be guessed at. Cairang Dongzhu [Tib: Tsering Dhondup], who researches the state of education in Tibetan areas at the Xiahe Tibetan Studies Institute, says “When we go and conduct research in the field, some teachers say that their only wish would be for a cell-phone mast to be built close to the school in their village so in the evenings they could chat with family – then they’d be happy.”
All students taught by Yu and Wei, the two research students working as teaching support Tibet Teachers Training College in Lhasa, are studying to be teachers, and during vacations they also give correspondence courses to students who are middle and elementary school teachers from villages and towns all over Tibet. According to what they told us, there is cause for serious concern based solely on the level of education among these teachers themselves, with even their Chinese not up to grade including some very elementary errors, and even being unable to find correct answers during open-book physics exams. And teachers such as these are made “Elementary Teaching Specialists” after 14 days of specialist training.
II, b) Vocational education and the lack of social opportunity
Tibetan youths broadly lack the technical skills and social paths to lead them into a modern industrial society, and it is very difficult for them to go back to a traditional agricultural society. Along with basic education, Tibetan youths’ vocational skills are also cause for extreme concern. By means of practical observation, the panel thinks that when considered from an even more practical point of view, as far as people of 20 years old and above are concerned, realizing universal basic education would be extremely difficult to attain, and that furthermore the reality of the problem cannot be immediately addressed. Resolving the problem of employment for urban Tibetan youth is far more urgent. Having the ability to practically apply labor skills will enable quicker and more effective integration into modern society.
The reality of the situation is that employment skills training in Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture got off to a late start and has developed slowly. At present there are five vocational middle schools, but the schools and their buildings are all old and dilapidated, and there is no teacher training apparatus, severely impeding the coordinated development of basic education and vocational skills training throughout the entire prefecture. Professor Awang Jinmei [Tib: Ngawang Jigme] from Tibet University gave a very concrete and representative example. “When Lhasa railway station was being built the land used to be agricultural, but it was razed to build the station. The state gave the farmers a great deal of compensation, but the education levels of the farmers was very low, and they didn’t really know about money. In a flash, they had several tens of thousands of yuan. And so they spent it wildly, with the children buying cars and motorbikes and hanging out, and within one or two years all the money was gone. They’d previously relied on growing crops to make money, but now they had no land, they had no education, no work, and under such social pressure is it any wonder they became so easily led as soon as they were provoked? And so policies such as these actually bring out the worst in them.” This example shows the difficulties faced by many Tibetan youths, where originally they lived in a traditional agricultural society, and with the progression of reform and opening up they were rolled into an industrial society. But they had grown up and lived in agricultural or nomadic families, and their skills were in planting fields and tending herds. As soon as they got to the cities, they couldn’t do factory or building site work, and from language to work skills it is very hard for them to compete with job-hunters from the interior. Nomads on the Ganga grasslands interviewed by the panel had many youths from their village who had left to find work but their Chinese was not good and so they could only work on building sites or do menial heavy lifting work.
Of all the factors restricting Tibetan youth from going to cities to live and work aside from a lack of technical skills, a “social path” is also a well-known but little acknowledged obstacle. A so-called social path is also commonly known as a “connection” [menlu].[5] As presented by the panel in descriptions in the sections above, the majority of heads of households had a very passive attitude toward their children going to upper middle school or taking the university entrance exam. “Even though they’ve finished high school, the university entrance exams are very difficult, and even if they get in the family has no connections [menlu] and so they can’t stay in the town and work for the government.”
Duoji Caidan [Tib: Dorjee Tseten], the boss of the Zhuoma [Tib: Dolma] restaurant in Xiahe county, says: “Families who want to send children to university have to sell livestock, and then what do they do later? If you go to school but don’t get into university then generally all you can do is go to Hezuo [Tib: Tsoe] Teacher Training college, and if you want to stay in the town after graduating from teacher training the only option is to be a teacher. To be a teacher in a city, you also need connections [menlu], jobs are not guaranteed for students who graduate from the teacher training college, except to officials or people from well-to-do families.” Duoji Caidan’s father is a businessman, who over the years accumulated some wealth. And although he himself had never been to school he was still regarded as successful. When mention is made of the men he grew up with since being a child together, Duoji Caidan uses a single word to describe their lives: “Muddled.” They’ve never studied, have no connections [menlu], have no family wealth, and they are not willing to go home and tend the herds, but they can’t just loiter in the cities and so become a surging undercurrent of “unstable factors”.
II, c) The sense of relative deprivation while living in a more open process of modernization as a catalyst for strengthening nationalist sentiment
If it can be said that the standard of living among Tibetans in their 50s and 60s represents the enormous transformations that have taken place since liberation and reform and opening up, then in can also be said that the lives of younger Tibetans in their 30s and under are a manifestation of the increasingly wide gap between Tibetan areas and the interior, and the growing gulf between the power-holders in Tibetan areas and the ordinary people. During the course of our interviews we could sense an evident difference in the way the elderly, young people and youth referred to themselves. In the language of the older people, we’d often hear such vocabulary as “cadre” or “commune member”. However, this was not so among the youth, where phrases such as “we Tibetans” or “our nationality” often appeared in their speech.
Along with a sense of relative deprivation comes various kinds of senses of difference, including the differences between center and margins, Han and Tibetan, and officials and ordinary people. Dongzhi [Tib: Dhundup], a researcher at the Gansu Tibetan Studies Institute, said: “The greatest outcome of reform and opening up has been the elimination of traditional outlooks among young people, the transformation of outlooks. (After the 3.14 incident), people in their 50s and above were extremely upset, wondering why they caused so much trouble. The older ordinary people and the older monks all thought this was a bad thing.”
The research panel was amazed to discover that Tibetan ethnic awareness was actually inspired by the 3.14 incident. This was especially because after the 3.14 incident and before the conclusion of the Olympics, a series of “preventative measures” adopted by the government such as Tibetans receiving “special treatment” at airports and public spaces in the interior made the Tibetan people, and in particular the youth, sense their “differences” even more obviously. A Tibetan girl called Baima Jizong [Tib: Pema Jetsun] described what she endured in Beijing during the Olympics: “I went to Beijing representing a certain company in Lhasa to participate in training by the Central Communist Youth League, and because I was Tibetan not a single hotel let me stay. I got angry and argued, saying what they were doing was racist!”
II, d) The loss and forgetting of one’s nationality’s traditional culture and history
Amid the impact of modern concepts from the outside, youths in Tibetan areas expressed to different degrees the forgetting and loss of their own nationality’s traditions, history and culture. This was manifested most in the form of barriers to the passing on of the Tibetan language and script, and the lack of any systematic knowledge about their nationality’s history and culture.
First of all, as an important catalyst for Tibetan culture, certain impediments have appeared to the transmission of the Tibetan language and script. Which teachers are most lacking in Tibetan areas today? When we started we would have guessed it was English or Chinese teachers, or mathematics. But in the course of our survey students and teachers broadly reflected that the largest shortfall of teachers in Tibetan areas today is in Tibetan language teachers. And furthermore, in interviews with a dozen or so elementary school students, when asked what was the most difficult subject to study, they all responded “Tibetan” and the easiest to study was “Chinese.” Even though they could speak Tibetan, there were however extremely few teachers who could undertake the teaching of Tibetan, and give in-depth explanations of the Tibetan language to the students.
The importance of language for transmitting a nationality’s culture goes without saying, and there are many in the Tibetan language teaching elite expressing concern about the current status quo. As the ethnic studies scholar Professor Ma Rong has written, “The formal texts of a people’s history, and the recalling for later generations of the people’s own epic poems of heroism, a people’s astronomy, mathematics, medicine, architecture, literature and agronomy – this collection of knowledge and culture is all recorded in that people’s written language. It is therefore a catalyst for that people’s traditions and culture, entrusting and manifesting the deep emotions that a people’s elite groupings and broad masses has for their history and culture. A people’s language becomes an emblem of that people’s culture. And therefore the future prospects of a people’s language and script often receives a great deal of attention from that people’s leadership figures, elite groupings and broad masses, who consider that the language and the future development prospects for that people are very closely connected.”
Secondly, there is a lack of systematic knowledge about their own nationalities’ history. The occurrence of the 3.14 incident and the lack of historical knowledge among some Tibetan youths is in fact very closely related. They do not understand the connection between their own nationality and the motherland throughout the historical course of development, and do not understand their nationality’s cultural traditions and historical demands. In the course of our survey, we learned that current teaching materials in middle and elementary schools in Tibetan areas that there is an extreme lack of historical content about the Tibetan nationality themselves, not to mention any kind of systematic study of Tibetan history. Professor Awang Jinmei [Tib: Ngawang Jigme] from Tibet University said that some university students in the Fine Arts Department could make immaculate copies of Thanka paintings, but if they are asked what they have painted, they are unable to answer, they don’t know who these people in the paintings are, nor what is the historical allegory. Wei, the teaching support at the Tibet Higher Teaching Training College, said that when he told students in class about the Heavenly Branches and Earthly Stems in Han culture, the students were very interested. When he’d finished, he asked if any of the students could tell him about the Tibetan calendar, and there wasn’t a single student in the entire class who could explain the Tibetan calendar to him. The Tibetan translations of teaching materials from the interior which are used by students in Tibetan areas do not have separate syllabuses on Tibetan history and culture, which has led to a desensitizing to the transmission of culture and an increase in the numbers of Tibetans who have no interest in their nationalities’ history, and it is extremely difficult to find any youths who have a thorough understanding of their history and culture.
III: The main problems with structures of governance in Tibetan areas
The 3.14 incident in Tibetan areas has a complex social background, and aside from going into the confusion and conflict brought about by the “development” logic discussed above against the background of modernization, the research group also paid close attention to the historical and current political ecology in Tibetan areas. Under the guidance of the powerful logic of “development,” politics took on a role of unrivalled importance in social processes.
Since the Ming and Qing, and particularly in the modern era, two problems have faced the social situation in the two Tibetan regions of Amdo and U-Tsang: one has been a problem with structures of the ruling state’s power systems, or to put it another way, the process of incorporating Tibetan regional culture as a regional society into the politicized structures of the ruling state’s systems; and two, the problem of adapting a society’s internal structures, in particular, the problems of adjustments to society and politics within a process of adaptation to face a process of modernization. Objectively speaking, as of now these problems have still not been properly resolved. Naturally, the evident contradictions in Tibetan areas are mainly products of the process of modernization, but among them there are also historical ailments which have been transformed and changed under modern conditions, and which are the accumulation of certain unsuccessful factors in the search since the Qing dynasty to find a model of governance for Tibetan areas.
III, a) The evolution of structures of governance in Tibetan areas
Han departmentalism developed to its most extreme form during the Qing Dynasty, where a central and already established ruling state was entered into by ethnic minorities. In order to ensure their own legitimacy and to construct authority for the ruling state, Emperor Shunzhi and Emperor Kangxi vigorously promoted “Manchurian-Han Unity,” and Emperor Yongzheng clamped down hard on anti-Qing nationalist sentiment exclusionary of the Manchu, creating an ideological campaign which rejected the debate of Chinese and non-Chinese. They attempted to use the ideology of Confucianism to instill a patriarchal practice of rites in all levels of society in order to demonstrate that the Manchurian Qing had orthodox Confucianist and political legitimacy, constructing a ruling state authority that comported to tradition. However, these efforts unavoidably created inner structural contradictions. First, even though the Qing Dynasty rulers all along spoke of “Manchurian-Han Unity” and “one family under heaven,” in reality there were still differences of “Manchurian-Han” and “Chinese-foreign,” and the distinctions of “inner-outer.” Secondly, although part of the polity, it seemed that all non-Han in the country were no longer the “barbarians”, but as far as the Han in the interior were concerned, the non-Sinicized peoples, or the peoples whose Sinicization progress was still relatively low were the “barbarians” outside the Confucian family circle. This could not but have an impact on the nationality policies of the Qing Dynasty and its Confucian culture, which on the one hand enabled it to look at its shortcomings and adopt a political strategy of “soft and moderate”; on the other hand, the strong sense of identity toward the state political authority created by the cultural tensions possibly made the Qing Dynasty treat ethnic peoples with discrimination and bias, adopting differing strategies and governance policies from repression to appeasement.
Even though the Qing Dynasty’s political strategies of rule over the various nationalities changed from “outside” to “inside,” the fundamental aim pursued however was one of “to not cause trouble is prime,” one which never actually changed. Under the guidance of the patriarchal concept of “races not like I,” local officials did not actually rule their regions actively. Serious but localized incidents were treated as “locals against locals” with no bearing on them; but if the contradictions grew greater, it was called “the locals, unusually boorish, are ignorant of the law,” and it was requested “apply extreme force and show no mercy”. Such cultural tensions created a weakening of identification with the authority of the ruling state, which not only reduced the effectiveness of the state’s power and operations, it also made the state unwilling to become too involved in social life in Tibetan areas. With the arrival of the modern era and in order to cope with the growing crises in the border areas, the Qing Dynasty did everything they could to exert a “unified” policy for the western regions and the interior to try to eradicate the possible threat brought by the disaffection of the ethnic minorities in the border areas. However, when the state authorities were faced with the regional social authorities in Tibetan areas, they were already in a weakened condition.
The political power of the Qing Dynasty collapsed in the 1911 revolution under an anti-Qing wave. Republican China replaced the old feudal empire, and promoted a course for China’s political modernization. However, the disintegration of the old authority did not produce a correspondingly new authority. The absence of the political authorities’ role during the period of Republican China meant that the government had no choice but to rely on old structures to maintain local society. Furthermore, even though the Republican government in Nanjing declared the “Republic of Five Races,” they still unconsciously regarded the ethnic areas in the western regions as a cultural border, and equated ethnic peoples as representative of remote and backward barbarians. The so-called standard of the central plains emphasizes a degree of similarity in cultural traditions. With this dual central and marginal cultural and political perspective, Tibetan areas are regarded as a cultural desert. Under this influence, the Republican government’s policies – no matter whether it was the direct rule over Gannan or the indirect management over U-Tsang and Qinghai with a heavy reliance on other forces – there was no ability or will to effect any change to the society and lives of all nationalities living in Tibetan areas.
It must be pointed out that the degree of contradictions in the Amdo Tibetan regions was different than in the U-Tsang region. Under the traditional political setup, an extremely remote place where state political order was negligible. In the empire of the central plains based on an agricultural civilization, the system of “counties and prefectures” had a great impact on the Tibetan area of Amdo, its system of rule maintaining a semblance of unity with the central plains; but because U-Tsang had never been a part of a system, even just this semblance did not exist in the slightest. During the Republican period, the title of “Security Commander So-and-So” could earn the recognition of the upper classes in Amdo, but it was completely unfamiliar to the elites of the U-Tsang region. The U-Tsang region of Tibet was more “pure” than the Amdo region in terms of a singular culture and the composition of the people, where in particular there was a lack of Amdo’s widespread bilingual elites, and the local elites instead held traditional Tibetan culture in very high esteem. In addition, at the start of the late Qing period, the elites in U-Tsang learned a great deal about foreign culture via India, and there were many in the aristocracy who were fluent in English. And therefore, efforts to insert U-Tsang into the systems of a modern state inevitably brought even more drastic changes which were particularly felt by the elite strata. The knowledge that the local power elites in Amdo had of the modernization process was closely related to the modernization process in the interior, and they themselves were very active in taking initiatives. But as far as the majority of the elites in U-Tsang were concerned, such modernization was more imposed and more sudden, and the modernization described by many of the U-Tsang elites was not that modernization was a natural component of the modernization of all China, but the result of compulsion from the political authorities on the central plains. Under the influence of the modern concept of “ethnic self-determination,” part of the overseas U-Tsang elite regarded the “Center-U-Tsang” relationship merely as a relationship of “religious conferral,” which produced the illusion of a “state”.
In 1949, the Republic of China was replaced by the People’s Republic of China, completing the second regime-change in the process of China’s political modernization. After the new government was established, it similarly promoted “unified” polices; however, the “unified” policies this time had new content. The so-called new content no longer borrowed from or upheld the old grass-roots community organizations or the old social structures, but instead smashed the old and established the new; and no longer would the benefits and privileges for extremely small numbers of the aristocracy and religious leaders be upheld in ethnic nationality areas. These new “unified” policies gained the support of the broad masses in Tibetan areas, and a good mass foundation was put down for the new and mandatory changes to be made to the social system. Under the new system of unified governance and economy, there were prominent changes made to society in Tibetan areas, and the ruling positions, traditional privileges and benefits of the old aristocracy and upper echelons of the religious personages came under attack. Among these, a small number of people took the risk of starting a rebellion in 1958 [sic] to oppose the historic and great changes in nationality areas. But once the rebellion had been put down, and particularly during the Cultural Revolution and under the impact of the ultra-leftist line, the state authorities and local government ignored characteristics of social history, cultural traditions and folk production, lifestyles and religious beliefs in the nationality regions, and ignoring also development levels of productive forces in these areas and differences with the interior in the process of modernization, attempted to use even more forceful administrative means and organizational methods to carry out in a short time a mandatory and thorough transformation of society in the nationality areas. Even though these attempts to “help shoots grow by tugging them” and meddling in the affairs of others were able to produce superficial results in the short term, it was very difficult to fundamentally resolve problems, but very easy to lead to a conflict in people’s hearts and a strong reaction due to various cultural factors.
It can therefore be seen from this that the process of political modernization in Tibetan areas without doubt needs the effective implementation of nationality policies by the state, along with handling connections with local power structures in Tibetan areas. Two strategies are seen to be at play when the state is faced with local societies: causal system change, and mandatory systems. First, the state’s actions and abilities in Tibetan areas are decided upon by two aspects: (1) The political authority of the state and the strength of the state’s mobilization of resources fundamentally decides the scale of a state’s ability to change a regional society, and whether it adopts causal change or mandatory change; (2) the degree to which the normative values professed by the state coincide with the regional social values dictates the direction of the state’s treatment of those regional social values, as well as the degree of the regional society’s acceptance of the state’s political authority. Second, and as far as Tibetan regional society is concerned where the regional characteristics of culture and society have always been so deeply ingrained, depending on different powers or on local power structure with long and twisting tendrils that have grown over a long time, the greatest contradictions appear in the struggles and cooperation between the state and the local power structures, the using, the hoodwinking, the controlling and toying. This not only includes the game between state and local political and economic groupings, it also includes the game played against time between the roles of modern and religion, and cultural and ideological forces. What direction this will eventually take is strongly related to power and strategy, but in the final analysis the standard for government policies in Tibetan areas lies in the question of identity.
Summarizing the reasons for the development of unhealthy power structures in Tibetan areas since the Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China, subjectively appears in the acceptance of status in Tibetan areas. (1) The state has not regarded the people living in these regions as being equally qualified as subjects or citizens, and regards them as outsiders; (2) Representatives of the state’s political power in these areas are seen as playing the role of a cultural superior who cannot face up to cultural diversity, cannot conceive of how to adapt to the culture, cannot create new understandings to complete the transformation of the masses’ identity status in Tibetan areas, and establish a concept of nation. Therefore, under conditions of lacking a basic concept of nationhood, there is no way of avoiding the contradictions between status and roles. History’s greatest lesson is that the main body of the masses in Tibetan areas lack a fundamental ideological identification with the state. This has led to a strange situation where state authorities within areas of authority in Tibetan areas have to rely on religious authority or local key cadres in order to function effectively.
The People’s Republic of China during the 60s and 70s resolved the problems of status and identity relatively well among the masses in Tibetan areas, completing the first large-scale mandatory system change in the process of modernization, as well as firmly establishing an overwhelming advantage for the state’s political authority within the local power structures. However, due to ideological rigidity and the reality of factors within the establishment, Tibetans went from “putting down the rebellion” to the new establishment of new power elites which gradually replaced the traditional elites in Tibetan areas. This became a political force heavily relied upon by the central government, but this force gradually created new problems during the changes. The contradictions between uni-polar political thought and the multi-polar regions once again appeared, and under the dual impacts of globalization and the renaissance of religious forces upon identity along with the “filter” of the new local power elites, the acknowledgment of “errors” between the state powers and the ordinary people in Tibetan areas is now a relatively concentrated contradiction in society in Tibetan areas.
III, b) Problems in power structures within regional autonomy in Tibetan areas
The Qing political maneuvers of “locals ruling locals,” and the modern political concept of “ethnic autonomy” along with the early successes of the Soviet models have all had a profound impact upon our nation’s planning for the basic system of “ethnic regional autonomy.” Ethnic regional autonomy is a theoretical guide and planning system, the value of which was affirmed during its implementation in our country’s Tibetan areas from the 60s to the 90s. However, its implementation in recent years has presented some new problems and challenges to be faced.
