Political Prisoner?
Filed under:General, human rights, News, politics | Tags:CCP, government, human rights, politics
Add comments
This is a follow-up to a post earlier this month, “A political prisoner in Sweden.” I promised to translate the text of the sentence from the original, and have finally finished proofreading and putting in comments.
Sentence 2010-03-08, carried out in Stockholm
Case no. B 8976-09
INVOLVED PARTIES (number of indicted [persons]: 1)
Prosecutor:
Chief District Prosecutor Tomas Lindstrand
Chamber of Prosecution for Security Cases
Indicted
BM, 480102-0639
Stovargatan 71
124 61 Bandhagen
Public defender:
Attorney Bjorn Hurtig
Forsvarsadvokaterna Stockholm HB
Box 12107
10223 Stockholm
JUDICIAL DECISION
Crimes committed
Illegal intelligence activities, serious criminal offense
Law section
Chapter 19, 2 and 3, Criminal Code
Penalty etc.
Prison for 1 year and 4 months
Forfeitures and confiscations
1. The following confiscations will remain until the sentence is ratified: Security Police; confiscation journal B 022-09 items A1, C5, C8, C13, C14, C16, C17, C20, C21, C25-29, C32, C34, C41, C44, C45, C47, C52-54, E7, E9, F12-14.
2. Confiscated passport has been declared forfeited according to chapter 36, 2 and 3 in the Criminal Code. The confiscation will continue (Security Police; confiscation journal B 022-09, item C39).
3. Confiscated 110000 SEK have been declared forfeited according to chapter 36, 1 in the Criminal Code. The confiscation will continue (Security Police; confiscation journal B 022-09, items F4 and F11).
Detention etc.
BM will be subject to a travel ban with obligation to give notice until the sentence is formally ratified in terms of responsibility. The travel ban amounts to BM not being authorized to travel outside the district of Stockholm and having to register his whereabouts every Wednesday at 5 PM, by the latest, at the police station on Kungsholmsgatan 45, Stockholm. If the travel ban is violated or the obligation to give notice not adhered to, BM shall be taken into custody, except in the case where there are no obvious reasons [WKL: I do not understand what the last sentence means, but have tried to be faithful to the original].
Secrecy
Secrecy according to Chapter 15, 1 and 2 in the Law of Publicity and Secrecy (2009:400) will persist in the case for information in the secret sentence attachment 3.
Crime victims fund
The indicted is required to pay a fee of 500 SEK according to the law (1994:419) on crime victims fund.
Compensation
1. Attorney Bjorn Hurtig is accorded compensation from public funds of 591498 SEK. Of this amount 439992 SEK relates to work, 26520 SEK to time spent, 6686.40 SEK on expenses and 118299.60 SEK value added tax. When paying public funds, it should be noted that 138000 SEK have been paid in advance.
2. The costs for the defense will be paid by the state.
CLAIMS AND PLEADINGS
The prosecutor has pleaded that BM be sentenced for illegal intelligence gathering, a serious criminal offense, according to the following statement of the criminal acts charged:
BM has, with the aim of [supporting] the security forces of the Chinese state and with the use of deceitful means, operated in the Stockholm area between January 2008 to the 3rd of July 2009 to collect information about personal circumstances of persons of Uighur ethnicity, most of whom have been active in Uighur organizations in Sweden as well as Norway, Germany and the USA. He has delivered the information to a Chinese diplomat and a Chinese journalist who has acted on orders from the Chinese state to secretly collect personal information about persons of Uighur ethnicity.
If BM’s actions should be considered as assistance to illegal intelligence activities [carried out] by the diplomat and the journalist, it is additionally stated that his assistance has not been temporary.
The activities have amounted to collection of information about personal conditions concerning Uighurs residing and working outside China’s borders. The activities have also amounted to BM being assigned tasks from the journalist and the diplomat to gather information about Uighurs and that BM thereafter had completed his tasks by reporting to the journalist and the diplomat information about political activities, including those within the World Uyghur Congress, what had been said by different persons within the Uyghur movement and what opinions and level of access to political information the leadership of said organization had possessed. He has also reported information about political asylum [applications], health conditions, and level of residence and telephone numbers to certain persons especially important to the Chinese regime.
The tasks have been given, and the information handed over, in private meetings and by telephone calls as well as over the Internet. The activities have been carried out secretly by taking special precautionary measures during meetings and telecommunications.
BM has gathered the information by using deceitful means in that he has claimed to sympathize with the ethnic Uighurs, taking part in congresses and meetings with them as well as concealing that he was handing over information about them to representatives of the Chinese state.
BM has been rewarded by his superiors with money and personal services.
The criminal offense is considered serious because the activities have been systematic, have been carried out in professional form and may have caused or might cause a large number of persons serious harm since the foreign power has been and is a totalitarian great power with strong resources.
Law section: Chapter 19, second and third paragraphs, Criminal Code.
Further, the prosecutor has argued in the plaint that confiscated evidence [material] mentioned above continues to be confiscated until the sentence is ratified, and that a passport and 110000 SEK will be forfeited.
BM has denied criminal charges both on objective and subjective grounds. He has not intended to provide [material] to the Chinese state and he has neither secretly nor deceitfully carried out the activities as described by the prosecutor. He has admitted that he had a number of contacts with a Chinese journalist and a Chinese diplomat. He had not been aware of criminal intent from the journalist or the diplomat.
BM has objected to the confiscation of evidence [material] and that the confiscated money be forfeited. He has not objected to the confiscated passport being forfeited.
GROUNDS FOR THE DECISION
Process material
BM has been interrogated and on demands of the prosecution, witness examinations have been held with the witnesses Dolkun Isa, Abduljelil Karakash, Rebiya Kadeer, Atahan Abudughani, Dilixiadi Rexiti, Adil Hakimjan, Hans Ohlsson, Bo Renner and Wilhelm Unge. The interrogations and examinations have been summarized in attachment 1. The prosecutor has put forth and referred to evidence as summarized in attachment 2. The parties have further set forth information from the preliminary investigation as can be seen from the trial protocols.
Presentation of the prosecutor’s case
Xinjiang Province and the Uyghur
China’s Xinjiang province is home to the original inhabitants, the Uyghur. As late as the 1950’s an overwhelming majority of the population were Uyghur. Due to an intentional Chinese policy the majority of the 20 million inhabitants in the province are now Han Chinese and not Uyghur. The province is rich in natural resources. The political history has been turbulent, and the area has been independent during certain periods and conquered by neighboring nations during others. The Uyghur are a Turkic people closely related to the peoples in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and other areas of Central Asia. Their language is related to Turkish. The Chinese regime carries out a policy to make the province as Han Chinese as possible. University classes for Uyghur are restricted and important posts are not given to Uyghur but to Han Chinese. Because of their origin and close relationship with the Turks, Turkey is an important country for the Uyghur and therefore also important to China.
There are Uyghur in many countries, but the [amount of people belonging to the] ethnicity is not particularly large in any country. In Sweden there are around 500 Uyghur, whereas Germany has around 1000 and the US 1500. Most exiled Uyghur live in Turkey. Many within the exiled Uyghur groups know each other. That they are speaking a similar language is significant [for their activities].
There is a global umbrella organization for the Uyghur called the World Uyghur Congress (WUC). Once every two years there is a meeting where the leaders of the organization are chosen. The [current] chairman is Rebiya Kadeer. The General Secretary is Dolkun Isa. In Sweden there are local interest organizations for the Uyghur.
The Chinese leadership is worried that remote parts of the country such as Xinjiang will separate from China. If one province separates there is a risk that other provinces will also separate. For this reason China talks about the five poisons – Tibetan and Uyghur separatism, Taiwanese independence, Falungong and the democracy movement. The Chinese state aims to control these movements, [WKL: This is actually what it says] not only in the country but also outside China.
A Chinese list of people officially deemed terrorists include several Uyghur names or organizations. One of these is the East Turkestan Information Center with its chairman Abduljelil Karakash who lives in Germany. Neither he nor his organization are listed as terrorist organizations by the EU or UN. Another of the organizations designated as terrorist is the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. That organization is listed as a terrorist organization by the EU and UN as well.
Chinese intelligence activities
Like all states, China also has a need for intelligence. China’s civil security service, the Ministry for State Security (MSS), is of special interest to this case. During the period the indictment indicates, the highest responsibility for security issues in the Chinese political leadership was [and is] Zhou Yongkang. That person is mentioned during the telephone tapping done in the case.
Those in charge of intelligence gathering are in need of platforms, places where intelligence can be gathered such as embassies, consulates, news services, companies and universities. Most of this gathering is legal. It has to be done secretly or by deceitful means to become a punishable offense. One of China’s platforms is the People’s Daily. This newspaper, which was founded in 1948, is the official mouthpiece of the party.
An intelligence officer does not need to be an officer, but is called that. [WKL: I don’t understand the original sentence. I have tried to translate it as faithfully as possible.] He has one or several gatherers that provide information. The gatherers have access to environments the intelligence officer cannot freely move within. A Han Chinese intelligence officer, for example, cannot move freely in a Tibetan or Uyghur environment.
Persons related [to the case]
Zhou Lulu was, when the activities mentioned in the indictment occurred, trade commissioner and supervisor of the consular and political departments of China’s embassy in Stockholm. She is married to Lei Da. Lei Da has officially been a journalist at People’s Daily but the Swedish security service have reached the conclusion that he is an intelligence officer for MSS.
Rebiya Kadeer lives in the USA and is leader of WUC. She has been sentenced in China for some sort of espionage activities and also accused of masterminding the riots in Urumqi. She is not, however, listed as a terrorist by China. She has been nominated the Nobel Peace Prize. Dolkun Isa lives in Germany and is general secretary of WUC. China has listed him as terrorist and is the only country to do so. Atahan Abudughani is a Uyghur political refugee, living in Norway and listed by China as a terrorist. Abduljelil Karakash is Uyghur, resides in Germany, is chairman of the East Turkestan Information Centre and has been listed by China as a terrorist. Adil Hakimjan is a Uyghur who has been given political asylum in Sweden. He was deprived of his liberty in Guantanamo and has been listed by China as a terrorist.
Preliminary investigation
Investigations were started in April 2008 against Zhou Lulu, who was said to have requested information about the Uyghur and other minorities in China. It was soon revealed that she met with BM. It was also found that BM had contact with Lei Da. There was information showing that Lei Da had a Uyghur friend who would give him information. A large part of the investigation has been conducted by the use of secret telephone tapping and telecommunications surveillance, as well as resource intensive physical surveillance.
Confiscation at BM’s [residential address]
During a search of BM’s accommodation, the police found in total an amount of around 110000 SEK in cash in a coat and a jacket, which were both in a wardrobe. In the accommodation there were also various notes of political and personal information about meetings and conversations, as well as lists with people of Uyghur origin. Nine cell phones were confiscated. Two telephones used when BM communicated with Lei Da, according to the technical investigation, have not been found
Contacts between BM, Lei Da and Zhou Lulu
BM and Lei Da have communicated with each other in several ways. They have called each other with cell phones and on public phones. Lei Da has also had access to BM’s email account. Their telephone contact has occurred in the usual way by calling each other and talking. But they have also used another method in which one has called the other with a [special] signal. After this they have called other telephones – operative phones – which have then been used for the subsequent calls. The operative phones have been cash refill [cell phones], which typically are much more difficult to track because there is no connection between the owner and the subscription [account]. Nine cell phones have been confiscated at BM’s residence, and of these at least three have been used in his communications with Lei Da. A number of calls have been made from public phones, which typically is a method of secrecy that aims to make it difficult [for trackers] and used to conceal.
BM and Lei Da have had, during the period of January 2008 to May 2009, at least 180 telephone contacts. Of these, 59 contacts have been between operative telephones. Eleven calls have been made from a group of nine public phones and in these cases, BM has called Lei Da six times. It has therefore been about one telephone contact every other day for about one year’s time.
BM was detained and arrested the 4th of June 2009. The police raid was reported in news media the same night, or at least the morning after. On the 5th of June 2009, Lei Da called BM 57 times between 9.30 and 14.30. One of the calls was made to his home telephone, which had not happened before.
From October 2008 to April 2009 someone using Lei Da’s broadband [connection] has in 57 instances logged in or tried to log in to BM’s email account. For technical reasons it is not possible to ascertain if the log in attempts have been successful.
BM has met Zhou Lulu six times and Lei Da at least ten times. Often these meetings have been preceded by phone contact, but sometimes not. They have met at a number of places, often at restaurants. BM has pointed out 29 places where they have met (in one meeting they have visited several places).
Collection of information
BM has learned where Uyghur families reside and travel, and reported this to Zhou Lulu or Lei Da. He has also reported if it will be a calm weekend or if there might be demonstrations outside the Chinese embassy. He has collected information about Abduljelil Karakash’s health condition and reported this to Lei Da. The latter has then reported this to his superior, old Liu. BM has also collected information and reported about Atahan Abudughani. His collection of information and reports has also pertained to Dolkun Isa and his actions, as well as a meeting in Malmo and WUC congresses. He has been handling information about shirts with motives critical of the regime that were to be used before the Olympic games.
Reward
Through the Chinese embassy, BM’s daughter-in-law has been given a job and his wife a free visa. He has also been paid for his information. The 110000 SEK in cash that was confiscated in his living quarters was compensation from China for information handed over.
Description of BM’s economy
During the years 2005 to 2008 BM had declared a net income of 60000 SEK per year. In the year 2005 he received economic support from the Social Service of around 20000 SEK and from the year 2006 to 2009 this amounted to between 50000 to 70000 per year.
Articles in People’s Daily
In the period from 2006 to May 2009, there have been 105 articles written by Lei Da and published in People’s Daily. Only one of these articles is about the Uyghur, which is an article about Adil Hakimjan.
The District Court’s assessment of guilt
Basis in penal law
The District Court bases its decision on penal law in the second section of the Criminal Code, 19th Chapter, 10, which says that whoever, with the intent of providing [information] to a foreign power, here in the country either secretly or by deceitful means carries out activities to gather information about others’ personal condition or contributes to such activity in a manner that is not temporary, shall be sentenced for illegal intelligence activities.
Basis in evidence
When it comes to evaluating the evidence in the case, BM’s public defender has pointed out a number of circumstances that need to be considered. The first [one] is that the prosecutor has only displayed a part of the considerable amount of [material] from the preliminary investigation which implies there are potential factors in the material that could be interpreted favorably for BM. The second circumstance is that neither Lei Da nor Zhou Lulu have testified in the case. The lack of knowledge of what they might have said if they had taken part should also be interpreted favorably for BM. Finally the defender has pointed out that illegal intelligence activity is a crime classification rarely used in court and that its placement in the national security law risks lowering the standard for what evidence the District Court will accept.
As for the amount of investigation material that has not been presented during the trial and has therefore not been presented to the court, and the District Court therefore does not know about, it should be pointed out that the public defender had been present during the police interrogations of BM and that he had spent at least 150 hours going through the investigation [materials]. The defender has shown that he has studied the case well. In light of this [fact], there does not seem to be any reason to assume that circumstances favorable to BM have not been presented at the trial. Also, the prosecutor is obliged to present circumstances favorable to the indicted in case they exist.
That Lei Da and Zhou Lulu have not testified in the case is a weakness in the investigation that must be considered when evaluating the evidence.
When it finally comes to evaluating the evidence, the District Court can only conclude that the same amount of evidence is needed in this case as any other: in order to consider the case proved, the prosecutor has to present evidence to the effect there is no reasonable doubt that BM is guilty of the crime of the charged offense. If there are any doubts, BM shall be acquitted.
Has Lei Da been an intelligence officer?
A question of significant importance when evaluating guilt is whether Lei Da was an intelligence officer and not a journalist. The evidence on this part is mainly based on Bo Renner’s and Wilhelm Unge’s testimonies. They have, in accordance with what is described in the secret attachment, described SAPO’s assessment that Lei Da has held the position of Chinese intelligence officer. The District Court finds their testimony convincing.
There are also circumstances beyond Bo Renner’s and Wilhelm Unge’s testimony implying that Lei Da has been an intelligence officer. BM’s own information in combination with the phone tapping that was carried out has shown that a large part of Lei Da’s communication with BM has been characterized by measures of secrecy including the use of different phones, a system of calling on one phone to signal the use of another phone, and calling from public telephones. That this activity would have happened as part of journalist activities from Lei Da’s side seems completely implausible. That it would have been a precautionary measure to hide negotiations between China and the WUC, something the District Court will elaborate on further down, is not plausible either. The conclusion is that it proves that Lei Da, during the time pertaining to the case, held the post of Chinese intelligence officer.
Was BM aware that Lei Da was an intelligence officer?
BM has argued that the reason he and Lei Da communicated secretly was because they were handling sensitive negotiations that were taking place or about to take place between the WUC and China. Lei Da would serve as an informal channel to China whereas BM in the same way would serve as a bridge to Rebiya Kadeer and the leadership of the WUC.
The District Court is of the opinion that there are circumstances that imply that China and the WUC have been in contact, primarily because of the letter dated the 26th of May 2008 that Rebiya Kadeer had Dolkun Isa forward to BM. Rebiya Kadeer, however, has testified that she and BM barely had contact after the letter had been delivered. Dolkun Isa has testified that he was not aware of any negotiations. Nevertheless, BM and Lei Da had very frequent contacts during the period of the year after the letter had been delivered. That BM during this time would have held indirect talks with the Chinese government without reporting to either Rebiya Kadeer or Dolkun Isa seems out of the question. Neither do the phone taps support the assumption that their contacts concerned negotiations between China and WUC. The District Court for this reason rejects [the claim] that the contacts between BM and Lei Da have been part of negotiations between China and the WUC. Neither can the secret communication be explained by BM wanting to get money back from the Chinese state. It can only be explained by BM being aware of Lei Da working for the Chinese intelligence service and therefore he took precautionary measures to hide his dealings with Lei Da.
Has BM gathered information about others’ personal conditions?
From a large number of intercepted phone calls as well as the testimonies from Abduljelil Karakash, Dilixiati Rexiti and Adil Hakimjan, it is clear that BM has collected information about the personal condition of people of Uyghur origin, most of whom have been active in Uyghur associations and organizations in Sweden and other countries. This information has concerned travel, health condition and applications for asylum. BM has also gathered information from meetings and demonstrations, including photographs. Notes taken during the meetings and pictures taken during a demonstration have included information about who participated and what they said, which falls under the personal circumstances mentioned in the relevant provision [of the criminal code]. BM has thus collected information about other’s personal conditions. The list of Uyghur found in BM’s living quarters might, however, have been part of an invitation to a wedding and therefore does not constitute information about other’s personal information as referred to in the indictment.
Has it been an activity?
In the penal provision there is a requirement that there must have been multiple actions to gather the information mentioned above. It is therefore not punishable to only take [a] single action, but it requires a number of actions that have been of the kind and in such a temporal relationship that they can only be seen as related to one activity. These activities need to have some form of plan-like organization.
When evaluating if it has been part of an activity, it can be established that BM has had contact with a large number of persons to gather information. He has travelled, collected photographs, talked [to others] and taken notes. He has met Zhou Lulu and Lei Da on at least 15 occasions. He has, during the time pertaining to the case, been in telephone contact with Lei Da on at least 180 occasions, in which 59 calls have been from operative phones and eleven calls from public phones. Also, the technical investigation as well as intercepted telephone calls between BM and Lei Da show that Lei Da has had access to BM’s email account. All these conditions show that there has been an activity.
Has BM provided [information] to the Chinese state?
From the phone taps it has further been found that BM turned the collected information over to Lei Da and Zhou Lulu. He has recognized that Lei Da was an intelligence officer and Zhou Lulu a diplomat. By handing over the information he has deliberately provided [information] to the Chinese state.
Has BM acted secretly or by deceitful means, and have the activities been carried out in the country?
BM has confessed that his meetings and contacts with Lei Da and Zhou Lulu have to a certain extent occurred secretly, although for a different reason than the one he has been convicted for. As can be seen from the above, the investigation also shows that he has carried out the activities secretly. By claiming to be sympathetic to the Uyghur cause and withholding [the information that] he acted in order to collect information for China, he has been using deceitful means. Furthermore he has been carrying out the activities in the country. This is the case even though he has on occasion traveled abroad and taken notes in other countries.
The charge is proved
The above shows that the indictment is proven. BM shall therefore be sentenced for illegal information gathering.
Is the criminal offense serious?
The prosecution has stated that the crime should be regarded as serious according to the 19th chapter, 10, third section in the Criminal Code, because it has been an activity that has been systematic, occurred over a longer period in professional form and might have caused or might cause a large number of persons serious harm since the foreign power has been and is a totalitarian great power with strong resources.
The District Court makes the following considerations in this part. BM has for a long time carried out an activity of significant extent. Even though the data he has collected and turned over might seem trivial taken by themselves [one by one] and in some cases have been public, the activity, in which BM has infiltrated the highest leadership of the exile Uyghur movement, can as such have caused or cause serious harm for Uyghur individuals in or outside China.
The aim of the specific penal provision, however, is not only to protect individual persons or groups of persons but also to prevent a foreign power from establishing an intelligence network in the country that can be used for other kinds of espionage than the type that is aimed at refugees. This is the reason the specific penal provision is part of the law on national security. In this regard, there has been potential harm that goes outside the scope of pure refugee espionage.
The risk of harm has been great since the intelligence activities have served a great power that does not fully respect human rights and also has resources to carry out their policies. Combining these circumstances, the criminal offense is considered serious.
Penalty
The penalty scale for the criminal offense of illegal intelligence activity is prison from six months to four years. There is no precedent from the Supreme Court. The Appeals Court of Western Sweden has in a sentence carried out the 13th of November 2007 (case B 84-97) specified the penalty for the offense as prison for eight months. The District Court of Southern Roslag specified in a sentence carried out the 28th of December 1993 (case B 738-93) the penalty to prison is one year and six months. Before 1993 the maximum penalty was restricted to prison for two years, but there was then no specific penalty scale for serious criminal offenses. Applying the [same] penalty scale, the courts have decided the penalty to prison ranging from six months to one year and six months (Sentence from District Court in Molndal the 18th of October 1988 in case B 525-88, as well as the sentences carried out by the District Court in Stockholm the 2nd of September 1975 in case B 347-75 and the 28th of Febrary 1974 in case B 670-73).
BM has no previous criminal record. As has been stated above, he has for a long period of time carried out extensive activities which have carried risk of serious harm. The seriousness of the offense is so high as to correspond to prison for one year and six months. Due to the seriousness of the criminal offense, there can be no other penalty than prison.