The central government considers that: “Ethnic minority cadres understand their own people’s history, they understand their own people’s language and customs, they have a strong desire for the revitalization of their own people, and they are able to fully reflect the wishes and requirements of their own people. They have an irreplaceable role to play when resolving nationality problems, when handling the relationship between an ethnic area’s interests and the interests of the entire nation, and when upholding the legal interests of nationality regions and the ethnic minority masses.” In November 1950, there was the central government State Council’s promulgation of the “Pilot program for the training of ethnic minority cadres,” there then came the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Congress and its demand to speed up the training of political and specialist ethnic minority cadres, and in December 1993 there was the “Suggestions for further improving work to select and train ethnic minority cadres” issued jointly by the Organization Department and the United Front Work Department, all the way through until 2005 when Hu Jintao at the Central Nationalities Work Conference emphasized the need to “recognize the importance of training ethnic minority cadres, to have not only warm concern and strict demands of ethnic minority cadres, but also to have full confidence and offer a free rein, and select even more outstanding ethnic minority cadres – particularly young cadres – to be installed into leadership positions at all levels.” Over more than 50 years of efforts by the central government and the localities, a “relatively ample in number, rationally structured, and basically professionally equipped” corps of ethnic minority cadres was formed in each ethnic minority locality. As of 2007, the number of ethnic minority cadres had grown from around 10,000 during the early period of the nation’s founding to 3 million people now. In addition, the uniqueness of Tibet also lies in the tens of thousands of cadres from the interior who have answered the Party’s call in the more than 50 years since the peaceful liberation to “Aid Tibet” and participate in construction. Since 1994 and the start of the Aid Tibet project, four groups of almost 4000 cadres have been dispatched to work in Tibet by the Center, by state organs, provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions and state-owned enterprises.
Autonomy is based on areas where ethnic minorities live in concentrated communities, and is necessarily accompanied by a localized system of officials, and over the course of several decades of organization and construction a large number of administrative officials and power-holders has been created. Subsequent problems have started to become more difficult:
III, b) (1) Unlike in non-autonomous areas, it is difficult for local officials in Tibetan areas to cross over the large distances for exchanges and to assume or leave a posting. Historical experience has told us that the mobility of officials has been poor, which can create locally fixed power networks, which inevitably lead to a high incidence of corruption and dereliction of duty. “Deep-rooted” local power elite networks have formed in many Tibetan areas, where it has become routine for the local authorities to be rent-seekers and for the administration to be inefficient. The complexity of Tibetan areas also shows in the renaissance of traditional religious forces over the past 10 years and more, where officials, the new economic aristocracy and religious forces have bound together to create a new power framework and a “new aristocracy”. “In reality, the background to the planning system in Tibetan areas has become a question of the right to distribute natural resources. There are vested interests at every level, and significant obstacles to breakthroughs in the system.” (Interviewee, Dr Wei Ming, a scholar at the Northwest Nationalities Institute.)
Unlike the traditional aristocracy, the characteristics of this new aristocratic class are: (1) the senior positions they occupy are legitimized, they have more complex social resources, and they are even more powerful; (2) If the traditional aristocracy can be said to have derived their legitimacy more from the “internal source” of clan and religious associations in Tibetan areas, then this new aristocracy derives it legitimacy more from the “external source” of central government affirmation. The differences in these forms of legitimacy become apparent during times of social contradiction when the “new aristocracy” are unable to become the “authority” that ordinary Tibetan people themselves can approve of. When differences appear between the state and ordinary people, it is difficult for the “new aristocracy” to play the role of a “buffer”. (3) Although the degree of power held by the “new aristocracy” may not be as great as the old aristocracy, their loyalty to the central government is much stronger. The first pursuit of the old aristocracy between the dual imperatives of “their land” and the “state” was “protect the land and calm the people,” and to seek “political balance”. Conversely, due to the gradual fragmentation of local, tribal and religious restraints upon the new aristocracy, more often than not, ordinary people in Tibetan areas will not regard them as “one of their own,” and therefore the consequences of some of the new aristocracy’s misconduct are then “logically” borne by the central government.
III, b) (2) Due to the special nature of the political environment in Tibetan areas, “stability” in the state’s Tibet policies has special significance. The Center considers that “If there is not a stable social environment, then all talk of development is empty.” Even though “development and stability” are the trains of thought for government work in ethnic areas, in the actual exercise of power “stability” takes on an overwhelming importance. Relying upon Tibetan officials and cadres for stability in Tibetan areas has become logical and they have been greatly empowered by the Center. But there is a lack of any effective supervision over the local officials, and there are many people who have learned how to use stability to protect themselves. Under “stability and development,” a blindspot in power supervision in nationality areas has been created. “Foreign forces” and “Tibet independence” are used by many local officials as fig leaves to conceal their mistakes in governance and to repress social discontent. Some officials will often turn social problems under their jurisdiction into “matters of the utmost concern,” elevating everything to the level of splittist forces in order to conceal their errors. In its follow-up interviews, the research panel discovered that in a certain county the government defined its handling of a compensation dispute between nomads and a local hydropower station as an incident of “anti-splittism and upholding stability.” As one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party in Tibet, Mr Pingcuo Wangjie [Tib: Phuntso Wangyal] has said “There’s a large group of people in the government who eat the food of anti-splittism. They take every opportunity to play the splittism card, and while on the face of it they shout about anti-splittism, in reality their personal interests are involved. They are unable to admit their mistakes and instead put all of their effort into shifting accountability onto ‘hostile foreign forces’. And thus they are able to consolidate their positions and their interests, allowing them to accumulate even more power and resources.”
The pursuit of stability and fear of chaos has taken root in the inertia of some officials, which in reality is a psychological deflection of their low administrative abilities and backward understanding of governance. Under the concept of “one less thing to do is better than one more,” religious gatherings of relatively large numbers of people have been postponed, restricted or even canceled; with an attitude of “policies from above, countermeasures from below,” local authorities contravene the Constitution and “Regional ethnic autonomy law,” but at present the corresponding supervisory and accountability systems are still incomplete. Basang Luobu [Tib: Pasang Norbu], the Private Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Regional People’s Congress says that implementing and breaking the law, legal corruption and poor understanding of legal concepts are prominent problems for legal construction in nationality areas. During the research panel’s interviews in Gannan there was a nomad who said “Security is a mess. They (the police) don’t care. If our sheep or cattle are stolen by someone, you can report it to the police and they’ll take the thief in, hold them for two days then let them go. But you don’t get your sheep or cattle back: the money from selling them is split up among the police.” (Interviewee, a nomad in Qu’ao, Xiahe.)
It should be added that because of the influence of religious thinking and levels of education, the degree to which ordinary people in Tibetan areas are inculcated with politics is far lower than in the interior, to the extent that many people cannot differentiate between central government policies and local regulations, or the difference between central decision-making and local actions, and the central government is often made the scapegoat for local errors. The research panel also discovered in the course of its interviews that many among the masses use “cadre” and “nomad” to differentiate between their own and all other levels of government, and think that “before, the cadres were good, now the cadres are sometimes good, sometimes bad.” (Interviewee, a nomad on the Dajiutan grasslands.)
III, b) (3) The expenditure model of financial structures and obstacles to cadres’ governance abilities. During the period of the Eleventh Five Year Plan, the total amount of money sent just to Tibet using normal transfer payments, system subsidies and special subsidies amounted to 4.75 trillion yuan [US $693.5 billion], with funds given by the central government amounting to 90% of Tibet’s total expenditure. When researching in the Tibetan area of Amdo, an official said that a certain county’s fiscal income was more than 10 million yuan, but financial support is more than 400 million yuan, meaning the shortcoming is made up forty times over from central transfer payments.
At the Third Tibet Work Forum in 1994, it was decided to adopt practices of “division of responsibility, targeted support, and regular rotation,” and transfer cadres from relevant provinces, metropolises and central government organs to do focused aid work in Tibet. At the Fourth Tibet Work Forum in 2001, it was decided to extend the period of cadres doing focused aid Tibet work by another 10 years, and at the same time it was decided to cover all counties, cities and prefectures in Tibetan areas. For many years, favorable policies in Tibetan areas have given a great deal of support in the form of funding, projects and materials, and improved the basic infrastructure conditions in Tibet. But at the same time it has also created officials in Tibetan areas who put all of their efforts into ways of demanding money and projects from the Center, and they take far more interest in operating their own social networks than they do in practical social and economic construction.
At present, the problem of cadres’ knowledge structures in Tibetan areas is becoming more prominent: on the one hand, there is a shortage of specialist cadres and personnel needed for social and economic development; on the other hand, there are large and swelling numbers of Party, government and industrial work unit personnel. The political cadres are largely redundant, whereas there’s a serious lack of technical, managerial and technology cadres. During the panel’s interviews in Tibetan areas, it was discovered that deputy officials in a certain prefectural Recreation and Sports Bureau were only educated to the level of elementary school.
In December 1993, the Central Organization Department, the Central United Front Work Department and the State Ethnic Affairs Commission jointly issued “Suggestions for further improving work to select and train ethnic minority cadres,” which was to “train and create a corps of ethnic minority cadres who are equipped with both morals and talent, who are politically pure and diligent, who closely connect with people of all nationalities, a corps which is multi-talented, equipped with specializations and rationally constructed, and which is able to adapt to the requirements of reform and opening up and the development of the socialist market economy.” Judging from the present, if this aim is to ever be achieved there is still a very long way to go.
IV: The government’s errors in handling the follow-up to the 3.14 incident
The research panel discovered that the 3.14 incident was caused by the confluence of many factors, including psychological loss created by development, discontent among economic classes, the question of migrants, influences from abroad, religious sentiment, and on-scene “mass reactions,” which cannot be simply reduced to “splittist violence.” We advocate that the handling of the aftermath of the 3.14 incident should have been to quickly pacify the incident, to decisively resolve contradictions, actively appease the masses, handle officials’ dereliction of duty, and actively promote the roles of stronger inter-ethnic unity and harmony. But looking at the handling in the current situation, there are some quite major errors in government policy. The government’s forceful propaganda and incautious handling have in fact driven outcomes in the opposite direction.
IV, a) The ensuing over-propagandizing of “violence” was used to make the 3.14 incident ever larger, which created certain oppositional ethnic sentiments. Depictions of the violence in Lhasa and Gannan were seen barely 10 hours later on television and the internet and seen all over the country and even the entire world, with an intensive depiction of violent acts by some Tibetans. And the sole cause given for the protests was simply “foreign forces,” which made Han citizens, who lack any practical understanding of Tibetan areas, form feelings of racist sentiment toward the Tibetan masses as a result. Such propaganda actions are in the long run detrimental to ethnic unity. The fascination that Han citizens have expressed toward Tibetan culture changed to fear and hatred of the Tibetan masses, and Tibetans were rendered as a people incapable of gratitude. After the incident, the research panel discovered many Internet discussion forums were filled with fanatical abuse by Chinese and Tibetan Internet users, which only deepened the misunderstandings. Mr Nongbu [Tib: Norbu] told the research panel that when his Han friends saw the pictures they almost cut all communication with him, which was extremely difficult for him to take. (Interviewee, Nongbu, international NGO worker and Khampa Tibetan.) It can be seen therefore that the government’s press releases went out quickly, intuitively and effectively, but their potential negative effects cannot be underestimated. When handling matters in such a way, what’s damaged is the Tibetan people’s support for unity, and what’s harmed is relations between the Han and Tibetans.
IV, b) Defining the 3.14 incident as “beating, smashing, looting and burning by Tibetan splittists” lacks political wisdom. The armed insurrection in Tibetan areas toward the end of the 50s has been defined as class struggle, and has not risen to being racial confrontation. The main thrust of policies was to “strike hard against a few arch culprits and appease the broad masses of farmers and nomads.” The policies were adjusted, and reform of ownership systems became means for resolving problems at the time, and contradictions were quickly resolved. But today, when faced with “beating, smashing, looting and burning,” and “the Dalai clique’s organized, premeditated and meticulously planned” splittist activities, the excessive response of governments all over Tibet was to regard every tree and blade of grass as a potential enemy soldier. Local policy turned to strict monitoring where everyone was suspect, “everyone has to pass a political test,” which was bound to lead to even more Tibetans becoming discontented, and created discord and dissension far and wide. Even more dangerous was that this suspicion and exclusion of Tibetans slowly spread to many places in the interior and there was some very unfair treatment. During the course of the panel’s interviews, many Tibetan elites said that they had been heavily searched at airports and hotels, and that their sense of patriotism had suffered.
IV, c) The poor understanding of the Tibetan people’s religious sentiment led to errors in the way monks and monasteries were treated in the wake of the 3.14 incident. Monks are the clergy in Tibetan areas who not only offer people spiritual guidance, they are also Tibet’s traditional intelligentsia, and Tibetan astronomy, the calendar, medicine and law were all produced by this grouping. In Tibetan areas where there is widespread faith, monks have extremely high social prestige. Therefore, the government’s serious handling of relations with monks and monasteries and positive interactions would in the long-term be extremely beneficial to Tibet’s stability. Furthermore, when handling matters post-3.14, many high status monasteries were ordered to be investigated, and for a short time closed for rectification; itinerant monks with household registrations elsewhere were driven out and traveling stopped; and all monasteries had to carry out “socialist and patriotic education.” In reality, such actions were a form of interference for the monks who wanted nothing to do with politics and were concentrated on their practice, and the outcome may not be positive. The panel happened to chance upon several rule of law propaganda activities which had interrupted the normal activities of services and practice, and the monks were complaining.
V: Problems of Tibetan religion and culture during this current complex phase
In the process of promoting the process of modernization in Tibetan areas, the question of Tibetan religion and culture is eternal and unavoidable. Any social and economic activity by humanity is carried out within a determined system and culture, and then interacts with it. The main body of Tibetan religious culture is Tibetan Buddhism: it is not only an important constituent part of Tibetan culture, it is also the main source of thinking for how Tibetan religious culture comports with the logic of historical development. And in this regard, the connection between so-called modernization and Tibetan religious culture can more importantly be regarded as the connection between modernization and Tibetan Buddhism. The director of the Tibet Academy of Social Sciences, Ciren Jiabu [Tib: Tsering Gyalpo] says, “Our government does not interfere with freedom of religious belief, but nor does it encourage religion. In reality, Tibetan Buddhism is not merely another form of religion, it is a field of learning, and it is more accurate to call it the Dharma Law than the Law of the Buddha. How to guide Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to the construction of a harmonious society is a key question.”
When we understand modernization as the social changes and transitions brought about by the gradual strengthening of the modern and the gradual weakening of the traditional in the modern era of the history of the world, a possibility is presented to us of re-examining the relationship between modernization and religion from a new and broader perspective, and to open a new path. The latest developments in modernization theory state that there is not a state of antithesis between the modern and the traditional, and that “the traditional interior of every society has the possibility of developing into the modern, and therefore, modernization is the process where systems and value judgments within traditions respond on a functional level to the demands and constant adaptations of the modern.” The strengths and weaknesses of such adaptability are defined by the compatibility of the modern and traditional, and in situations where there is little compatibility and there is a lack of modern factors, then the power of government authorities must be relied upon to effect mandatory system changes. Of course, when the state is promoting transformation, the systems in advanced countries should not just be blindly copied, but they should start out from the cultural traditions found within the country, otherwise “if the cultural values of a society and the differences in its social customs are ignored, then the foreign systems that are introduced with new technologies have no way of serving the desired outcomes and can only cause social chaos.” Evidently, as far as post-modernized countries and regions are concerned, the start of the modernization process is usually founded on mandatory systemic changes, and on the basis of the consequent outcomes of mandatory change, causal systemic change can be effected. On the basis of this significance, we consider that Tibetan Buddhism is the basis of traditional Tibetan systems and culture in Tibetan areas, and not only should it not be regarded as an obstacle to modernization, it should actually be regarded as a reliable traditional resource for providing a functional basis for promoting the process of modernization in Tibetan areas. Only then can we hope to see the early realization of modernization in Tibetan areas.
On the other hand, we have to break through the arguments from the radical proponents of secularization, and get over the old-fashioned religious epistemology where religious systems, behaviors and ideologies have lost their social significance, and establish an understanding that religion can fully go hand-in-hand with modernization. This has already been proven to be the reality in the modern world. The process of secularization is a reductive force upon Tibetan Buddhism, but it cannot lead to fundamental change of the disappearance of Tibetan Buddhism: “Secularization only changes Tibetan Buddhism and weakens its traditional roles, and this is an inevitable process of change brought about by Tibetan Buddhism’s own transformation of its internal structures.”
To conclude the theoretical discussion, we will look back once again at the Tibetan areas of our country, where it can be seen that in practice there are numerous variations and contradictions arising from the intertwining of the process of modernization and religious culture. First of all, the mandatory systemic changes by state political forces cleared obstacles and presented conditions for the modernization of the Amdo Tibetan region, but it has not been possible to carry out causal system changes, and it has not been possible to eradicate the impact of errors made during the process of mandatory change. Since the establishment of the new China and under the leadership of the Party and government, regional ethnic autonomy has generally been realized in the Tibetan region of Amdo, and the Tibetan people have exercised the right to be their own masters. This earthshaking social transformation has brought vitality to the government, economy and culture of the Amdo region: with the gradual elimination of feudal and religious privilege, the state of impoverishment has improved greatly. However, due to the malignant developments of the extreme left during the Cultural Revolution which damaged the Party’s nationality policies and religion policies, customs created over a long historical period in the Amdo region and the masses’ normal religious activities were completely disregarded in a deliberate attempt to destroy religion, to irrationally destroy all monasteries, to denounce senior religious personages and compel them to return to secular life. This forced religious activities underground, seriously wounding the religious sensibilities of the believing masses and giving rise to mass discontent. Following the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Congress when out of the chaos order was restored, policies to protect and respect the freedom of religious belief were enacted and religious activities at the monasteries gradually resumed. The newly re-opened monasteries operated on principles of democratic management, and monastery democratic management committees were established, and were composed of monks who uphold the Party’s direction and policies and who are patriotic, and who were elected by the faithful masses and the monastery’s monks, thereby gradually putting religious policies onto a standardized path.
However, two types of contradiction remain at present: (1) There is a rigidity and backwardness in political discourse at the national level with regard to religion and relevant policies and measures, which has led to inconsistencies in the relationship between modernization and religion and the relationship between socialism and the realm of religion, and inconsistencies between theory and practice; (2) Local officials still have no understanding of how to recognize the relation between the status of citizen and the status of religious individual, an there is even a phenomenon of monks being forced to retire by means of patriotic education. The existence of such a situation will inevitably have an impact on how religious believers regard the political authority of the state, and how the state’s causal changes to Tibetan Buddhism enacted on the basis of mandatory change will impact the transformative functions of Tibetan Buddhism to functions of modernization.
Secondly, once Tibetan Buddhism was released from mandatory repression there was a period of strong flexibility and renewal, and its own schisms and contradictions inevitably appeared. In the early period of reform and opening up in the Amdo area where the masses’ deep religiosity had been repressed, they showed a very warm enthusiasm for religious activities. Later, and in the wake of regional economic construction, cultural education and the development and progress of scientific, technical and communications undertakings, there was a fundamental change to the formerly feudal and semi-feudal society, and there was a change in people’s thinking – particularly the thinking among people in the arable areas along communication lines, where there were enormous changes. Among some of the middle-aged, religious concepts had already started to gradually weaken. Under such circumstances, a trend started within the Tibetan Buddhist monasteries themselves toward secularization: (1) there was an increase in “lay characteristics” among religious personnel; (2) monasteries’ organizational functions became more utilitarian, and the monasteries’ organizational management became more democratized; (3) the beliefs of the faithful were transformed, their motivations became pragmatic, there were formative changes to religious practices and rituals, and where reverence was towards the morality of senior teachers. Nevertheless, due to the special nature in which Tibetan Buddhism is propagated and which makes it an indispensable element in the socialization and internalization process for every single person in Tibetan areas, it therefore has an extremely broad influence. However, such changes are likely to eventually bring changes to religion’s internal power structures as well as changes to the role and hue of authority, thereby bringing about a change to the internal structures of religion as well as renewed adjustments to its relationship with society. And under such circumstances, there are questions of how should Tibetan Buddhism’s religious authority and local power be regarded, and how should the questions of monasteries and monks be managed.
In summation, at present the state lacks adequate preparation and actions for changes under the new situation, and there are serious shortcomings on how to effectively use the traditional resource of Tibetan Buddhism to promote the process of modernization in Tibetan areas, as well as how to adjust strategies to the changing situation, how to coordinate the relationship between the state and religion, to reduce unnecessary ideological conflicts, or how to remodel Tibetan identity and their self-image within nationality and religion policies. This should be the root cause that created the current complex problems in the Tibetan areas.
VI: Conclusion and recommendations
For the sake of the long-term harmony and unity of the state, the 3.14 incident in Tibet is worthy of our deep reflection. If external factors alone are emphasized and we ignore reflections upon internal social and political structures, this would be irresponsible to the long-term interests of the state. Against the great background of modernization, although there have been great developments to the economy in Tibetan areas, compared to other provinces, other countries, and even ordinary people of other nationalities living in Tibetan areas, it is still evidently backward. This is particularly so when more and more people from elsewhere are acquiring great wealth in Tibetan areas, and unintentionally creating a sense of relative deprivation. At the same time, religious traditions have come under attack from modernization, and many young Tibetans have been cast into a state of puzzlement and confusion. Behind all of these questions lies an urgent problem, and that is the problems in our country’s political structures. Power relations from top to bottom have created a group of local Tibetan cadres who use the resources of authority that come to them from above in order to build a complex network of contacts in nationality areas, where the state’s economic assistance largely becomes used for career projects for the few, or for the personal wealth of the few. They are not good at facing the masses, not good at facing a society in the process of development and with a plurality of thought, and they frequently stir up social contradictions and then hope that the central government will foot the bill. Ordinary Tibetans have a far keener and evident sense of deprivation than any sense of government help, and like many people living in provinces in the interior, are deeply discontented with the local power-brokers. This accumulation of frustration and anger over a long period of time with the added fuses of religion and external forces led to the 3.14 incident.
We believe that at present, there is no factual basis for the “extinction of Tibet” as described by some. In the main, Han-Tibetan relations are good. However, following the chaos of 3.14 in Tibetan areas we discovered that there are many prominent contradictions and hardships in society in Tibetan areas. We tried to understand this situation by means of research and documentary analysis, and to understand the living conditions of the masses in Tibetan areas. This report is only the reflection of a merest glimpse, and such perspectives can in no way cover all of the issues facing Tibetan areas. However, it has been based on the intention to understand the changes taking place in Tibetan areas, and at the same it is hoped that it will bring about further and ever more detailed exploration.
We call for ethnic relations of “unity, equality, mutual assistance, harmony and people first,” and “a unified multi-ethnic joint struggle, common construction, common prosperity and shared success.” The prerequisite is for the government to fully recognize the citizen status of ordinary people in Tibetan areas, to ensure the rights and interests of ordinary Tibetan people, and that conceptual thinking needs to adapt to the social reality of Tibetan areas in a period of rapid modernization, where it is hoped to be able to be unencumbered by current ideological frameworks to broaden horizons and make policy breakthroughs.
In focusing its research on the social factors of the “3.14 incident,” the research panel presents the following suggestions:
1. Earnestly listen to the voices of ordinary Tibetans and on the basis of respecting and protecting each of the Tibetan people’s rights and interests, adjust policy and thinking in Tibetan areas to formulate development policies which are suited to the characteristics of Tibetan areas, and which accord with the wishes of the Tibetan people.
2. Guide the rational development of economic structures in Tibetan areas, paying particular attention to guiding all Tibetans to share in acquiring ample benefits from opportunity and development. Pay attention to nurturing local economic entities; in the process of support, pay close attention to changing the degree of serious inequalities, reducing the discrepancy between urban and rural rich and poor in Tibetan areas; extend the scope of Aid Tibet to Tibetan autonomous areas outside Tibet. Continue the model of economic development based on a combination of financial aid, technical assistance and human resource expertise, and adopt measures to attract foreign investment at the same time as taking appropriate measures to protect local industries. In the labor market pay close attention to fully protecting the employment rights of Tibetan people. In farming and nomadic regions within Tibetan areas, promote support and protections which benefit the individual.
3. Increase effective supervision over local power structures in the implementation of regional ethnic autonomy policies, and speed up the process of democratizing power structures. End tolerance of corruption, poor administrative abilities and dereliction of duty which is apparent in government in Tibetan areas, and in particular of those officials who suppress local social problems in the name of “anti-splittism.” Establish more rational and democratic selection policies for Tibetan cadres in order to optimize current cadre structures.
4. Pay close attention to the living situation of young Tibetans, and with the greatest good faith resolve current education problems in Tibetan areas, particularly the problems of rural education and education for farmers and nomads, and by means of subsidies and guidance entice children to complete nine-year compulsory education. Continue to develop and encourage training mechanisms for highly skilled personnel in Tibetan areas, and to optimize specialized knowledge structures among college students. Speed up and improve grass-roots professional technical education in Tibetan areas, and using the method of joint work and study as used in schools in the eastern provinces, allow Tibetan students to set out and increase the degree of training in schools’ high-tech content and training in practical production in Tibetan areas, in order to train up skilled workers and eliminate all barriers for encouraging varied Tibetan employment and entrepreneurship. Particular attention should be paid in school education on extending and developing appropriate content on Tibetan history and culture, and increasing the civic awareness content of the training. Education and training must be regarded as the most important long-term resolution to the question of Tibetan areas.
5. Fully respect and protect the Tibetan people’s freedom of religious belief, resuming and supporting normal religious lives and activities. Fully recognize the important significance of religion and a religious life to Tibetan areas and to the Tibetan people. In the area of culture and religion, make best use of the situation and pay close attention to the role of religious authority. Respect and resume normal religious activities such as Dharma events, the practice of traveling to study, receiving teachings, and the monastic examination hierarchy. Pay close attention to protecting the transmission of Tibetan Buddhism. Fully protect and respect the Tibetan people’s religious sentiment in propaganda activities.
6. When resolving problems in Tibetan areas, thinking must be transformed; adopt appropriate measures and thinking which is more positive and wise. With the guiding thought of facilitation, understanding and integration, reduce inter-ethnic prejudice, ignorance and injury. When handling sudden incidents, change the overly-strong attitude of “from top to bottom,” and wisely mobilize positive forces in Tibetan areas (such as religious forces) to solve them.
7. Promote rule of law in governance processes in Tibetan areas. Urge the introduction of laws and regulations as represented by ordinances in the Tibet Autonomous Region and other autonomous areas, to change the current status quo of a lack of lower laws since the promulgation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law. Regulate the ownership rights and disposal rights of key natural resources. Encourage positive expert participation in advising and discussing all aspects of policy in Tibetan areas.
8. When upholding and propagandizing construction to the state of ethnic unity, propagandize the successes of reform and opening up in Tibetan areas instead of depicting the past system of serfdom. At the same time as manifesting the vitality of development, admit to the social problems facing Tibet. Be vigilant against the dark racist waves of secession and ethnic revenge.
9. When handling crisis situations, it must first be discerned whether there is a social problem, an economic problem, or a religious problem, with different problems having different means of being handled. The central government should be in the position of “arbiter,” and maintain a distinction to the best of their ability from local officials’ inappropriate conduct. Sensitive incidents should be “de-sensitized” to the greatest degree.
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Page :On First Page
- admin's note
- Contributors, Table of Contents, and Notes
- Foreword
- I: Economic and social changes in Tibetan areas amid a process of rapid modernization
- II: Hardships faced by young Tibetans born in the 70s and 80s
- III: The main problems with structures of governance in Tibetan areas
- IV: The government’s errors in handling the follow-up to the 3.14 incident
- V: Problems of Tibetan religion and culture during this current complex phase
- VI: Conclusion and recommendations
- ALL
139 Responses to “An investigative report into the social and economic causes of the 3.14 incident in Tibetan areas”
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June 2nd, 2009 at 1:44 pm
@admin
I read the report in Chinese some weeks ago and I was waiting for someone to translate it. This is a very good step, thanks for sharing it!
June 2nd, 2009 at 4:55 pm
Admin,
Well said on your Intro. Thanks very much for posting this important document and your feedback in the translation.
It should be noted that this report deliberately avoided any mention of the “800 lb gorilla” on Tibet i.e. HH Dalai Lama in resolving this problem. Baba Phunstok Wangyal, Wang Lixiong, and many other experts living in China and abroad have mentioned it that, “China needs Dalai Lama’s help in winning over the hearts and minds of the Tibetan people to resolve this problem for once and all “. Once that’s recognized by the PRC officials and if they are sincere in resolving this problem, then other problems will not be insurmountable (i.e. economic, social, soveriegnty etc).
The authors are fully aware of it but I think chose not to include it so as not to be dismissed or banned by top officials, which I think is politically wise move as a first step. This would be precedented setting if this report was acknowledged and taken seriously by the PRC top officials instead of another on-the shelf collecting dust.
June 2nd, 2009 at 6:50 pm
Thanks for posting this. I haven’t commented here in a while—I noticed I was getting a bit bitter and nasty. But this is great stuff.
June 3rd, 2009 at 2:40 am
Adm@
Thank you for creating a separate forum for this important report. I believe that debating on history makes no sense. We should leave this to the historians to debate and decide. We look forward for creating mutual understanding and peaceful resolution of the existing problems.
This report summarized the reason for the 3.14 protest,
1. “accumulation of frustration and anger over a long period of time with the added fuses of religion and external forces”
2. “The poor understanding of the Tibetan people’s religious sentiment led to errors in the way monks and monasteries were treated in the wake of the 3.14 incident”
and concludes
“Defining the 3.14 incident as “beating, smashing, looting and burning by Tibetan splittists” lacks political wisdom.”
I believe that religion and culture is the oxygen of the Tibetan people and that the Dalai Lama is in the DNA of Tibetan people. When I say Tibetan people, I also mean cultural Tibet including people outside of TAR and even the Himalayan belt of India, Nepal and Bhutan. What Tibetans are asking is autonomy with ‘Tibetan characteristics’. I like this term.
The report must be applauded for its bold stand to tell the truth under a situation where every such move is brandished as anti national. This report has certainly increased Tibetan people’s respect and love for the majority of the Chinese people. Collectively we must expose those people in the government, who according to the founders of the Chinese Communist Party in Tibet, Mr Pingcuo Wangjie [Tib: Phuntso Wangyal] has said “There’s a large group of people in the government who eat the food of anti-splittism. They take every opportunity to play the splittism card, and while on the face of it they shout about anti-splittism, in reality their personal interests are involved. They are unable to admit their mistakes and instead put all of their effort into shifting accountability onto ‘hostile foreign forces’. And thus they are able to consolidate their positions and their interests, allowing them to accumulate even more power and resources.”
June 3rd, 2009 at 3:53 am
You know, I’m going to be the devil’s advocate and say that it is not the Chinese government’s job to maintain Tibetan culture and language, but it is the job of the Tibetans themselves.
As an Chinese living in the US and it is probably true in other Western Nations, the Chinese don’t expect the Federal, State and local government to maintain Chinese culture and language. Did you ever hear mainland Chinese protesting the US government maintaining Chinese culture and language? No. If the they want teach their kids to read and write Chinese, they have to pay extra for that. Come Chinese New Year, it is not a Holiday and the Chinese have to take a sick or vacation day to celebrate it with their family. Chinese organizations help out and maintain Chinese culture.
I also want to note that this ‘independent report’ is from a bunch of lawyers who are at odds with the Chinese government one time. This investigative report tries to victimize the Tibetans as the suppressed. Heck yeah, it is poor in the regions where the Tibetans live, but Chinese are just as poor also in the same. But this kind of victimization will go so far then won’t gain the sympathy of the Chinese and perhaps it is the Tibetan’s job to help themselves instead relying on the Chinese government as the scapegoat.
June 3rd, 2009 at 4:17 am
@pug_ster: In some European countries you have exactly that: children have the right to get tutored about their own language, for example. When I studied Chinese, I met this Cantonese girl who was taught Chinese as a kid in the local school.
But whatever the truth is in any Western country, in China you have the additional problem that Tibetan practices, from what I’ve heard from the Tibetans commenting here, are curtailed. It’s certainly easier to help yourself when you’re not being interfered with. Also, the report doesn’t just mention poverty as the only problem, but also marginalization and the importance of local religions and cultural practices. That’s a completely different beast.
Finally, is it a problem in itself to have a viewpoint that deviates from that of the government? It’s quite common here, actually, and if not too controversial even published. One thing that struck me with “中国不高兴” was its negative tone towards the authorities, something that sets it apart from “中国可以说不”.
June 3rd, 2009 at 4:31 am
I also wanted to mention a story about what happened today when I signed my daughter up for pre-k for this fall. In my neighborhood, there is a gentrification going on that many Chinese moved here within the last 20 years where it goes from less than 5% Chinese to 40-50% Chinese. However, all the teachers and staff that I saw today are not Chinese. Yet I saw another couple whom barely speaks English managed to fill out the forms in English and not one of them complained.
When I hear the the Dalai Lama complain Chinese government of ‘cultural genocide’ I think it is utter BS and they should start thinking darwinism. Obviously Tibetans in China have to learn to adapt or get left behind. It is unfortunate that most Tibetans in China have the reputation of being lazy and uneducated thus the reason Chinese won’t hire them. It is sad, but maybe it is the job for the Tibetans themselves to rise up to work for their goals and causes otherwise they will will feel socially and economically repressed.
June 3rd, 2009 at 4:33 am
@
“it is the Tibetan’s job to help themselves instead relying on the Chinese government”
This might be a surprise for your mindset, but this is all what Tibetans are asking for.
Tibetans say, “Hey, let us help ourselves and guide ourselves.” Tibetans had been living on their own until new China, and surprisingly , at least for your mindset, that Tibet’s development then was more or less same as rest of China, except some coastal cities such Shanghai where foreigners “brought in development” with their “helping hand”.
Tibetans are asking for an autonomy where they can help themselves, maintain their own culture. That’s all. Beyond this is dream for one and suspicion for other.
Here is Tibetan saying:
Tibetans die in hope,
And Chinese (mainly Hans) die in suspicion.
“As an Chinese living in the US and it is probably true in other Western Nations, the Chinese don’t expect the Federal, State and local government to maintain Chinese culture and language.”
For this part, I don’t have to answer, because most of Chinese, especially those ultra-nationalists, won’t like this comparison as well and will answer you.
June 3rd, 2009 at 4:44 am
@Wukliong, #6
Yeah, there’s the tutor, but there’s no teacher teaching Chinese to the students in elementary school, isn’t it? I heard there’s alot of complains from the Tibetans who said that the Elementary/primary schools don’t teach Tibetan, well, maybe except for the TAR region. Maybe it is my belief, but I don’t understand the marginalization of the local religions and cultural practices. Like I said, where I live there’s no Buddhist temples and no places for any formal culture practices and we don’t complain to the government about it.
June 3rd, 2009 at 4:49 am
@ pug_ster
“Obviously Tibetans in China have to learn to adapt or get left behind.”
Are you ready to leave your culture and get adapted to western culture? If not, then don’t your “BS”.
June 3rd, 2009 at 4:49 am
@The Old Guy #8
Tibetans are asking for an autonomy where they can help themselves, maintain their own culture. That’s all. Beyond this is dream for one and suspicion for other.
Why do they specifically need autonomy? Autonomy is asking for the government to maintain and respect their culture. Where I live, the government doesn’t do that, it is the job of the Chinese community to do it.
June 3rd, 2009 at 4:52 am
@The old Guy #10
Are you ready to leave your culture and get adapted to western culture? If not, then don’t your “BS”.
Adapt is not leaving the Chinese culture, but rather live in Western society while maintaining your Chinese culture.
June 3rd, 2009 at 4:52 am
@ pug_ster
“where I live there’s no Buddhist temples and no places for any formal culture practices and we don’t complain to the government about it”
If you build temple by yourselves with your own fund to show your cultural identity, will the government label you as separatist who wants have to different cultural identity than rest people of the country where you reside now? If not, keep your “BS” for yourself.
June 3rd, 2009 at 4:57 am
“Adapt is not leaving the Chinese culture, but rather live in Western society while maintaining your Chinese culture.”
Living in modern society with your culture is one thing and living in modern society with your culture being curtailed because someone think it’s backward or is enemy of unity is another thing.
June 3rd, 2009 at 5:07 am
@ pug_ster
“Why do they specifically need autonomy? Autonomy is asking for the government to maintain and respect their culture.”
Why Chinese government had to give the name of autonomy to this region in the first place? If you don’t know that, then any talk about autonomy in China will be “BS”.
Autonomy is not asking for the government to maintain their culture, but asking the government to allow Tibetans to maintain their culture. Well, autonomy does ask government to respect their culture. I don’t think you have any problem about that.
June 3rd, 2009 at 5:08 am
To Pugster:
if a Chinese person emigrates to a foreign land, it’s hardly the job of the destination nation to maintain that person’s Chinese culture/heritage/language etc. After all, you chose to go there. Having said that, hopefully there is no undue impediment to a person trying to maintain ties to their roots, even in a faraway land.
But this in no way compares to the Tibetan situation. We’re talking about Tibetans in Tibet; they haven’t gone anywhere. It’s just that someone moved in and set up shop. So I think the CHinese do have a responsibility to maintain Tibetan culture, or at least provide necessary assistance therein.
And if Charles Liu or Wahaha were reading this, I’m sure they’d be happy to tell you that the proper parallel would be the North American First Nations’ peoples. And I would agree that we have a similar responsibility in that regard.
June 3rd, 2009 at 5:13 am
pug_ster @
pug-star says “won’t gain the sympathy of the Chinese and perhaps it is the Tibetan’s job to help themselves instead relying on the Chinese government as the scapegoat”
Your rhetoric of the very notion of Chinese government being the great benefactor, liberator and sympathizer to the Tibetan people projects inequality, something which the constitution of China tries to address for all the ethnic nationalities . Tibetans don’t seek Chinese sympathy but equality under the constitution. The report talks about education “The Tibetan translations of teaching materials from the interior which are used by students in Tibetan areas do not have separate syllabuses on Tibetan history and culture,”
Isn’t this cultural genocide? Do you agree that Tibetan people have a distinct history and culture? If yes, do their children have the right to study? Why Tibetan remain uneducated even after 50 years of liberation? Certainly Tibetans in Tibet did not choose to be lazy and uneducated and Chinese people are born intelligent.
June 3rd, 2009 at 5:14 am
@ S.K. Cheung
Thanks for making my point clear about the inappropriate parallel between Tibetans in Tibet and Chinese in foreign country made by pug_ster.
June 3rd, 2009 at 5:37 am
@The Old Man
Living in modern society with your culture is one thing and living in modern society with your culture being curtailed because someone think it’s backward or is enemy of unity is another thing.
Why Chinese government had to give the name of autonomy to this region in the first place? If you don’t know that, then any talk about autonomy in China will be “BS”.
Autonomy is not asking for the government to maintain their culture, but asking the government to allow Tibetans to maintain their culture. Well, autonomy does ask government to respect their culture. I don’t think you have any problem about that.
It reminds me of why Scientology is being so hated. They think they are wronged by the government and by others who question their religion. Unfortunately, in most secular countries, the government wins and China is no exception.
And please be more explicit about ‘maintaining the culture.’ If it is about the Dalai Lama, since he keeps spewing anti-China words, that’s why the Chinese government bans his teachings.
@SKC,
I’m sure that in the TAR region the Chinese government does try to maintain the Tibetan culture. However,I see it in my neighborhood, as more Chinese move here, and they set up Chinese shops and restaurants. Gentrification is the word that comes to mind and I don’t think there’s much the Chinese government can do.
June 3rd, 2009 at 5:37 am
To Admin:
wow, thanks to you and/or whoever translated this. It’s a tome, and must have taken an awful long time. Your intro was spectacular, and your method of allowing “tabbed” browsing is way cool.
I think the final recommendations are fair. It’s also encouraging to see a thorough disavowing of this “us against them” mentality between Chinese and Tibetans. Nice to read a position that emphasizes what would seem to be legitimate Tibetans problems and grievances, and not play to the fanning of nationalistic flames whereby all Tibetan discontent must have been sowed by evil foreigners, without whom Tibetans would be happy as clams.
At the same time, i am awestruck and somewhat in disbelief that a one-month immersion by this group of researchers could produce such a volume of perspective, garnered from all parts of a region with difficult terrain and populated by peoples who would seem not entirely uniform. I wonder what type of questions they asked, and how many people they interviewed. In other words, the nuts and bolts of how, if not why, they came to the conclusions that they did.
Having said that, I’ve always maintained that, if you want to know what Tibetans think, it’s best to go ask them. And this research, if not the final word, is a much better start than anything that came before it.
June 3rd, 2009 at 5:44 am
To Pugster:
“I’m sure that in the TAR region the Chinese government does try to maintain the Tibetan culture.” – I believe that’s part of the point of this report. Without judging what the Chinese government has achieved in the past, there is still way more work to be done.
“I don’t think there’s much the Chinese government can do.” – but that’s not the Chinese government’s job. If I was a Canadian expat living abroad, i wouldn’t look to the Canadian government or my local Canadian consulate to help provide me with a sense of Canadiana somewhere beyond her shores; if that’s what I long for, that’s something I need to go and get/make for myself.
June 3rd, 2009 at 5:48 am
@Dorjee
Your rhetoric of the very notion of Chinese government being the great benefactor, liberator and sympathizer to the Tibetan people projects inequality, something which the constitution of China tries to address for all the ethnic nationalities . Tibetans don’t seek Chinese sympathy but equality under the constitution. The report talks about education “The Tibetan translations of teaching materials from the interior which are used by students in Tibetan areas do not have separate syllabuses on Tibetan history and culture,”
Isn’t this cultural genocide? Do you agree that Tibetan people have a distinct history and culture? If yes, do their children have the right to study? Why Tibetan remain uneducated even after 50 years of liberation? Certainly Tibetans in Tibet did not choose to be lazy and uneducated and Chinese people are born intelligent.
If they want to learn Tibetan History and culture, maybe they should learn it from their parents, or from other sources rather than from the Chinese schooling system. Cultural genocide happens when the Tibetan parents don’t make an effort to Teach Tibetan culture, culture, and history to their Children. Like I said, relying on the government to do that is just fruitless.