The circumstance that BM from the 28th of August 2009 has been subject to a travel ban with an on obligation to give notice should lead to mitigation of the penalty, see NJA 2009, page 599. The time for the penalty shall therefore be reduced to prison for one year and four months.
Travel ban and obligation to give notice
There is still a risk that BM might try to evade prosecution or punishment. He should therefore be subject to a travel ban with obligation to give notice.
Forfeitures and confiscations
When it comes to forfeiting the 110000 SEK in cash in exchange for [carrying out] the crime, the District Court concludes that this is money BM kept in envelopes in clothes inside a wardrobe. BM has, during the specific time, only had a small income and received economic support [from the state]. The phone tapping has also shown that he has received compensation for his intelligence activities. His objection that this had been savings money given to him by his children, among others, does not need to be considered. In light of the described circumstances it is obvious to the District Court that the money has been compensation for criminal activities. They shall the fore be forfeited. The claim of the prosecutor is therefore approved in this part.
The confiscation of the evidence should continue and the passport be forfeited.
Questions of secrecy
The trial has been held behind closed doors. For this reason, secrecy can be ordained for information revealed during the trial. The secrecy in this case will amount to the one described in the 15th chapter, 1 OSL for secrecy relating to foreign powers, and also the 17th chapter, 2, same law, for the designated secrecy to protect the activities of SAPO to reveal or prevent crimes against national security.
Secrecy relating to foreign powers holds for information relating to Sweden’s relations with another state, in which it can be presumed that revealing said information will harm Sweden’s international relations or harm the country in any other way. In order to ascertain if information pertaining to the case should be subject to such secrecy, considering the 10th chapter, 8 RF [Constitution], the District Court has requested a statement from the Government Office.
The secrecy to protect the activities of SAPO to reveal or prevent crimes against national security will hold if it is not clear that the information can be revealed without the objective of the decisions or prepared activities being prevented or future activities harmed.
The District Court makes the judgment that a large part of the information pertaining to the case presented at trial should not be subject to secrecy. Only the information in attachment 3, secret, should be kept secret according to the law sections mentioned above.
Court costs
The defender has asked for compensation for 388 hours of work. Due to the extent and character of the case, this work has been necessary to carry out the assignment. The defender shall therefore be granted the requested compensation. The cost should stay with the state.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR APPEALS; see attachment
Appeals, stated to Svea Appeals Court, should have been received by the District Court before the 29th of March, 2010
Hjalmar Forsberg
Originally I planned to post my own reflections about the case in this entry, but I’ll save that for the comments, in order to make my point: Whatever viewpoints you or I might have, the important thing is that we reason from the facts (in this case, how the court actually decided and what it says in the verdict). I’m interested in hearing your comments as to whether the case is solid or not.
There are currently 12 comments highlighted: 67125, 67150, 67296, 67400, 67416, 67482, 67532, 67537, 67601, 67663, 67882, 67953.
April 1st, 2010 at 6:59 am
Wukailong,
Thank you very much for your undertaking. This is really great.
April 1st, 2010 at 10:10 am
Good work, Wukailong!
I find the text on the use of the phones interesting.
April 1st, 2010 at 12:32 pm
This is a very valuable resource, thanks for the translation.
The original post that brought all this up compared Babur’s situation to Rebiya’s. In light of this translation, we can again ask some questions, did Babur violate Swedish law? Is the Swedish law in violation of international human rights standards? Were Rebiya’s activities that implicated her comparable in intent and scale to Babur’s?
April 1st, 2010 at 12:37 pm
A second quick observation, one of my own issues when comparing the Chinese legal process with judiciary proceedings elsewhere is the level of transparency. The fact that all the documents regarding Babur Mehsut’s proceedings (an individual who Nimrod was trying to classify as a political prisoner) are so immediately and readily available, even in the case of a closed trial such as this one, is telling. If these documents were directly accessible for not only Rebiya Kadeer’s trial, but also for the hundreds of trials going on the wake of the 7/5 riots, that would be progress.
April 1st, 2010 at 4:04 pm
@Porfiriy
Here’s the evidence against Kadeer: http://www.antiwar.com/paul/paul79.html. It has to do with the organization that funds her like a welfare check for Chinese traitors.
April 1st, 2010 at 4:26 pm
@ Jason: The article you referenced is decidedly off topic and doesn’t even mention Kadeer or Mehsut. If you want to write up a post on NED and how it affects China, please do so in the Letters section. This post is about a specific trial in Sweden.
April 1st, 2010 at 4:29 pm
WKL, great job on this! It’s a very long translation and took a lot of time and work. Legal proceedings cannot be translated using standard internet translator programs, the legal wording is just too unique. It’s a real resource for us to have so many bloggers who are able to translate from one language to another.
April 1st, 2010 at 4:45 pm
Thanks for translating these materials- this really is interesting reading.
@Porfiry- it certainly would be progress if the legal proceedings surrounding RK’s trial and the trials of July 5 defendants were more transparent.
April 1st, 2010 at 5:09 pm
How is he guilt of anything? He didn’t do anything that can cause him to get imprison for. He is not spying on Sweden for the Chinese government. Anyone can be accuse of spying their organization like that, I feel he is a victim of hate crime against some people with different opinion by that organization and the government there, that they are all in this together.
April 1st, 2010 at 7:56 pm
Wi, agree with your sentiments:
– No state secrets are involved, according to the document: “data he has collected and turned over might seem trivial taken by themselves [one by one] and in some cases have been public”
– “may have caused or might cause a large number of persons serious harm” is not proof of any actual harm. The guilty verdict is based on the court’s perception of possible harm, in conjunction of working with foreign power.
– Trial was conducted in secret, on claim of national security.
I don’t necessarily disagree with the verdict, but I do have a problem with how this is viewed so differently than trials held in China:
– Many have criticized the Chinese government for holding secret trials, yet no complaints in same parity exist for the Swedish trial. This IMHO is duplicitous (as if China doesn’t have the same right to judicate its own sense of national security?)
– Funding by foreign power being element of prosecution’s evidence is accepted here but ignored when it comes to our own funding of groups the Chinese government views as hostile or prohibited political activity under their laws.
In addition to the NED funding Jason mentioned in comment 5, other verdicts from Chinese court have also employed the same rationale, that citizen’s political activity isn’t genuine and can be reasonably prohibited, if it’s at the direction or patronage of foreign agent. eg. prosecution of Liu Xiaobo where foreign remittance to Bank of China was cited as evidence that Liu’s political activity in constitutional reform was patroned by foreign entity.
(Liu receiving over $650,000 from US government via the NED is not a secret, neither is the fact we underwrite other nation’s domestic political activity while prohibits others from doing the same in US via FARA.)
April 1st, 2010 at 8:05 pm
Thank you for your translation.
I like to complement your information with additional resource.
BM is guilty according to the District Court bases its decision on penal law in the second section of the Criminal Code, 19th Chapter, 10,
Penal code of Sweden
http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/02/77/77/cb79a8a3.pdf
Excerpt
Chapter 19
Section 10
A person who, with the intent of aiding a foreign power, conducts
activities designed to acquire information relating to military or
other matters, the revelation of which to that foreign power could
cause harm to the security of another foreign power, or lends
assistance not solely of an incidental nature to such activities in the
Realm, shall be sentenced for unlawful intelligence activities to a
fine or imprisonment for at most one year.
A person who, with the intent of aiding a foreign power, secretly
or by fraudulent means conducts in the Realm activities designed to
acquire information concerning the personal circumstances of
another individual or lends assistance not solely of an incidental
nature to such activities, shall likewise be sentenced for unlawful
intelligence activities.
If a crime under this Section is gross, imprisonment for at least
six months and at most four years shall be imposed. (Law
1993:207)
I want to point out — All evidences are circumstantial.
I like to know how the Sweden court define intelligent officer.
“A question of significant importance when evaluating guilt is whether Lei Da was an intelligence officer and not a journalist. The evidence on this part is mainly based on Bo Renner’s and Wilhelm Unge’s testimonies. They have, in accordance with what is described in the secret attachment, described SAPO’s assessment that Lei Da has held the position of Chinese intelligence officer. The District Court finds their testimony convincing.”
I am missing the testimonies and the SAPO’s assessment information.
Without these information, I am in no position of judging the verdict of the trial. Whether Lei da is a intelligent officer or not is the crucial part of the trial. If Lei Da is only a journalist, BM would not be guilty of Sweden Criminal Code of chapter 19 section 10.
I like to know how BM was arrested. Did the police arrested BM on the act like a drug busting case where the police arrest two perpetrator exchanging drug for money? This would be a concrete proof.
April 1st, 2010 at 9:37 pm
I’m not certain how it is in Europe, however I think this case, by American standards, is highly questionable, and barring any strong evidence from the secret attachment supplied by SAPO, hardly rises to the judicial standard of “without reasonable doubt” that the court wants to apply.
The evidence portion of the verdict rests on these reasonings, and we can take a look at them one by one:
1. Has Lei Da been an intelligence officer?
It appears that a person in the role of a journalist who conducts investigation with some degree of secrecy, as is often done on the grounds of protecting the source or indeed carrying out the very duty of investigative journalism (whether or not it is the case here), can, prima facie, be evidence of being an intelligence officer.
2. Was BM aware that Lei Da was an intelligence officer?
It appears that a person agreeing to communicate with another person via various private modes, even if other times, the same communication is done through meetings in public places, is evidence of being aware that one is engaging in intelligence gathering.
3. Has BM gathered information about others’ personal conditions?
Having knowledge of information concerning travel, health condition and applications for asylum of a person’s acquaintances or of those who invited the person to their wedding, taking photographs and notes at meetings and demonstrations to which a person is invited, are all considered intelligence gathering.
…It goes downhill from here…
4. Has it been an activity?
This part of the evidence is a bit confused. Perhaps it was trying to show coordination or planning. However, any form of sustained communication usually requires coordination and planning. See 1.
5. Has BM provided [information] to the Chinese state?
There is no separate evidence for this, besides what is already stated for 2.
6. Has BM acted secretly or by deceitful means, and have the activities been carried out in the country?
This part again provides no new evidence. Where the “activity” takes place appears tangential, since the court can latch onto any connection to Sweden. However, there are several alarming things going on here. One, the evidence for the “deceitful means” part is entirely dependent on how to interpret evidence in 5. This is circular logic. Two, the court presumes the logic that talking to the Chinese state is contrary to being “sympathetic to the Uyghur cause” and inherently deceitful. Three, one is judged “deceitful” in learning personal information of acquaintances or even public information, even if passively, unless one declares all current, past, and future communications.
7. Is the criminal offense serious?
There is no evidence given here, but simply a series of political declarations about China (added to the political statement about Xinjiang in the introduction). It rests on whether China is a “totalitarian great power” (a certain overreach, as most consider China at most authoritarian); whether the activity has been systematic or is in a professional form (depends on how you interpret the other evidence), whether serious harm or potential harm befell a “large number of persons” (no evidence of either harm or potential harm given at all). The language given here is highly charged and honestly, I’ve read some Chinese court verdicts on dissidents that were more level-headed than this.
April 2nd, 2010 at 2:10 am
@Steve BS reason
April 2nd, 2010 at 2:32 am
@ Jason: Grow up. I gave you the reason I collapsed the post. If you continue to flout blog rules your posts will go into moderation.
April 2nd, 2010 at 2:33 am
Thanks for the comments! I’m a bit busy now, but just a number of answers:
@wuen (#11): Good work about the law. “Realm” (rike) and “gross” (allvarlig) in your quote is “country” and “serious” in my translation. There are actually attachments I haven’t translated. I could have a go at them too, but no promises. I agree with the rest of the assessments as well. I’ve read the attachments (except the secret one), but still can’t say whether I’m in the position to judge the verdict…
@Nimrod (#12): Thanks for going through the points one by one, that’s exactly what I wanted people to do. I’ll give my own thoughts on this later.
@Charles: You’ve been repeating in several places that he hasn’t been leaking “state secrets,” but the trial and/or the law quoted isn’t about that at all. Also, I was going to say this sooner or later, but the money BM received seems to have played very little role in the verdict. It’s not illegal to receive money as such, even if it’s from a foreign organization. Also, are you against trials behind locked doors in any country (so as to not use double standard), or is it OK if it happens in China?
April 2nd, 2010 at 2:45 am
I have an unrelated question:
In the process of becoming a citizen, does it absolute need to give up loyalty to other countries?
What does “loyalty” mean here? If someone still have feeling connect to the nation that you are from, does it mean you didn’t give up loyalty to other countries?
Please help me here, it could mean a lot.
April 2nd, 2010 at 2:45 am
Full of bull and outrageous reason.
April 2nd, 2010 at 3:17 am
@ Wi #16: You’ll always have a strong connection to your original country and you should have it. “Loyalty” in this regard just means you would not betray your new country. You might choose to make a new country your home but that doesn’t mean you forget your roots, for your roots are what made you into the person you are.
In the future, if you have a question that is off topic, just ask it in the Open Thread section. We created that for exactly these kinds of questions. If your question is complex, you can always write it up in the “Letters” section.
April 2nd, 2010 at 3:22 am
Thank you Steve.
April 2nd, 2010 at 4:40 am
For BM to be find guilty, he need to satisfy 2 conditions from the following passage of the Criminal Code
“A person who, with the 1)intent of aiding a foreign power, 2)secretly or by fraudulent means conduct in the Realm activities designed to acquire information concerning the personal circumstances of another individual or lends assistance not solely of an incidental nature to such activities, shall likewise be sentenced for unlawful intelligence activities.”
2)
To satisfy the second condition, the prosecutor must prove he collected the information “secretly or fraudulently”. This proof is base ont the assumption BM has claimed to sympathize with the ethnic Uighurs, taking part in congresses and meetings with them as well as concealing that he was handing over information about them to representatives of the Chinese state.
1)
To satisfy the first condition, the court need to find out if Lei Da is a foreign intelligent officer. According to the assessment by SAPO, Lei Da is a foreign intelligent officer. In addition it have to show proof of BM intention to help foreign power. The proof is base on circumstantial evidences with his plan meeting with Lei Da and the reason why BM help is for the money.
If these two conditions are satisfy, this conclude BM is guilty as charge.
My opinion about this is if Lei Da was not a foreign intelligent officer, the indictment will not satisfy the first condition and the second condition, which is base on deduction from circumstantial evidences, would have become void.
Thank Nimrod #21. I made the change according to you info.
April 2nd, 2010 at 5:03 am
wuen, “secretly” or “fraudulently” in this passage appears to refer to the collection or aiding in the collection of information, not of passing it on. This is why they try to prove he collected the information “deceitfully”. Secretly passing on the information is another matter, which was supposed to prove his awareness of what he was doing.
April 2nd, 2010 at 5:39 am
@wuen and Nimrod (#20, #21): Actually, the first part of the law says “gå främmande makt tillhanda” in original, which means that you either aid or provide something [pass over] to a foreign power. That’s why I translated it as “with the intent of providing [information] to a foreign power.”
April 2nd, 2010 at 4:39 pm
WKL, the reason I pointed out no state secrets were involved is because of the previous criticism against Chinese government’s prosecution of Hu Jia. The criticism was precisely that since no state secret was involved, the Chinese government had no right to prosecute him for collecting information and handing them over to the US embassy.
Now we see from this case aiding foreign power is prosecutable, and it not need to be state secret. The difference is we are quick to accept this one, but quick to reject the other. This demonstrates bais.
April 2nd, 2010 at 4:46 pm
Same thing with the secret trials. I actually am for secret trials and ALL nation’s right to claim sovereign security. But the bias I’m seeing, again, is while we criticize the Chinese government for holding secret trials, there’s no parity in calling for open trial in the Swedish case. Show me if AI or any other supposed human rights group that b!tched about Hu Jia’s trial being secret that made a peep about this case being secret? I bet you can not fine one.
April 2nd, 2010 at 9:41 pm
Charles
The Chinese government/CCP is criticised for holding secret trials because it is far too ready to do it as a means of making sure it gets the verdict it wants – usually when people are charged with political crimes. It does so to stop the media picking up on what happens so that it can pretend justice is being done, when really it isn’t.
In contrast Sweden does not hold secret trials lightly, nor can there be any serious suggestion that the man was charged and convicted because he had displeased the Swedish government/ruling party. As far as we understand there was a specific reason for holding the trial in secret, and if you’re not satisfied you can pay a translator to translate the attachment referred to. Furthermore even in this case the verdict was still published to be picked over, whether that reflects well or badly on the case.
As for Hu Jia, what information about others did he collect without their permission? He collected information about human rights abuses in China and was convicted because the government/CCP felt they were embarrassed.
This guy was charged because he was suspected of compiling information on individuals that the Chinese government considered a threat and could have been used against them in some way.
Wi (9)
You can spy on people or non-governmental organisations. You don’t need to do it against a government or public body.
I’m sorry, but I cannot see why there is any conspiracy here involving the Swedish government. There could have been a miscarriage of justice, but in that case why the use of the different phones? Are you suggesting this was a lie and there were no phones used at all and no information was collected?
Also, no offence but are you suggesting you compile data on where your co-workers live and other private information on them? That’s not usual, and I don’t do anything like that.
April 2nd, 2010 at 11:53 pm
Raj wrote:
As for Hu Jia, what information about others did he collect without their permission? He collected information about human rights abuses in China and was convicted because the government/CCP felt they were embarrassed.
+++++
I think spuriously assigning motives is the problem with those who always see problems in China and always see roses elsewhere. It’s entirely unconvincing. One can, if one wishes, infer a motive either noble or nefarious, depending on need. So a country arrests one of its own citizens for what it believes to be subversive activities on its soil. If I were the alterego of Raj, I might say Sweden convicted BM because the government/Swedish king is embarrassed by BM revealing it is hosting a bunch of terrorists. Sounds equally ridiculous.
April 3rd, 2010 at 12:03 am
Raj, don’t expect me to waste my time on your biased opinion. Show some factual proof of your “far too ready to do it” and “making sure it gets the verdict it wants” claims.
Did any of the Hu Jia secret trial complainers knew Hu’s mother was in attendance? Not to mention his defense team? Oh look, US govt propaganda outlet RFA’s reporting on Hu Jia is not censored.
If nothing else, your baised opinion agasint China pretty much proves my point.
April 3rd, 2010 at 6:46 am
Let’s try to get back to the topic at hand: the trial, and what you think about it. I won’t get into Hu Jia’s trial because I don’t have any documents of that trial that are comparable to the ones above. Maybe I wasn’t making myself clear in the post, so here goes: The whole point of the translation is to provide information open to everybody, and argue from that, not media reports. If you want to compare cases, do so based on actual knowledge of them. This also goes if you argue that others are biased.
I’m interested in the discussion of the concept of “secret trial.” Let’s begin somewhere with a definition (as usual, I’ll include the caveat about using Wikipedia: this is only preliminary, until someone finds a more authoritative source):
“A secret trial is a trial that is not open to the public, nor reported in the news. Generally no official record of the case or the judge’s verdict is made available. Often there is no indictment, the accused is not able to obtain the counsel of an attorney or confront witnesses for the prosecution, and the proceedings are characterized by a perceived miscarriage of justice to the benefit of the ruling powers of the society.”
Under this definition, I wouldn’t characterize the trial as “secret,” rather it was carried out behind locked doors. The documents are public, and can be read in translation above. But I digress.
Here’s my personal views of the case, based on reading the reports (I’ve indicated points where I agree with Raj and Nimrod):
Personally, I have my own opinion as to whether it should be illegal to pass information about private individuals on to the embassy of a foreign power. I didn’t even know there was such a law in my own country. However, if we by “political prisoner” mean somebody who’s been convicted on phony charges, then the convicted doesn’t belong to the category.
First of all, the most important factor in the case was that the journalist was in fact not a journalist at all, but an intelligence officer. BM claims to have believed that he actually handed the information over to a journalist and nothing else. If that’s true, why did he use such secretive measures? I agree with Raj here. As the verdict says:
“Their telephone contact has occurred in the usual way by calling each other and talking. But they have also used another method in which one has called the other with a [special] signal. After this they have called other telephones – operative phones – which have then been used for the subsequent calls. The operative phones have been cash refill [cell phones], which typically are much more difficult to track because there is no connection between the owner and the subscription [account]. Nine cell phones have been confiscated at BM’s residence, and of these at least three have been used in his communications with Lei Da. A number of calls have been made from public phones, which typically is a method of secrecy that aims to make it difficult [for trackers] and used to conceal.”
BM claims that the secrecy was necessary to protect sensitive negotiations between WUC and China, especially delivering a letter from Rebiya Kadeer to a Chinese representative, but as the verdict says,
“Nevertheless, BM and Lei Da had very frequent contacts during the period of the year after the letter had been delivered. That BM during this time would have held indirect talks with the Chinese government without reporting to either Rebiya Kadeer or Dolkun Isa seems out of the question. Neither do the phone taps support the assumption that their contacts concerned negotiations between China and WUC.”
Another interesting part about the sentence is that the supposed payment from the embassy (which would include a “foreign organization”) plays a very minor role in the indictment. It’s not illegal to get money from foreign organizations (I’m not getting into tax issues here). The main thrust is that BM has provided information to a foreign power in a secret and deceitful way. These conclusions does look solid, in my opinion.
However, the judgement isn’t entirely apolitical. There are parts where ideology seems to play a role, like the conclusion that the criminal offense is serious based on China being a “totalitarian great power with strong resources,” which I think is a very loaded wording. I can understand that authorities of any country are wary of potential spy networks, but to judge based on the activities having “served a great power that does not fully respect human rights” seems naïve at best. I agree with Nimrod here. I can’t name any great power (or any country, for that matter) that fully respects human rights. Hopefully the appeals court will reverse this part of the decision.
In the end, it might be a personal decision as to whether BM is a “political prisoner” or not. Some people consider everyone convicted of spying or any kind of intelligence activities a political prisoner, so it might just be impossible to tell.
April 3rd, 2010 at 11:16 am
Nimrod (26)
You are not being sensible. Neither the Swedish ruling party nor its king control the courts. Moreover even if Moderata samlingspartiet (the Moderate Party) did (rather hard to change the courts’ allegiance given that they’ve only been in power since 2006) they seem to accept criticism of themselves on every other issue and do not widely censor the media. Compare that to how the CCP operates.
It makes no sense for Moderata samlingspartiet to allow reports that could lead to them losing control of the Riksdag (Parliament) on any number of issues and rig a verdict on just one matter, especially when the Chinese government is not exactly trusted by Europeans when it comes to matters of truth. Not to suggest that the Swedish public could not be persuaded by reasonable evidence, but it would have to be very convincing. The nature of the information collected, according to the verdict, was personal like information on asylum applications, home addresses, etc. That doesn’t show someone is a terrorist.