June 3rd, 2009 at 6:10 am
pug_star says “And please be more explicit about ‘maintaining the culture.’ If it is about the Dalai Lama, since he keeps spewing anti-China words, that’s why the Chinese government bans his teachings.”
China government called the Dalai Lama “an evil spirit with a human face and the heart of a beast.” “the chief ringleader of activities to sabotage the normal religious order of Tibet.” “A liar” and so on so forth. The “patriotic education” campaigns during which monks, nuns, and others are asked to denounce the Dalai Lama and sign statements agreeing that Tibet has always been a part of China. The police have searched for images of the Dalai Lama, tearing them up or forcing Tibetans themselves to take them down.
Can you cite few anti-China words spewed by the Dalai Lama which made Chinese people really angry?
June 3rd, 2009 at 6:37 am
“And please be more explicit about ‘maintaining the culture.’ If it is about the Dalai Lama, since he keeps spewing anti-China words, that’s why the Chinese government bans his teachings.”
If your understanding of Tibetan culture is limited to DL’s teaching, then you should first learn about Tibetan culture little bit more and the ground reality in Tibet little bit deeper. And do you know there is a language called Tibetan?
June 3rd, 2009 at 7:49 am
“If they want to learn Tibetan History and culture, maybe they should learn it from their parents, or from other sources rather than from the Chinese schooling system”
If the Malaysian Chinese will to base on the same line of thought process, most probably we would be assimilated into the majority long time ago.
We insist that our government have a duty to ensure the safeguard of the minority culture, including the Chinese schooling system. China could and should do better than America and Malaysia.
June 3rd, 2009 at 11:25 am
@J Dorgee
Can you cite few anti-China words spewed by the Dalai Lama which made Chinese people really angry?
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/world/asia/29dalai.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=dalai%20lama&st=cse
His latest rhetoric is ‘death sentence.’ Now the Dalai Lama calling what exactly a ‘death sentence’ is he referring to?
@The Old Guy
If your understanding of Tibetan culture is limited to DL’s teaching, then you should first learn about Tibetan culture little bit more and the ground reality in Tibet little bit deeper. And do you know there is a language called Tibetan?
I don’t know what is your argument here. Unfortunately, the offical language in China is Chinese, and if the Tibetans want to get a decent job, maybe they have to learn speakable Chinese. Whether learning Tibetan or not, it is up to them to learn it.
June 3rd, 2009 at 3:07 pm
Thanks for the translation, Admin.
pug_ster @ 26, in US the Native Americans as a group has the highest unemployment rate in US, and if they want jobs they’ll have to learn English, move out of his desolate reservation and join white people’s society, and leave his culture, heritage, behind.
June 3rd, 2009 at 4:23 pm
@Charles Liu
I don’t know about American Natives leaving the culture and heritage behind. Some Indian Reservations chose to isolate themselves and well, you know what happens. I have seen other Indian Reservations decided to adapt and opened up Casinos or any other tourist areas to attract tourist, capital and promote their culture and heritage. I know of 2 casinos in Connecticut like Foxwoods and Mohegian Sun that were very successful.
That said, I think that the Tibetans can choose to isolate themselves from the Han Chinese and be poor, or they can adapt by creating some kind of business that will promote their culture and heritage. Unfortunately, they chose the former and blame on the Han Chinese for their social and economic problems.
June 3rd, 2009 at 7:39 pm
Another 800 lb gorilla in this case is “colonialism”. The authors of the report have managed to describe all the symptoms of a classic case of colonialism and assimilation backed by socio-economic force, and yet avoid using the most obvious and useful term. This must be Chinese answer to Tibetans’ middle way. Good start!
the concept of the so-called “new aristocracy” needs to be further analyzed. If the local ethnic Tibetan officials do not have legitimacy, as suggested in the paper, and the exile government is not regarded as an alternative, who should have the legitimacy in Tibet government? Better educated, more virtuous over-ruling Chinese? That sounds familiar if you know a bit of colonialist history or what Chinese have been doing over the past 50-60 years in non-Chinese minority regions.
June 4th, 2009 at 12:47 am
“Unfortunately, the offical language in China is Chinese, and if the Tibetans want to get a decent job, maybe they have to learn speakable Chinese. Whether learning Tibetan or not, it is up to them to learn it.”
Being a minority in my country, I think the above statement sounds too arrogance and chauvinist. 这是一个五千年文明央央大国该有的气派吗?
Hey, everyone is watching.
June 4th, 2009 at 1:01 am
Charles and pug-ster
You should come and visit Australia, the land of real wonder. We treat our aborigines brothers and sisters much much better.
1 Learning English is not compulsory for the aborigines people, they can learn their own language in the school. Since there are so many different tribes and each has its own language, every school actually offers language courses for at least 5 of them. If an aborigines only speaks his own tribe language, he can still finding a well-paid job. Yeah, no problem at all, unlike what’s in USA and China.
2 We preserve and respect their culture well. The aborigines don’t like to dress up, so basically, you can see naked(or half-naked) aborigines CEOs in office buildings. And sometimes, we also take our clothes off in front of them to show our respect and friendship.
3 A huge portion of aborigines don’t like to live in the cities and they choose to be isolated from our civilisation, so we allow them to live in the wild and we don’t bother them anymore. We are so nice that we claimed we had killed these aborigines so people from outside won’t intervene with them, hence preserving the aborigines culture. I think the USA is doing the same good deed, so China has much to learn from us!
June 4th, 2009 at 1:38 am
@ pug_ster
“Unfortunately, the offical language in China is Chinese, and if the Tibetans want to get a decent job, maybe they have to learn speakable Chinese.”
Fortunately, the Constitution of PRC say otherwise. It says every nationality has the rights to use her mother-tongue language in national autonomous regions. And nobody is asking for allowing using minority’s language use outside the autonomous region, it seems you are not clear about that.
It’s not only China that has many different nationalities and languages. Look at Belgium, Switzerland and lots of other countries have different languages, no majority language is replacing minority language, and that’s not a problem for them. Chinese is in Chinese language call Hanyu, and is the language of Han nationality. Just because Hans outnumbered other nationalities won’t give Hans the rights to oppress the other nationalities’ rights to live with their own mother-tongue language in their own hometown. Japanese used to teach Japanese in eastern China and oppressed the local people’s rights to use their own language for a living. You may say they are foreign invaders. But then, why can’t Chinese government do better than an invader did, for their own people?
And the founders of the nation recognized the importance of minority’s rights and put it on the Constitution, yet later coming arrogant Hans like you ignored the Constitution and violated the basic rights of the country’s Tibetan citizen and other minorities. As a result, social instability came, and again your kind of people blame it on DL and western force instead of looking for alternative possible reasons.
Are you again comparing your situation in USA with Tibetans’ situation in Tibet? If so, S.K. Cheung has already answered you.
About the culture part, think more before you spew another anti-Tibetan words.
June 4th, 2009 at 2:04 am
@The Old guy,
I seriously think you should take a chill pill as you take personally of what I said. You don’t even know me yet you seem already putting words in my mouth and you seem to know what I think. You should read admin’s thread about Call of comments and code of conduct by talking my post and not the poster. Since you don’t want a civil debate, I have nothing to say to you because I deal with immature and self-righteous people everyday.
June 4th, 2009 at 2:14 am
@Charles Liu #27,
“US the Native Americans as a group has the highest unemployment rate in US, and if they want jobs they’ll have to learn English, move out of his desolate reservation and join white people’s society, and leave his culture, heritage, behind.”
Huh? Since you are an American, I would have thought you’d be aware that basically all American Indian people in the U.S., except for a few elderly persons, are native English speakers. There is a high level of unemployment among a lot of American Indian groups, but this is not caused by a failure to speak English.
June 4th, 2009 at 2:33 am
“all American Indian people in the U.S., except for a few elderly persons, are native English speakers.”
Do you mean that their culture was already gone ?
_______________________________________—
Bridge,
You should go to China to see how han chinese have been living peacefully with other minority.
Without people like you stirring the pot, we wouldve had no problem with Tibeten people.
June 4th, 2009 at 2:37 am
Bridge says “So we allow them to live in the wild….”
Who you are to allow or disallow where the aborigine lives? Is this what can we learn from Auatralia, to dictate where the aborigines should live?
June 4th, 2009 at 3:01 am
Rhan,
(He’s pulling your leg.)
June 4th, 2009 at 3:12 am
@Rhan 30
Being a minority in my country, I think the above statement sounds too arrogance and chauvinist. 这是一个五千年文明央央大国该有的气派吗?
Hey, everyone is watching.
Thus the reason why it sucks to be the minority….
June 4th, 2009 at 4:26 am
@ pug_ster,
I have been reading and following the threads since as early as beginning of this blog. So, I clearly know who you are and what you think. And don’t lecture me if you can not answer my points. Don’t avoid questions, if you can not answer, just admit it.
June 4th, 2009 at 4:39 am
@ pug_ster,
“Siince you don’t want a civil debate, I have nothing to say to you because I deal with immature and self-righteous people everyday.”
Can you point out some points where I did start an uncivil debate in my post? I can compile a book with list of your uncivil words from your posts.
“I deal with immature and self-righteous people everyday.”
Aren’t you, too, too self-righteous to decide which are uncivil debates and who are immature posters?
June 4th, 2009 at 4:40 am
@The Old Guy
So, I clearly know who you are and what you think.
Like I said, self-righteous is the word that comes to mind. That’s why I have nothing to say.
June 4th, 2009 at 4:50 am
@ pug_ster
“Like I said, self-righteous is the word that comes to mind. That’s why I have nothing to say.”
You debate until you realize that your own logic and reasons have slowly framed you. When that comes, then you simply declare that the opponent is an “anti-China” or a “self-righteous” and call on others to denounce him/her, and will ask admin to ban him/her.
So, I take your above sentence as a sign that you are run out of humanly reasons and intellectual logic, once more.
June 4th, 2009 at 5:04 am
@The Old Guy,
Just because you said a statement that is anti-China, I don’t assume that you are anti-China in general because if I did that, I would be profiling you and that would be unfair. I’ve made some pro-China comments here and because of that you assumed that you know what I think. I don’t think it is fair because I believe you are profiling me. That’s why when you start making assumptions of what I said and that is the reason why I call you self-righteous.
June 4th, 2009 at 5:34 am
I thought this was an intriguing report, and achieves something that, although probably imperfect, is still a laudable first attempt. So why is no one talking about the report? Instead, in the first 40 some-odd posts, it’s back to the old stand-by’s of comparing China to the US, the bemoaning of the abhorrent plight of Chinese in the US, sarcastic comparisons to Australia, etc. If this was a Pavlovian experiment, “Tibet” would be the bell, and some of you would be…well, you get the idea.
To Pugster:
I’ve read Old Guy’s #32 twice, and I can’t see where he’s so offended your sensibilities. If that offended you, then you’d best avert your eyes to about half the stuff around here. And you know, if he misquoted you, or misrepresented what you said, the easy thing would simply be to correct him, or clarify your own point, and move on. This whining about “putting words into your mouth” is unbecoming, and does make it seem like you’re throwing in the towel without the decency to admit as much.
June 4th, 2009 at 6:42 am
@ pug_ster
“I’ve made some pro-China comments here and because of that you assumed that you know what I think.”
Not necessarily. However, as I said earlier, I have been following the threads on this blog for more than one year, and all this time I have never missed the majority comments of those representative figures on this forum, including you. So, as much as you are entitled to decide whether I am “self-righteous” or not, that much I am entitled to say I know your position when you talk on this forum.
However, I appreciate that you have changed your tone towards me already. We are all human being with emotion, when someone hurts your feeling, you will also try to pay your bite back. Unfortunately, this fact sometimes lead all parties to extreme side, and that’s when we all start to lose our human inner goodness.
June 4th, 2009 at 7:24 am
@ bridge.
I am posting from sydney. How are Aborigines treated here? 200 years after white men landed on the continent, Aborigines’ life span is 20 years shorter than the rest of population. Aborigines CEOs? Never heard of. Aborigines have shockingly high unemplyment. Aborigines have a reputation of child sex abuse and alcoholism. Yes, they are still seen half naked on the TV. They live in isolation among rubbish. Many branches of aboriginal language have died out……The rest of the world knows this? Why I do not see anyfinger pointing at the Australian government by our big brother the US of A? There is no calls to “Free Australia” or return native land which is entire Australia to aborigines. As far as I know the USA’s NGOs are not interested to look after Aborigines human rights. When Aborigines riorted it was all their fault. The stupid government of China should send a study team to Australia immediately to learn! The Northern Territory invented by Australian government is a great idea to learn first. Just draw a small piece of land in north part of the TAR and put whoever wants autonomy there and let them live free life under Dalai Lama. I am off night shift and mentally drained because I do not get much sleep during day time but I still have this great idea! They should employ me to do the job! I will get them out of trouble immediately by copying Australian policies.
June 4th, 2009 at 7:31 am
Here we go…yet again. Let’s not talk about China, even though this blog is ostensibly for that purpose. Let’s talk about China as she compares to Australia. Y’know, maybe when China is down under learning about treatment of Aboriginals (which sounds not so much like a shining example), she could learn a thing or two about parliamentary democracy to boot, and start implementing that besides.
June 4th, 2009 at 10:06 am
Kui, maybe you’re not monitoring responses to your thread entitled “A recollection of the 1989 student movement in Tianjin”, but I recently posed the following question to you:
“OK kui, can you identify the “Australian high school textbook” and the offending page that cites “thousands killed by the communist government”? I’m sure I’m not the only one who’d like to know what it’s called and where it fits into the Australian school syllabus.”
Maybe you can pop back over there and answer the question. Thanks, Barny.
June 4th, 2009 at 1:03 pm
Criticism is NOT an academic exercise of the “kettle calling the pot black”.
The Kettle gets called on to answer in comparison.
June 4th, 2009 at 6:57 pm
@KHan
“China could and should do better than America and Malaysia”
Yes, and it is already the fact for many years. It was actually the Tibetan exiles that did not teach native Tibetan language to their kids until fairly recent, before that they only used English in their schools in India.
Below is a segment from Wiki article on Tibetan language.
Note: English is a official and standard language in US, and China uses Chinese the same way.
“Chinese sources claim that in much of Tibet, primary education is conducted either primarily or entirely in the Tibetan language, and bilingual education is rarely introduced before students reach middle school. However, Chinese is the language of instruction of most Tibetan secondary schools. Students that continue on to tertiary education have the option of studying humanistic disciplines in Tibetan at a number of Minority colleges in China.[3] This contrasts with Tibetan schools in Dharamsala, India, where the Ministry of Human Resource Development curriculum requires academic subjects be taught in English beginning in middle school.[4] Literacy and enrollment rates continue to be the main concern of the Chinese government. A large proportion of the adult population in Tibet remains illiterate, and despite compulsory education policies, many parents in rural areas are unable to send their children to school.
In February 2008 Norman Baker UK MP, released a statement to mark International Mother Language Day saying “The Chinese government are following a deliberate policy of extinguishing all that is Tibetan, including their own language in their own country. It may be obvious, but Tibetan should be the official language of Tibet. The world must act. Time is running out for Tibet.” The rights of Tibetans, under Article 5 of the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity are to “express themselves and to create and disseminate their work in the language of their choice, and particularly in their mother tongue”, as well as being “entitled to quality education and training that fully respect their cultural identity”.
Some scholars have questioned this claim, however, as most Tibetans continue to reside in rural areas where Chinese is rarely spoken. Lhasa and other Tibetan cities have now become largely Chinese. In the Texas Journal of International Law, Barry Sautman stated that “none of the many recent studies of endangered languages deems Tibetan to be imperiled, and language maintenance among Tibetans contrasts with language loss even in the remote areas of Western states renowned for liberal policies…claims that primary schools in Tibet teach putonghua are in error. Tibetan was the main language of instruction in 98% of TAR primary schools in 1996; today, putonghua is introduced in early grades only in urban schools…Because less than four out of ten TAR Tibetans reach secondary school, primary school matters most for their cultural formation.”[5] On the other hand, Tibetans in India have noted a decline in the linguistic performance of newly arrived refugees fleeing their homeland.
Tibetologist Elliot Sperling has also noted that “within certain limits in the PRC does make efforts to accommodate Tibetan cultural expression” and “the cultural activity taking place all over the Tibetan plateau cannot be ignored.”[6]”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tibetan_language
June 4th, 2009 at 7:17 pm
@Hohhot
“the concept of the so-called “new aristocracy” needs to be further analyzed. If the local ethnic Tibetan officials do not have legitimacy, as suggested in the paper, and the exile government is not regarded as an alternative, who should have the legitimacy in Tibet government? Better educated, more virtuous over-ruling Chinese? ”
Actually, Tibet will be able to get better and better managed and governed by native Tibetans as they improved their expereince and skills. The so-called “new aristocracy” is a notion overblown. Leadership is a natural process of selection, those who perform will stay, as Chinese government is so focused on performance of its offcials and civil servants.
On the other hand, Tibetan exiles can better use their time and skills by returning to Tibet and extending a helpful hand to their native brothers and sisters, instead of sitting in a comfortable enviornment in western countries and making loud noises.
June 4th, 2009 at 11:39 pm
This is a condensed version of my e-mail with my high school classmate who is a teacher in Canada:
A few students from each one of my classes are Chinese students who came from China (mostly from 福建) only a year ago or even a few months ago. They’re 16, 17, 18 and a couple of them are 19 and 20 years old. Very shockingly, they have never even heard about TSM from their parents or from their teachers back home in China. Can you guys just f@#king believe this??? Just like how we were not taught or told about the Rape of Nanking when we were in high school. Aahh, two thumbs down to that hush-hush traditional Chinese mentality, 一代過一代!! They had no idea what had happened in Beijing 20 years ago until I educated them this morning. Nobody has ever told them about this while growing up in China!. I guess news media about June 4th Incident in China vanished without a trace very quickly and conveniently, taken over by the rapid economic growth and materialistic pursuits by all. The painful, shameful past diminished and all erased in the minds of the majority, just like what happens when brand new ownerships take over belly-up companies in our modern world. People in China, are basically 向錢看 and not 向前看. There’s a real lack of morale and loyalty when it comes to $$$$$$$$$. I believe lots of corruptions would naturally take place either discreetly or even openly and it will only keep on spreading. May be it has become somewhat socially acceptable even?! Aahh, a 5,000 year old culture….the vicious cycle or circle of life in our ‘dear’ homeland?!
June 5th, 2009 at 1:03 am
Otto 37, Bridge did that? Oh, I am so naïve.
pug_ster 38, I know but I can’t sit here and do nothing right?
Shane 50, I read what you paste here before, Chinese lack propaganda and rhetoric skill although we may know the facts well.
June 5th, 2009 at 1:03 am
@TonyP4
That is a typical reaction from those living outside of China and fed with western forms of ideologies when they grow up. They seem to totally forget the enormous challenges Western societies are facing nowadays, and they still think comfortably that they are living in a “paradise” in comparison to China, when actually the grounds are shaking under their feet. They thought Chinese do not have aspiration to better their spirits and culture and improve on their dreams along the way of prosperity. They will be suprised again once more in near future.
The fact that openly making crack-down on corruption as an important part of Chinese political life is a sign of social progress in modern China. Those from UK saw recently how corrupt their MPs are, that is just a tip of iceberge. Those who stay in California, US knew how volunerable for years the state has been, and now is more than ever that the state faces over 30 billion dollars hole and is in danger of insolvency. California for years has been a pet model of ultra-democractic liberalists, in which they intend to legalize everything (you name it), including corruption and incompetency. Their utopia is coming to an end now.
>> “Very shockingly, they have never even heard about TSM from their parents or from their teachers back home in China.”
It is true that June-4th of 1989 is a political taboo in public place. It got its notoriety because of its scale and the number of people killed during the unrest. But what is wrong by moving on from a bad event. It’s like burying the dead in tombs and move on. People’s memory are selective by nature. Some people like to remeber their dead family members, some just want to forget about past bad experience. So what?!
How many people in the west knew there were several small scale political events before June-4th of 1989 in recent Chinese history? How many people in the west knew those events that were far more bad, horrible and important than the June-4th of 1989 during the last 200 years of Chinese history? Are they saying much about them, or just be selective and narrowly interested in June-4th of 1989 ?
June 5th, 2009 at 2:51 am
I happened to notice a similar observation mentioned on Xujun Eberlein’s blog a couple months ago: “Among the so-called ’emancipated serfs,’ there is a small group of them who actually possess the ‘right to speak,’ and they are Tibet’s new noblemen. This interest group of Tibetans would never want to hand over their power, therefore they support the CCP. Though they are a small portion from the serf class, they are a quite powerful and dependable force for the CCP.”
June 5th, 2009 at 6:32 am
To Shane:
“But what is wrong by moving on from a bad event. It’s like burying the dead in tombs and move on ” -don’t you go and pay homage to your ancestors’ grave sites at least once a year, every May?
June 5th, 2009 at 12:59 pm
If we do not learn from history, we most likely repeat history. We need to learn from bad events, but not to bury them. I accuse the Japanese of changing history of the Raping of Nanjing. Now, we have one in our backyard.
I hope all the Chinese apologists will read the book ‘ugly Chinese’ by a Taiwanese author and it applies to mainlanders as well. It has a lot of truths in it. Personally I am guilty as charged. However, I admit my problems, learn from them, and never repeat them. Can it be more simpler than this?
Compared to Mao’s miserable era when millions died because of bad governance, CCP is doing a good job to lift millions from poverty (thanks to Deng and US playing China card against Russia instead of India card). However, CCP has to do same: admit errors, learn from them, and never repeat them.
Dumb nationalism is not patriotic, but just dumb!
June 5th, 2009 at 4:50 pm
@TonyP4
It’s okay to be criticial of your countrymen. But my previous point is that you and many other living abroad did not get the whole picture.
It is true that the current government is playing a strong hand on public media by shielding mainland Chinese from foreign disturbance and interference at CERTAIN critical point of time. There are some good modern and historical reasons for this. I don’t think you can call someone who understand the whole picture a “apologist”.
To a large number of Chinese public, they now can afford the oppertunities to travel to HK, Taiwan and many foreign countries and communicate broadly on Internet with friends and strangers alike. It is native to think Chinese public do not know their own history and only liston to the government nowadays. The fact is that many Chinese are very criticial of their government on many aspects, yet on the hand, they don’t like foreigners to interfere their way of living, as well as on national unity issues. I have to often take pain to explain to those who don’t live in China and don’t understand how China works, 1) Chinese nowadays are very apolitical and cynical about any form of political movement (in a strong contrast to place like Taiwan or countries like US and European ones) 2) the educated population (both young and old) have been constantly pushing for social progress with concrete actions, and 3) the government has been keenly aware of their demands and making adjustment, and sometimes play guidance to direct this energy to a positive direction. Think about, if the government in 1989 was as smart as the current one, bad thing will not happen.
So understanding your countryman better before waging your fingers
June 5th, 2009 at 5:20 pm
The fact is that many Chinese are very criticial of their government on many aspects, yet on the hand, they don’t like foreigners to interfere their way of living, as well as on national unity issues.
Exactly, Shane9219,
Like 6/4, I want to talk about it with Chinese whose priority in their mind is making China better, but I am very suspicious of West politicians and Media and those who nonstop talk about ” human right “.
WE WERE USED ONCE IN 1989, AND I DONT WANT TO BE USED AGAIN.
June 5th, 2009 at 6:46 pm
This is an article on Osel Hita Torres, a Spaniard chosen by 14th Dalai Lama as a reincarnation of a high Lama.
Boy chosen by Dalai Lama turns back on Buddhist order
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/31/dalai-lama-osel-hita-torres
“As a toddler, he was put on a throne and worshipped by monks who treated him like a god. But the boy chosen by the Dalai Lama as a reincarnation of a spiritual leader has caused consternation – and some embarrassment – for Tibetan Buddhists by turning his back on the order that had such high hopes for him.
Instead of leading a monastic life, Osel Hita Torres now sports baggy trousers and long hair, and is more likely to quote Jimi Hendrix than Buddha.
Yesterday he bemoaned the misery of a youth deprived of television, football and girls. Movies were also forbidden – except for a sanctioned screening of The Golden Child starring Eddie Murphy, about a kidnapped child lama with magical powers. “I never felt like that boy,” he said”
June 6th, 2009 at 2:36 am
“Osel Hita Torres”,
Case study in Tibetan Buddhism Brainwashing.
June 6th, 2009 at 2:49 am
It seems certain pages of this website is stopped again. I’m happy the Chinese government follows the correct path and shields the public from foreign information during these perilous times. Unlike other one-party states, it’s done completely for the people and will lead to a perfect democracy in the future that exhibits Chinese characteristics and no horrid Western ones.
June 6th, 2009 at 3:15 am
It’s simple propaganda.
Interesting to know that NOT 1 “dissident” said anything about the selective racist prosecution of Wen Ho Lee by the US government.
Yeah, I’m sure those “grants” they were getting from NED had something to do with it.
*What most people don’t know is, many other Asians in US were similarly victims of selective prosecution as Wen Ho Lee, without any hope of redress. (Not just Chinese, but Japanese Americans as well.) Some had prison times, some were interrogated and deported.
1 case was even about a Chinese “dissident” who worked with FBI to track down illegal technology exporters in US, and ended up being the scapegoat for the FBI handler. He got deported back to China.
June 6th, 2009 at 3:27 am
Anyone who has seen how Wen Ho Lee was convicted by the US Media, and imprisoned by the government of the “People”, can easily see how easily the “Free Press” uses rumors and innuendos to destroy Truth and Livelihood.
There is no counterbalance against the Western Media in the world today.
Chinese government must defend China against such destructive influence. “Dissidents” have no interests in defending the likes of Wen Ho Lee. It is obvious that when the cause of violation conflicts with their “funding”, they do not stand with the Victim.
You can go search http://www.wenholee.org and see if you can find any “dissidents” on the list of signatures supporting Wen Ho Lee. You will NOT!
That alone tells me that these “dissidents” have no concept of “human rights”. They were in it for themselves.
June 6th, 2009 at 3:29 am
@raventhorn4000: Please don’t forget that there are more than 300 million inhabitants of the US. Everyone can’t get what they want from the government. There are injustices everywhere.
June 6th, 2009 at 3:39 am
Wukailong,
some seem to want more expedient justice from China than US.
June 6th, 2009 at 4:02 am
@Wukailong #62: Err… that was strange you feeling all right?
June 6th, 2009 at 4:08 am
@admin: I’m still reading the translation above post but want to say at the outset I really appreciate the work of you and the translators.
BTW, There’s either something funny going on from posts 62 to 66 or Wukailong has a heavy fever.
June 6th, 2009 at 4:23 am
@Ted: Don’t worry about me. 🙂 I was kidding with some of the arguments put forth on this thread. But raventhorn’s last comment makes sense – it’s better to be like Amnesty, finding faults with all countries and not just one, though I think some of China’s critics are doing just that.
Going back to the topic at hand, I agree that admin and others have done a great job on this report. I skimmed it through in Chinese earlier on and was impressed by the willingness of the original writers to see it from a Tibetan perspective. I’ve never been a fan of conspiracy theories explaining riots and demonstrations with small, evil cliques pulling the strings. 3.14, like 6.4, have their complex historical roots. I don’t think something like 6.4 would happen again, but a reenactment of 3.14 might come again in 10 years, which is a very sad thing.
June 6th, 2009 at 4:30 am
@TonyP4 57,
That’s an interesting book. I think the main problem with many of the people involved who took part of the TAM square protests is that they had no regrets or remorse about it. It is not just the Students, but the workers, soldiers, leaders, etc… I’m sure that some of them did something wrong but they refuse to admit guilt, remorse, and maybe even ashamed to talk about it, and it seems okay for the government to censor it. The Western Media is actually making it worse by shaming China even more.
It is good that the government start that they start to talk about it. I think the next step is to talk about the emotional part of it. I think that maybe the next ‘healing’ step is for all the people involved (Soldiers, workers, leaders, students, etc) who are involved in this incident to have a frank discussion in hopes of trying to reach a understanding and admitting their wrongs in this protest with good intentions that gone tragic, and maybe asking each other forgiveness. Unfortunately, to ask someone to forgive is seen as weak in Chinese culture because you are admitting that you are guilty. This incident has happened 20 years ago and we whatever happened has happened already. We should not punish any more people and it is probably better to bury the hatchet to move on.
June 6th, 2009 at 4:44 am
TonyP4,
The book “Ugly Chinese” was authored by Bo Yang. It was a very popular book in China in the 80s, especially in colleges. It arguably had contributed to the 6/4. I was subsequently banned until a few years ago.
I read it and some of Bo Yang’s revisionist Chinese history books long ago. It made quite a strong impression on me when i was a younger man. I give credit to him of his fresh way to look at history, and prompting me to read up a lot of Chinese and Western histories. Bo was locked up for near a decade in Taiwan. As an older man who has had the life experience of living in Chinese and Western societies and the knowledge to a wider spectrum of topics, I tend to think his central premises are all fundamentally wrong. His imprisionment drove him angry, and he being a Manchu, just couldn’t blame the decline of China on late Qing alone — he had to drag down the whole Chinese civilization.
In recent years, “Ugly Chinese” has been allowed to be reprinted again in mainland. In the 80s youngsters would be enthralled by the stories told by those who were lucky enough to travel overseas, and fantasize what a wonderful world the outside was. Nowadays you can see Chinese practically everywhere in the world. The younger generation reads Bo Yang’s book, probably has more a “huh?” type of reaction.
Look at Yao Ming. Chances are he hasn’t read the book yet, given that it was banned when he grew up. But can you see this so-called “post-80” young Chinese man, as ugly? Ancient Chinese said, “仓廪实而知礼节，衣食足而知荣辱”. Materialistic adequacy tends to produce better human beings overall, in China, or in any country.
June 6th, 2009 at 5:16 am
@raventhorn4000 #64
Actually there is. Al Jazeera is one. It turns the game around and now the US is seemed as the one that is actively stop its availability in the main cable/satellite distribution. You don’t need to be a victim per se, just need to play the game better…
In an unrelated but similar note, for the longest time, it’s only the 3 major US-based credit rating agencies giving out sovereignty ratings on other countries. Now both Brazil and China will start their own credit rating agencies. It’ll very interesting to see what the rating of US government bonds would be. Somehow I think the UK government bonds may be rated as junks.
June 6th, 2009 at 7:18 am
To Shane:
“1) Chinese nowadays are very apolitical and cynical about any form of political movement” – if that’s the case, and the CCP must know this since they somehow have their finger on the pulse of the nation without ever having to ask, why the need to shut down the 6/4 discussion and censor the internet even more than usual on a milestone anniversary? Why not just allow a free exchange, since people wouldn’t bother anyhow? It seems like common sense that you only shut something down to prevent it from happening, and the reason why you want to actively prevent something from happening is if you have reason to believe that it might actually happen.
June 6th, 2009 at 9:29 am
@Wukailong: opps sorry about that, guess I was reading things too literally 😉
June 6th, 2009 at 9:17 pm
14th Dalai Lama keeps on his trick …
14th DL is now in Paris. He said his European trip is non-political, yet beyond what he already said at previous European countries, here is what said when arriving Paris:
“”Since March 2008 I have the feeling that a very old nation and its heritage and culture have received a death sentence,” he told reporters at Paris airport on his arrival.
The Chinese government makes a hard line policy, but the Chinese people are ignorant of the situation. The international community must go there to investigate, without restrictions.”
After 50 years of exile, probably he is the one igorant of Tibet situation than anyone else. The trick he got under his hat is to keep lobbying and begging Europeans to stand by his separatist cause, he forgot that it is the old European that robbed the world and caused so much goe-political troubles in the first place. More ironically, even UK politicians chose to distance them from his cause last year.
June 7th, 2009 at 3:25 am
JXie,
“Actually there is. Al Jazeera is one.”
Yeah, sometimes. Except until US “bombs” them by “mistake”, like they did with the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.
Now, I wonder what US Media would say about China if China “mistakenly” bombed a Associated Press building??
June 7th, 2009 at 4:27 am
Raventhorn4000,
But after the “accidental” bombing (who are we kidding?) of the Al Jazeera office in Kabul, AJ continued its edgy on the ground reporting in ME that you simply couldn’t find in any of the major Western news outfits. Nowadays if all major US and UK news outfits report a story in ME one way, and AJ reports the other way. I think majority of the people worldwide (outside of the US/UK), if not the overwhelming majority of the people would believe AJ’s version. You earn that with your blood, and your perseverance.
After the 1989, China’s worldwide reputation was at an all-time low. At one point the American president told the Chinese president about “the wrong side of the history” and very few in the world felt anything wrong with. Yet today reputation-wise the 2 are reasonably shoulder to shoulder. As hard as it is to take the “mistaken” Belgrade embassy bombing, it was a turning point between the 2 nations. The world is watching, and knows the wrong and the right.
Like the recent way over-the-top Western news blitz of the 20th TAM anniversary, and the hypocrisy of the US government — yeah China needs to be reminded for something happened 20 years ago when yesterday’s Abu Ghraib pictures can’t be released — can only do wonder to the worldwide opinion on China.
Now, how exactly do you propose to bomb an AP building “mistakenly”? Life is never fair — you work very hard to make it to your favor.
June 7th, 2009 at 6:14 am
“American president told the Chinese president about “the wrong side of the history””
I remembered Clinton said that to Jiang with a stern voice and equally disgusting looking. Clinton was brilliant president, but also rude and arrogant. When he arrived in Beijing, it was Hu who welcomed him at the airport, but he simply made a node to Hu and then stepped into his limos, leaving Hu standing in the cold alone for over 10-min to see him off (he probably treated Hu like a US marine when he got off Air Force One). However, when Clinton finished his presidency and deep in debt, Hu and Wen treated him very well, let Clinton do multiple talks in Shenzhen and HongKong and collected some fat speech fees. All these was done when Clinton was in his low point and no market whatsoever in US for him.
President Obama also tried a stern voice (to China ?) during his inauguration, but quickly toned down his hash rhetoric afterward, so did his Treasure secretary. What a political drama!
June 7th, 2009 at 10:32 am
SKC (73)
Good suggestion.
June 7th, 2009 at 9:45 pm
To Raj:
oh well, Shane doesn’t seem to wanna go there. For unknown reasons.
June 7th, 2009 at 11:46 pm
“But after the “accidental” bombing (who are we kidding?) of the Al Jazeera office in Kabul, AJ continued its edgy on the ground reporting in ME that you simply couldn’t find in any of the major Western news outfits. Nowadays if all major US and UK news outfits report a story in ME one way, and AJ reports the other way. I think majority of the people worldwide (outside of the US/UK), if not the overwhelming majority of the people would believe AJ’s version. You earn that with your blood, and your perseverance.”
Doesn’t say much about the moral authority of those who did the bombing, does it?
June 8th, 2009 at 12:19 am
@SKC & Raj
To answer your question and very simply put, because those who made the decisions on that day are still alive today and to do so will reopen old wounds and especially old divisions, for once the discussions are underway, people’s tendency to allocate blame will inevitably come to the fore. That would be largely pointless and counter-productive in the greater scheme of things at the moment, particularly when the focus should be on the current economic problems and the resulting varied social problems.
In fact, having read many mainland Chinese language forums, while there are alot of curiosity as well as discussions about 6-4 among the younger generations, I find that there are no huge demand for a public examination of the events and even many such as myself who have witnessed the actual event remain ambiguous and is unconvinced of the benefit of such a course of action at this time. In fact I find it rather ironic that it is often those, ie foreigners and non-mainland Chinese, least impacted by the actual events itself who make the loudest noise. And my question is why?
Personally, after twenty years I have very little sympathy or patience for the main exiled student leaders. I much rather save it in rememberance of the bravery and the sacrifice of the ordinary people who died protecting them and the young ordinary soldiers who did their duty and lost their innocence in doing so. I wonder if these exiled student leaders have ever spared a thought for these people.
June 8th, 2009 at 5:06 am
To Oli:
“to do so will reopen old wounds and especially old divisions, for once the discussions are underway, people’s tendency to allocate blame will inevitably come to the fore.”
— I see what you’re saying, even if I don’t agree with it. How I interpreted Shane’s remark was that the CCP was suppressing discussion because there was no public interest for said discussion. That makes no sense to me at all. If I understand you properly, there may well be an interest to undertake such a discussion, but such a discussion might derail the pursuit of current and future priorities. Hence the CCP efforts at suppression thereof. If I interpreted poorly, well, I’m sure you’ll let me know. But that actually makes sense.
That being said, I don’t agree with it. First, it suggests that Chinese society cannot at once pursue continued economic growth, while openly examining a significant prior event. Why would that be?
Second, why must such an examination await the bucket-kicking of the main characters? Would CHina be circa 1989 tomorrow if the discussion were opened today?
And finally, if there is a demand among the people, is it reasonable for the government to suppress them, against their potential wishes?
June 8th, 2009 at 6:39 am
@SKC
Whether you agree or disagree with my personal interpretation of China’s current mood with regards to TAM is pretty much irrelevant as it hinges on your knowledge or non-knowledge as it may be of contemporary China and the projection of your own set of values unto what YOU THINK ought to be done under the circumstances.
While there is curiosity and discussions among the younger generations on the internet, however obliquely or in private, currently within the society as a whole there is no noticeable upswell in demand for an examination a la South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The reasons are manifold and includes the society’s and the government’s pre-occupation with continuing development, the current economic conditions as well as the fact that many who witness or participated in those events, like myself and many who I have spoken to, have more or less come to understand them for what they are and the context and circumstances in which those events took place. In fact, they are currently doing precisely all that the demonstrators twenty years ago demonstrated for in order to be allowed to do. And non-mainland Chinese and foreigners wonder why there has been no urge to revisit TAM?
For examples which you may find easier to empathise with, I suggest you look at the N. Ireland example of how compromises were made not to persecute and press Sinn Fein and the IRA to account for all the unresolved sectarian killings or force them to submit to an independently verifiable accounting of the weapons decomissioned in favour of embedding Sinn Fein in the peace process and a lasting chance at peace. I suggest you look at unified Germany’s reluctance to persecute each and every DDR era Stasi officer, how Allied occupation forces in the end employed many ex-Nazis and ex-Baathist to rebuild West Germany and Iraq and its efforts during the Cold War or how French Normandy civilian deaths and rape at the hand of Allied forces were hushed up in favour of defeating Nazi Germany.
Making a choice not to do so does not denote an inability to undertake the other at the same time. It is simply a choice that the government or an individual have made according to what THEY believe is best. To imply otherwise not only hint at an inability to see beyond one’s limited perspective on the human nature of those not of one’s own, but also an inability to empathise with other people’s circumstances and priorities. Consequently, yours and other foreigners and non-mainland Chinese’ agreement or disagreement with the Chinese government’s or an individual’s choice of priorities is irrelevant. Ultimately, who are you to decide what and how the Chinese society, its individuals or its government should prioritise their needs? Are you resident in China? Are you a Chinese taxpayer? Yet you profess to know what its people need? Spare us the preachy, lecturing claptrap that is redolent of Western liberal, well-meaning, but oh-so-misguided sanctimony. Seriously, haven’t we had enough of all that already? Talk of major cringe inducing level of ignorance and hypocrisy there.
Ultimately, unless you’re a five years old, I think you need to adjust your monochromatic perspective to include all the messy and uncomfortable moral grey areas of human history, otherwise conversing with an intellect as circularly refined as as yours is about as constructive as @*%$£ (feel free to insert whatever phrases you imagine I may be thinking lest you think I may be loosing it).
June 8th, 2009 at 7:37 am
To Oli:
I’m relieved that you had the wherewithal to at least acknowledge that the basis of your tiresome lecture is your personal opinion. For a second there, I thought I was living in the World According to Oli. Thankfully, such is not the case.
It seems that, on the one hand, you suggest that there is a desire for some open reckoning of the events. Then on the other, you’re back to the well-worn fall-back position that there’s nothing to see here. Which yet again begs the question, which you seemed to answer then proceed to un-answer (if there is such a thing; but if there isn’t, then congratulations, you just invented it): why suppress something that isn’t there? I think that would be a concept that translates well in just about any culture, or language.
As for your breadth of experience on TAM, it surely dwarfs mine. Nevertheless, it seems presumptuous to think that you, and those to whom you have spoken, represent the entire spectrum of opinion 20 years later. So, on that basis, if your point is that people have no desire to relive those events, that seems not much more compelling than someone saying that there is. Perhaps to you it does; but you should know that I’m beginning to value your opinion about as much as you value mine. At least on that, we can agree.
You’ve listed some nice examples of situations where two groups have made compromises for the greater good, and in so doing, perhaps turned the other cheek to some moral ambiguities. I’m as pragmatic as the next guy, and as you say, I can certainly empathize with those situations. But those situations have no parallel whatsoever to TAM, except perhaps in the hallowed halls of your own mind. Where have the compromises been following the TAM incident to merit your comparison? What of the negotiations, and quid pro quo? The PLA, at some point after 6/4, said okay, that oughtta do, and stood down. And then for 20 years, it officially never happened. That seems like a fairly unilateral approach to me…but hey, that’s just me.
Absolutely, making a choice not to do something in no way implies one’s inability to do said thing. However, in this case, as in many cases, the group making the choice is not the same as the group who have to abide by it. Yes, the government has indeed made a choice based on what they believe is best. If nothing else, the CCP can absolutely be counted upon to do exactly that, time and time again. I would surely not dream of implying otherwise, and as a result, am heartened by my apparent ability to empathize, as well as my resultant apparent new-found relevance. Of course, I would happily forgo any such relevance to see a society that allows her people to make choices for themselves, and not be treated, as you say, like five year-olds. Perhaps that’s something you share; perhaps not. No matter.