Finally, where is this “embarrassing” information that shows Sweden has hosted “terrorists”? The verdict says that there had been many communications between the parties. If this was done to gain evidence of terrorism, why not use it? With such tough evidence that would move someone like the Swedish government to attempt a coverup, it would be worth using. The Chinese government/authorities has/have been accused of orchestrating a spying operation on Swedish terroritory. Their contact/”spy” has been caught and convicted In such a situation it would be normal to disprove the allegation or at least explain why that happened. The lack of such action suggests that the Chinese government has no such defence.
Charles (27)
Having a defence team does not mean the trial is automatically fair, nor does having a relative attend ensure justice is done. But in any case this thread is not about Hu Jia’s trial. If you’re unhappy about how that was treated, go write about it elsewhere. Wukailong’s thread is about providing information so that we can assess a different case with better details rather than just media reports.
Wukailong (28)
You make a good point about the trial being “secret”. Trials in England can be held behind closed doors for certain reasons (like reputations of accused persons/organisations being damaged before a verdict), but transcripts of the proceedings and verdict can be applied for by anyone. In this case we have a verdict and the case was reported.
We also really have to think about the use of the telephones. This indicates that at the very least he and his colleagues didn’t want the authorities to know about what they were doing. If it was innocent information it would have been done in plain sight. The use of his e-mail account by the other parties is a tactic in avoiding sending e-mails that could be tracked (you write a draft message, save it and let someone read it).
In regards to your penultimate paragraph, I think that the comment “served a great power that does not fully respect human rights” was a diplomatic way of referring to China’s bad human rights record. The Swedish court was faced with a difficult international matter, and it doubtlessly feared that being too direct in highlighting what goes on in China would be too political and make things worse. I don’t think that they were saying because China is imperfect that’s a relevant fact in the trial.
April 3rd, 2010 at 2:21 pm
I doubt Lei Da is a intelligent officer working for the PRC MSS base on three reasons.
First Lei Da method of obtaining information does not follow the characteristic of a intelligent officer. For example he directly use his internet IP address to log into BM email account. A intelligent officer would have used multiple proxy setup around the world to login into someone else account so it can not be retrace without the authorities of others countries. This is easy to do and he could ask his networks to help him do it. Using own IP address show Dei La was working alone like a journalist without the network of a intelligent officer. All intelligent officer have networks their can rely on.
Second their is no concrete proof of transfer of money from Chinese MSS to BM. The money is used to prove BM intention because it relate to his motif, without motif it will be difficult to prove BM intention. All crime base on circumstantial evidences require to present a motif. The prosecutor state “BM has been rewarded by his superiors with money and personal services.” The prosecutor alleges these superiors, who are more than one person, are working for the Chinese state. Without the bank account of the original depositors, these superiors could have come from a number of different sources that is not link to Chinese MSS. BM could also work for others secret services.
Third the Sweden authority did not arrest Lei Da. Sweden authority have the right to arrest any intelligent officer. Lei Da have no immunity and must follow the law of Sweden. If Lei Da is a intelligent officer gathering information concerning the personal circumstances of another individual for a “bad foreign power”, he would been arrested and interrogated. I am puzzled why the authorities did not arrest Lei Da. I assume the authority did not have enough proof to warrant the arrest of Lei Da. For this reason I question the testimonies from Bo Renner and Wilhelm Unge and the assessment from SAPO that Lei Da is an intelligent officer. By convention an ambassador who practice or support spying would be expel from the country. Sweden did not expel the Chinese ambassador. This mean the Embassy did not conduct unlawful mean of spying.
If Lei Da is arrested, he could be charge from this passage of Sweden Criminal code:
“A person who, with the intent of aiding a foreign power, conducts activities designed to acquire information relating to military or other matters, the revelation of which to that foreign power could cause harm to the security of another foreign power, or lends assistance not solely of an incidental nature to such activities in the Realm, shall be sentenced for unlawful intelligence activities to a fine or imprisonment for at most one year.”
From these three reasons, I conclude Lei Da is not a intelligent officer. BM could be working for other secret services agency, but China MSS is the scapegoat here. The evidences presented by the prosecutor are not exhaustive. Evidence that show BM working for another secret services could be withhold by the prosecutor.
April 3rd, 2010 at 7:38 pm
For the people who think I am being wrong in stating Sweden did not expel the Chinese ambassador for spying — Should know on what basis I state this fact.
Read the following article carefully
http://www.thelocal.se/20212/20090622/
“We can confirm that a foreign diplomat has been deported. I’m not going to comment on what country the diplomat is from. We can confirm that a Swedish diplomat was deported in response,” said Swedish foreign ministry spokesperson Anders Jörle told TT.”
The Swedish authority never confirm or deny the Swedish expel Chinese diplomat or if the word deported is equivalent to expel. The person who allege the diplomat are from China is the media. I have my doubt on western media after the Lhasa riot and Urumqi riot. Western media contain many false accusation on China like showing Nepal police as Chinese police during the period of Lhasa riot. If there really was a Chinese diplomat involve, it could be because China recall it ambassador to show it protest over the allege spy accusation against China. To recall ambassador is a way to show protest. The Swedish authority never say China expel Swedish diplomat, so it can not prove China expel Swedish diplomat.
If a country expel a foreign diplomat, the satement would be written like this:
Lieberman ‘regrets’ U.K. decision to expel Israeli diplomat
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1158393.html
“Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman on Tuesday said Israel “regretted” Britain’s decision to expel an Israeli diplomat over the use of forged British passports by suspected killers of a Hamas commander in Dubai. ”
Australia: Fraser calls for expulsion of Israeli diplomats
http://rainbowwarrior2005.wordpress.com/2010/03/30/australia-fraser-calls-for-expulsion-of-israeli-diplomats/
“Former prime minister Malcolm Fraser has called on the Federal Government to expel Israeli diplomats from Australia.
Four Australians apparently had their passports forged and used as part of the assassination of a Hamas leader in Dubai.
It is believed the Israeli spy agency, Mossad, is responsible for the murder.”
Morocco expels Swedish diplomat
http://www.thelocal.se/23082/20091105/
“Swedish ambassador Michael Odevald was summoned by Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri to be told of “a serious breach in diplomatic practice and an unacceptable professional error committed by an advisor at Sweden’s embassy in Rabat, Mrs Anna Block-Mazoyer,” a statement said.”
All of these articles come from the mouth of the government officials and not the media. In the case of the article of China spying in Sweden, it is the media who allege the expel diplomat is from China, not the government.
April 3rd, 2010 at 8:54 pm
Charles — Western Europe has a good track-record of free, independent judiciaries, and has for decades, maybe centuries. “Secret trials” make up a very small percentage.
China has a terrible track-record in terms of open, free trials. Just about any case that could potentially embarrass or criticize the Communist Party is treated in secret. Lawyers are barred, family are harassed, information is not released, etc. Sometimes, you can’t even get basic details, like court dates.
I’m sure you can find exceptions if you really want. But if you look at the broader picture, you can see why there’s more criticism of the Chinese legal system.
There are many dissidents in jail in China. There aren’t in Sweden.
Scandinavian countries rank the highest in the world for press freedom — so there are checks and balances. If there really is a miscarriage of justice, people can read about it and criticize it. That does not exist in China.
Finally, there’s “secret” and there’s secret. The fact that we are openly discussing this case here — and reading the documents in full — means that this Swedish proceeding is far more open than most in China.
You’re comparing apples and oranges.
April 3rd, 2010 at 9:30 pm
@Joyce
I hope you are joking, most netizens does in fact criticizes some cases where China courts overturns their ruling. Pointing that there’s no practice of people’s critique of justice is something very outrageous on your part.
April 3rd, 2010 at 9:54 pm
Wukailong wrote:
First of all, the most important factor in the case was that the journalist was in fact not a journalist at all, but an intelligence officer. BM claims to have believed that he actually handed the information over to a journalist and nothing else. If that’s true, why did he use such secretive measures? I agree with Raj here.
+++++
I addressed this in my original post already:
Is this the case? Is secrecy of communication by itself evidence of intelligence activity? Then can we apply the same to (foreign) journalists who undertake to communicate secretly with Tibetans or Uighurs or other “dissidents” in China for the purpose of conducting some kind of investigation?
April 3rd, 2010 at 10:24 pm
wuen (30)
Point 1 – This falls apart if we entertain the possibility that he got sloppy. Intelligence officers make mistakes all the time.
Point 2 – What would concrete proof be? The Chinese security services don’t have bank accounts open in their name, so that’s not going to happen. If we followed your logic no one could ever be convicted of spying because money will never be marked “property of security service X”, nor will contacts write on their facebook pages “I’m a spy”.
Furthermore you’re speculating when suggesting he may have worked for someone else. Who else gives a monkey’s about Uighurs as much as China does?
Point 3 – Just because you are an intelligence officer does not mean you cannot have or rely on diplomatic immunity.
Nimrod (33)
That is your analysis, not the words of the Court. Journalists do not normally resort to such ridiculous methods to protect their sources, especially in democratic countries where the authorities do not routinely censor and/or control the media. That is, I guess, why Wukailong agreed with me.
April 3rd, 2010 at 11:48 pm
@raj
Point 1 – 57 time accessing BM email account with personal internet IP address is consider beyond sloppy. No intelligent officer would use it own internet IP address to used someone else email account. The way I think, BM give permission to Lei da to use his email account, so Lei Da received approval from BM to access his email. If Lei Da was trying to break into BM email account, it will need more than 57 attempt.
Point 2 – The money is consider circumstantial evidence because it does not have any traceable source to Chinese MSS or even to Lei Da. It just mention about “reward by his superiors”. Who are these superiors? These superiors could be a group of people who intent to blackmail China with spying. It is more probable BM who first contacted the Chinese journalist by being the messenger for Kadeer letter to the Chinese, not the Chinese who started to contact BM. That how the plan to blackmail the Chinese started. BM could be train to used different mean of communication, not by Chinese, but by other operating agency. How did BM learn to evade authority eve-dropping? I doubt it is Lei da who taught him. Lei da cannot even use a proxy to hide his IP address.
Point 3 – Lei Da have no immunity in Sweden. Any foreign intelligent officer operating against the law of the country would be arrested. Please search the information on the internet to understand. American, Russia, France, England, Algeria, etc arrest foreign spies, Sweden would have done the same.
Lei Da is not a intelligent officer according to these three point. He is a journalist who decide to investigate an organization in which BM had information.
To better understand how a country behave toward another country intelligent officer breach of law, please wait for my article after post #30. It need some time to appear because it is being moderated.
April 4th, 2010 at 2:37 am
Raj wrote:
That is your analysis, not the words of the Court. Journalists do not normally resort to such ridiculous methods to protect their sources, especially in democratic countries where the authorities do not routinely censor and/or control the media. That is, I guess, why Wukailong agreed with me.
+++++
This is exactly used by the Court as evidence to prove its point. It also says there is some secret attachment showing investigation by the SAPO. It may as well have left it there, but nevertheless felt it necessary to bolster the case by adding to it using exactly this line of reasoning I pointed out. Are you saying it is meaningless drivel? If not, then you should have no beef with me just parsing what they say.
Your further statement on how “democratic countries” do not censor and/or control the media is beyond ridiculous and is a further abuse of reasoning by ideology. Investigations by journalists on any sensitive matter is frequently censored in so-called “democratic countries”. Even such trivial matters as photos of body bags coming back from Iraq had been forbidden under Bush. So journalists do not resort to such “ridiculous methods”, you say? Ever heard of Deep Throat and the Watergate investigation? Here, let me quote for you:
Therefore, I guess these were spies, and so were those journalists secretly talking to what they unilaterally label as “dissidents” in China, and whom they unilaterally feel the need to “protect”? Spies, not journalists?
You can’t have it two ways. Certainly I can imagine some extenuating circumstances here to “believe” (and it is just that, “believe”) that Lei Da is not a journalist but a spy, but the court didn’t make that case, and I feel no obligation to make its case on its behalf. All I have are what is visibly provided to me by the court re: secrecy, and it’s unconvincing unless you go back to that miracle crutch of who is democratic or not. So then ask yourself, is it evidence, or ideology?
April 4th, 2010 at 2:57 am
Jason — I’m not saying that there is no criticism at all. Sure, you can find online comments, usually by anonymous posters. And, occasionally, court cases are overturned.
I’m speaking in a broad sense: There is no real, systematic way to challenge the Chinese court system. Not in a way that is comparable to any major developed nation.
You’re probably not going to read a good, critical article on the judiciary on the front page of a Chinese newspaper — certainly not the kind of critical coverage that a U.S. paper would give the Supreme Court. You’re not going to organize a protest in front of a major court without risking arrest.
The average guy on the street has no idea about dissidents being jailed or many of the things that happen. And if this average guy is accused of criticizing the Party, God help him trying to get fair coverage or a fair retrial.
Just look at the parents who are still pressing their case against the Sichuan school collapses.
You guys can argue the little details all you want.
I’m taking a big step back and saying that you can’t compare an open, free court system in a Western democracy to a less-developed, closed court system under a one-party Communist rule.
Side note: Why are the Chinese so darned defensive? U.S. newspapers are full of criticism of America, British papers are full of criticism of Britain — its wars, its politics, etc. Why can’t the Chinese say: “Our court system isn’t exactly the most open. Let’s try to fix that.” Instead of “Hey, let’s pick on Sweden.”
April 4th, 2010 at 3:14 am
@Nimrod (#33): I read what you wrote, but for me there are many levels of “secrecy of communication,” from using encrypted email to a bunch of cell phones (8-10, apparently), special signals and all that. It isn’t just using secret means of communication. I found the court verdict more convincing in this case than the analysis you provided.
As for whether this happened in a democratic country or not, that’s not part of my analysis or ideas of the case. I would be as worried if someone had provided similar information to CIA (well, who knows if it hasn’t already happened), but again, that’s personal.
@Others: I can see there’s a lot of speculation going on as to how spy networks operate and what’s reasonable. I’m just curious about your sources of information?
April 4th, 2010 at 3:20 am
Sure the Brits and American newspaper criticize but it is extremely hard to find behind the corporate media. Most of the critiques came from blogs and other media form that is hidden away from the public. I wish the corporate media would bring those to the front since most people are too lazy and just read whatever that is easily accessible to them and not question it.
April 4th, 2010 at 4:28 am
Jason — Man, I’m going to stop, because I don’t think people like you will be convinced.
I don’t know what you mean by “corporate media.” Log onto the websites of major media owned by big corporations outside of China and you will find tons of reporting when there’s a major court case, and criticism of the government.
CNN, NYT, WaPo, BBC, ABC, Fox News, The Guardian, Le Monde, The South China Morning Post, etc.
I have no idea what you mean by things being “hidden” in blogs. In a free society like the West, practically no media is blocked. People can read what they want.
This conversation has gotten totally off topic.
The main question was why Chinese courts are criticized for being closed, when this Swedish court is not.
My answer is that China is a far more closed society than Western Europe. And that even a “secret” trial in Europe is relatively open to the public, compared to a Chinese one.
April 4th, 2010 at 4:46 am
@ Joyce Lau: There are others on the blog that are very interested in what you have to say, including myself. Please don’t let one or a few people stop you from giving your opinion.
April 4th, 2010 at 4:47 am
“Why are the Chinese so darned defensive?”
Nope, the “Chinese” are not defensive. They bring forward their view point to construct a more dialectically debate. It is up to the readers like us to form our own synthesis. The age to presume everything from the West represent “truth” is over.
“Let’s try to fix that.”
Did Iraq finally fix their democracy system? I think we need to profoundly ponder the socio-political conditioning of that society before telling others what should be done.
April 4th, 2010 at 4:52 am
Oh btw Joyce, i agree with Steve, i like to read your comments.
April 4th, 2010 at 5:08 am
@wuen (#31): Sorry, I didn’t see your comment until now. I knew that Sweden expelled a Chinese diplomat, and that China responded in kind, and it was connected to BM’s case. I guess there are standard procedures for this but I don’t know what they are. Both China and Sweden have been very low-key on the whole thing, which is interesting.
As for doubting Western media, I began to do that a lot earlier (all media, in fact) than the Lhasa and Ürümqi riots. If you know a subject in detail and read the news reports, you’ll more often than not be disappointed. It goes the same way with news reports here in China about Taiwan.
April 4th, 2010 at 7:58 am
Wukailong Says:
@Nimrod (#33): I read what you wrote, but for me there are many levels of “secrecy of communication,” … I found the court verdict more convincing in this case than the analysis you provided.
+++++
Sure, it’s a matter of degree and I guess I am just feeling especially skeptical about it, trying to put myself in the shoes of an imaginary jurist. Maybe that’s unjustified in this case, but I don’t think I’m being more skeptical than people are about cases in China; in fact, probably less so.
April 4th, 2010 at 8:04 am
@Joyce
Take Hany Kiareldeen, for example, was incarcerated for 13 months in 1998 in the United States on the basis of secret evidence that no one – not the prisoners themselves, not their lawyers – may see.
Submit to a US polling service, like Rasmussen of asking Who is Hany Kiareldeen? I bet less than 10% of the people knows who he was.
Or even try Ibrahim Jassam who is throw in jail to an Iraqi prison camp by US without evidence.
Our corporate media loves to point to and loudly condemn the censored behavior of other governments as proof of how tyrannical and evil they are — look at those Commies imprisoning dissidents/look at those primitive, corrupt, lawless Chi-coms and their “culture of impunity”/look at CCP and their tolerance of torture — while completely ignoring, when they aren’t justifying, identical behavior by their own government.
And it ingrained their behaviors to the public that these past things are all forgotten.
April 4th, 2010 at 1:05 pm
I am afraid I play the jin for a cow, nevertheless I try: Jason, alone last amnesty international report on capital punishments says more that 1000 cases (exact number not known), which is more than the rest of the world. Doesn’t that make you think that there is more transparency in any other country than in China?
April 4th, 2010 at 4:45 pm
@Wukailong
I do not know why you state: “It goes the same way with news reports here in China about Taiwan.” I never mention about Chinese news media in this forum about political prisoner. The credibility of Chinese news media about Taiwan is another matter which I won’t discuss here. I mention the western media because it is the western media who alleged the foreign diplomat who had been deported is Chinese, not the Swedish official from the government who said it. Why would Swedish official not say it that Chinese diplomat had been expel for illegal intelligent gathering like any others countries around the world would have done? I had given my point of view at post #31.
In relating to the Penal of code of Sweden on chapter 19 On Crimes against the Security of the Realm, section 10, all evidences are circumstantial. With circumstantial evidences, their are more than one way of interpreting of the actual event base on these evidences.
My point of view base on the information available through the translation by Wukailong on the trial of BM on “illegal intelligence activities and serious criminal offense” is BM is not guilty of the Penal code of Sweden on “Crimes against the Security of the Realm”. To build a solid case against BM, the prosecutor must charge Lei Da as an intelligent officer conducting illegal information gathering in Sweden. Without the guilty verdict of Lei Da, the prosecutor team does not have concrete evidence BM endanger the Swedish Realm. For this reason the final verdict at the court for BM is guilty of “illegal intelligent gathering” but not “intention of aiding a foreign power”.
A citizen in Sweden can be guilty of acquering personal information about others people without their consent. That is the lesson I learn from this trial. I believe BM would have a chance of winning if he appeal.
April 4th, 2010 at 5:56 pm
How exactly does the number of death penalties relate to transparency?
April 5th, 2010 at 4:30 am
I thought the Lei Da bit was interesting and highlights the difference in the relationship between journalists and their respective governments in China and elsewhere, and how perception influences our interpretation of their actions. The seemingly clandestine nature of Lei Da’s information gathering techniques was not aided by the fact that he is a reporter for the People’s Daily, “the official mouthpiece of the party.” Based on the report above the things he was doing sound pretty sketchy but I’m curious if his actions would have been interpreted differently if he were working for an independent news source out of the mainland or Hong Kong. Really interesting read, thanks Wukailong.
April 5th, 2010 at 4:34 am
@ Ted: Great to see you back on the blog! I hope your studies are going well. Are you back in China or still in the States?
April 5th, 2010 at 11:17 am
“How exactly does the number of death penalties relate to transparency” – the non-visibiltiy of the exact figure is an indicator.
For your reference:
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/death-penalty-report-china-must-end-secrecy-surrounding-sentences-and-execut
April 5th, 2010 at 1:05 pm
@ Steve: Hey thanks! I’m back in China now doing the language portion of my degree. Nice to formally study the language and planning to hang around for a bit. A little more troublesome to access the website these days but I’m still checking in and out.
April 5th, 2010 at 2:10 pm
It is not Lei Da who started to use secrecy method of communication. BM wanted Lei Da to hide his contact with him. All evidences of secret communication point to BM but not Lei Da. Lei Da did not have many cell phones or used proxy to hide his presence. Lei Da used regular mean of communication. All secret method of communication his found only with BM not Lei Da. There are no evidences that prove Lei Da used secret method of communication.
April 5th, 2010 at 4:13 pm
Ted, “was not aided by the fact that he is a reporter for the People’s Daily, “the official mouthpiece of the party.”
So, does this logic also apply to people who talk to reporters for RFA, VOA, “the official mouthpiece of the US government”?
April 5th, 2010 at 7:34 pm
There are many dissidents in jail in China. There aren’t in Sweden.
Scandinavian countries rank the highest in the world for press freedom — so there are checks and balances. If there really is a miscarriage of justice, people can read about it and criticize it. That does not exist in China.
you will find tons of reporting when there’s a major court case, and criticism of the government.
___________________________________________________
Joyce,
There are no dissidents in Sweden, not no dissidents in jail.
By the way, under the system, the most powerful people are not government officers.
For example, in Taiwan, who gave Chen Shuibian millions of dollars ? no so-called free-media went after that. Chen Shuibian was not the most powerful person in Taiwan, the ones who gave him money had more power.
April 5th, 2010 at 7:44 pm
I am afraid I play the jin for a cow, nevertheless I try: Jason, alone last amnesty international report on capital punishments says more that 1000 cases (exact number not known), which is more than the rest of the world. Doesn’t that make you think that there is more transparency in any other country than in China?
__________________________________________________________________________
Josef,
There is no doubt about the lack of transparency when it is about the most powerful group of people in China, the government officers.
Then who are the most powerful people in your country ?
When an Indian billionaire built a 2 billion dollar home for himself in Mumbai, a city of million people living in slums, no media dared to say something.
How many Americans approved government’s plan of using hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayers money to save those banks ? why was the media overwhelmingly on one side ?
Figure that out, then you will know who are the most powerful people in your country, then you will know what transpraency is.
BTW, in Europe, there are hardly any dissidents, and media is highly unanimous on all political issue, that is why you have freedom, as there is only one voice.
What if media have different opinions ? Clinton’s sex scandal shows you the picture.
April 5th, 2010 at 8:00 pm
Let me give you another example :
Senator Chuck Schumer was one of those politicians who blowed the house bubble out of proportion in last 10 years, but he has been safe, no media went after those politicians, why ?
Eliot Spitzer was kicked out by media within no time, why ?
Who were behind these ?
You dont have tranparency when it is about the most powerful people in your country, in any corner of earth. In China, it happens to be that the most powerful people are government officers.
In China, People know that they dont know what the most powerful people in their country are doing.
Under “great” system, people believe they know everything while they know nothing about what the most powerful people in their country are doing.
April 6th, 2010 at 3:25 am
@Joyce #32
The PRC legal system is still behind most of western society. It will need time to improve and be transparent. Every year it is improving. For example, the trial of riot people from Lhasa and Urumqi are all open to outsider.
Currently, the major threat to the PRC government is the color revolution. The people who are part of the color revolution have the gold of overthrowing the current government of the PRC. The dissident who are part of the color revolution support a change in government system to democracy system like the U.S. which I oppose. For these people, the trial is held in secrecy. The majority of Chinese are not interesting in a color revolution, so very few Chinese ask for these trials to be transparent. For other dissident who complaint about unfair trial or illegal land repossession by the state have support of the majority of Chinese. The internet chat is full of these instances where Chinese care more about social injustice than a political change to democracy system. These trials about social injustice are transparent.
About the censorship in China. This is the decision from the delegate of the Nation People Congress. What the delegate from the NPC put into law, the Chinese government will implement it. If young Chinese want less censorship, then when they become the delegate of the NPC, they could draft a law about less censorship, the Chinese government will implement it. The Chinese respect the choice of the NPC,
April 6th, 2010 at 5:40 am
I collapsed a few posts because they are off topic which at this stage is disrespectful to the post author. If you want to address a question to Joyce, keep it to China and/or Sweden as they relate to the post topic. If you want to go in another direction, please write up your own post on the subject.
April 6th, 2010 at 1:21 pm
Steve,
What is the definition of “political prisoner”? the people who have different idea about current political system, as a result they offend the group of people who benefit most from the current system, the most powerful people in the country, and they are thrown into jails.
So, what I have been talking about has everything to do with “political prisoner”. downgraded 6 times ? hahahahahaha
April 6th, 2010 at 8:47 pm
@Wukailong
“I knew that Sweden expelled a Chinese diplomat, and that China responded in kind, and it was connected to BM’s case.”
Could you please elaborate on how you knew about it? I tried to find news about Swedish government official stating Chinese diplomat have been expel in Sweden due to BM case but I can not find it.
April 7th, 2010 at 1:43 am
Hi Wuen,
sorry for taking so long to answer. I’m really busy these days, so unless it’s a weekend I don’t have much time to comment, but I’ll make an exception for you.
I agree there are weak parts in the verdict, and I’ve been trying to follow your arguments. However, I have a couple of questions:
#30: “First Lei Da method of obtaining information does not follow the characteristic of a intelligent officer. For example he directly use his internet IP address to log into BM email account.”
That might be correct (it doesn’t actually say that Lei Da personally used the connection), but now you’re basically arguing that somebody wouldn’t make a stupid mistake, and so he didn’t. It could of course be used as a reason in the appeals court.
“I am puzzled why the authorities did not arrest Lei Da. I assume the authority did not have enough proof to warrant the arrest of Lei Da. For this reason I question the testimonies from Bo Renner and Wilhelm Unge and the assessment from SAPO that Lei Da is an intelligent officer.”
We don’t know whether he was arrested or not. Also, I don’t understand why that in itself would invalidate the testimonies of the SÄPO officers (Renner and Unge).
#31: Are there any standard procedures for expelling diplomats or foreign personnel that says it must be reported directly by a government ministry? I agree it’s odd that the whole case was kept so low-key both by Sweden and China. It might be that the expelled diplomat was directly related to the case and since it was under investigation, they didn’t want to make a statement about it.
#63: OK, I get your fine points now. It’s not that it wasn’t reported in the news (as you linked to), it was that no government agency made a statement. I just read the news.
April 7th, 2010 at 4:39 am
To Wuen:
What do you even know of China’s current legal system or US legal system that give you so much right to say that? I really do want to know.
April 7th, 2010 at 4:40 am
@Wukailong
Thank for your time in answering my question so promptly. I wish to return you the favor by answering your questions promptly, except I have more questions to replies. I will post my replies as soon as I finish typing the text in OpenOffice Writer.
Thank you again for your time.
April 7th, 2010 at 4:45 am
@Wi
I do not understand your question. What do you mean by “that”?
April 7th, 2010 at 4:52 am
To Wuen:
Does US give the rest of the world clear and open to trials that are political in nature.
I think you just preach to people about how it should be, but at the same time no one else do it as well.
April 7th, 2010 at 5:21 am
@Wi
To make the legal system effective in all part of China, China need to produce many qualify judges, lawyers, prosecutors, officials in charges of writing the happening in trial, officials in charges of creating forms, officials in charge of validating forms, officials in charges of supervising something, etc. As you see, the legal system require many professionals. China lack professionals or experience professionals in some cities. I am aware of these deficiencies. I hope with time China will produce enough qualify professionals for all China. This is the reason why I say China is still behind the western society.
China is in the process of judicial reform across the country.
China is speeding up judicial reform
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200502/19/eng20050219_173988.html
THE SITUATION, ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECT OFJUDICIAL REFORM IN CHINA
http://jrn21.judiciary.gov.ph/forum_icsjr/ICSJR_China%20%28Su%20Zelin%29.pdf
I do not have the time to read everything now so I let you decide about these articles.
April 7th, 2010 at 5:26 am
To wuen:
I just don’t think that you really know anything about the legal system in US or in China to give such talk of how US legal is so good, and China legal system is so not transparent. I believe that Western nation have the same position on these type of things. That they are closed door on everything that is political related.
April 7th, 2010 at 5:44 am
@Wi,
I will answer you question by asking if you could provide the transcript of Liu Xiaobo from his trial started in December 10 2009. I will like to get this transcript of the court proceeding but I do not know how to proceed in China. Could you help me?
Without this transcript I cannot defend China close door trial. All I need is one transcript of any political dissident in close door trial.
April 7th, 2010 at 5:28 pm
@Wukailong
[quote]
#30: “First Lei Da method of obtaining information does not follow the characteristic of a intelligent officer. For example he directly use his internet IP address to log into BM email account.”
That might be correct (it doesn’t actually say that Lei Da personally used the connection), but now you’re basically arguing that somebody wouldn’t make a stupid mistake, and so he didn’t. It could of course be used as a reason in the appeals court.
[/quote]
It cannot be proven Lei Da used secret communication in his side. Lei da did not keep his secret contact with BM on his side. Zhou Lulu knew about Lei Da contact with BM. Zhou Lulu is a trade commissioner and supervisor of the consular and political departments of China’s embassy in Stockholm. If Zhou Lulu know, the embassy know. Lei Da did not broke any diplomatic protocol by contacting BM. Lei Da protected BM by not citing his source when publishing his news article. That is how a journalist protect their sources.
BM is the one who used secret method to contact Lei Da with his many mobile phone. He also did not tell his party about his contact with Lei Da. It is not the responsibility of Lei Da to contact BM party. It is BM responsibility to inform his party about his contact with foreigner.
I assume BM give permission to Lei Da to used his email account. This is not a breach of law by Lei Da to used BM email account because BM give his permission. The reason why BM want Lei Da can be sum up by Raj: “The use of his e-mail account by the other parties is a tactic in avoiding sending e-mails that could be tracked (you write a draft message, save it and let someone read it).” I want to emphasize it is BM who do not want to be tracked.
[quote]
“I am puzzled why the authorities did not arrest Lei Da. I assume the authority did not have enough proof to warrant the arrest of Lei Da. For this reason I question the testimonies from Bo Renner and Wilhelm Unge and the assessment from SAPO that Lei Da is an intelligent officer.”
We don’t know whether he was arrested or not. Also, I don’t understand why that in itself would invalidate the testimonies of the SÄPO officers (Renner and Unge).
[/quote]
SAPO charge Lei Da as a intelligent officer without a trial is unfair to Lei Da because Lei Da can not defend himself in this trial. Lei Da should be given a chance to testify of his innocence. In the rule of logic, if using a statement A to prove statement B, then statement A must be first proven to be true. In this case statement A is “Lei Da is a intelligent officer”. The proof for statement A require a guilty verdict from the court. Without the guilty verdict, statement B cannot be proven with statement A.
Lei Da should be present in this case to defend his status in front of the court. Without Lei Da presence, the testimonies of Bo benner and Wilhelm Unge is an unbalance view of the situation. This is the reason why SAPO need to arrest Lei Da. The authority could arrest Lei Da according to the assessment by SAPO. Why SAPO did not arrest Lei Da as a intelligent officer if they have proof during the trial of BM? I assume SAPO cannot arrest Lei Da because they don’t have enough proof.
[quote]
#31: Are there any standard procedures for expelling diplomats or foreign personnel that says it must be reported directly by a government ministry? I agree it’s odd that the whole case was kept so low-key both by Sweden and China. It might be that the expelled diplomat was directly related to the case and since it was under investigation, they didn’t want to make a statement about it.
[/quote]
I do not know about standard procedure in diplomacy. But I know if a country expel a diplomat, then it give a reason. I had pin pointed many cases when a country expel a diplomat, it always give a reason by the government official. You can search the internet for more of these cases. In the case of Sweden and China, their were no government official acknowledging the expulsion of Chinese diplomat. If the case is under investigation, then Swedish authority should not have expel a diplomat before the end of the investigation.
Without the fair assessment of Lei Da and using secret evidences not available to public — this trial resemble a kangaroo trial. I am not surprise Swedish government official do not want to link BM trial with the expulsion of Chinese diplomat.
April 7th, 2010 at 6:12 pm
wuen,
As I’ve written before, China is a bit behind in legal transparency like this and making the details of cases public especially on the internet. Part of it is technological, but I’ll add that it is also cultural. Going to court used to be considered a shame. This is perhaps understandable, as even the author of this post felt it to be a good idea to not mention BM by his full name. It is much more so in China. China is not a very litigative society. People almost always settled privately via their relation network, sometimes by means of bribes. (I actually think that’s as much to avoid shame as to save some money and trouble — topic for another day.) For these reasons, it’s difficult to find what you want in general.
However, having said that, I’ve seen media descriptions of some cases (including the defense) against the crime of “stealing, collecting, bribing for, or illegally providing national secrets or intelligence to a foreign entity” (为境外窃取、剌探、收买、非法提供国家秘密、情报罪). They exist. Here is a typical one in Shanghai, if you can read Chinese. It’s related to passing information to Human Rights Watch, if I’m not mistaken…
http://www.bianhu.com.cn/flws/jdpj/20060412/20031215120244.htm.htm
郑XX为境外非法提供国家秘密案的刑事判决书
“Verdict on the case of Zheng illegally providing national secrets”
Note that there are also lawyers who defend against this, and their defense is in here, saying the information provided is not secret and Zheng did not intentionally provide this knowing it is secret, etc. The court’s review of this defense is also in there. This site is visible in China.
Here is another one.
http://www.ahpf.gov.cn/dt2111111379.asp?DocID=2111188152
Law students also study this, and there is a database of past cases … maybe this is one but you seem to need an account:
http://211.100.26.173:8002/outline?ChannelID=60000
Here is the law in question
http://www.law-lib.com/LAW/law_view.asp?id=497
and a review of the law for law students
http://www.tzqlawyer.net/zmxj/html/?330.html
There are even people who debate the merits of this law saying it should be clarified. You can find this if you look.
April 7th, 2010 at 7:50 pm
I don’t think trials should have too much transparent because people on trial could have find out things about how the police getting information and that could let to get other people in harm’s way for provide these information for the police or police that are under-cover. That I feel that there are a lot of things people don’t really know what will happen and if this is really good or bad.
April 7th, 2010 at 11:58 pm
@nimrod
Thank you for your effort of gathering these site. I am sorry to say I cannot analyze it. These articles must be in English for me to understand. I won’t be using Google translate to read these articles.
What matter is the function of the legal system help China maintain the law. Foreign opinion on Chinese legal system are not negligible but are not as important as it main function. All we can do is to inform them about China current legal system and it is their choice to believe it or not. China legal system is not worse than any others countries legal system. China legal system is suitable to the Chinese level of development and do a good job of enforcing the law.
April 8th, 2010 at 3:10 am
@Nimrod (#73): Thanks a lot! This is the kind of information I was looking for. Especially the case on the “bianhu” site (“Verdict on the case of Zheng illegally providing national secrets”) might be used for comparison. I’ve read it once but haven’t looked up the specific provisions mentioned in the verdict.
As an aside, I notice that the wording and legal language used is very similar to the Swedish verdict (as similar as it can get between language boundaries). I’m not really in a position to comment on that, but from what I’ve heard China is in the “continental” legal traditional (originally from Germany and France) as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon tradition, similar to Sweden.
I will comment more on this as soon as I’ve read through the verdict in more detail.
@wuen: Thanks, I will think about what you wrote and give my answer in a couple of days’ time.
April 8th, 2010 at 9:44 pm
Nimrod (37)
I was just flicking through some of the earlier comments and came across this.
Your further statement on how “democratic countries” do not censor and/or control the media is beyond ridiculous and is a further abuse of reasoning ideology.
This isn’t a contest, we’re supposed to be having an adult discussion. Stop trying to score points and be a bit more mature. I’m not questioning whether your reasoning is affected by any ideology.
First of all, Watergate was more than a quarter of a century ago. We’re talking about now, not the past.
Second, when I talk about censorship I really couldn’t give a monkey’s arse about whether Bush tried to stop the American media from showing body-bags – which is curious because I’m sure I remember seeing body-bags on CNN before he left office – given that casualties were reported anyway. We’re talking about a serious sort of scandal that a government would want to bury at all costs. That’s the kind of serious thing that one would want to hear about.
I’ll take a recent example from the UK. When the Telegraph published a series of expense claims from MPs that literally rocked the political establishment, no steps were taken to silence the newspaper. Day after day, week after week the information continued to be published. The journalists were not arrested or threatened by the Police.
There may be times where a government tries to restrict a certain story for the national good (e.g. that Prince Harry was on deployment in a certain Afghani province so that his unit wouldn’t be targetted by the Taliban), national security, etc. But in countries like the UK and Sweden governments do not routinely abuse their powers to stop stories that damage them and them alone. They don’t control the media in the way the Chinese government does – even their influence is limited.
So my point remains, there was no need for an honest journalist to use such means in handing over information. He wasn’t facing imprisonment for shaming the Swedish government. The authorities would not have successfully blocked such a media story (can you show that they even have the power to do that in Sweden?) – even if they had tried it would have been pointless as other countries’ media would have republished it, and I don’t believe they can block websites like the Chinese authorities can.
Finally, as I keep saying given information was passed on to the handler, why hasn’t it been published to prove this guy’s “innocence” and the existence of the “conspiracy”? It’s because there is no such information. What the guy was doing was collecting information on private citizens for use by the Chinese government to keep tabs on (and maybe at some point harrass/harm) people it found politically annoying.
April 10th, 2010 at 1:40 pm
Raj #77
“I was just flicking through some of the earlier comments and came across this.”
So was I 🙂
“There may be times where a government tries to restrict a certain story for the national good (e.g. that Prince Harry was on deployment in a certain Afghani province so that his unit wouldn’t be targetted by the Taliban), national security, etc. But in countries like the UK and Sweden governments do not routinely abuse their powers to stop stories that damage them and them alone. They don’t control the media in the way the Chinese government does – even their influence is limited.”
The trouble is you’re looking at China from your Western point of view.
Publication of MP expenses is ok in UK but not Prince Harry’s deployment in Afghanistan, organising a political party to contest the current government is ok but not to tell the public how chaotic the UK asylum system was: Damian Green was arrested for it without a warrant! There is a set of “rules” as what is right or wrong in UK.
However China has its own circumstances and at a different stage of development so you shouldn’t be surprised it has different set of “rules”: What is “national good” for China today is not necessarily the same as what is “national good” for UK today (and UK has had its fair share of dubious “national good” when it was at China’s development stage – it was considered “national good” to deny women’s rights to vote even in 1927 – unfortunately certain things only become clearer once you reach a certain stage of development) and what is important for Chinese “national security” today (stability!) is not necessarily the same for UK (which didn’t suffer the chaos China did over the past centuries).
In China, discussing & publishing dissident views are general ok as long as you don’t turn it into an organised political movement aimed at contesting the current government. In western world which has well developed universal suffrage, this is considered political oppression, which is fair enough from a Western point of view. But most Chinese don’t want to see political contests yet in fear of instability and the juror is definitely still out as if universal suffrage can work effectively for developing countries (India & Africa are examples of how it is not working and I know no cases yet that it has worked before a country has completed its industrial revolution) so it’s arguable that Chinese government is not working for the benefit of Chinese people by wanting to hold the status quo until China has completed its industrial revolution before looking for universal suffrage like what Taiwan, South Korea have done.
When you looked from this Chinese angle, the political censorship stopped being as black & white an issue as most in the West view.
Personally I disagree with political censorship in China, not because I want to challenge CCP’s power (I happen to believe it is the best choice for China today) but because I have more faith in Chinese people’s ability in spotting the bias & hidden agendas that would exist in a more open media in China. However, who am I to decide China can take the risk that my faith was unfounded?
April 10th, 2010 at 3:32 pm
@ ChineseInUK #78: That was a very balanced and thoughtful comment. I agree with you that China cannot use the same criteria as countries with a long history of freedom and democracy because the situation is just so different there. One question you raise is how much media freedom is appropriate in today’s China. I’ve often wondered about this. I found the Chinese people I knew to be pretty reasonable when it came to how they viewed the government. They recognized both good and bad and didn’t strike me as fanatic on either side, though in a country with that many people you’ll always have extremes. That’s just human nature.
Going back and forth between mainland China and Taiwan (as far as I know, FOARP and I are the only two blog regulars that actually lived in both places) I was able to make some comparisons between the two cultures though in many ways they are very different. I noticed in Taiwan that the electoral process had begun to run more smoothly than in the past, so that part seems to develop satisfactorily over time. But I noticed that there was a lack of independence between executive, legislative and judiciary, especially judiciary. The institutions that support additional freedoms and even democratic systems are still young there and not fully developed. In China, they are virtually non-existent. Therefore, I don’t believe the people can yet express themselves in that fashion in an organized manner without running into major institutional difficulties.
For universal suffrage to work properly, the society must have reliable and independent legal institutions and the rule of law. China currently has rule by party decree so that part isn’t even close to being ready. You must also have an educated populace with a reasonable living standard. China has two worlds, the decently educated major cities with reasonable living standards, and the country where living standards are still very primitive and education is lacking. This is a tricky one because societies don’t develop evenly across the board. Where do you cross the line and say you’re ready to open up the process?
I believe the CCP allows a certain amount of expression on the internet as a guide to what the people are thinking, since they have no other way of finding out because they do not have elections to use as an indication. But I wonder if the internet accurately expresses the thoughts of the people. My guess is that it is more xenophobic, nationalistic and critical than the general populace and so the government is operating with somewhat inaccurate data.
The Chinese I talked to would prefer elections but weren’t overly concerned about the lack of them. What they were most concerned about was making money and improving their lifestyle.
I’d say the Chinese have already completed their industrial revolution. But if you observe history, technological change always runs ahead of cultural change. Minds just take longer to catch up to new lifestyles and ways of thinking.
People make emotional decisions and then use logic to try and justify them. It’s the same with politics. That politician that is taking bribes believes in his heart that he is the best person for the job and his constituents are lucky to have him, and he justifies in his own mind why it was OK for him to take the bribes. The politician that votes against a bill that would help his constituents immensely believes he is doing the right thing, yet just so happened to take large political contributions from opponents of the bill. It’s not different in China. Politicians there want to help their country, yet also want to stay in power, help themselves and maintain their lifestyle. They can come up with all kinds of rationalizations to keep themselves in power and can even successfully “sell” those rationalizations to the general public, yet in the end their primary purpose is to maintain power. If China is stable, why does China have so many protests per year? I think they stopped reporting numbers after they had reached over 80,000 in 2005. That doesn’t sound very stable to me, so I think some of this is hype. I believe the government is trying hard to create stability, not necessarily to maintain what they have. I’m sure they’d like to see it improve but I’m not sure their current methods will achieve that goal. Obviously, they would disagree with my assessment.
You wrote, “However, who am I to decide China can take the risk that my faith was unfounded?”
I believe there is a lot of wisdom in that statement. You live in the UK, I live in the States, neither of us lives in China. Who are we to suggest to the people who actually live there how they should live, what their laws should be like and what form of government best suits them? I remember people in Taiwan getting annoyed when Taiwanese Americans give money to their elections or come back to vote, then turn around and go back to the States. They told me, “Why are they involved in our elections? They don’t even live here! They don’t have to face the consequences or live with the elected officials but we do. They should worry about American politics.”
I read a lot of statements by “Chinese” that are not living in China, would not bear the consequences of their recommendations but live in countries that have given them residence or citizenship yet they do nothing but criticize the places where they have chosen to live. It makes no sense to me. When I lived in China, I quickly realized that it wasn’t as bad as what I had read in the media and that for the most part, I had complete freedom to do or say what I wanted, except in certain categories where I had zero freedom to do or say what I wanted. Sometimes I found it frustrating (just ask WKL when he is trying to access this site through a proxy server) but it was a small frustration. In general, it wasn’t a big deal to me.
April 10th, 2010 at 4:31 pm
ChineseInUK (78)
It’s nice to have a civil discussion with someone, so please keep coming back.
The reason Prince Harry’s deployment was not publicised was because he was in a war zone, and it was feared that if it became public knowledge he and his regiment would become the focus point of all Taliban operations. This would lead not just to him coming under greater danger but also his fellow soldiers. If he had been captured it would have been absolutely horrible.
Ordinarily he wouldn’t have been allowed to deploy at all, but because UK newspapers agreed to keep things quiet until after he came back he was able to go. This decision was not taken to protect the government/Labour Party, it was done to protect Prince Harry and his brothers in arms.