I am disappointed that a well-spoken individual of your ilk needs to resort to questioning a foreigner’s influence on Chinese policy. Clearly, I have none. But considering your zip code, perhaps you should be reminded that you have frightfully little either. So since we’re just talking here, maybe you can consider sparing me the sermon, already uttered many a time previously, by people of a lower pay-grade. It bores me, and demeans you. It has achieved both those things with remarkable efficiency. If one day, a Chinese resident or a CHinese taxpayer can actually, regularly, meaningfully, and freely influence the choices of their society and their government, that, to me, would be a good day indeed. As for what such a day would represent to you, I don’t know, and frankly could not give a damn. On that last point, I’m sure we also agree with each other.
So in the future, perhaps you can spare me your eloquent, but ultimately irrelevant, sentiments of my opinions. In the final analysis, you have been as successful in convincing me as I you. It hardly bothers me, since I’m just talking here. But if such a realization seems to affect you so, perhaps you should seek professional help, lest all that simmering anger and impatience cause some sort of meltdown which will subsequently deprive me and others of your continued words of infinite wisdom.
June 9th, 2009 at 2:27 am
@ SKC
LOL, Okey Dokey, let me deconstruct your waffle for you.
Para 1
Self-contradicting, gratuitous, rhetorical, irrelevant and misapplication of literary reference, possibly from not having read the work in question.
Para 2
Demonstrating an inability to read and comprehend by interpreting and conflating curiosity and discussions among the younger generations as being a general, nation wide “desire for some open reckoning of the events”.
An inability to identify, distinguish, not to mention understand the mood, feelings and priorities of different generations of the Chinese population.
Confusing official unwillingness to discuss the events, to avoid assigning blame to the parties involved, including the students themselves, with active government control of discussions of the events that are deliberately left ineffective and failing to see or understand the purpose of why this is so.
Para 3
Again failing to read or comprehend by persistently interpreting what I said through the prism of absolutism, nevermind contradicting yourself between para 1 and para 3 with regards to what you think I am supposed to have said. Thereby demonstrating an intellect that is incapable of grasping neither the concept of deliberate ambiguity or of moderated gradualism in societies, in government policies as well as in general discussions.
Para 4 & 5
Provides an insight into a mind that is insecure, unsophisticated, narrow and overly literal in scope. It requires everything to be spelled out and enacted out in tedious pro forma and in accordance with his own particularly set of values, dogma and political/social modus operandi that he’s accustomed to. It demonstrates a noticeable lack in the ability, nevermind the necessary tolerance, to contemplate or accept the possibility for another culture that is not of one’s own to have a different way of doing things. Particularly when reconciling their own social, political and historical issues and any accompanying ambiguities in order to come to a compromise in their own manner and in a way that suits them.
A tendency to view issues in static and simplistic freeze frames rather than an ever-evolving, living narrative. It speaks of an inability or politically-motivated unwillingness to see or understand how the Chinese society, the vast majority of the students and other demonstrators themselves have moved on and the way they’ve done so and what that says about their evolving perception and understanding of the events. Particularly when many of the same students who once demonstrated against the government are today themselves working in and for the government, both directly and indirectly and their understanding of the political and social necessity for the government’s stance, in spite of their often ambiguous feelings about it.
It shows an intellect that is unable to penetrate the superficial by failing to understand what the Chinese students and the population in general have long come to understand in the past twenty years. Namely that they have in fact won and the hardliners have lost. The students have got the vast majority of what they campaigned for, hence making an unwritten and undeclared compromise possible. This is one of the reasons why in today’s China TAM matter a lot less than to those outside of China who have persistently projected and interpreted the wrong set of values and notions unto the events themselves and misunderstanding the nature of the event itself.
Para 6
An intellectually damming tendency to make assumptions in the absence of facts and jumping to unsupported and unsubstantiated conclusion. An inability to contemplate or imagine situations and circumstances that is beyond one’s ken.
Judging by your rhetorical, but ultimately meaningless assertions, you obviously have very little understanding or experience of the many ways in which ordinary Chinese taxpayers, should they choose to, do actually affect government’s policies at any given level, both directly and indirectly, that is beyond direct elections and which, surprise, surprise may even include what is often regarded as an “un-free” Chinese press.
Consequently, maybe you would like to tell me what YOU think my “zip code” is since you obviously know me so well and we are such great buddies, LOL! Would it surprise you if I told you that I pay taxes in more than one country and one of which happens to be China? Does that then mean I have more of a right to question a foreigner’s say on Chinese policy, LOL! Or how about that that on average I sleep only 3-4 hrs a day and irregularly so, since you’ve obviously try to ascertain my country of residence based on the timing of my postings, LOL! How endearingly juvenile.
Para 7
Touche, what can I say, the paragraph speaks for itself.
June 9th, 2009 at 3:59 am
Just read the ‘recommendations’ made by the so called ‘research panel’ is mostly idealistic, result orientated and often one sided while ignoring the social, economic and political hurdles between the Hans and the Tibetans. Let me give you some examples in response to the recommendations.
1) While it is nice to respecting and protecting Tibetan rights and interest, how about the Tibetans do the same to the Hans?
2) While it is ideal to reduce poverty between rich and poor, and helping economic prosperity, it fail to mention on the steps of how to do it, as this statement is mostly results oriented.
3) Sounds like political policies that other regions in China doesn’t even follow, especially when they use the word ‘democracy.’
4) With the issue with the young Tibetans, the recommendations are mostly idealistic and result oriented. The government can only do so much to provide an education but it is up the Tibetans to educate themselves. While it is nice to provide the skills for the young Tibetans, good jobs might not be there unless there is an environment for it.
5) While is it nice to allow people religious freedom, China does not tolerate religion that support changing, challenging, or subverting the Chinese government.
6) When resolving problems in Tibet… question is totally idealistic way to approach things. While it is idealistic for 2 conflicting parties what they want, most of the time one of the parties won’t get what he/she want and sometimes neither parties will get what they want.
7) While there are local laws that should be respected, what if the laws conflict with the laws of the Chinese government?
8) You know, I actually agree with this one.
9) I agree with this, however, sometimes the Chinese government can do so much, but sometimes outside forces like the Dalai Lama and Western governments get in the way.
Like I said, it is not just the sole effort of the Chinese government to address these social and economic issues, but the Tibetans as well. But this ‘independent report’ doesn’t mention anything about that.
June 9th, 2009 at 5:21 am
To Oli:
you’re really quite a funny guy. You’re really starting to amuse me. Of course, it is also disappointing that, for a guy with that much time to dive into a dictionary, he can’t actually find time to respond to straight-forward questions. To each his own, I suppose.
Para 1 of 85 is in direct response to para 1 of 84. I’ve read the work in question, though it’s hardly evident that you have. And while you’ve clearly been busy with a thesaurus, it’s clear to me now that your only meager capacity is to flout words with no relevance to the context to which you purportedly refer.
Para 2 of 85 is also a direct response to para 2 of 84 (are you seeing a pattern here, or should I spell it out for you?) The only difference is that I made no suggestion of there being any “general nation-wide” anything. That’s ok, it’s easier to attack someone’s point when they never made it. What else can a guy expect from stuff like you. Of course, I leave it to folks like you who have the pulse of the Chinese nation in hand, while it’s suppressed. Ah, but the true pulse that would emerge in the absence of such silly suppression? I don’t think types like you can even conceive of such a thing, hence the blinkers, and the tunnel vision. So I should definitely defer to you to identify the “mood, feelings and priorities” of Chinese people whilst under the CCP’s boots, since that seems your one and only specialty. And believe you me, in that narrow construct, you rock.
“Confusing official unwillingness to discuss the events…with active government control…”
—this is your best work yet. And that’s saying something. You’ve now gone from ‘there is some desire for discussion, and hence the suppression’ in #82 to ‘there is no real desire for discussion, but there’s suppression all the same’ in #84, now to “the government is simply unwilling to discuss”. So, if the government is unwilling to discuss officially, are they willing to let the masses discuss amongst themselves? If so, why all the internet shutdowns on the eve of 6/4? And if not, why not? Oh yes, I’m sure it’s for the peoples’ own good, cuz if there’s one thing the CCP knows, it’s that the CCP knows best.
In para 3, if you want to see “the prism of absolutism”, you need only gaze into your nearest mirror. For you seem utterly convinced that your opinion and that of those to whom you have spoken aptly reflects that of all Chinese people. In furtherance of your zeal for absolutism, you also seem to believe that your understanding of the “context and circumstances” is the only possible one. So your “intellect”, such as it were, seems acutely intolerant of any dissenting opinion. Speaking of which, are you from China originally? Your mode of “thinking” seems oddly similar to a certain political party there.
“Provides an insight into a mind that is …overly literal in scope.”
— yes, that is definitely a limitation of mine. See, when people want to draw comparisons, I have this nagging tendency to insist that they compare apples with apples. I haven’t the abstract, and perhaps bordering on psychotic, mindset to routinely compare apples and oranges. That is a talent I’m glad you monopolize.
I must say, however, that my Chinese upbringing never exposed me to that unique cultural phenomenon of having the CCP decide what can and cannot be discussed, and what is and isn’t a part of history. Even now, that is a part of Chinese culture that I fail to grasp, despite learning of such from a noted authority such as you. I wonder, however, why a Chinese culture that apparently so abhors choice and discussion in CHina would be so demonstrably different than the CHinese culture in places like Hong Kong and Taiwan. No matter…I’m sure it’s a cultural aberration and has nothing to do with the mode of governance.
“This is one of the reasons why in today’s China TAM matter a lot less”
— which is precisely why the government needs to continue its suppression efforts. See, in Oli’s world, it makes perfect sense to suppress something that isn’t there. Must be cultural.
“you obviously have very little understanding or experience of the many ways in which ordinary Chinese taxpayers, should they choose to, do actually affect government’s policies at any given level, both directly and indirectly”
— you are completely correct here. Though I suspect that our understanding of a meaningful effect on government policies is probably widely disparate. Again, clearly, a cultural thing.
“Does that then mean I have more of a right to question a foreigner’s say on Chinese policy, LOL!”
— it seems that, for a guy who’s one-trick is to tell others to re-read stuff, you should also embark in same. I have no influence in China’s policy. And if you’re a taxpayer, apparently you think you do, which is as good an example of wishful thinking as you’ll ever see. But nowhere have I implied any right to question a foreigner’s opinion. Though clearly, that is something you take upon yourself already.
You know, the problem with you is not that you’re stupid, for someone has taught you English and you’ve been able to learn it well; it’s not that you’re necessarily illogical, save some apples and oranges comparisons, since you can construct a paragraph that is at least internally consistent, if not necessarily reflective of the preceding discussion that bore it; and it’s not that you lack factual knowledge, for you clearly in possession thereof. The problem with you is that you have a far-overinflated sense of self-importance that extraordinarily exceeds what can be remotely justifiable for a mere mortal, resulting in a complete dearth of tolerance for any opinion that even trivially deviates from your own. And your stereotypical response is to launch into a shower of useless verbiage that says in 10 sentences what could have been said in 1, the better to prove to yourself, if to no one else, that you are in fact in control and all must cower in the face of such a barrage of self-proclaimed intellect. The Achilles Heel, of course, is that your world exists only in the space between your ears, and has no real bearing on any points beyond.
June 9th, 2009 at 10:45 pm
SKC is always with the “apple and orange” thing.
Not enough or too much fruit in your diet?
Don’t talk about other people’s “problem”, stick with the issues.
It’s obvious that you have no valid arguments, and you divert the topic to talk about other People. (or how wordy they are getting).
I wouldn’t brag about your 1 liners as brevity.
Cat got your tongue? Or are you gagging on all that fruit?
June 10th, 2009 at 6:53 am
@ SKC
Consider the following as also my response to your posting in the other thread.
Firstly, with regard to the literary work in question, let’s just say Garp! to you too and set free the bears from the Hotel New Hampshire with a prayer for Owen Meany, in accordance with the Cider House rules and a pity for Dr. Tiller in hope that you don’t have your penis bitten off on your driveway while dressed in a bear costume, LOL!
Concerning your rant and without meaning to defend the Chinese government per se or know what motivate your intense antipathy towards said institution, it is clear that you remain deeply enmeshed in your outdated, monolithic perception of what you think the CCP and the Chinese government is today. Never mind your apparent narrow-minded discounting of the possible divergent and diversity of views within the CCP/government itself. Never mind the naturally differing quality, individualism and professionalism of the people working at various government levels, from the very best to the very worse that simply reflects the evolving nature of any society and system of governance. Never mind the constantly evolving Mainland Chinese and many Overseas Chinese’ attitude, perception and opinions of the Chinese government and society as well as that of foreign residents. To you the glass is not only half-empty, but unchangingly so and all opinion to the contrary are easily and stereotypically dismissed as being from people who have been “brainwashed” by the CCP or from people who know no better.
It is clear that you are a convinced anti-“Communist” ideologue who is so stuck in the past as to be little different from the American neo-cons you often appear to disparage. For when it comes to the CCP or the Chinese government, you are little different from Rush Limbaugh et al, no matter the more nuanced and different opinions placed before you from PRC citizens, foreign residents or those who are more in tune with the situation there. The irony is that while China and its government are progressing beyond ideological dogma in favour of a more pragmatic approach, you persist to interpret it through the prism of ideologies and an imperfect one at that.
The ultimate cliché of ironies is your failure to realize that the more you despise something, the more you become that which you think you despise, irrespective of all your superficially reasonable discourse and especially when your mask of civility fails after being pushed and challenged beyond your ethical and political comfort zone and convictions, as witnessed by your rant. In the end, when laid bare your attitude remains indistinguishable from other ideological zealots replete throughout history, with the only difference being in the ideologies that you seek to uphold.
It is particularly disappointing that for someone who professes to be in command of certain, ahem, intellectual nous, you persistently fail to demonstrate any iota of ability to perceive issues beyond the absolutism of black and white. In your perspective, your world must be very dull having missed out on the full spectrum of colours and grey areas of human existence and interaction. How disappointing also that in your moral and political Weltanschauung the flow is always either on or off without the ability or room for subtle moderation, adjustments or discernment.
This is clear from your inability to grasp or even attempt to grasp the ambiguities that necessary exists in every society when wrestling with contentious or divisive issues, irrespective of the different ways in which they approach or reconcile them and in spite of your lip service to the contrary. It seems this lack of intellectual dexterity and judgement along with your persistently one dimensional perspective is also carried over to your understanding and grasp of “Chinese culture”. Despite your assertion of having a Chinese background and upbringing, a claim which I incidentally find suspect, it is actually painfully obvious that it is your narrow Western education and experience that predominantly informs your ethos, Weltanschauung und Dasein.
You’ve singularly failed to realize that what you perceive or understand as Chinese culture is in fact Hong Kong/Canadian Chinese culture. Which despite many similarities can in fact be markedly different from that of Mainland China, never mind from the other Chinese cultures of Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore and beyond that have evolved with subtle differences since China’s century of socio-political convulsions, notwithstanding the beginning of a recent trend towards convergence in the last ten years with globalization and China’s continuing development. That within China, with its sheer size and physical, anthropological and socio-economical diversity similarly often renders the assumption of an uniform “Han”, let alone the positing of an overall Chinese culture, intellectually lazy as well as not very discriminating or sophisticated.
As for what you consider to be my supposed intolerance of opinions not of my own, I am afraid that is correct in so far as should I consider them to be superficial, uninformed, one dimensional and in the end tiresomely and predictably dogmatic and doctrinaire, as according to the reasons I’ve laid out above. Regarding your assumption of me being in possession of “a far-overinflated sense of self-importance that extraordinarily exceeds what can be remotely justifiable for a mere mortal”, again I am afraid that, unfortunately for you, it is also true in so far as it is simply perceived by yourself as being so relative to your own self-perceived sense of inferiority, insecurity, self-doubt and conflict of identities, being the reasons why you hold so tightly on to your treasured convictions which ultimately stifle and suffocate any potential intellectual flexibility or elbow room you may have had. To put it in words you might find easier to grasp, the problem lies more with you than me, buddy.
June 10th, 2009 at 7:01 am
To R4000:
“Don’t talk about other people’s “problem”, stick with the issues.”
— I’d love to. But neither you nor Oli seem all that interested in, or capable of, sticking to the issues.
“SKC is always with the “apple and orange” thing.”
— yes, I do have a tendency of wanting to compare things that are actually comparable. Clearly not an enthusiasm that you or Oli share.
“Not enough or too much fruit in your diet?”
— are you even CHinese? Clearly you are much different than the ones I associate with…much less class, way less intelligent.
You know what I always say: whatever floats your boat. And given your recent behaviour, I would expect you to start saying that pretty soon too. I can educate you on one-liners, among other things, for many moons to come, given what you’ve shown so far.
June 10th, 2009 at 1:55 pm
SKC,
“— are you even CHinese? Clearly you are much different than the ones I associate with…much less class, way less intelligent.”
yeha, what I would expect from you, more 1 liners. Oooh, my “class”, or “intelligence”. Like I haven’t heard that one before. You just can’t help yourself to insults, can you?
“You know what I always say: whatever floats your boat. And given your recent behaviour, I would expect you to start saying that pretty soon too. I can educate you on one-liners, among other things, for many moons to come, given what you’ve shown so far.”
FACT: you bring irrelevant personal attacks in your posts. Your 1 liners are evidence of your behavior. Now that you have admitted to your mastery of 1 liners, I’ll leave the admin to tell you what you can do with them.
June 11th, 2009 at 6:19 am
To R4000:
“Your 1 liners are evidence of your behavior.”
— for a lawyer, you employ a unique use of “evidence”.
“Oooh, my “class”, or “intelligence”. Like I haven’t heard that one before.”
— based on what I’ve seen of you here, it would hardly surprise me if others have had the same queries.
Yes, I would love Admin to tell us whether he prefers one liners at the end of a point, or just sprinkled around randomly.
June 11th, 2009 at 7:47 am
To Oli:
thanks for the John Irving box set, though it was hardly requested, or required. All it takes is one reference, I guess. Maybe if I now mention Saleen, you might see fit to send an S7? That would make you extremely useful.
You seem an expert, proven time and again, in the ability to paint people with broad strokes the size of highways, while offering little if anything as an example of how you might have arrived at such a conclusion. Thus, we are left with, for example, SKC’s writing is “Self-contradicting, gratuitous, rhetorical, irrelevant” (from #86). When the basis of such a belief is not offered, and thus cannot be disagreed with, the remaining option would be to disagree with the statement itself. Henceforth, we are left with a rousing rendition of “yes you are”/”no I’m not”, the type of debate to which any 5 year old would happily aspire. If you disavow typical 5 year old behaviour as you seem to suggest, you have a curious way of showing it. Granted, #90 represents a marginal improvement, and you should be commended.
It seems also that you have a recurring predilection to lecture. And it seems inconsequential to you that some here have not registered for Oli’s View of the World 101. So while I’m sure you find your view to be fair, balanced, nuanced, objective to a fault, and beyond reproach, that others have the audacity to disagree with you does not auger well. Hence the snappy comebacks and the overheating thesaurus, with which the naysayers can be dispatched to wherefore they came, so that that world-view can identify the happy horizon again, and go forth merrily on its way. And so it is that we then get proclamations like: “no matter the more nuanced and different opinions placed before you from PRC citizens, foreign residents or those who are more in tune with the situation there” – because surely, in the face of such authority, all penitent men must kneel and bark in agreement, and forgo their own opinions for the sake of said authority’s.
There is no basis for your accusation that I, essentially, ignore people as individuals with individual points of view. I have never suggested on this board that Chinese are brain-washed. In fact, what you describe is true of any group of individuals, be they in a company, or in the PRC. I don’t doubt Chinese peoples’ capacity for change or evolution; but I do have doubts about whether they are afforded the opportunity to exercise that capacity, in a way that actually allows them to effect the changes of which they are capable. And yes, I’ve read many a time about these oh-so-divergent views within the CCP. But the final CCP product is not so unique, at least not until such divergent views can be offered to the people based on their own merits.
“This is clear from your inability to grasp or even attempt to grasp the ambiguities that necessary exists in every society when wrestling with contentious or divisive issues, irrespective of the different ways in which they approach or reconcile them”
— is that so? Aren’t you, in fact, describing the CCP’s inabilities in this regard? I never suggested that Chinese society MUST discuss this or that, out in the open, before the world. I merely suggested that they should be allowed to do so, if they so choose. Isn’t it the CCP that’s in fact ignoring the ambiguities, and prohibiting one form of discussion outright?(ie, the open form). You may say: well, Chinese people discuss it in private, with hushed tones…and the CCP allows it. But that may be because even the CCP can’t control everything, and certainly not for a lack of trying.
“You’ve singularly failed to realize that what you perceive or understand as Chinese culture is in fact Hong Kong/Canadian Chinese culture. Which despite many similarities can in fact be markedly different from that of Mainland China, never mind from the other Chinese cultures of Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore and beyond that have evolved with subtle differences since China’s century of socio-political convulsions, notwithstanding the beginning of a recent trend towards convergence in the last ten years with globalization and China’s continuing development.”