In regards to Damian Green, as much as I dislike the Labour Party I don’t think that I can safely say his arrest was a conspiracy. The Police are generally independent, and I don’t think he was arrested under the government’s instructions. From memory a complaint was raised by the Civil Service about the leaking of the information, which was investigated. The Police definitely erred in arresting Green, and it was good to see him cleared of all charges, but this wasn’t about press censorship.
In regards to your point about the time it took to offer voting rights to women in the UK, you have to acknowledge that long before then various democratic principles had been established in part or full. For example, the government being chosen via regular and national elections at regular intervals, freedom to form a political party and stand for election, the ability of the press to call for a new government, rule of law, judicial independence, etc. Restrictions on the size of the electorate (which were relaxed) are not the same as having no electorate or having it consist of less than a hundred Party bigwigs.
China is a lot more developed now that Britain was in the 19th century – education, infrastructure, health coverage, life expectancy, average wealth, civil society, law enforcement, etc are better. So in what respect is China more “backward” and less able to cope with some of those democratic principles that I refer to above than Britain was over 100 years ago?
It’s also fair to say that wiithout at least some aspects of democracy – good rule of law, an independent judiciary, etc – you can’t realise a country’s full potential. Developed countries became developed only after they had already introduced such democratic aspects. They were not luxuries that could be afforded after development, they were necessities required beforehand. If China doesn’t reform itself it will end up like Russia, an eternally “developing” country with so much potential wasted.
In China, discussing & publishing dissident views are general ok as long as you don’t turn it into an organised political movement aimed at contesting the current government.
I’m afraid that is simply not the case. I think most people critical of Chinese censorship could live with such restrictions, but in actuality you can get into trouble from doing a lot less. For example, writing an article merely calling for the ability to openly discuss the way the Tiananmen Square protests (1989) were dealt with would get the author fired and possibly taken away by the Police – the publication would also get into trouble.
And what about Huang Qi? He got three years in jail just for collecting information on the schools that collapsed during the Sichuan earthquake. I can’t see how that was organising a political movement to try to challenge the Chinese government.
You can fail jail time just for finding out about things that embarrass the government. That’s hardly the same as trying to overthrow the CCP’s one party state.
However, who am I to decide China can take the risk that my faith was unfounded?
Who are unelected officials, who only gained power by toeing the Party line and impressing older Party leaders, to say that China has to put up with the level of censorship it suffers under today? The censors and their political masters aren’t gods or superhumans. They’re ordinary people who get their way because they’re powerful. That doesn’t mean your views are less valid than theirs. Everyone is entitled to their view, and everyone has a right to stand up and speak their mind.
In any case I think that you’re rather misunderstanding my point. I was not making a point about Chinese censorship, more that there was no need for this “journalist” to use extreme methods to pass on/receive information as happened in this case because of the good standard of civil rights in countries like Sweden.
April 10th, 2010 at 5:41 pm
Raj#79
“It’s nice to have a civil discussion with someone, so please keep coming back.”
Thank you for your comment.
Can I please ask you a question?
How well do you personally know China? Have you lived in China for extended periods or did you get to know China mostly through Western media?
The reason I ask is because it feels to me that what you say is quite typical of Western hearsays: not necessarily without an element of truth but lacking the understanding of the real substance or whole picture or backgrounds that go with what you’ve written about.
However if my suspicions are unfounded, please do let me know, and I apologise in advance. You can back up your statements with your personal experiences, and I’ll do the same, then we can have a real & proper discussion, not what I suspect to be just cut & paste from polular Western media reports.
April 10th, 2010 at 11:55 pm
Steve #79
“That was a very balanced and thoughtful comment.”
Thanks.
“For universal suffrage to work properly, the society must have reliable and independent legal institutions and the rule of law.”
I agree with you in part, the part that “the society must have reliable and independent legal institutions and the rule of law” before it should even contemplating universal suffrage. However observing very closely with English democracy, I remain unconvinced that universal suffrage is “working properly” in England in the sense that it is facilitating a fair & efficient society for the long term good of the masses, which was what you implied considering England has fairly independent and strong rule of law.
I’m an expert in a specialised area of economics and I understand very well those decisions that are made in England which fall within my speciality. Do I believe the man in the street would ever understand the real & whole impact of those specialist economical decisions? No chance. Do I believe I would ever understand the real & whole impact of those decisions that are not in my specialist areas, even within general economics? No chance.
The man in the street votes mostly according to what he is told, by politicians, by the media and by observations of short term & presentational results – the exceptions being in very “local” elections when a politician’s actions impact directly and simplistically on his constituents which I believe is rare – hardly a reliable way of deciding on the future of a country!
“I’d say the Chinese have already completed their industrial revolution.”
I guess it depends on your definition of “industrial revolution” and whether you take China as a whole or as having different parts that have been developing at different speeds.
My definition is a country or different regions within a large country like China that has moved from mostly an agricultural nation to an industrial nation and an economy that is based mostly on large scale-machine-added-productions. Whilst some parts of China may have completed their industrial revolutions, it can’t be said for many other parts where a good proportion of people struggle to survive on their small family based agricultural & other rural activities.
But you’re right in saying “Minds just take longer to catch up to new lifestyles and ways of thinking.” and asking “Where do you cross the line and say you’re ready to open up the process?”
I don’t envy Hu & Wen, pun intended!, being the leaders of such a huge & complex country, having to deal with difficult issues like these on a daily basis 🙂
“If China is stable, why does China have so many protests per year?”
The question is not if China is stable today in absolute terms, but if most Chinese are contented with the relative stability and how fearful they are of the return of past chaos or chaos that may result from sudden changes they can clearly see in other parts of the world, i.e. Russia and many African countries.
I don’t think you can gauge China’s stability by the number of “protests”. China does not have very strong rule of law, which if not overcome I think will be one of the major obstacles that will hinder China’s further development, so many issues are decided by officials based on his personal understanding and balancing of power. Coupled with the fact there aren’t sufficient official channels to communicate citizen grievance, protests are very effective for the man in the street in China to be heard and gain support & collaboration. The same issues that an Englishman would take to his MP/local councillor are often taken to the street by a Chinaman – a traditional Chinese way, let’s face it. Most of the time, the protestor either get what he wants or fail to gain sufficient support so give up the fight, not too dissimilar to those in England who go to their MPs/local councillors for help and some get what they want and others leave empty-handed. It is only when those protests gain momentums and not resolved by central government interventions, especially if the central government has to resort to hard-line clampdowns that we need to worry about the impact of those to China’s stability.
From what I can see, the protests of this nature are few and far between.
April 11th, 2010 at 11:38 am
ChineseInUK (81)
You’re both right and wrong. I haven’t lived in China for as long as Steve or FOARP, but I don’t get my understanding of the country just from the world’s free media – obviously as I don’t live there I’m going to have to use parts of the world’s media to read about new developments. I’ve spent a few months in China, been to different parts and have friends from there who I chat with fairly regularly.
the understanding of the real substance or whole picture or backgrounds
Which is what, exactly? I’m aware of many aspects of China, past and present issues, etc, but I don’t always let that change what I write. Sometimes I like to challenge people’s views to get them to justify their position rather than suggest something that they can latch on to.
Some foreigners will write very boorish versions of Steve’s reflections on his experiences in China, and I’ve read them too often to be able to write something that feels genuine for myself. The result is that I will just launch into something without taking the time to explain that/how/why I understand China in a way better than Joe Public. I don’t think that members of Foolsmountain need to pass a peer-review to have a valid POV about China – I am not suggesting you think that they should, though I have encountered that attitude from others.
In any case I think it’s hard for anyone, Chinese or non-Chinese, to see the full picture of life in China today. What does an electrician in Shanghai necessarily know about peasant life in Shanxi? What does an investor in Guangdong necessarily know about the life of a construction worker in Harbin? People all around the world don’t realise how ignorant about their own countries they are, how cut off from their own countrymen and women they are.
Also sometimes an outside view not coloured by personal experiences can lead to more objective reflections. I’d like to think that I have seen enough of China not to fall prey to common misconceptions but not spent so much time there that I make excuses for it in my head, but maybe it’s the other way around.
By the way, do you mind telling me (again if you have done so previously) whether you’re a British citizen, Chinese student in Britain, etc? Because whilst I agree there is no perfect political system, British democracy has undoubtedly empowered the lower classes to a degree that they were not in the 19th and earlier centuries. The precise way votes are used, etc can be changed, but the fact that everyone has a voice does help them. Dispensing with rule of law, judicial independence, Police independence, regular elections and so forth would not help the disadvantaged but would make life worse for them. The flaws with English democracy cannot be used as justification for not reforming China in the ways I have previously described.
Also I would appreciate it if you could still respond to some of my queries in my previous message.
+++
By the wrap, with respect to Wukailong I suggest that we wray this deviation up in the next few comments and move back to the discussion about the case in Sweden. It’s nice to have a thread about FM that is both serious but doesn’t turn to whether democracy would be good or bad for China.
April 11th, 2010 at 1:26 pm
Raj #83:
I don’t think anyone needs to pass a test to have a point of view about China, or anything else for that matter. But your personal experience is usually the cornerstone of your deep understanding of a country/culture. I admire your efforts in trying to learn as much as you can about China from world’s media, but it usually is very difficult, if near impossible, to gain very deep understanding purely or mostly from modern media, which can be very lazy, highly commercialised, biased & misleading.
Personally, if I hadn’t lived, socialised and worked & studied in England for many years, I would never have acquired the level of understanding on how things work here and how people think & behave which has enabled me to appreciate many unspoken words, unwritten rules & other backgrounds.
You asked what these are. I have to admit I find it difficult to put into simple words so let me give you a couple of examples to illustrate.
I have had jokes explained to me numerous times, and still do sometimes now, before I could understand the humour, even though my English is quite good, so I was told, because I didn’t know the backgrounds to the jokes.
When I first arrived in England, I thought English were totally heartless and selfish: how could they leave their elderly and ill parents living alone and fend for themselves? Then I discovered something which never existed in my comprehension: Social Services and NHS.
I was basing my opinion of the English on my own country/culture background where there was almost none of the facilities of state home help for anyone with children and there were no GPs who one could visit locally or been called to make a home visit and hospitals didn’t have a booking system: elderly people relied on their children for all home care needs and they had to queue up in hospitals to register to see a doctor on the day and if they weren’t early enough in the queue they didn’t get to see a doctor and had to try harder the following day and even if they managed to register for a doctor, they then had to queue, often without a seat, to be seen and the queues could be anything up to several hours long! – having said all these, things have improved in China over the past 2 decades so these are old stories.
I think it was reasonable for me to have considered anyone in China who left their elderly and ill parents living alone totally heartless and selfish. But was I right to do the same to most of the English, especially those whose parents were well taken care of by Social Services and NHS? No. I would have been none the wiser if I hadn’t lived in England……unless I voiced my unfounded opinion and someone in the know had pointed out my lack of background knowledge.
As for your comment about it being “hard for anyone, Chinese or non-Chinese, to see the full picture of life in China today.”, I agree. But a native Chinese or someone who has lived extended periods of time in China would still be most likely to have far deeper understanding of China than someone who isn’t Chinese and hasn’t lived much in China.
I was researching India the other day. I found it difficult to understand the behaviours of one group of people so I asked a colleague of mine who was a British born Indian. He didn’t know much about this group either and shared my confusion but he suggested I explored the link between their behaviour and Indian’s caste system because he had a hunch this could be the reason. Guess what, he was right: an Indiaman’s hunch about India was better than a Chinaman’s hours of research!
However, you were absolutely right that “sometimes an outside view not coloured by personal experiences can lead to more objective reflections”.
So for someone who hasn’t lived in China for extended periods, and don’t read Chinese perhaps?, but read widely, think carefully and taking the time to explain his views about China, I’ll treat your points of view and comments with both the caution and the respect they deserve.
And to answer your other question: I came to England as a student a long time ago, stayed to work, returned to China, back to England, returned to China again……a number of times and I’m currently working in England but am planning an imminent return to China because my mother is not well – but don’t tell my employer yet 🙂 And I am a Chinese citizen.
I accept your suggestion that, out of respect to Wukailong, though did I read somewhere Steve had said that deviation after 100 or so comments are acceptable and this is such an old thread that anyone who had wanted to discuss on topic would have done so? :), so that we stop our off topic and continue our debate on another day.
Though I had only recently discovered FM, I’m sure there will be plenty of opportunities for us to exchange more view points about China and democracy somewhere here in the future. 🙂
April 11th, 2010 at 2:28 pm
@wuen (#72): I wonder if we’re getting much further with this, but based on my own assessments on what I wrote I don’t find it very plausible that it’s BM who worked on this and somehow got Lei Da involved. If the testimonies of the involved Uyghur activists are true, then it seems he didn’t actually have any contact with them after the letter from Kadeer was delivered. Why was that? If he wanted to hide information, whom did he hide it for? Also, it doesn’t seem that Lei Da’s one article about one Uyghur had anything to do with the information he provided.
It says in the verdict that it is a weakness of the prosecutor’s case that neither Lei Da nor Zhou Lulu have testified. I agree with this. I wonder why, though? Perhaps he is already out of the country so he can’t be arrested?
Finally, I still find both Sweden’s and China’s low-key attitude to the whole thing odd, and we seem to agree on this. My thinking about the case is that Sweden might have realized they got a big fish related to Zhou Yongkang, who’s a high leader. They didn’t want this to get in the way of a good relationship (small countries have to be way more careful about this than big ones) and China didn’t want too much exposure. In the end, they agreed on a solution that fit both. I should add that this is pure speculation from my side, but it does fit what I know better than any other explanation.
@Steve, Raj, ChineseInUK: I like the personal touch of the latest entries. 🙂 I’ll just say in my case that I’ve been in China for almost 8 years in total, back and forth. When I first went to China I have to admit that I had a sort of romantic idea that wasn’t true – but I liked the real thing better, and my personal development and family is tied to this country.
When I go back to my hometown in Sweden, most of the places are the same. I can go to my old highschool, walk in its old corridors and feel nostalgia about the place I graduated. In Beijing, most of the places I went to in 1997 are long gone, and I can only feel the nostalgia from my memories. This enormous pace of change is both exciting and dizzying.
I’d like to chime in a bit on the democracy discussion too, but that will have to wait for tomorrow. Let’s just say that China in 2000 was very different from China in 2010, and I believe that the changes will be even more dramatic in the year 2020 because of a group of synergetic effects. What these are, exactly, I will write about later. 😉
April 11th, 2010 at 3:14 pm
ChineseInUK (84)
I understand your point about learning through personal experiences. However, I don’t want to get into a discussion over what newspapers, journals, books, websites, which people I talk to, etc I read because that’s far too complex. All I can do is assure you that it isn’t just the BBC and New York Times that I read.
As for your experiences in the UK, I agree that understanding humour is something that you can only gain by talking to people – that’s definitely true. I’ve been pleased to find that many Chinese people (or maybe only the better educated ones I had the privilege of spending time with) enjoyed British comedy like The Office and Fawlty Towers.
However, I don’t think your other point about how you thought people were “heartless” because you didn’t know about the NHS or social care wouldn’t quite work today. If someone visited today and thought the same to begin with, to be fair that would be down to a lack of research. Whilst that person wouldn’t know to search for “NHS” on Google if they didn’t know it existed, after looking into matters generally you would surely stumble on something about it. But I recognise that might have been different if you came here before the internet really took off. It’s also different to hear about the theory and see the practice.
A contrast with China would be someone who didn’t realise that China had elections at any level. Whilst they might find that out by visiting China, they could easily do it by reading some Chinese newspapers online (whether in English or Chinese) and by having a look around the internet more generally. Of course if you’re researching a tricky topic an “insider”‘s tip can work wonders as you suggested.
Anyway you seem to be quite fair in being willing to consider my POV and not pidgeonholing me as someone to automatically ignore. I certainly respect your right to chime in on anything to do with Britain.
I hope that you keep coming back to the UK because you like it. I won’t pry into your mum’s illness, but I hope it’s something she can shake off with your tender love and care. I’d like to think I’d do the same if I was in your position. 😉
April 11th, 2010 at 4:12 pm
@Wukailong
Thank you for you reply. I disagree with your assessment about Lei Da.
From yours post at #28, you state Lei da is a intelligent officer. I assume you have neglected the missing testimony of Lei Da. I will be surprise if anyone can assume someone of guilty of an accusation without due court process in the case of Lei Da.
I believe in the assumption of a suspect is innocent of the accusation until proven guilty. From what I have read, SAPO failed to prove Lei Da is an intelligent officer. The missing testimony of Lei does not invalid the testimony of Bo Renner and Wilhelm Unge. His testimony should complement the assessment of the court on whether Lei Da is guilty or not of the accusation. By not arresting Lei Da. it have no chance of proving if he is an intelligent officer or not. The final verdict by the court prove this point – BM is guilty by of “illegal intelligent gathering” but not “intention of aiding a foreign power”. BM cannot be guilty of intention of aiding a foreign power because SAPO cannot prove Lei Da is working as an intelligent officer for Chinese MSS.
If Lei Da is out of Sweden mean this could be the end of proving Lei Da is a intelligent officer. This is the reason SAPO need to detain Lei Da. I don’t think SAPO failed to detain Lei Da — SAPO don’t have enough evidences to detain him. How could SAPO failed to detain Lei Da if it did not begun the procedure to detain him.
Yours speculation of the expulsion of Chinese diplomat could be true but without the statement from the government official as evidence, I consider it to be false.
BM did commit a crime of “illegal information gathering” according to the court. But is Lei Da an accomplice? Whether BM contacted his party or not after the letter of Kadeer is deliver to the embassy of China is irrelevant to the accusation of Lei Da. The news articles publish by Lei Da cannot be used to prove the accusation of Lei Da.
Lei Da did not commit any crime. Lei Da and the personnel from the embassy are not accomplices of the crime committed by BM. Lei Da is free to return to Sweden and no official arrest warrant is issue by the Swedish authority to arrest Lei Da. Whether Lei Da want to return to Sweden after this affair is his personal choice. This is my assessment of the trial. My point of view could change if new evidence prove Lei Da is an intelligent officer. For now Lei da is innocent of SAPO accusation. The embassy of China is also innocent of the accusation by the media of supporting illegal activity of espionage in Sweden.
April 12th, 2010 at 3:28 am
@wuen (#87): I agree with some of your assessments, but I guess I need to clarify some things:
“you state Lei da is a intelligent officer. I assume you have neglected the missing testimony of Lei Da. I will be surprise if anyone can assume someone of guilty of an accusation without due court process in the case of Lei Da”
That’s my personal view after reading the verdict, yes. I wouldn’t say he is an intelligence officer just like that, because I don’t have that information or assessment. I didn’t neglect the missing testimony – it’s noted as a weakness of the case. The appeals court should either have Lei Da and Zhou Lulu testify, or clarify the situation (if they refused and if so why), otherwise this weakness persists and BM might actually be acquitted (which I hope he is if the court has really failed to prove his status, as you say).
Btw, further down, if you say something is the case, I will take it to mean you think it is the case.
“Yours speculation of the expulsion of Chinese diplomat could be true but without the statement from the government official as evidence, I consider it to be false.”
I doubt you will ever get a statement from a government official in a case like this, if they’re trying to avoid a political struggle between countries.
“BM did commit a crime of “illegal information gathering” according to the court. But is Lei Da an accomplice? Whether BM contacted his party or not after the letter of Kadeer is deliver to the embassy of China is irrelevant to the accusation of Lei Da. The news articles publish by Lei Da cannot be used to prove the accusation of Lei Da.”
It is relevant because it raises the question of intent of both parties. Why did BM hand this information over to Lei Da (is this point in doubt?), and what did he (LD) do with it? Why did he gather the information for such a long period if he only wrote one article about a person from Xinjiang? I guess it could be that BM wanted to hand it over to the embassy for his own, personal reasons, but I find it highly unlikely.
“The embassy of China is also innocent of the accusation by the media of supporting illegal activity of espionage in Sweden.”
I think the media basically just describes what’s written in the court verdict. If Lei Da and Zhou Lulu are indeed innocent, then, yes, the embassy hasn’t carried out illegal activity of the kind described above.
All in all, I think you have raised some good points and I hope the appeals court will make a more detailed assessment of the case. Personally, I hope they remove the part where China as a “totalitarian great power” is used to judge the case as a serious criminal offense. Also, I think it’s always important to be careful in judging these cases when we don’t have all the information (that goes for any country, of course).
Some notes:
* Zhou Lulu and Lei Da somehow doesn’t sound like real Chinese names. I might be wrong, but I get the impression that they are pseudonyms, which is weird.
* If the case has been accepted by the appeals court, they might already have begun their investigation (the deadline was in late March). I’m not sure how long it will take, but sometimes in late summer or autumn is likely.
April 12th, 2010 at 3:33 am
@Everybody: I wrote the 88th comment, so from now on, if you want to comment on something off-topic, it’s auspicious to do so.
Frankly speaking, I think this thread has fared pretty well. Nobody has mentioned Tibet yet! 🙂
April 12th, 2010 at 4:23 am
@ChineseInUK, Raj: I really liked the latest discussion, so I’ll join in. 🙂
China reminds me of a science fiction-like picture I saw a long time ago, of a sort of future metropolis. The picture is intensely complex and in the upper half you can see a landscape of residential areas, factories and skyscrapers fill the horizon. (There’s a face in the sky, somehow showing the soul of the picture) In the lower half you see a street scene which disappears into infinity, with cinemas, bars, restaurants, cars and people.
In most media reports, you would read a general description of the top of the picture, but the feeling of the ground is more like that street scene. Somehow the two parts are connected, but it’s so immense that it’s hard to get a feeling for it. As an example: I used to live in an area where a lot of migrant workers enter Beijing. Somehow that’s part of the big picture – the migrant workers – but on the ground you mostly see them as small groups of people, just arrived and often confused by the new environment.
When I arrived in Beijing the first time, I was only 19 and really nervous. I was nervous because I’d never been that far from home and not tried to really live in a country with a different language (even though I had prepared for a year). At that time, China really felt different and I was exhilarated by taking in all the details. It felt like a mix between Western, Soviet and indigenous things, completely different from what I had expected.
The reason I say this is because that’s also the way I’ve slowly begun to see the political and economic system. I’ve gone through more pro-CCP and more pro-Western periods in my thinking. China’s problems are in a sense typical of developing countries, but there is also a political angle to things that’s hard to deny. You might try not to “politicize” questions but some of them are already highly politicized by the government. For example, there are currently a number of legal reforms underway in China, mostly aimed at educating legal personnel (lawyers, judges, prosecutors) and making sure that laws are promulgated. This is good. However, at the same time the Party has direct control over all the courts through the 政法委 (Political and Legislative Affairs Committee), and I find it hard to see how you can guarantee any due process as long as this system is in place. It will probably not affect “non-political” cases too much, but what if a case involves high-ranking party members?
In 2006, a blueprint of political reform was published in China, titled “攻坚：十七大后中国政治体制改革研究报告” (Storming the fortress: a report on reform of the political system in China after the 17h National Congress). Some of the reform ideas are quite far-reaching, including the idea that the Communist Party should actually be more like a parliamentary party under the supervision of the People’s Congress, and rule by creating legislature, rather than having the pervasive control over society it has today. Unfortunately, in the discussions of how to change the legal system, the recommendations are vague and mostly the same of what is already underway now. I really believe this has to change in the future.
In the long run, I believe China will change because of pressures from civil society. Like Nimrod noted in #73, there is much open debate on laws. We’ve already seen some changes like this (for example, the Sun Zhigang case) and I believe there will be more of these. When educational standards rise and people become more aware of their rights, they’re going to challenge the authorities more. This will “soften” the CCP, just like what happened to the KMT in the 70s and 80s. In 2020, it’s estimated that 60% of China’s population will be urban. Just imagine how this will change the character of the country as a whole.
Perhaps this all sounds wishy-washy, but I think of democratization as a necessity in the future and also something which is very difficult to pull through.
April 12th, 2010 at 4:12 pm
National Endowment for Democracy: Paying to Make Enemies of America
http://www.antiwar.com/paul/paul79.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hu_Jia_%28activist%29
“In 2006, Beijing Zhiaixing Information Counseling Center (formerly called Aizhixing Institute of Health Education), a human rights advocacy group with which Hu was affiliated,[citation needed] received combined grant of $179,113 from National Endowment for Democracy and US State Department for conducting programs within China. [13][14] “
April 12th, 2010 at 5:08 pm
@ tanjin: Please see Comment #6. You’re welcome to write this up in the Letters section if you feel strongly about it.
April 12th, 2010 at 5:26 pm
Steve: you make people really wonder what make you feel so superior than anyone else here. Stop being the butt of joke!
REPOSTING …
National Endowment for Democracy: Paying to Make Enemies of America
http://www.antiwar.com/paul/paul79.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hu_Jia_%28activist%29
“In 2006, Beijing Zhiaixing Information Counseling Center (formerly called Aizhixing Institute of Health Education), a human rights advocacy group with which Hu was affiliated,[citation needed] received combined grant of $179,113 from National Endowment for Democracy and US State Department for conducting programs within China. [13][14] “
April 12th, 2010 at 7:11 pm
@ tanjin: Thread hijacking is disrespectful to the post author. It took Wukailong a lot of time and effort to write this post so the least we can do is stick to the subject as most have done so far. You have the option of writing a post on whatever topic you want yet you choose not to do so. If you continue to spam this post, your comments will be placed in moderation before posting.
When you talk about “people”, you reminded me of that old Mark Twain quote, ‘The Public’ is merely a multiplied “me.”
April 12th, 2010 at 10:01 pm
Wukailong #90
I like your descriptions of the “picture of China”. If I was to paint it, the bottom half would probably be a lot dirtier, chaotic & groom. After all, 150 million Chinese still live below the poverty line!
I think most media reports tend to go to extremes, focusing either on the extremely rich & modern big cities and China’s total GDP or the extremely poor backward side of the society and China’s GDP per capita. If only they would talk to each other 🙂 China is both and more.
Regarding legal reform, it’s always going to be hard for China, since Chinese justice has over the past thousands of year always been delivered through man in power (whatever the emperor says goes) rather than rules. The family & community spirit (whatever the elder / head says goes) over individualism also doesn’t help. “All are equal” and rule of law are very foreign concepts for Chinese so will take time to settle into new culture and fully develop.
Your observation on Chinese politics is fairly accurate. I personally think China is both desperately looking for a new ideology and scared of what they may find or what it may bring.
Most Western politics had the time & opportunities to evolve and develop fairly naturally. China had been thrown into political mayhem ever since the end of the imperial system. In a short space of less than 100 years, it had tried so many different political set-ups and suffered the consequences of their drawbacks; I think most Chinese are tired. The current political set up gives people the opportunity to better their living standards, often unprecedented life changing improvements, so they are quite happy with the status quo.
As for CCP reform, I’m also watching with great interest. And I agree with you that China, or CCP depending on which angle you look at the issues, will change because people will demand it. However, I’m not yet convinced the kind of democracy currently practised in the West can work in China.
I think it likely that CCP will experiment with a lot more democracy within itself and try to make itself more representative of the nation to achieve an indirect democracy for the near future: CCP becomes a facet of a mini-multiparty substance and the elections are done within the party so that at the same time an improved level of democracy is achieved, a reasonable level of stability can also be maintained as power struggles are toned down and power transfers are smoothed out.
Considering a large proportion of young educated urbanites currently fight to join the CCP, and with the continuation of urbanisation and improved education in China, it seems a promising interim solution that will overcome the pitfalls of Western democracy and strict one-party power control in China today.
April 13th, 2010 at 9:30 am
Wukailong,
“It will probably not affect “non-political” cases too much, but what if a case involves high-ranking party members?”
++++++
I think the idea is the party apparatus itself (its disciplinary bodies) is supposed to take care of these. This is the theory anyway. It’s true that the reduplicative system of party and state is causing a lot of problems today, but perhaps, being something that is in place, it also offers a potential way out — I’m not sure what yet. Usually things in evolve by recruiting existing structures for new purposes, rather than inventing completely new ones (I’m taking a cue from biology here). But I’ve always thought that some subset of: a growing civil society; a reactivation of the “flower vase” junior parties; expansion of NPC powers; “universalization” of the CCP and factionalization are the most viable political changes for China going forward. Things are certainly set up in a way that peaceful power sharing is the most acceptable and desired outcome, and at the end of the day, that’s the most important thing. There is a lot of hope in this trajectory.
“When educational standards rise and people become more aware of their rights, they’re going to challenge the authorities more. This will “soften” the CCP, just like what happened to the KMT in the 70s and 80s.”
++++++
This is true and we should remember that the CCP is not an externality. It’s a subset of the people and extracted from them, election or not! People inside and outside of China always forget this easily. It’s really true that the people deserve the kind of government they get, even in China! Just like the baby boom has a baby boom echo, we will also see echo of the reform and opening, which is just beginning. Upcoming are the generations whose worldviews and education are modern and many of whom have even studied abroad. They will replace the Cultural Revolution generation of leaders who are in power today and that will improve things. We can even see this in Chinese students overseas. They speak much better English from the start, than students before, are much more confident and creative, and a rich civil society in overseas Chinese communities is flourishing rather than what used to be purely political and factional organizations associated with anti-CCP sentiments. This tracks the experience of overseas Taiwanese in earlier decades (say, 70’s and 80’s).
April 14th, 2010 at 9:07 am
#90,95,96 – thanks for this very good description of one way China/CCP could go.
My concerns are, that it is not necessarily (yet) the only way. As long as CCP has its strong leadership (which is an advantage for a non-developed country) it might also, in its struggle to keep the power, turn back. And then, eventually a leader, facing his downturn, could play a “cultural revolution” card again.
I hope that China, like Taiwan, manages a peaceful transition from strong leadership to a system, where the power is shared (with its disadvantages for non-developed countries).
In that sense I hope with you, Nimrod, as you wrote:
“Things are certainly set up in a way that peaceful power sharing is the most acceptable and desired outcome, and at the end of the day, that’s the most important thing. There is a lot of hope in this trajectory.”
ChineseInUK:
“However, I’m not yet convinced the kind of democracy currently practiced in the West can work in China. ”
There are many different models of democracy in the West. Often correlated with the wealth of the country. If one of this models is working in Taiwan, why do you think it cannot work on the mainland? And if there is really no model, how can a peaceful power sharing (with leadership weakness but safety against a fallback to some bad system) happen?
April 15th, 2010 at 3:18 am
The comments have been great lately. Thanks! Some thoughts:
@Josef (#97): ” As long as CCP has its strong leadership (which is an advantage for a non-developed country) it might also, in its struggle to keep the power, turn back. And then, eventually a leader, facing his downturn, could play a “cultural revolution” card again.”
I read a book last year about the way the CCP has been changing, “China’s Communist Party – Atrophy and Adaptation”:
http://www.amazon.com/Chinas-Communist-Party-Atrophy-Adaptation/dp/0520254929
It addresses these concerns in the final chapter, which is the author’s take on the theories of others, and one of the scenarios discusses is exactly that, a return to totalitarianism. I don’t remember how the arguments went exactly, but it was something like this: the power of individual leaders in the CCP have diminished and been more formalized over the last decade. Jiang Zemin wielded less power than Deng Xiaoping, and Hu Jintao has less power than Jiang. This is mostly because of the increased power of the bureaucracy itself.
My own take on it is that the party has indeed become more structured and rule-abiding. It’s not be in the interest of its leaders to give away their power, of course, but they can make sure things are as stable as possible. For this reason, I don’t believe there will be chaos unleashed from the top in the future. But then again, who knows? These ten years are probably crucial for the party and the government of China.
“There are many different models of democracy in the West. Often correlated with the wealth of the country. If one of this models is working in Taiwan, why do you think it cannot work on the mainland?”
Personally, I agree… But the political system in Taiwan is viewed quite unfavorably on the mainland. One of the reasons is of course the negative reports, but another seems to be that people aren’t used to a more competitive political culture and dislike what they see. I’ve heard several people use the same word to describe Taiwan’s elections, “乌烟瘴气” (a foul atmosphere). Even other democratic countries aren’t viewed too well, but usually better than Taiwan.
April 16th, 2010 at 4:18 am
I don’t mean to be Johnny One-note around here, but I do want to point out that the Tibet and Xinjiang situations will create serious complications in any scenario where China moves toward democracy, even if the move is gradual. Not to put too fine a point on it, I strongly suspect that the people in all the Tibetan areas and in southern Xinjiang would vote for secessionists if given half a chance. That means about that at least 28% of the PRC’s land area is inhabited by people who are not loyal to the state. How can you move toward a representative system without those destabilising energies being released? I’m sure they would try to place some limits on what kind of parties or candidates could appear on the ballot, i.e. overt secessionists would not be allowed to participate. However, the voters would simply vote for whichever candidate was closest to their preferences, which would encourage candidates to keep pushing the limits of what’ss acceptable under the law until the restrictions gradually became irrelevant.
The simplest solution would be to exclude the so-called “autonomous” areas from democratic reforms. However, that kind of two-tier system would be pretty obvious and I’m not sure how long it could be expected to last.
April 16th, 2010 at 4:42 pm
Well if the Han population are overwhelming the local Tibetan and other minority population, in a popular vote it wouldn’t change the outcome assuming ethnic Hans are against sessionism right?
April 16th, 2010 at 5:23 pm
Otto Kerner,
That’s why gerrymandering was invented. 😀
But good points, although I am concerned, I am not as pessimistic.
Tibet and Xinjiang have somewhat different dynamics.
Tibet is a concern for China I think due to the Dalai Lama’s existence outside China and the exile community’s international agitation. Internally, China may be perfectly fine with letting Tibetans do whatever they want with much more autonomy, because there is little overlap between them and Han Chinese: not enough Han Chinese really want to live in Tibet and Tibetans are too few to affect China.
Xinjiang is the opposite. Externally there is almost no support now. However, internally it is a problem. Han Chinese actually want to be in Xinjiang, and they and Uighurs just do not meld at all. They don’t even look like each other, so it’s a much greater challenge to the identity of the Chinese state. Yet, demographically Xinjiang is much more secure* and even not counting Han, there are sizeable other groups like Mongols, Hui, and Kazakhs, who for their own reasons don’t get along with Uighurs and detest an independent Uighuristan even more than the Han do. When we speak of Southern Xinjiang, the troublespots really are just Yining and Kashgar. Worst comes to worst, let them be autonomous cities 😀
In general, I think it’s a bad idea to have direct democracy in places where there are irreconcilable interests. However, if even Chechnya can elect pro-Russian leaders and Iraqis can figure something out, I really cannot predict the outcome. I think it will depend on how much China becomes a place that anybody, not just Uighurs, will want to live in.
* With regard to demographics in Xinjiang, ever since the July 5th Urumqi incident last year, there has been a lot of internet talk about the “demographics problem” in China whereby minorities have (and are allowed to have) a much higher birthrate than Han Chinese, such that the Han supermajority has dropped in percentage every year, to about the low 90% now. It’s nothing serious at this point, but people are clamoring that it is ethnic suicide, so that’s another angle on the One-Child policy. One day it will be repealed, of course, but it is almost certain that Han Chinese birthrate will never be as high as minorities. Some people advocate now that the One-Child policy should be based on region and not on ethnicity. For example, they believe everybody in Xinjiang should be allowed to have 2, while everybody in Shanghai 1, for instance. It definitely shows some concern about the ethnic balance in minority regions.
April 17th, 2010 at 6:03 am
Thanks for your observations, Nimrod. I think that the problem with autonomy is that there is no obvious end to it. You know how people are — you give an inch and they take a mile. I think this is why the Chinese government has shown so much resistance to the idea of autonomy so far: not because autonomy by itself is contrary to their interests, but because they see it as a dangerous move in the direction of independence. Autonomy would unleash Tibetan political aspirations that would be difficult to get back under control later.
If Tibetans had autonomy, the first thing they would do would be to arrange for the Dalai Lama to come back to Tibet. If they can’t invite the Dalai Lama back, then they don’t really have autonomy. Therefore, autonomy doesn’t seem realistic unless the Chinese government can reach some kind of understanding with the Dalai Lama. I don’t think that simply waiting for the current Dalai Lama to die will solve that problem, either. The demand would simply switch to the return of the exile version of the 15th Dalai Lama and his tutors. It’s possible that Tibetans will lose interest in dalai lamas during the course of the next one’s lifetime, but I don’t expect that will happen for a while.
I don’t feel comfortable with the assumption that serious anti-government sentiments in Xinjiang are limited to a few places like Kashgar and Yining. In both Tibet and Xinjiang, there is only a small hardcore of persons willing to resist the government actively, which is understandable because they put life and limb at severe risk by doing so. Voting for secessionist or quasi-secessionist candidates is a much less risky activity, and so a much broader portion of society could be expected to participate. I think that a very large number of Tibetans and Uighurs would take the opportunity to do so. It’s true that Xinjiang is demographically securer than Tibet because Uighurs are not an absolute majority there, so the region as a whole is unlikely to vote for secession. But having a large bloc of pro-independence representatives in the regional government would still be at best an embarrassment and at worst highly disruptive. This map shows the areas inside Xinjiang which are predominantly Uighur: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Xinjiang_nationalities_by_prefecture_2000.png . Actually, I think this might be a bit misleading because Bayin’gholin Autonomous Prefecture (the giant chunk in the middle and southeast of Xinjiang) is shown as red but it probably contains large areas that are mostly Uighur, with the Han and Hui concentrated in the north near the cities.
I think the solution, at least in Tibet, is to pursue some form of autonomous semi-democratic system, modeled after Hong Kong but with less direct citizen influence on policy. This would require the involvement of Tibetan elites to act as an intermediary between Beijing and the public. The difference between the public and the elites is that you can’t make a deal with the public at large and expect them to honour it. With a Tibetan government in power that is partially insulated from public opinion, the central government could tell them to keep a lid on things or risk a return to direct rule from Beijing.
April 17th, 2010 at 9:37 am
@Otto
Semi-democratic system???????? Haha!
DL is a Marxist and Tibet will be a theocratic nation.
There’s will be no semi-democratic system in Tibet and it won’t be coming from DL.
April 17th, 2010 at 6:18 pm
Well said, Jason. You’ve convinced me of your case once again through compelling arguments persuasively stated.
April 17th, 2010 at 7:49 pm
I think that the problem with autonomy is that there is no obvious end to it. You know how people are — you give an inch and they take a mile.
___________________________________
Now you know why western democracy doesnt deliver in a developing country, so stop selling it to chinese.
April 17th, 2010 at 7:59 pm
Josef ,
There is a saying in mainland that if you have not been to Taiwan, you dont know that Culture Revolution is still going on.
and if CCP succeeds tackling the problem of corruption, CCP will win. They have money, money can buy lot of things, including stability.
Does anyone know that the democratic advocates in China made a big fiasta out of the poland plane crash ? those websites are all controled by the newpaper that interviewed Obama.
April 17th, 2010 at 9:35 pm
Otto,
Of course the problems of Tibet and Xinjiang are not easy to solve. But geopolitical issues of these types are rarely easy to solve.
(For other examples: Cuba, North Korea, and Iran. and as yet, we are not sure Afghanistan and Iraq are being “solved”).
To be sure, Tibet and Xinjiang will be problems for China for probably several generations, there is no quick solutions.
But I dare to say, China will continue to develop, even in Tibet and Xinjiang, with or without the likes of Dalai Lama.
Unlike the West, China is not contemplating “exit strategies” to their problems.
Tibet and Xinjiang are bitter pills, and China is not afraid of “eating bitter”. Compared to the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution and Civil War, Tibet and Xinjiang will be barely mentionable in the long history of China.
April 18th, 2010 at 1:12 pm
Wukailong, thanks for this link!
It is true that the Taiwanese system often does not look too well (fighting between legislators, vote buying etc.) and therefore even can be made look worse, which might be also some intention in the reporting about Taiwanese democracy. But there are also highlights,- see for example the (female) Mayor of Kaohsiung or the (again) female DPP leader. CPP always claimed to be women friendly, but if you look at the top, you barely find any woman.
I hope that visitors from the mainland recognize the constructive KMT and DPP fractions, and change their opinion about the Taiwanese democracy. But anyway, there might be other and better democracy examples (I simply don’t share the opinion of a famous movie actor)
r v, what exactly do you mean with, “the Cultural Revolution is still going on?”
April 18th, 2010 at 4:46 pm
I didn’t write that quote, “the Cultural Revolution is still going on,” but I think it means that all the nasty fighting in the Taiwanese Democracy is more similar to the Cultural Revolution, where a person can easily targeted as some “foreign sympathizer” or “traitor”.
In Taiwan’s case, of course, being labeled as “mainland” sympathizer can definitely get one death threats and rotten tomatoes in public.
That’s hardly the “tolerant” Democratic model that China should be emulating.
Uh…. I think China has been through all that already. No Thanks.
*and having women at the top doesn’t mean more tolerance and less sexism.
China had a female emperor once, that hardly meant that Chinese women suffered less discrimination at that time.
One should look at the traditionally non-women friendly professions. How many women generals, engineers, soldiers, etc. does Taiwan have?
How many percentage women legislators?
Any affirmative action gender quota for women in professions? (Mainland has, don’t know about Taiwan).
April 18th, 2010 at 8:44 pm
Josef,
Unless the society is dominated by religion or idealism, the society usually consists of three parts, the government, the rich and the people, not like described by western democracy, only government vs people.
Please remember : Politically, government is people’s enemy; but financially, the rich are people’s enemy, not government.
As 99.9% of people care their financial situations far far far far far more than their right of voting and free speech (except for media and lame activitists, as this is their way of making a living). so the final winner is always economy, not beautiful idea.
Otto said absolutely right “You know how people are — you give an inch and they take a mile.” The logic conclusion of this is that either western democracy + freedom is built on wealth, or it is designed in realty for the rich.”
April 18th, 2010 at 9:33 pm
@Josef
Are you forgetting who are Wu Yi and Wu Changhua? Those Taiwanese women doesn’t even come close to compare to the two Chinese women.
April 19th, 2010 at 2:19 am
r v, thanks, it’s clear now what you meant (I do not agree with the Chinese people you quote, but I do understand).
Wahaha, You are so focused on the U.S. Take also a look to some of the rich European countries, like Sweden. You know that the maximum tax rate in Sweden is 100% (there was even the strange case of Astrid Lindgren, who once had to pay even more that 100% tax…).
Jason, I looked at this heads only: http://www.prcgov.org/
I agree that 吴仪 and 吴昌华 are respectable and powerful women.
April 19th, 2010 at 3:18 am
Comparing the Cultural Revolution to the antics surrounding Taiwanese democracy? What a lack of proportion. The Cultural Revolution made China a hellish place to live, disrupting its society and culture at a deep level and destroying what was left of its economy. Many innocent people who just wanted to mind their own business were killed or injured. Taiwanese democracy frequently annoys the public and harms the careers of politicians (plus occasional minor injuries to politicians), but when has it ever harmed anybody who didn’t choose to get involved in politics?
April 19th, 2010 at 3:22 am
@Josef
Since you used that link and said that there’s barely any women that matches Taiwan, then why is 刘延东 in the group?
April 19th, 2010 at 3:57 pm
Josef,
Let us cut the crab and focus on solving the problems. When there are lot of people in misery in a country, The govenment has to SOLVE THE PROBLEMS to help people, right ?
Now, there are millions of children in Thailand sleeping on strees, over 10 years has passed by and nothing has changed.
Find way to SOLVE IT before being so confident that you even know what democracy is in real world.
April 19th, 2010 at 3:58 pm
Otto,
Taiwan + Thailand = Culture revolution.
April 19th, 2010 at 8:56 pm
Otto,
“but when has it ever harmed anybody who didn’t choose to get involved in politics?”
I think you best clarify your definition of “politics”.
I think you are making a distinction based upon nothing at all.
Afterall, in Taiwan, there are votes, everyone is in politics. Are there Taiwanese people who purposefully vote themselves out of political involvement? I don’t think so.
April 20th, 2010 at 12:25 am
By “political involvement”, I meant someone who becomes a politician.
April 20th, 2010 at 12:55 am
Really Otto? You mean professional politics?
NGO people don’t count? Appointed? Self-appointed? Elected?
Not politically involved if one merely advocates a policy? Join a political group? Saved environment? Recycled trash part time?
I think your vision of “political involvement” is rather doing injustice to the “grassroot” and “vibrant” politics of Taiwanese Democracy, aren’t you?
April 20th, 2010 at 1:36 am
I don’t know exactly where the line would be drawn, r v. Can you give some examples of harm done by Taiwan’s political culture to NGO workers, self-appointed politicians, policy advocates, part-time trash recyclers, and people who have saved the environment?
April 20th, 2010 at 2:02 am
r v, you are correct, the “cultural revolution statement was coming original from Wahaha.
But you mentioned as a counter argument against Taiwan’s democracy the hate, mainland supporters sometimes face. Now, first of all, all should would work together to reduce this hate. But to do so, you have to analyzes from where it comes. And here I see this hate rather a reaction than an action.