—again, what i’ve said is completely opposite. I’m the one who brought up Chinese culture in HK and in Taiwan. The point is that Chinese culture does exist in different environments and circumstances, and in certain such scenarios, Chinese people are able and willing to exercise their freedom of expression, and to engage in discussions as they see fit. So it is not some genetic quirk that robs Chinese people of such capacity. LIkewise, such a penchant for discussion may be lacking in China, but similarly not for a lack of genetic, physical, or intellectual capacity; perhaps you, with your exquisite wisdom, can guess what it is they lack.
“unfortunately for you, it is also true in so far as it is simply perceived by yourself as being so relative to your own self-perceived sense of inferiority, insecurity, self-doubt and conflict of identities”
— some people are smarter than they think; others merely think themselves smarter than they are. You, sadly, seem to belong to the rather dubious latter category. So no, when I accuse you of being over-inflated, it’s not that I think any less of myself. It’s just that: you’re overinflated, needlessly, repeatedly, ridiculously so. Lest we engage in another high brow debate about “I’m smarter”/”no you’re not”, I’ll just say that you can take Oli out of the playground, but you can’t take the playground out of Oli. I’ll admit my guilt in advance, since that is an unsubstantiated statement; for all I know, you could be swinging on the monkey bars as we speak.
June 11th, 2009 at 1:08 pm
SKC,
“— for a lawyer, you employ a unique use of “evidence”.”
It’s in this public forum, you wrote them. What’s “unique” about it?
““Oooh, my “class”, or “intelligence”. Like I haven’t heard that one before.”
— based on what I’ve seen of you here, it would hardly surprise me if others have had the same queries.”
yes, and that says much about yourselves, who write such comments in public forums, as discussion.
“Yes, I would love Admin to tell us whether he prefers one liners at the end of a point, or just sprinkled around randomly.”
I don’t want to know about your gastric waste disposal habits.
June 12th, 2009 at 1:22 am
@ SKC
What yawn inducingly droll bully-boy tactics. If I’m not mistaken, I believe it was you who asked whether I know the work in question. Maybe you can tell us how Garp got his name, why his mother was killed and who her close companion and protector was? LOL!
As for the next two and the final paragraphs of pure, unadulterated rant a la SKC, well what can I say, the insecurity, prickliness and resulting personal attacks when reason fails is all too evident. And should you wish to bark, well bark away. I suppose its better that than having you cock you leg uncontrollably all over the place. Can’t be very healthy for the young’uns to witness.
“…but I do have doubts about whether they are afforded the opportunity to exercise that capacity, in a way that actually allows them to effect the changes of which they are capable.”
– LOL, you’ve obviously been existing under a very large rock. Pray tell what do you think has been happening in China for the last fifty years both economically, politically and socially, in spite of, but also because of government regulations? Pray tell from whence do you think the CCP draws their members, leadership and their divergent views from?
You obviously have no clue as to how much schtick party secretaries generally get and sometimes deservedly so, especially at the local level, how this leads to changes in policies and in this age of the internet, how views and opinions are fed up and down government/party hierarchy and from without, how more conscientious government officials/employees often deliberately leak or sabotage corrupt and ineffective officials/policies, never mind the developing role of a nascent domestic press that is increasingly showing a greater degree of pluck as a legal framework is being implemented. From your uninformed complaints, it is also obvious you have a very simplistic view as to how policies are formed and shaped in China, never mind a very naïve and idealistic view of the same process within Western governments. Indeed, the act of voting and of a supposedly “free” and “impartial” press often delude “Westerners” into believing that they are more “empowered” than they actually are.
“…with hushed tones…and the CCP allows it.”
– LOL!, pray tell when was the last time you were in Beijing or even China? While there are restrictions should you decide to make your views into a spectacle or organise to challenge the authority rather than consult on the issue, there is actually no restrictions on what one can discuss in public, say over dinner at a very public restaurant, over coffee at Starbucks, on the streets or at a village meeting. And should you say that its because the government can’t control it all, perhaps you should ask yourself why is it that they can’t do so now when they could apparently do so forty years ago? What has changed? And why should the government ignore one ambiguity and not another? Why allow a gay festival, yet discourage public discussions thereof or ban certain parts of it? Why does the US military have a don’t ask, don’t tell policy?
“So it is not some genetic quirk that robs Chinese people of such capacity. LIkewise, such a penchant for discussion may be lacking in China, but similarly not for a lack of genetic, physical, or intellectual capacity; perhaps you, with your exquisite wisdom, can guess what it is they lack.”
– HUH? Where the heck did this come from? What exactly is it with your pre-occupation with genetics anyway? You some kinda a heel-clicking, closet eugenicist? I sure as hell didn’t mention anything about genetics, so what is the statement in relation to? Should you find my vocabulary too difficult, I suggest you take my sincere advice and re-read the relevant paragraph in its entirety, preferably with the help of a thicker dictionary. But if it is the concepts you are having difficulty with, then I’m afraid I can’t help you much there other than suggest that you go and live in China for a few years to get some first hand experience, rather than persistently rely on second-hand accounts and your own out-moded political persuasion.
Ultimately, what you seem incapable of comprehending or simply don’t want to understand because it is beyond the comfort zone of your political conviction, is that it’s not the Chinese government not wanting change, the very purpose of the reforms and liberalisation in the first place, but rather managing the pace and the manner of change, being something which a large portion of the Chinese society has come to tacitly agree with, particularly now that over the last forty years they’ve gained an increasing stake and interest in said change.
For an insightful article on the topic, I suggest the link below from a China resident foreign journalist.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KF11Ad01.html
PS I’ve deliberately used simple, easy to understand words, less you SKC whine incessantly. Hope it helps.
June 12th, 2009 at 2:51 am
@Oli (#96): That article is quite good and could be used either as a new entry or the beginning of a new discussion here. Since I’ve lived in China for quite some time now, I have my own ideas about the situation, and I don’t agree completely with the observations of Mr. Sisci (for example, this obsession with Chinese culture to explain almost everything), but as I said it could be used as a starting point.
More later, when work doesn’t hunt me.
June 12th, 2009 at 3:32 am
@ WKL
Actually, neither am I fully in agreement with Sisci’s proposition particularly on the idea of preserving communist jargon (shudder, esp. when they are translated into English). However, from a socio-historical perspective and at the risk of over-simplification, I find the main thrust interesting, considering that at the fall of Ming dynasty and afterwards, many Ming officials opted to help the Manchus to stabilise the empire, how later repeated Ming revivial attempts failed to find traction and earlier at the fall of the Han dynasty, when Western Shu and Easter Wu ostensibly sought to re-establish the Han Empire, though the purpose of seeking legitimacy may have also been a political consideration.
Having said that, i am also interested in your take on the issue, whether here or as a starting point in a new entry. You volunteering? 🙂
(I would do it myself, if I wasn’t already pre-occupied with something I’ve long promised Admin.)
June 12th, 2009 at 4:55 am
@ Oil, WKL
Francesco Sisci’s article only told a half-truth about China, so did the various writings from other renowned China watcher, such as Nicholas Kristof. The root of their problems is that westerners tend to see China from western perspective, instead of historical Chinese perspective.
They forgot the fact that China’s societies were never built upon the kind of explicit social contracts that western societies developed since 18th century. As the result, history often evolves in a different path down the road than people in the West would like to predict.
Westerns also ignored the basic fact that there is a strong will and force from China’s long history and culture to bind China together, even when China was divied or ruled by new ‘foreign” rulers, such as the Yuan and Qing dynasties.
One good example was written in a book called ‘China Wakes” by Nicholas Kristof of NYT and his wife (a third generation Chinese American, sigh! ). Kristof captured China’s late 80s and earlier 90s in his own reporting and writing. He made a grand prediction about China in late 90s when he left, yet missed the mark so much. As a reporter, he is smart and sharp. As a columnist and historian, he is both impulsive and clumsy.
So recently, he has refrained from making another grand prediction, saying “Nobody’s ever made much money predicting how China is going to evolve politically”
http://www.cfr.org/publication/19552/
This is really a good one. I tempt sometime to create a ranking among popular China watchers, to see how good or bad they captured China’s transformation in modern time. However, I don’t have the energy nor have the time to devote to such project. It is a really interesting topic by itself though. Hopefully, someone can pick it up from here.
June 12th, 2009 at 6:19 am
@Shane9219: While I can’t name any scholar now, I read about the Chinese predilection for unity and stability before I even came to China, and those were Western works. If you mean that a lot of people miss this point I agree with you, but not that none of them understand it.
I have to admit I didn’t know much about Nicholas Kristof. I’ve heard the name, and in this article he comes off as quite well-informed:
http://www.cfr.org/publication/19552/
I don’t believe much in predictions about any country or part. There are people who claim to have known beforehand there would be an economic crisis in the US, but either they’re just bad at PR or they were markedly silent about their findings. I think what we could do is to find out who the major actors will be and what alternatives there are for the future, but what direction the world will take is impossible to predict accurately.
June 12th, 2009 at 6:27 am
@Shane: This is one of the silliest mistakes I’ve ever made. I reference exactly the same article as the one you mention above. Unfortunately, there’s something wrong with the editing function with the browser I’m using… Anyway, most of the contents of the article seems reasonable to me.
June 12th, 2009 at 6:28 am
@Oli: I’ll volunteer! 🙂 Actually, I have made some promises to admin too… I need to get some more time and energy.
June 12th, 2009 at 7:20 am
LOL!!!
SKC’s description of himself!
“You know, the problem with you is not that you’re stupid, for someone has taught you English and you’ve been able to learn it well; it’s not that you’re necessarily illogical, save some apples and oranges comparisons, since you can construct a paragraph that is at least internally consistent, if not necessarily reflective of the preceding discussion that bore it; and it’s not that you lack factual knowledge, for you clearly in possession thereof. The problem with you is that you have a far-overinflated sense of self-importance that extraordinarily exceeds what can be remotely justifiable for a mere mortal, resulting in a complete dearth of tolerance for any opinion that even trivially deviates from your own. And your stereotypical response is to launch into a shower of useless verbiage that says in 10 sentences what could have been said in 1, the better to prove to yourself, if to no one else, that you are in fact in control and all must cower in the face of such a barrage of self-proclaimed intellect. The Achilles Heel, of course, is that your world exists only in the space between your ears, and has no real bearing on any points beyond.”
My version of your blah blah blah in 1 sentence: SKC is a self-righteous, arrogant, and duplicitous crusader hell-bent on destroying how the Chinese wish to govern themselves.
Sorry, Admin, and also to other law-abiding citizens of this forum. I couldn’t resist this violation.
To WKL, I know, the CAPS and the !!! in LOL. Sorry buddy.
June 12th, 2009 at 8:06 am
If we don’t look at the issue from an angle of dignity, probably SKC is providing everyone an opportunity to explore an additional option?
June 12th, 2009 at 9:19 am
@huaren: There is a difference between peppering your texts with caps and providing one nicely bold and italicized. I like the style. Don’t take it so personally, btw.
@Rhan: Good point.
June 12th, 2009 at 11:08 am
WLK, Rhan,
I don’t mind “exploring other options”.
I don’t much care for insulting snippy 1 liners and ignorant barrage of half-truths and white lies
Like any person, I have tolerated innocent mistakes now and then, but habitual insults and half-truths have no place in civilized debates, whether in the West or in China.
On that point, I have no interest in “exploring” further into the depth of those who insist upon such behaviors.
June 12th, 2009 at 12:10 pm
@ Shane & WKL
Personally, I think Western historians have often got it wrong whenever they simplistically describe the Yuan and the Qing dynasty as “foreign” as a juxtaposition to the “Han culture” in order to satisfy their desire for a neat and tidy Western worldview, rendering it akin to trying to forcibly fit a square peg into a round hole.
Considering the length of China’s land borders, China’s minorities, whether within or at the periphery, have always exerted their own fair share of influence throughout China’s history, from the Turkic influence of the Tang, to the Mongol of the Yuan or the Manchurian of the Qing. What many Western historians often overlook is the fact that these supposedly “foreign” minorities often have had a long, intimate and official association with the imperial court of the preceeding, ostensibly “Han” dynasties. To the extent that many were in fact very much a part of the imperial establishment and when a dynasty failed internally at the center, it is these parts of the imperial establishment at the periphery who came in to re-establish order. This is perhaps also the reason why over the centuries, the Yuan and the Qing have come to be regarded as part of China’s heritage.
This is in fact no different from the many emperors Rome have had who were not originally of Roman descent. The difference is that for some reasons, China as a political and civilisational entity somehow persisted whereas that of Rome did not. The reasons I personally suspect may be because Confucian culture, politics and philosophy is more meritocratic, humane and more tolerant and accepting than that of the Roman empire. That the economic foundation of succesive dynasties never relied on mass slavery or plundering probably also helped too in how minorities saw themselves with an interest in participating in the preservation and continuance of China as a civilisation.
Personally, I have a strong dislike of Western media’s oft reference to the “Han” population vis-a-vis this minority or that minority, as if the “Han” population is a homogenous group of people, which is clearly not the case. Particularly considering that “Han” as a description for the groups of people in central and eastern China only came into use in the late 19th Century. Unfortunately, in the absence of an apt and less cumbersome description of all the peoples that make up the “Han”, I don’t see this changing any time soon.
@Shane
So consequently, I think a more interesting question to ask is where and why did this “strong will and force from China’s long history and culture to bind China together, even when China was divied or ruled by new ‘foreign” rulers” came from or came about?
This being the sixty millions dollars question that have long baffled many Western China historians and watchers.
June 12th, 2009 at 1:00 pm
Oli,
the key difference between China and Rome (and other ancient empires) is that there are 2 different kinds of Imperial systems.
Roman Empire (and others) are what I would call “Unequal opportunity empires”.
China on the other hand has consistently maintained a system of “Equal Opportunity Empire”.
Rome (like many others) conquered very rapidly, but assimilated almost none of its conquered people. The key problem was that Rome, by law, treated its newly conquered people as 2nd class citizens. For example, Judeans became part of the Roman Empire by conquest, but they were not full Romans, allowed to participate as equal Romans. That system of legal discrimination naturally caused the conquered people to continue to hold onto their old cultural and national identity, because the Romans literally forced them to do so, whether they wanted to integrate or not.
China on the other hand, since the 1st Imperial Dynasty of Qin, has been “equal opportunity”. The 1st Qin Emperor decreed upon unifying all China, that all in his realm are his subjects, no one is above him in rule, and his laws apply equally to all.
Qin had a long history of “equal opportunity”, where its rise in power was largely attributed to its employment of wise counsels from non-Qin territories.
*The other major difference is the slow pace of China’s historical expansion.
The only time in Chinese history where expansion by conquest was rapid was the time of the Yuan Dynasty and its Mongol rulers. But also very telling is the fact that as soon as the Yuan rulers became “sinicized”, adopted Chinese cultural habits, they stopped their expansion plans to the West.
China had plenty of military might in its ancient history to probably conquer all of Europe if it wanted to.
But Chinese tradition of prudence countered that need for conquest. Instinctively, the Chinese rulers knew that they could not hold onto territories if they cannot assimilate the conquered people, that too rapid expansion could cause the whole “house of cards” to come down.
*Instead, Chinese culture assimilated people nearby. Many of these nearby cultures began to participate in Chinese internal power struggle. Tributary kingdoms like Qi and Di rose in power during the North and South Dynasties, and tried to unified China on their own, during civil strife in China.
They added their cultural strength to China in history.
Tang Dynasty, began as a small outlying province of assimilated people with Turkish bloodlines, and it became 1 of the most enduring and prosperous dynasties in Chinese history.
If it had been Rome, these tributary Kingdoms would have split off instead.
June 12th, 2009 at 1:12 pm
By “equal opportunity”, I don’t mean it in the modern sense.
I mean simply that the average citizenry has the same approximate political social economic rights. (even if such rights are limited by the State).
Of course, there are informal discriminations in every culture. But that’s far different than a legalized caste discrimination system like that in India and in Early Yuan Dynasty. (part of the reason why Yuan fell quickly, is that it was unwilling to completely abolish the Caste system. In contrast to the Qing Dynasty, Manchurian rule, where they had a Caste system in the beginning, but within a few generations, the system was abolished.)
June 12th, 2009 at 1:30 pm
I would also add that the current Western notion of “spreading Democracy” is an informal form of “unequal opportunity imperial system”, where the West maintained the right to intervene in other nations’ political affairs, but the recipient nations have no influence to be treated as “equals”.
I mean, some can criticize that the Tibetan Governor and the Tibetan CCP cadres don’t really represent their people, but Iraqi people have no say whatsoever in US government, even when the US military is shooting up their neighborhoods.
US of course shroud the argument in traditional Western geopolitical scheme.
But they obviously neglected to consider that Rome also had client Kingdoms, that it spent enormous military resources to maintain.
One can argue that Tibet is a “client state” of China. But Tibetans have seats (by quota) in the Chinese Parliament, and Tibetans are in CCP and the PLA. More than we can say about Iraqi citizens in US.
*the point is, foreign interventions invite further political entanglement. If a state is NOT willing to assimilate the foreign client, it becomes a military imperialism, which will eventually become too expensive to maintain.
June 12th, 2009 at 1:56 pm
Predictions about China.
One should 1st ask whether anyone has a truly good understanding of China to even be making predictions.
1 good Western historian once wrote, “Even the average Chinese might not truly understand all the prevailing forces influencing China.”
I would be the 1st to admit the truth of that. But of course, that is also true of most large nations. Only some “democrats” are deluded in thinking they know what’s going on in their own countries. (just look at Enron, the Recession, the Housing bubble, etc.)
That’s why perhaps the Chinese populous give a wide tolerance for their governments, historically.
*I think the only prediction is the universal truism, that “the only true knowledge is one’s lack of it”, or “beginning of wisdom is an admission that one knows nothing.”
*And I find the general Western Predilection for predicting things (especially doom and gloom scenarios) for other nations to be generally arrogant, ignorant, and rude, and lacking in civility and humility and wisdom.
June 13th, 2009 at 1:08 am
@Oil #107
The forces that hold China together for over thousands of years, in my view, come from a strong belief on a common civilization identity — the Chinese way of life that include elements of both material and non-material such as Eastern philosophical thinking, religions, writing languages and many other cultural elements.
It was common for older generations of westerners to see China as a unique civilization, and their attitudes towards China often sound reasonable. After all, there are not many civilizations, like Chinese, of this unique, splendid, peaceful, long lasting and having made great contribution to humankind.
Younger generation of westerners, mostly grown up around WWII, saw or experienced the great political struggles of their times. Those experience made many into political or ideological nuts with mostly conservative or neo-conservative views. When coming to the subject of China, they don’t immediately see China as an unique civilization, they prefer to dedicate that topic to historians and archeologists. After all, Chinese civilization in their view has long faded and don’t deserve any admiration from them. Instead, they see China as a troublesome political entity that they have a mission or duty to “fight” against. Their views towards China often come with a sense of condescending, ridicule, discriminatory and even hateful beyond the fair and reasonable principle they usually embrace for themselves.
I personally think it is important to start a Project Watch of China Watchers by documenting and tagging those renowned China watchers to see how their public view got evolved, and how their predictions on China come along. These people are quite influential in the West.
June 13th, 2009 at 9:05 am
To Oli:
“If I’m not mistaken, I believe it was you who asked whether I know the work in question.”
—you are mistaken. I merely made a passing reference to Garp…but I guess you do know the work in question…good to know.
“the insecurity, prickliness and resulting personal attacks when reason fails is all too evident.”
—and we could go on accusing each other of exactly the same thing all day long. Fine by me if that’s how you like to roll.
“…how views and opinions are fed up and down government/party hierarchy and from without, how more conscientious government officials/employees often deliberately leak or sabotage corrupt and ineffective officials/policies…”
—where have I denied such occurrences? I am happy that people have increasing capacity and freedom to move along the “railroad track” of the CCP. But it still seems like a one-track setup, and what opportunities are afforded those who might prefer a different one?
“there is actually no restrictions on what one can discuss in public, say over dinner at a very public restaurant, over coffee at Starbucks, on the streets or at a village meeting.”
—why so literal all of a sudden. Surely you knew that “hushed tones” didn’t mean whisper level, under the covers, or in the privacy of your home. But you’re right about this: this is better than 40 years ago, so perhaps the CCP is lightening up just a bit, or perhaps Chinese in China are awakening to their ability and/or desire to have such discussions.
“HUH? Where the heck did this come from?”
—I say “genetic, physical, intellectual”…and you run wild with eugenics. Bravo! You seem to suggest in #86 and #90 that Chinese culture is such that the pursuit of choice and discussion of TAM is not consistent with same. And I’m suggesting that is simply not the case, since you even allow that Chinese culture under different influences in different places like HK, Taiwan etc have evolved differently. So Chinese culture, as you suggest it to be, in China, is merely reflective of the CCP’s influence. For a guy with your exquisite abilities, you are displaying a dogged inability to comprehend this. And puh-lease, nuff with the “re-read” bit. Your stuff is adequately nauseating the first go around, and reliving it will only serve to heighten the unpleasant experience, but to what end?