Just an example from last week. Again at the Shanghai Expo a “mistake” occurred, and instead of “Chinese Taipei”, Taiwan was called “Taipei, China”. Now, this grassroots party has a very simple slogan, saying: “My home country is Taiwan”. Consider a person who is not even allowed to say “My home country is Taiwan” what he thinks about this group of people who suppresses him. That is similar as someone from Chicago is not allowed to say, “My home country is Illinois” and compromises to “American Chicago”, but at the end the suppressor says “Chicago, America”! And you know the difference between Zhong Hua and Zhong Guo.
To understand the hate against mainland supporters you have to see also the regular humiliations from the mainland against Taiwan.
Another example from the 2008 Sichuan earthquake: At our company money was collected for help and many followed the guidelines (according to rank & income). Some colleagues however, strictly refused. We had a discussion and a first argument, that there was no help at the big Taiwanese earthquake I could counter, that someone has to start. But when another colleague said: “with every Dollar I give to the CCP, they safe more money to build lethal weapons against me” I did not have any answer.
Again, to understand this hate against mainland supporters you should keep in mind that the mainland still keeps threatening Taiwan.
Of course a political group, which supports the mainland, should be met with the same respect as any other political group. And I hope that the trend is going into this direction, but I do understand why we are not yet there. Everyone should work to deescalate and compromise.
I agree with you that the Taiwanese Democratic model is not the best one to take as example.
I understood from Wukailong’s reference (98) that the CCP tries to extract the benefits of a Democratic system without applying the system itself. And as such, the linear scale, i.e. used by the house of freedom with one extreme “democracy” the other extreme “dictatorship” should now be expanded with another dimension. Which is not named yet, except something like the “Chinese Model”. Characteristics of this model in simple words are: power sharing to avoid dictatorship, professionals in the administration instead of popular charlatans. It is interesting, especially when comparing with the Singapore system (not a developing country), which many expats regards as superior to (real) democratic systems.
It brings up again the question: on which topics the people should decide, which is a hot topic also within democracies: example is the Swiss popular vote to reject minarets, which was seen in Germany as an argument against popular votes.
To close: one should remain open minded also to the Chinese system…
April 20th, 2010 at 3:02 am
It’s obvious quite a long time has passed since the Cultural Revolution ended. To compare it to the present Taiwanese situation seems quite a bit like the 1984 or Nazi comparisons so popular in the West. But, since I haven’t been to Taiwan, and I suspect most people on this thread haven’t either, it would be welcome if someone who actually have lived there and also in another democratic country describes, in more detail (and personally, if you will) what it is like and what the differences are. Are all democratic systems similar? Is the Taiwanese one special?
@Josef (#121): While I agree with you that Freedom House’s model is simplistic, I’m not sure adding a “Chinese model” would make it any better. 🙂 In the long run, I still don’t believe China is or will be a unique model. I think the sheer size of the country gives it economic might disproportionate to its development per capita, and this makes people believe that it somehow is a new thing in the history of mankind. To me, it’s just a mega-version of South Korea or Singapore. Of course, being a huge country poses problems of its own, like all these territorial disputes and keeping it together, but the underlying dynamics are the same. It’s impossible to foresee what will have happened in another decade if the current growth of civil society continues at the same pace.
Still, I agree that it’s best to remain open-minded about the Chinese system. It continues to evolve, as does the Taiwanese counterpart.
April 20th, 2010 at 6:13 am
WKL, I looked up Lei Da’s Swedish press club info and snet the link to your verdict translation, asked him to comment on FM. He read your translation but declined to comment. However he agreed to allow me to post some of his email reply here:
– Lei Da insists he is a journalist, not a spy. His identity is not a secret, neither is his articles and pod casts:
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/other3983/4034/index.html (article archive)
http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8212/169859/index.html (pod cast home)
http://tv.people.com.cn/GB/177969/11343398.html
http://tv.people.com.cn/GB/14644/11242904.html
– SAPO’s 105 article count is incorrect. In addition to People’s Daily overseas articles, he also produce PD podcast and writes for Global Times domestically. GT editorial guideline is not as strict as PD, and Lei Da writes OpEd under the pen name “Wang Jue 王艳” and “Wang Yen 王燕” (phone numbers to GT office provided), where he’s written about a dozen articles on Xinjiang issue.
– Lei observed the verdict had almost nothing about the diplomat accused of spying, while he’s singled out. Diplomats in contact with overseas nationals is part of the job. As to his contact with Barbur being secretive, it is at the request of Barbur due to concern over dangerous elements in the Uyghur community, and he is obliged to protect his source. Lei said he did not pay Barbur, and 110k Krona is less than 20k USD, an ordinary amount for older Chinese people who are savers.
April 20th, 2010 at 6:35 am
Thanks Charles, that’s valuable information! Just one question: Did you get permission to publish the pen names? When I translated the verdict I shortened Lei Da and Zhou Lulu to LD and ZLL as well because I didn’t want people to come here with web searches. If he accepted to have them published, then that’s fine, otherwise you might want to remove them.
I’m a bit busy now but will comment on this later.
April 20th, 2010 at 11:49 am
Can anyone here tell the difference of the current system in China from that under Mao ?
Yes, it is still one party system, but there are differences.
Most westerners linked democracy with voting and election, which is right. An one- party system is of course not democratic.
The mistake westerners easily make is that they will consider a system democratic once it has voting and election.
BTW, I have a question : in real world, what is human right ?
and what is politics in most countries(not those dominated by religion and idealism)?
April 20th, 2010 at 1:21 pm
Otto,
Surly, there are plenty of people in Taiwan who have claimed that they have been harmed by the betrayal of pro-mainlanders. (lawsuits even against President Ma).
Are you suggesting that all these unhappy freedom loving ordinary non-political Taiwanese people are on dope?
April 20th, 2010 at 1:24 pm
Josef,
I understand the fear and suspicion in Taiwan, but that’s part of their own cultural revolution, ie. they are taking it out on their own people, who they perceive as “pro-mainland.”
Frankly, that’s akin to US suspecting and interning Japanese Americans in WWII. It’s not democratic. It’s simply another Cultural Revolution.
April 20th, 2010 at 6:07 pm
WKL, I asked if it’s okay before posting here. Lei’s pen names are not secrets.
April 21st, 2010 at 2:56 am
@Charles (#128): Good, I assumed you did but I just wanted to check.
April 22nd, 2010 at 4:04 am
A belated comment…
@ChineseinUK #95
This reminds me a Zen story:
A young man had a clay statue, a family heirloom. He’d always wished that it were bright shiny gold instead of plain brown clay. When he began to earn a living , he put aside a little now and then, until he had enough for his special project: to have his statue covered with gold.
Now it looked just the way he wanted it to, and people admired it. He felt very proud that he had a gold statue. However, the gold-plating didn’t stick to the clay very well, and it wasn’t long before it began to flake off in spots. So he had it gold-plated again. Soon he found himself using all his time and resources to maintain the gold facade of his statue.
One day his grandfather returned from a journey of many years. The young man wanted to show him how he had made the clay statue into a gold one. However, clay was showing through many spots, so he was somewhat embarrassed.
The old man smiled and held the statue lovingly. With a moist cloth he gently rubbed it and gradually dissolved some of the clay. “Many years ago, the statue must have fallen in the mud and become covered with it. As a very young child, you wouldn’t have known the difference. You forgot, and thought it was just a clay statue. But look here.”
He showed his grandson the place where the clay was removed, and a bright yellow color shone through. “Underneath the covering of clay, your statue has been solid gold from the very beginning. You never needed to put more gold on to cover the clay. Now that you know what its nature really is, all you have to do is gently remove the clay and you’ll reveal the gold statue you’ve possessed all along.”
Thousands of years ago, ancient Chinese already had the ideas of “民为贵，社稷次之，君为轻”, and “王子犯法，与庶民同罪.” The elegance & sophistication of the ancient Chinese legislative and justice systems probably peaked in Tang/Song — for instance, the justice system alone vested in 3 branches of the government: 大理寺, 刑部 & 御史台.
What China needs, isn’t covering some more gold plates on the statue, but rather cleaning the mud built up over the years.
April 24th, 2010 at 1:50 pm
What China needs, isn’t covering some more gold plates on the statue, but rather cleaning the mud built up over the years.
_______________________________________________________
You are right about the “mud”, but you have to prove that the “gold plates” ARE gold. what if the “gold” is not even as good as the “mud” in protecting the statue ?
April 24th, 2010 at 3:31 pm
While in law school, I postulated that Confucianism is a form of Constitutional Law in China.
If one really boils down what is Constitution, one finds that a Constitution is a set of generalized principles that are really fit to be specific laws. But more a set of moral principles that the people share in common.
For example, US constitution generally sets out the powers of branches of government, and prohibits them from what they shouldn’t do, but leaves much of the details to be implemented by Congress.
Indeed, in 604, Japanese Prince Shôtoku wrote a 17 clause constitution based upon Confucius’ teachings.
Thus, the concept of adapting Confucian doctrines to a form of Constitution law is not new.
However, I would say that Confucian doctrines are so in the core of the Chinese mentality over the last 2000 years, that it amounts to a basic form of Constitution law.
Afterall, every new Chinese Dynasty invariably starts its legal codes by looking at Confucian doctrines. (two exceptions were the Mongols and the Manchurians, but as they slowly sinicized, they turned their legal codes toward the Confucian doctrines at the urging of the Han Chinese court officials.)
April 24th, 2010 at 6:05 pm
To Wahaha:
is the “mud” really “protecting the statue”? Or is it imprisoning it, obscuring it, and preventing it from shining through? To constantly worry about whether the gold plating is better than the mud or not is to completely overlook the fact that it’s a gold statue. Why would you want mud on that in the first place?
As JXie said, I’d worry less about the gold plates, and look more into ways of getting rid of the “mud”.
May 4th, 2010 at 9:08 pm
SKC,
I dont think there is much points to back and forth between you and me.
I said before : Western democracy is built on wealth. What is happening in Greece is what you will expect in a west country once the money runs out or it can nolonger borrow the money, it is inevitable, because westerners believe individualism, which fundamentally contradicts with democracy, the only way these two can coexist is money, or plainly speaking, new technology that greatly enhances the productivity, exploiting people in other countries or borrowing the money.
The western democracy is under more threat than CCP ( or communism) is, as CCP controls the economy, hence they control the money, hence they can buy stability, you think they will let money rot in the bank and let the power go ? The future of democracy in China now largely depends on the performance of democracy in democratic countries.
If Hongkong had been able to build the highspeed as fast as China, Chinese wouldnt have viewed (western) democracy as an obstacle of economy; if the democracy in Taiwan can be squeezed out a single drop of decency, Chinese will believe a “good” democracy is possible in China; if the chinese democratic advocates could have even talked democratically on internet, not like chinese police, Chinese would have thought a reason of overthrowing CCP.
So if you want to overthrow CCP, please educate those democratic advocates in China to be “nice”, not like Chinese police. BTW, tell them stop doing stupid things like making huge splash of the Poland plane crash.
Let me show you a paradox :
According to some people here and those “Freedom” fighters in China, CCP is evilest. Well, people like HanHan can still talk, right ? so CCP cant be the eviliest unless those “Freedom ” fighter are doing what CCP wants to do and cant do, or those “freedom fighters are the spies of chinese government.
Now go solve the paradox.
May 4th, 2010 at 11:52 pm
Well, we’ve been through this before. Wealth helps most things. It seems that Chinese people probably tolerate the CCP now in part because of the increase in their wealth over the last 30 years. However, has China’s economy grown because of the authoritarian nature of her governance, or because she adopted a capitalist system? Do you think China would be where she is now if she hadn’t “opened up”? And if she was still financially mired in her pre-1980’s state, do you think the CCP would still be in charge. Obviously the only honest answer is “who knows”. But my suspicion on those 3 questions would be the latter, no, and no respectively. About the only aspect where I think an authoritarian system can benefit the economy is to enforce the greater good at the expense of the unfortunate few who get screwed with less recourse than in a “democracy” (although even then it implicates the rule of law and is not solely the effect of the model of governance).
At the same time, the economy directly affects the people, and the leaders who screw up the economy no doubt pay a political price, as I presume the Greek leaders will soon realize. The people have an interest in installing leaders who (they hope) will be better stewards of the economy, within the same political system. But that’s not the same as concluding that the Greeks will next opt for an authoritarian system of governance.
None of this has any relationship, however, to whether “westerners” value “individualism”. It may be in people’s nature to be selfish; but that doesn’t mean that people believe that they will get absolutely everything they want and avoid absolutely everything they don’t want in a “democracy”. And even if “westerners” value “individualism”, that hardly means they are prepared to go to the extreme of “every man for himself” and “every man is an island”, which is what you would have to assume for such individualism to “fundamentally contradict” with democracy. I have never understood why and how you are forever stuck on your assumption that people in a democracy get everything they want at the expense of the greater good..all the time. And I’m not sure there’s any basis for the implication that Chinese people are fundamentally less selfish, but at the same time there’s no basis to assume that the CCP offers the only antidote to Chinese selfishness run amok.
Your “paradox” again makes no sense. Who said the CCP is “evilest”? To argue a supposition (ie if…then…) when the premise is flawed is pointless. Besides, “evil” or not, tolerance of someone like HanHan does not prove or disprove such underlying evilness (that HanHan tends to take it out on local officials while sparing the central government of his venom is probably a good strategy on his part, and probably allows the CCP to tolerate him…but all this is beside the point). HanHan’s popularity and the fact that he stays away from red-lines means that, by the CCP’s calculation, he’s probably not worth going after. That’s merely a calculation, and is neither good nor evil. I’m afraid your latest scenario, not unlike the overwhelmingly vast majority of the stuff you’ve offered up previously, needs work.
May 5th, 2010 at 12:00 am
@ “SKC: It seems that Chinese people probably tolerate the CCP now in part because of the increase in their wealth over the last 30 years.”
Not true. Chinese people who are middle class and the wealthy are getting the dough but migrants and below the poverty line are not getting a dime.
By opening up more, it will devastate below the poverty line even more and cause dent to the middle class and the wealthy.
May 5th, 2010 at 12:55 am
“not getting a dime” is obviously exaggeration.
Migrants are obviously getting more than what they used to “get,” otherwise why would they bother to go into the cities?
Capitalism, spread the wealth by making some rich first.
May 5th, 2010 at 2:20 am
To Jason,
you’re correct. I was referring to Chinese people in general, but certainly some have reaped more benefits from the opening up of the last 30 years than others. I imagine that the wide and growing disparity between the have’s and have-not’s is probably something that gives the CCP pause. And I don’t think this disparity is the fault of the system of governance. I think any upstart and burgeoning capitalist economy, regardless of the system of governance, will not benefit every citizen at exactly the same pace.
My point above was that China’s economy does not justify nor repudiate the CCP mode of governance. Wahaha has a tendency to conflate the two.
I don’t know what you mean by “opening up more”. Can China be more capitalist than she is now? I guess they could move towards fewer state-owned enterprises. Is that what you mean?
May 5th, 2010 at 3:16 am
@ Jason: Along with R4K, I realized you were exaggerating to make a point concerning the poor in China but as SK noted, I was also curious about what you meant when you wrote “opening up more”. I think your answer could generate a nice, intelligent discussion about future progress in the country and the best way to go about it. I’m very interested in your thoughts on this subject.
May 5th, 2010 at 9:29 am
Some notes on democracy, wealth, individualism, etc:
The CCP doesn’t have some sort of absolute control over the economy that democratic countries lack – in that case it would basically be a planned economy. I can agree that it has relatively more control over its economy than many other countries (through various measures), so of it needs 1% of the GDP for some project, for example, it can funnel it as it seems fit. It can’t, however, do that with 50% of its GDP. When the economic crisis came, it didn’t use some absolute, godlike control but created an investment package, something that has happened in democratic countries in the past and isn’t unique to authoritarian governments.
If the problems in Greece were solely caused by Western individualism, then you would expect all Western countries to be more or less in the same situation. Another factor to weigh in when making these judgements is that an EU that includes most of Europe’s country is relatively new, and it evolves to meet new problems as they arise, just like any other governmental body. Two recent proposals to solve future problems like these are a bailout fund and a new authority to coordinate government spending between countries.
I’m not sure how individualist Greek culture is. Historically, Western and Northern Europe have tended to be more individualist than their Southern brethren, so I’m not sure that explanation really suits the present situation. But I could be wrong.
May 5th, 2010 at 1:23 pm
Economy is good enough an indicator of effectiveness of governance.
If all “human rights” are manifested self-evident, then there would be no need for government to define these rights.
If the government is supposed to protect these rights, then protect from what/whom? If it’s foreign powers, then we are talking about governance of the Military. If it’s terrorists or criminals, then we are talking about governance of the Police.
Economy, livelihood, is the one major real indicator of any government, since time immemorial. It is the rise and fall of every nation in History, it is what US and Europe bragged about for the last century. (That and the power of the military).
other more conceptualized concepts of good v. bad governance are purely theoretical and speculative.
May 5th, 2010 at 1:40 pm
Greece’s problem is not so surprising. Corrupt governments are a dime a dozen in the world. If Greece was some small republic in Africa, no one would even bother.
The bigger problem of Greece is how it is linked so tightly with the EU, which has allowed the Greek economic problem to fester in the good times, and now finally rot in the open in the bad times.
This is an EU problem. It speaks much of EU’s overly ambitious plan to expand and recruit new members in the last decade (without bothering to even check whether they are getting good new members).
Relative new EU members, especially those of former USSR republics, are all hard hit by the recession, because of their still relatively backward economic conditions.
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania, just to name a few, now are all relying on EU to provide support. (or begging for EU money from Germany and France).
If Greece falls, others will follow, and that could be the end of EU (or a severe setback).
The former USSR republics may be forced to seek Russia or China or even the Shanghai Coop Organization (SCO) for financial help.
May 5th, 2010 at 10:25 pm
@Wukailong
In respect of Greece failures and corruption, their big government ideology and unions are the cause of their downfall. It is really destructive that EU is awarding them with EU taxpayer’s money to bail them out.
May 6th, 2010 at 6:39 pm
actually, according to many, tax evasion by the wealthy is costing Greece estimated $20.5 billion a year, and probably one of the biggest factors in Greece’s current budget deficit of about $40 billion.
At the same time, across Europe, even UK has a significant budget deficit.
It would be interesting to see what UK does. Back to Thatcherism?
May 10th, 2010 at 6:07 am
I thought the reason why Greece and other developed countries are in trouble is due to the fact of poor fiscal planning. Every country goes through troubled patches, but like people, they could have planned for it in better times. Even if countries experience long-term decline due to aging demographics, or because the EU structure is new, or whatever, it is still something that could have been planned, like people do with their lives. So there are structural issues, sure, but that’s not insurmountable, or shouldn’t be. So it comes down to poor planning. And this poor planning is due to a lack of responsibility. And this lack of responsibiltiy is not due to individualism, as we see time and again that individuals in a country work very hard, by and large. Some don’t, for example, the rich. But they are a small fraction of the people. They may own most of the wealth, but they don’t produce most of it in any given year. So the lack of responsibility is on the public side, namely government spending.
And here is the problem: Large democracies don’t have fiscal discipline. It’s as simple as that. It’s not built into the system. There are lots of checks and balances for the corruption of power, but no check on financial irresponsibility. Democracies aren’t built for that. Candidates promise bread and games, and they get elected on that. Then they spend what they don’t have by borrowing, sticking the bill with the next guy. Do you see anything in the system that hints that this should not go on? There is absolutely none! Rather, it’s as if the whole system of democracy is designed to encourage this behavior. It’s breathtaking! Even a supposedly independent central bank, for the sake of its own survival, would have to go along with bailouts and purchasing of worthless debt, and so on.
There are many ways in which large democracies fail, and they usually stem from the simple fact that, away from local issues (local democracies tend to be fine), and away from short-term interests (people are good at judging short-term), the people are not capable of selecting either the right policy or the representatives who will make it. The national economy is merely the largest and most important example of this.
But it’s not for nothing. Western countries have used decades of fake and unsustainable prosperity (in which they did not save) as a deceptive show of their high living standard, in order to promote their system. Inadvertently, they have showed people that capitalism works, but the political system does not. Is it any surprise that China learned the lesson very well?
May 10th, 2010 at 7:10 am
Your argument is certainly apropos today. But it may have been less so from the mid 1990’s to the early 2000’s. And hopefully it will again become less so in 1-2 years’ time. If there is an ebb and flow to the economy, and if it reflects poorly on a system of governance in the bad times, then how does it reflect on the same system of governance in the good times?
I do agree that our system makes it difficult to make long range plans. How do you plan for 10 years from now if you don’t know who’ll be in charge at that time? That’s certainly a problem the CCP hopes she won’t have to face, and we shall see.
If a democratic system supposedly lacks checks and balances in the realm of fiscal conduct, does an authoritarian system so provide? You’ve suggested that a democratic “political system does not” work. For whom do you mean? As Jason pointed out above, if one links prosperity to a system of governance, one could similarly suggest that the CCP system isn’t working so well for a good number of people in China either. In a democratic system, fiscal failure might be a good reason to change the stewards of said system. What is the recourse in China’s system?
May 10th, 2010 at 5:06 pm
S. K. Cheung,
I am not sure what works perfectly, but I am sure that it’s not China or the West that alone has it all figured out. One can learn. China is very new to the modern system, being very much in transition, and I believe its leadership and people are very willing to learn things that work. It’s a newcomer’s advantage. On the other hand, those who stubbornly cling to a dysfunctional system and refuse to learn are in the developed world, having become heavily invested in it rhetorically and having believed, especially since the end of the Cold War, that the Western system with all its trappings has won the argument once and for all. But has it won? Reality speaks otherwise.
As for the good times of the past, more and more we understand the reasons for them, and become disillusioned with the theory of good governance leading to them. This has less to do with whether the times are good or bad at this moment, but rather the current bad times shine a bright light onto what has been going on. Prosperity was always used to sell democracy. Hardly anything else was convincing. We were told that the former Soviet republics, when they found the democracy, achieved miracles. And they did on paper — who could argue? But now we see they were actually bankrupt. These things you will only see in the bad times. It was not a fluke. Becoming a democracy is truly a luxury of the already rich and prosperous societies, because it carries a burdensome frictional cost by incentivizing short-sighted and irresponsible behavior in all domains. At this moment, we don’t even know if this cost is more serious and possibly terminal. It’s not a question about whether democracy is so good it can improve your lot. It’s whether you can handle the costs of democracy so you can enjoy some abstract benefits.