“but rather managing the pace and the manner of change, being something which a large portion of the Chinese society has come to tacitly agree with, particularly now that over the last forty years they’ve gained an increasing stake and interest in said change.”
—tacitly, indeed. That’s the first honest assessment out of you in ….well… possibly ever.
June 13th, 2009 at 9:12 am
To Huaren:
“hell-bent on destroying how the Chinese wish to govern themselves.”
—the day you can show me that Chinese are free to choose how they govern themselves, and perhaps would willingly choose the CCP way to boot, would be a great one indeed.
June 13th, 2009 at 3:03 pm
@ SKC
Eh, you may have made a passing reference to John Irving @ #85, however, may I suggest you also, ahem, re-read your implying what I may or may not have read @ #88, second paragraph. Sometimes it really does help the thinking process to re-read what has been written, particularly in your case it seems, LOL!
Let’s see how the waffle continues –
“Where have I denied such occurrences”
– Let’s see, both directly, indirectly and by implication @ #88 para. 4, #94 para 5 and para 6. Furthermore, what is obvious is that, being typical of your Western education and in spite of your supposedly much referenced “Chinese” upbringing, you’ve consistently missed the forest for a single tree. It seems your focus on the few days the Chinese government blocks certain websites out of perceived security and political concerns, whether justified or not, without knowing or understanding what goes on the rest of the time both online, in private and at gatherings. I suggest you consider how Charter 08 came about and the background story to it.
“But it still seems like a one-track setup, and what opportunities are afforded those who might prefer a different one? “
– Ah, the SKC speciality of acknowledging something in the first sentence, then plays it down in the next, followed by lots of obfuscations and buts. Tactics worthy of a five years old trying to get his mother to buy something.
I suggest you consider the nature of the provenance behind the study on the 3.14 incident that is the subject of this entry. I also suggest you research the work of Chinese and Chinese-foreign NGOs, whether environmental or social etc., and how they affect/influence government policies and decisions, whether successfully or not.
Ultimately, despite China being a one party state, it does not exclude the existence of divergent opinions both within the party or society and their interactive dynamics. In fact even at the height of ideological excesses, China was never as repressive as the USSR was during the Cold War years. While it may be one-track setup, the overriding concern for many Chinese is whether the track is headed in the right direction and if it were not, incidents far worse than that of TAM or 3.14 would have happened a long time ago, government control notwithstanding.
“Why so literal all of a sudden. Surely you knew that “hushed tones” didn’t mean whisper level, under the covers, or in the privacy of your home. But you’re right about this: this is better than 40 years ago, so perhaps the CCP is lightening up just a bit, or perhaps Chinese in China are awakening to their ability and/or desire to have such discussions.”
-LOL, more buts. Unless you say what you mean and is cogent about it, you are obviously only worth being taken at face value and nothing more. FYI and which you obviously still fail to grasp is that mainland Chinese have always been able to have such discussions, the point of contention is rather how such discussions are expressed. I suggest you think carefully about that distinction.
“I say “genetic, physical, intellectual…”
– Eh, firstly why include genetics at all and how is it even remotely relevant? Ditto, your waffle about physical or intellectual capacity. What you’ve singularly and repeatedly failed to grasp is that not only is all that irrelevant, but your comparison of the Chinese societies and experience in Taiwan or HK with the historical, social, cultural, military, domestic-political and geo-political situation and imperatives of mainland China is equally pointless, not to mention juvenile and ignorant in the extreme, being akin to, eh, in your own words, comparing apples and oranges. And should you really need to ask why, I suggest you, ahem, re-read your history books on China, HK and Taiwan. I would also suggest you not just simply read what happened, but actually think about why it happened, ie try tracing the chains of cause and effect of China’s historical events. I would suggest you start from the beginning and consider why and how the CCP came to defeat the KMT and the role of the Chinese people in determining said outcome.
In the end, through all your waffle and your hither and thither arguments you’ve demonstrated not only your ignorance of contemporary and historical China, Taiwan and HK, of Chinese cultures in general, but also an inability to reason coherently and logically. Frankly, you’ve rendered so many inconsistencies that I consider your claim to be of HK Chinese descent, among all the other personal claims, to be spurious at best, thereby casting serious doubts about the extent, if at all, of your supposedly and oft mentioned “Chinese upbringing”.
June 13th, 2009 at 5:34 pm
To Oli:
good grief, more of your “re-reading” nonsense. The “work in question” is the basis of this thread (ie. the investigative report) and not John Irving’s piece. Talk about a genius who can’t read! And forget re-reading, sometimes you need to read it for a first time before responding. In fact, if you can try that even once in a while, that would be a fantastic development.
“Let’s see, both directly, indirectly and by implication @ #88 para. 4, #94 para 5 and para 6.”
— your sight is clearly in disrepair. First of all, my statement was having not denied the inner workings of the CCP, to which the statement was referring. On the other hand, the points you cite were in reference to Chinese people in general, and not just those within government. Once again, your penchant for comparing apples to stuff that shouldn’t be compared with apples rises to the fore again. And second: (“the rest of the time both online, in private and at gatherings”)- I’ve stipulated as much. Perhaps my idea of “open discussion” isn’t the anonymous, in private, over-a-plate-of-Peking duck kind, y’think? And speaking of Charter 08, you might then ask yourself what type of attention the authors garnered for themselves for their troubles, and how well that bodes for the next group who may want to foster “open” discussion.
“While it may be one-track setup, the overriding concern for many Chinese is whether the track is headed in the right direction and if it were not, incidents far worse than that of TAM or 3.14 would have happened a long time ago, government control notwithstanding.”
— that may be true. It’s unfortunate, however, that the expression of displeasure in this arrangement need take the form of TAM or 3/14. Surely, there must be some type of system where displeasure need not occur with such high drama, or bloodshed. I wonder what one such alternative might be….
“acknowledging something in the first sentence, then plays it down in the next”
— acknowledging something does not mean I need to agree with it; at least you know I’ve read it, and know what I am responding to. Not something you do too well…oh well, just a tiny blemish in your facade of perfection.
“the point of contention is rather how such discussions are expressed”
— does not an “open discussion” imply not only the presence of such discussion, but also the manner of expression thereof? It seems that, unless something is expressed in a construct that you employ, it becomes entirely incomprehensible to you. That might be another blemish…
“firstly why include genetics at all and how is it even remotely relevant”
— because “Chinese” are genetically similar, yet there are many variations of “Chinese culture”, as you even acknowledge. So the PRC version of CHinese culture is not “nature”, but “nurture”, courtesy of the CCP.
“how the CCP came to defeat the KMT and the role of the Chinese people in determining said outcome.”
— as I’ve discussed with others, yes, Chinese people got to make their own bed 60 years ago, and have been sleeping in it ever since. THe point is whether Chinese people will get to, or want to, make their bed again sometime in the future, perhaps this time with more than one set of linens to choose from.
I must say that you have improved, in that your overarching statements are at least now in reference to something, rather than offered as the random musings of a guy on a street corner. If nothing else, that makes it a little easier to respond…assuming of course that a discussion is what you seek, and not just the opportunity to rise to the lectern and use a laser pointer. Your pointless presumptions about my background notwithstanding, I am extremely happy to note that our “Chinese upbringing” did not take a singular form, and once again I have my parents to thank, to whom I am truly grateful. I mean, gosh, look at the alternative!
June 13th, 2009 at 7:27 pm
@Raventhorn4000 #108
Not that I dispute your central thesis… It took Tang less than 50 years from establishment to reaching the Aral Sea, which is near 4000 km West from Chang’an — the distance to the capital was slightly narrower than the width of modern-day continental USA and the Roman Empire when Julius Caesar died. Quite probably the most famous Chinese poet Li Bai was born in modern-day Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan. However, Tang was only able to control the last 1000 km or so on and off for a few decades. The inability of building a transportation network connecting to the East, and the relative inhospitality for large settlements supporting the lifestyles Tang people used to, doomed any chance of long-lasting westward expansion. It was similar to Rome’s northward expansion — when you couldn’t grow grapes and make wine, you could only build military outposts there.
June 13th, 2009 at 10:28 pm
This is a balanced and constructive proposal I ever heard from a western politician regarding the Tibet issue. Maybe someone can translate it into English. Her view is similar to mine, that 14th DL and Tibetan exiles should brave enough to walk cross their ideological divide with China by dropping their political demand if any. This is the only way to reach a potential resolution.
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4313809,00.html
“德国绿党政治家批评西藏流亡政府战略
德国联邦议院前副议长福尔默女士日前表示，在她看来，目前，难以解决中-藏冲突，很大原因在西藏流亡政府。
福尔默本周一晚在埃森参加”墨卡托基金会（Mercator-Stiftung）”举办的一次讲座中表示，去年，北京奥运前夕，中藏对话机会并不坏，但因达赖喇嘛和西藏流亡政府实施的战略而坐失。
这位兼任北威州政府管理学院客座教授的绿党政治家称，考虑到奥运会，中国政府早在2002年就进行过对话的试探，但由于达赖喇嘛与外国国家元首和政府首脑的众多公开会面，以及通过示威和宣传进行的”许许多多最真诚的公民社会的努力”，使中国在世界面前蒙羞。福尔默提醒说，”一种政治解决办法必须能够向对方提供一条可行的道路”。
这位拥有博士学位的福音教神学家指出，目前，西藏人自己也已认识到，”公民社会的巨大欢呼”以及所有那些国外访问，于事情本身并无多少助益。福尔默称，那种以为中国会像1989年后苏联一样解体的期待已经失去了现实感。
福尔默研究西藏冲突问题凡20年，曾多次访问过喜马拉雅地区。她认为，中-藏冲突的任何解决方案建议都必须考虑到中国源于其殖民地历史的对国家分裂的忧虑。
福尔默表示，解决中-藏冲突的第一步是做到国家不干预宗教生活，从法律上保障宗教自由。作为交换，藏人放弃政治权力要求。（据福音教通讯社）”
June 14th, 2009 at 12:07 am
JXie,
To further clarify the historical background.
Tang royal family have a bloodline tracing back to their Turkish ancestors west of China. It was not surprising that they had a need to expand to their “historical domain”.
However, such fetishes are almost always restricted to the early generations of a dynasty that’s not quite completely sinicized, like Yuan and Qing.
Usually after 2-3 generations, the more sinicized emperors began to lose interest in far away territories, and prefer to stay home and guard the rich interior Chinese land instead.
It’s probably more due to influence of Confucius, who wrote famously, “Do not befriend strangers who have no desirable virtues.” (Thus do not mix with “barbarians”.)
June 14th, 2009 at 12:16 am
I have no doubt that DL’s followers will never accept the “middle ground” policy, (not to say that the “Middle Ground” is such a good idea. It’s frankly full of self-contradictions.)
Frankly, DL is more frantically trying to appease his own followers than anything else.
Reality is, everyone knows that if DL dies, his followers will go to violence as solution.
Though bloodshed is terrible, but one can easily see that there is no hope for that cause, if the cause is a stone throw away from collapsing on its fundamental principles.
As Tibetans have done countless times in history, there will be sectarian violence. DL is all that holds them together.
They almost went to bloodbath amongst themselves when the Karmapa went to Exile, and the Exiles already had another Karmapa.
And even the DL instigated his little crusade against the “Shugden” followers. Gee, I wonder what will happen to that issue when he dies?
It’s a house held together by glue and duct tape. You pull that support beam, and the panels will start falling.
June 14th, 2009 at 1:31 am
Of course, historically, the DL’s always needed some nearby power to enforce their own rule in Tibet. Sectarian dispute over DL’s succession is constant, so every DL needed some outside help to quell any potential rebellions.
The whole ritual of Qing Court participating in the selection of DL’s was to legitimize DL’s rule, and serve as a warning to would-be rebels that the Chinese military would help crush any rebellions.
Of course, the 13th DL first thought that China would help repel the British, and then realizing that the British was strong, he thought then British can help push China away, and Tibet can reclaim its “historical territories” in Amdo and Kham.
And then it’s the Japanese who sent military advisors to Tibet to help them train an army.
And then it’s the CIA.
*Of course, from the historical pattern, you can see that Tibet hasn’t been independent for a LONG time. It’s always dependent upon SOMEONE to keep it together, in recent history. (By recent, I mean pretty much the last 700 years or so.)
**The point is, the various factions and sects of Tibet have been feuding for a long time, and they still are even in Exile. They have consistently used outsiders to maintain the fracturing group called “Tibetans”.
“Shugden” wasn’t even that remotely significant threat to DL, and he ordered the entire practice BANNED, as if he’s powerful enough to destroy an entire belief system just by his order. (I mean, come on, even the CCP needs more than just 1 order).
And the DL calls for “unity” when he BANS “Shugden”! I guess he doesn’t see how similar he really is to the CCP!! (I have seen photos of a wall in Exile Community, with words in English written, “Long Live Dalai Lama!” Seriously, even Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin never got that kind of Red Guardish devotion. But are we talking a “cultural revolution” in Exile? Maybe!)
Already, accusations of mutual assassination attempts in Exile, between the Shugden followers and the Tibetan Youth Congress. (Again, Tibetan “Cultural Revolution”?)
And accusations of Tibetans colluding with the Chinese Government. (Again, Tibetan “Cultural Revolution”?)
*Like I always tell people, It has happened before.
June 14th, 2009 at 6:33 am
This article by Tangen offers a good point. Although it is still not the current perspective of mainstream media, soon it will be …
“China redefined
How it will influence the post financial crisis world
By Einar Tangen
Long before President Nixon’s first trip to China, we in the West developed the habit of trying to interpret Beijing’s ideas and actions as if we were reading tea leaves.
We looked at China and wove our own picture of its workings and motivations claiming that it is the only recourse in deciphering an opaque and “inscrutable” society. Viewing China through the looking glass of our own perceptions and values has not always been helpful, too often we have seen what we wanted to see.
As China’s influence waxes and ours wanes we need to see China clearly. We need to understand that China is an evolving construct of ideological elements and pragmatic policies applied to an old and unique culture, not a competing political ideology or business model. Instead of reading tea leaves we need to begin a dialog with Chinese political, business and social thinkers about the China Construct in the post crisis world”
http://www.biztimes.com/news/2009/6/12/china-redefined
June 15th, 2009 at 4:04 pm
Shane,
I completely agree with the point from Tangen.
To illustrate, Confucian doctrines are the foundation of Chinese culture. And yet, for centuries, the West has not been able to properly understand these doctrines.
The West attempted to classify Confucian doctrines as Religion, Philosophy, Moral code, or Law. It failed repeatedly, and in the end gave up.
How the West could bypass this fundamental understanding and try to classify other cultural political issues in China, is entirely ignorance upon ignorance.
*Many (Most) in the West simply have no knowledge of the great debates and writings of famous Confucian Scholars over the last 2000 years.
For example, the extensive debates regarding the power of the government and the authority of laws, and the components of essential efficient government.
I wonder if any Western advocates of democracy would feel comfortable debating Chinese politics in purely Confucian doctrine terms, as they seem to insist that all debates should be using Western ideological standards of “reasonableness”, etc.
June 15th, 2009 at 5:11 pm
Just saw an article from TYC and we might see Tibetan Jiadhists in the future.
http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2008/05/tsewang-rigzin-gets-some-ink.html
June 15th, 2009 at 7:23 pm
“‘I answer that pacifism has led us on a blind alley. About us speaks only so incidental, limited. We are forgotten by the international community. Many fine words and then nothing. We look instead as they felt the Palestinians and activists in Iraq thanks to the suicide attacks. L ‘attention of world media is all for them. ”
I think these words from the leader of the Tibetan Youth Congress don’t need any one to “see the worst”.
As I have already written earlier, the Exile’s cause was always violent, since the beginning. The DL merely put a temporary halt on it, and dressed it up like it’s “all about the love” since the 1980’s. (Of course, he did it because once Nixon opened up to China, it was embarassing for the CIA to keep supporting DL’s people’s violent actions against China.)
But if DL dies, his followers will naturally go back to violence if they could.
Let’s not pretend here folks, DL’s exile followers were armed insurgents from the beginning. Throughout the 90’s, despite DL’s “peace”, bombing continued sporadically in Tibet. Even DL had openly admitted to it in NY Times. (He denies responsibility, but admits their occurrence.)
But hey, I guess we’ll find out how “peaceful” they really are in their religion.
June 15th, 2009 at 7:39 pm
On 1 Tibetan Exile website, one Tibetan openly said, “Everyone knows that the Middle Way is merely a way for us to get back into Tibet, from where the real struggle would begin.”
in a 1998 interview with NY Times,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A01E7DC123EF932A35756C0A96E958260, the Dalai Lama publicly acknowledged that bombing had been going on in Tibet
by Tibetans, 9 times in the 1st 4 months, all targeting government buildings. He clearly
knew these acts of terrorism were going on. Yet he has chosen public plausible
deniability.
June 15th, 2009 at 10:39 pm
Speaking of Palestine, food for thought for the Tibetan Jihadists,
(1) The Jewish community was significantly split on the issue of Zionism before terrorism started to hit Israel. After the terrorist activities, anti-Zionist factions of the Jewish communities stopped virtually all of their protests against the establishment of Israel.
(2) Then, the tiny nation of Israel (as compared to the much bigger nation of China), managed to hold out against all the Arab nations.
(3) some 60 years later, still no nation of Palestine.
*Of course, why let history be an inconvenience? What didn’t work for someone else might work for the Tibetan Exiles.
Hmm… I wonder what Israel would have done to Muslim clerics rioting?? Perhaps China should try it. (Since Israel is a “democracy” and all).
(A) Build a giant demarcation wall, and put the suspect ethnic group on the other side.
(B) Have a bulldozer run over protesters.
(C) Have tanks and troops shoot reporters, on the count of the camera looks like a RPG launcher, and the microphone looks like a grenade.
(D) All of the above.
If you picked (D), you are correct.
June 15th, 2009 at 11:07 pm
BTW,
Between 700,000 to 750,000 Palestinians left or were expelled from Israel. Their properties were all confiscated by Israel. Israel passed laws to regard all Palestinians who try to return as “infiltrators”, and subject them to arrest and interrogation.
Tibetans who left for exile: 80,000 to 100,000.
June 16th, 2009 at 2:22 am
pug_ster Says: “Just saw an article from TYC and we might see Tibetan Jiadhists in the future.”
We can only hope.
June 16th, 2009 at 2:45 am
Hope? To see Jihadists?
What are they, zoo animals? 🙂
I certainly hope that I never see a Jihadist.
July 18th, 2009 at 6:43 am
… and now the Open Constitution Initiative has been shut down by the government: http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/malcolmmoore/100003658/a-step-backward-for-law-in-china/
July 19th, 2009 at 2:26 am
And Chinese legal reforms continue, with adoption of the 3rd Revision of Chinese Patent Law!
Amazingly, there are more Chinese lawyers working!
July 19th, 2009 at 2:30 am
And soldiers are still dying in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bombs are still going off in Indonesia. Turkey is still fighting war against PKK.
Life still goes on.
August 3rd, 2009 at 11:55 am
… and now Xu Zhiyong, one of the Open Constitution Initiative’s most prominent leaders, has been arrested:
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2009/07/where-is-xu-zhiyong.html
Judging from past comments, I gather than raventhorn does not care what happens to people in China. What about the rest of you?
August 3rd, 2009 at 5:44 pm
@Otto Kerner #134
There should be enough legal ground for his arrest. People’s opinion can be better formulated by looking into facts about the case before jumping out and waving a flag this earlier stage.
August 4th, 2009 at 3:00 am
What are the facts about the case? According to Baidu, his whereabouts are unknown. At least yesterday when I googled it and checked – today, with the same search term, the Baidu link has disappeared. (the search term is 许志勇)
August 4th, 2009 at 3:44 pm
His case appears not a standalone one, but an escalation of an earlier tax invasion case by his law firm (see the report below by South China Morning Post).
It is known fact that Chinese government likes to keep radical liberals in check. For example, these liberals embarrassed the government a great deal by coordinating a wide protest echoing Pelosi’s name with banners and red graphite on government building when Nancy Pelosi was visiting Beijing earlier this year.
Under current state law, once law enforcement gathered enough evidence, a suspect can be detained and put under “house” arrest (so called “under control, but not in formal legal custody”) for up to 6-8 months before he/she is formally charged. Sometime, an isolated hotel room is used to serve as the location of “house” arrest. One or two visitation of his/her immediate family members are arranged shortly after.
http://www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/menuitem.2af62ecb329d3d7733492d9253a0a0a0/?vgnextoid=39acea0a69cc2210VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD&ss=China&s=News
“Dr Xu, as its legal representative, received a notice from the Beijing Local Taxation Bureau and the Beijing branch of the State Administration of Taxation on July 15 ordering Gongmeng to pay 1.23 million yuan (HK$1.39 million) in fines plus 180,000 yuan in back taxes.
Two days later, the Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau and police raided the office and took away documents, furniture and all computers and electronic equipment. Later, civil affairs authorities said they would shut down the organisation. “