By the way, when I say democracy, let’s interpret it in the specific sense of the large-scale practice of electoral political systems. I am a big believer in local democracies, the key being people actually are more involved, care more, understand more, and have the ability to hold people responsible at that level. But these virtues of democracy apparently do not scale. It’s no way to run anything larger than a village or neighborhood with that system. China has been trying its own things, and in at least three respects depart from the Western system, though these are found in some Western municipalities and especially organizations: (1) stakeholder model rather than shareholder model; (2) consensus governing rather than adversarial competition; (3) caretaker transition rather than direct handover. This seems to work.
May 10th, 2010 at 8:53 pm
“Recourse” in case of failure is not “check and balance”. “Check and Balance” is supposed to prevent failures from occurring in the first place!
After the failure, there is only damage control.
And the West may be good at “damage control”, or may be not! (from looks of things now for US and Europe, not sure what good any amount of damage control is doing.)
Sure, China is not as good as US in “damage control”, but China is learning.
Fortunately, so far China is responsible enough with its own internal “check and balance” to prevent similar failures as US.
Of course, the excuses will be that China is lucky so far.
Of course, comparison of this kind only propagate the myth that somehow some “check and balance” is working in US, instead of some half-assed damage control.
May 11th, 2010 at 12:27 am
r v,
Let’s not speak too early, because the housing bubble still needs to be contained in China. One thing that a party not facing elections could do, is to make the unpopular political decisions subject only to its self-interested belief about the long-term viability of such decisions. It doesn’t try to do something for the sake of lowering the stock of the “other side”, which if you think about it, doesn’t make much sense, since the “other side” is often half of your country.
May 11th, 2010 at 5:05 am
To Nimrod,
you again make some good points. I agree with your first paragraph. I also agree that some of the “good times” in the recent past (especially in the US) were predicated upon questionable central bank policy and inadequate constraints and regulation of accounting gymnastics. However, were those policy and regulatory shortcomings the fault of “democracy” as a system of governance? Was it the electoral process alone that installed people in positions of power which permitted the appointment of individuals who failed to detect the warming signs of impending doom? Would doom have been averted without the electoral process? Furthermore, how would an authoritarian system mitigate the potential for similar shortcomings?
Your condemnation of “democracy” earlier was on the basis of irresponsible public spending. During the years when the mill was churning prior to the fall, it was an era of budgetary surpluses. Regardless of whether you credit “democratic governance” with a system that was outwardly bustling but internally teetering on collapse, I imagine there would be some acknowledgment for evidence of the capacity for fiscal prudence. And while “democratic systems” are mired in the red of late, that seems not substantially different from some authoritarian systems either.
Prosperity was no doubt one attractive feature of “democracy”. But that was hardly the only reason to espouse it. And the benefits are hardly abstract, I dare say, although one probably cannot gain full measure of those benefits until one no longer enjoys them. That’s simply a fundamental chasm we can acknowledge and move on, I believe.
If China were to start small, and further the local democracy model with which she has experimented in certain select places, I think that would be a fantastic step. I’d be interested in seeing how peoples’ appetite may change after they’ve been given a taste. I’d also be interested in seeing how the current system responds to such a potential change in appetite.
May 11th, 2010 at 2:46 pm
Nimrod,
I think the real estate “bubble” in China is real, but overblown as a problem, and is already being contained.
The fundamental problem with the real estate “bubble” in the West was that real estate became too easy to trade as a commodity investment, and became too integrated into the nations’ REGULAR cash flow. Namely, the passing of laws to make it so easy for people to get financing on real estate, and then inclusion of mortgage backed instruments in the regular transactions of banks.
This is a dangerous recent trend in Western markets, ie. the allowance of speculation on almost EVERYTHING. (consider that Enron’s trading on energy ended in spectacular failure, it’s not surprising that mortgage trading would end equally badly.)
Fundamentally, somethings should not be traded so openly and so easily. It become more like gambling than investment.
One would have to ask, would a nation allow trading of financial instruments based upon the value of highways, subways, or nuclear missiles?
But we do have trading on value of companies that manage subways and railways, but the actual subways and railways are owned by the Federal Government usually.
*
China’s case is very different.
(1) Chinese legal concept of real estate ownership (mainland) is very different. The Chinese government actually owns the land. Individual owners are only purchasing the “usury” right to use the land for set number of years. (HK has a similar arrangement, where the lease duration is typically 50-75 years.)
The individual owners really own just the value of the structures of the house/condo, plus the right to use the location for the set term of years.
Thus, if an owner defaults in China, the government can similar withdraw the lease of the location, set new lease term, or do a variety of other things to back the value of the location.
(Contrast in US, most often it is the bank that repo the defaulted properties and stuff them in questionable instruments to be traded by the banks. THIS is a REAL problem with the US bubble, where the problem was allowed to fester for number of years, and pollute other financial markets, before the problem even came onto the market. People started defaulting years before it was discovered that banks were trading these bad loans in derivatives.)
Because China does not have these hidden bad loans in derivatives, it reduces the amount of speculation and makes it much easier for the government to back the value of the land in question.
(2) China does still have a lot of people who are buying with cash, and living in the houses/condos.
Generally, most Chinese people buy the houses/condos as investment for life. They are not planning on moving after a few years.
Thus, even if the properties lost some value, it may not trigger a massive panic sell off.
Furthermore, in China people don’t make refinancing to cash out equity based upon speculated gain in the value of the properties. (Which means, even if the properties lost some value, for most owners, the gain is still there.)
(3) Unoccupied properties, is a waste, but I’m not sure it is a total lost for the banks in China.
The cost to the banks would have been pretty low to start with to build the properties. (We are not talking about plush mansions, we are talking about matchbox type tenement buildings.)
Again, the Chinese banks have backing of the Chinese government, and the cash flow right now is not a problem in China.
Furthermore, I am reminded of the story of the Qin Kingdom during the Warring Nations period. When Qin planned to move its capital to Yanyang, they planned the new city to a massive scale. Some ministers complained that the new city would be too empty, and a waste of resources to building so many empty buildings. But the prime minister Wei Yang replied, “Build the nest large, and wait for Phoenix to come.”
I firmly believe that real estate is a fundamental investment of a government, like transportation and communication infrastructures. There is nothing wrong with some aggressive investment, if the cash flow is available.
The Chinese government should aggressively back the value of all real estate in China and transportation and communication infrastructures. So that the long term stability of people’s housing needs would be secured.
(What is happening in US is a real shame. If you can imagine the upheaval and the disruption in productivity caused by people’s loss of homes, you would not want such things to happen in China.)
May 11th, 2010 at 2:55 pm
5 stages of “Recourse”/damage control in the West:
(1) Denial of problem: Cooking the books to show positive cash flow.
(2) Anger: Media appearance by all parties pointing fingers at each other.
(3) Bargaining: Congressional hearings.
(4) Depression: Public protests accusing various “sell-outs” and “socialists”, Glenn Beck cries on TV. Occasional crazies flying airplanes into IRS buildings.
(5) Acceptance: turning off the TV.
May 11th, 2010 at 4:35 pm
Getting back to the interesting discussion that Nimrod was having with SKC and others, when I look at China’s current policies I pretty much see the policies that Japan pursued in the ’70s and ’80s and that Korea, Taiwan and Singapore pursued in the ’80s and ’90s. The only real difference is that China is so large that the effects are multiplied by 10 or more. Each country enjoyed blindingly fast growth rates up to a point, then each country suffered as it had to fight its own bureaucracies to make the proper adjustments.
It’s a good formula until a certain stage, then it becomes a bad formula. But no one can ever see that stage coming and once it does, the bureaucracy that got all the credit for economic success is unwilling to change the formula, because that’s how bureaucracies operate no matter which country you’re in or government system you use. Businesses adapt when they must but rather than adapting, they always prefer government interference to protect their existing business which only makes the overall problem worse. I’ve noticed that no one has yet mentioned that the PRC has forecast a 154.4 billion US dollar budget deficit this year. In 2009 they ran a 139 billion US dollar deficit and in 2008 it was 16 billion US dollars. These are China’s numbers, not western forecasts. Seems to me that democracies’ failings equally apply to the CCP. And how are they covering this debt? By issuing treasury bonds, of course! The bonds are financed by the Chinese people themselves, exactly how it was done and is being done in Japan.
As with Japan, China has developed an infrastructure industry that employs hundreds of thousands if not millions. That industry is dependent on government largess to maintain itself. When the major infrastructure improvements are finished, do you really believe that this industry will automatically shrink to half or a quarter of its present size with a corresponding loss of accompanying jobs? That would be political suicide, especially in a country that needs to lower unemployment drastically. That’s when the wasteful projects come along. It reminds me of the huge US bureaucracy that built dams throughout the west after WWII. After they had dammed up the rivers that needed it, they started to dam up every river or creek they could find to keep themselves in existence.
Maybe my point of view is different because I’m older than most of you on here and lived through what happened in Japan rather than reading about it in a textbook. But what I experienced there is very, very similar to what I experienced in China and read about on an almost daily basis. I genuinely hope China can get past this particular “sticking point” but based on human nature, I sincerely doubt it.
Korea has managed to adapt reasonably well while under a democratic government, though its democracy is still in a relatively formative stage. However, they also have plenty of wasteful projects and are far too dependent on a handful of corporations for their economic health, as Japan is too dependent on the auto and electronics industries for their economic health. I’ve been impressed with China’s ability not to put all their eggs in one industrial basket.
May 11th, 2010 at 8:19 pm
The major difference between western democracy and the system in China is not that one of them can avoid the FINANCIAL problems, it is that if the problem can be solved under the system.
I will talk more later.
May 11th, 2010 at 11:22 pm
Steve,
China has had a budget deficit for years. It’s been around 3% of GDP.
Japan has had almost annual 8% deficit since 2000. Also Japan’s debt ratio rose to 123% in 2000.
Check out this graph: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Public_debt_percent_gdp_world_map.svg.
You can see the significant difference between China and Japan.
*Furthermore, much of China’s infrastructure building projects are manned by mobile workers from the countryside.
By nature, these workers are not full time, there is no expectation of long term employment. They go back to their farms if there are no work, or they go to new locations for other work.
May 12th, 2010 at 1:52 am
Japan ran very low budget deficits during the bubbling years. Those deficits started to climb after the bubble burst in 1992. I’m comparing Japan’s economic policy in the 1980s to China’s policy of today. Any figures or examples post 1992 are irrelevant to my point.
China’s budget deficits are specifically the numbers I gave, per official Chinese government figures. I’m not saying China is going to have the same results as Japan did, what I’m saying is that China’s economic policies today are very similar to Japan’s economic policies in the 1980s. That’s what I’m referring to as the “bubbling years”, which is the term used in Japan for that era. I was in Japan during that boom and I’ve been in China during this one. When the boom busts (all booms bust eventually), China will need to make decisions to mitigate the effects of the bust or they could end up like Japan. I don’t think they will but the reason Japan didn’t make the correct changes wasn’t due to its being a democracy (it was one party rule for over 50 years) but that the bureaucracy was unable or unwilling to change their course and continued to do what had made the economy hum during those good years, as if they could somehow bring them back.
Currently there is a battle in the CCP bureaucracy between the banking people who want to strengthen the exchange rate and the export people who want to keep it where it is. The export bureaucrats judge their success by the overall dollar/RMB number, not by what is best for the Chinese economy. Each bureau looks out for its own interests. This is the nature of all bureaucracies. All bureaucracies are resistant to change, but historically the bureaucracies of one party governments (even in democracies if one party has controlling power for a long time) will be far more resistant to change than power shifts between two or more parties, simply because the party in power isn’t forced to change to maintain power. That’s the dilemma.
Wukailong, I hope you don’t mind that we’re completely off track per your original topic but we ARE past the 100 comment level. If it’s a problem, please let us know. 🙂
May 12th, 2010 at 4:25 am
Tend to be with Wukailong #140 on the democracy vs individualism vs fiscal responsibility, etc. Most of the southern European countries are not fiscally disciplined — if not in the eurozone, many of them would practically be just a bunch of banana republics, not unlike Argentina, which actually has slightly better education stats than Greece. Being a part of the eurozone just artificially delayed the reckoning… This will get much uglier slowly and I am not sure euro will still be around in another 20 years.
The question is, if most people think it’s a bubble, is it still a bubble? When in 1990 the total real estate value of Tokyo was higher than that of the US as a whole, do you recall seeing that much bubble talk? I thought the prevailing wisdom was that Japan found the formula for the more efficient capitalism. The contrarian in me thinks we’ve all got it wrong w.r.t the Chinese RE market — this has a LONG way to go at the upside, albeit in the short-term this can get painful.
@Steve your last 2 comments.
* Growth cures debts. Japan’s problem was it stopped growing.
* If I have to draw a comparison with Japan, it would be mid-60s. Then Japan hosted the Olympics, built its first Shinkansen line, and more importantly the per capita industrial/agricultural production compared to that of the US matched roughly where China is today. (GDP is a basically useless # but that’s another story.) If you think China would peak now, you would have to think the Chinese’s potentials on average are lower than those of the Americans. Which brings up the next point, what makes a nation perform better another on average?
* It’s all about education. If you look at the recent history of just about any nations, taking out the mineral riches, by far the best indicator how well a nation would perform at the per capita level is its education attainment of its labor force. Japan achieved developed world level of education earlier than Korea/Taiwan, and Korean/Taiwan achieved that earlier than mainland China.
* If you look at China today, its labor force is still lagging the developed world in education attainment; but among the youths, the gap has disappeared. This can only mean there is still a lot of growth ahead for China.
* This brings up my favorite topic, the Yangtze River Delta area where the locals had enjoyed the highest living standard in the world about half of the last 2 millennia. There are about 85 million people living there. As of now, the gross college enrollment rate among the 18 to 22 age group of that area is actually higher than that of the US and Japan. Here is my prediction: RE price in Shanghai in another 2 decades will be higher than Manhattan.
May 12th, 2010 at 1:53 pm
Steve,
Japan’s debt ratio (government liability) was already at around 60% in 1985. Even if Japan had a budget surplus before 1992, it was already heavily burdened with debt, and not paying them off. Once Japan’s budget went into deficit after 1992, the debt ratio just exploded upward.
I can’t imaging a country with a debt ratio of 60%.
but US is hovering around 50% to 60%. All of Europe is hovering around 40% to 60%. Italy particularly is around 80% to 100%.
This is very bad obviously.
Of course, China should watch its deficit situation very carefully, especially to prevent itself from going toward a heavy debt ratio, as already occurred in US, Japan and Europe.
But I would say that China is in slightly better financial position than Japan was in 1992. (namely, China doesn’t have a high 60% debt ratio. China’s debt ratio is only about 10% to 20%.)
May 13th, 2010 at 3:53 am
S. K. Cheung wrote:
Was it the electoral process alone that installed people in positions of power which permitted the appointment of individuals who failed to detect the warming signs of impending doom? Would doom have been averted without the electoral process? Furthermore, how would an authoritarian system mitigate the potential for similar shortcomings?
+++++
In partial agreement with Steve, human nature dictates life cycles for societies, of which shorter-term business cycles are just a part. Just like people and organizations, a society may start out “backward”, they work, produce surplus, save and invest. They discover new technology and opportunities, become more productive, and they get rich. Living standard skyrockets, and they start to get complacent, consuming more and investing less. Life may get so good, they can seemingly sit on their butts and reap benefits. Eventually the real growth saturates for any number of reasons whether it be resources, technological limit, or demographics, and things are not looking so good. To keep up the lifestyle, consumption continues apace. They start to spend down their wealth rapidly. Here, some become prudent and cut back or become more productive. Others don’t see it, and take delight in speculation and gambling for quick gains, eventually ending with nothing. Either way, things start over again. Hence the Chinese aphorism 富不过三代 (the rich don’t last three generations.)
I’ll leave to others to speculate on where China, Japan, US/EU are in this cycle and which adjustment paths they are taking. So how does electoral politics enter into this? Well, all over the world, the government has a cemented role in the economy, not only as a spender and taxing authority, but as an implementer of Keynesian stabilization. There is a lot of room for abuse and misuse here. For example, government spending, even in down times, really should be directed toward prudent investments, and not toward propping up failed sectors or made-up projects that serve no economic purpose. Most governments are not capable of doing any of this, which is why this experiment usually fails. But we can ask the question, does electoral politics make it easier or harder?
If you were competing for the next election, would you want to take away the punch bowl, or rein in the largess, or would you fail to prop up the failed enterprises? Perhaps you wouldn’t want to do this, if you did not want to end your political career. Once elected, might you just institute some permanent largess or tax cutting that the other party finds politically suicidal to undo? And why would they undo it? The competitive pressure is there, the incentive is there for you to appease the most people as quickly as possible, so you appeal to the basest instincts of people, which are greed and laziness. This never works out well in the long run.
Now, fair to say that within the CCP, there is also competitive pressure, but this is an exercise in interest sharing. The CCP is ultimately interested in its own perennial survival by ensuring stability and national well-being. Matters of national fortune are debated and set in the five-year plans and ten-year plans, not in 30 minute scripted TV “debates” of no substance, and these are actually carried out. The CCP wants to be united at the top while debating internally, which produces a cooperative equilibrium rather than worse adversarial results. And this is much easier to do when there is no “other party” or “other party’s base” to defect to. The several times when the CCP wasn’t united at the top were, surprise, surprise, during the Cultural Revolution and during 1989, when the masses actively got involved. And both times, the masses were wrong (economically)!
So is it more likely for China to be capable of tempering vested interests in the face of unemployment and popular discontent, etc.? I think yes, look at the track record. Want to cut the army’s budget in the 1980’s? Done. Want to lay off millions of workers from SOE’s in the early 1990s and do privatization reform? Done. Want to build dams and roads and move millions of people to new towns? Done. Want to impose a 50% down payment and property taxes to stop real estate craziness? Done. Would any of this happen in electoral politics? People in democracies are “shocked” about these “brutal” things, not necessarily because they produce bad results — they do sometimes, but the people in democracies are hardly evaluating at that level — they are “shocked” because they would never “vote” for any of these things because they are not politically popular, even if it improves the wellbeing of the country and their own wellbeing. So what does that say about the decision-making prowess of the “electorate” and the efficacy of electoral politics?
China is about the only country that has pulled off half a dozen seriously difficult and transformative transitions where all others have failed. I think any vested interest that becomes counter to the goal of maintaining perennial CCP power and long term stability loses political influence, so far as the CCP is concerned. This alignment of political interest and economic interest, and the alignment of the party interest with national interest, while repugnant to many people and rough around the edges, does have its incentives set in the right places.
May 13th, 2010 at 6:08 am
Nimrod, a very good comment, thanks. I still have to digest it.
I just wonder now about your aphorism you quoted:
Hence the Chinese aphorism 富不过三代 (the rich don’t last three generations.).
I would say, this applies rather to a inflexible structure (united at the top) like the CCP has than to electoral politics. With the exchange of a complete “political gang” you send important impulses to the economy which might stop the down turn and “discover new technology and opportunities” etc.. To my opinion at least in the past it was like that.
Also, you quoted:”half a dozen seriously difficult and transformative transitions where all others have failed.”
What transitions did you mean with that? Especially, why have others failed?
May 13th, 2010 at 7:33 am
There is a “western” phrase that also comes to mind: absolute power corrupts absolutely. In the CCP, there is internal competition, and internal interest-sharing. This would actually be a commonality between electoral systems and authoritarian ones, so long as those “internal” interests are in line with “external” ones. After all, if everyone agreed on the preferred method to skin a cat, then everyone’s happy (with the possible exception of the cat). The contrast is only brought to light when there is a divergence of opinions. But what happens when faced with such a scenario? “The CCP is ultimately interested in its own perennial survival by ensuring stability and national well-being…and any vested interest that becomes counter to the goal of maintaining perennial CCP power and long term stability loses political influence, so far as the CCP is concerned.” So the CCP model in fact does not preclude vested interests; it merely selects those that please her, while unilaterally rejecting those that don’t. To espouse the CCP would be to hold fast to the notion that the CCP did, does, and will continue to do only those things that are good for Chinese people…whereas the proverb above would suggest that, if given the chance, and if the CCP is given to things that affect people in general, the CCP will do things that are good for the CCP…and if they also happen to be good for the people, then so be it.
Of course, one could argue that the CCP derives her mandate from the people, even if such mandate arrives from an unconventional and non-electoral source. But we’ve also seen that the CCP, when flirting with losing the pleasure of the people, has immense powers of persuasion in bringing people back in line.
Nimrod is correct that the CCP system allows her to push through reforms. And the ones he describes have largely been good for China, though those displaced by the various decrees may or may not have a slightly different perspective. But if we are to evaluate systems, does her power to push through reforms fundamentally establish those reforms to be “right”, or to end well? Obviously that’s in the eye of the beholder. However, if the answer is no, then the success to date speaks unto itself, but not onto the underlying system.
Nimrod is also correct in his description of some of the limitations of an electoral system, although some aspects might be more acute in a 2 party arrangement, and less so in democratic states with multi-party systems (which, as far as I know, is the more common iteration). But it’s an over-generalization to suggest that unpopular decisions are not made. Democracies always have an electoral process, but only sometimes issue referendums. For most decisions, popular or not, the elected representatives make them…and every so often their body of work is evaluated. In between these report card opportunities, these representatives are probably as susceptible to vested interests as the CCP. They’re all humans after all. The difference might be the absolute abandon with which they can pursue, and reward, such vested interests, since one group is set for life, while the other has to face the judges at least from time to time. And I would suggest that the interest in installing oneself into a position of being set for life, then staying there, is probably the most vested interest around.
May 13th, 2010 at 2:12 pm
“Divergence of opinion”?
At least there wouldn’t be a filibuster, or 8 months to 1 year campaigns.
When is there ever a shortage of “divergence of opinion” in the world?
Does that mean that there should be endless pointless debates while nothing is done (or some half-assed compromise is whipped up)?
No thanks, for China.
May 14th, 2010 at 12:25 am
@SKC
How is that CPC model? That is the same model that Bush and Obama administration are doing. This is called partisan politics.
May 14th, 2010 at 2:00 am
The multi-party system doesn’t give “recourse”, because in reality, policies do not drastically change in any fashion.
Doctrinally, “opposition parties” are cut from the same type of political ideologies from the same political system as the “ruling parties”. thus, no significant change in policies would ever result, even if “parties” change.
*The only true recourse for the dissatisfied populous is to change the political system. This is true for 1 party system or a multi-party system.
We call that Revolution. It is the drastic change in the realization that the fundamental political ideologies require changes.
*Thus, “elections” in a multi-party system are not real “changes”. They are ceremonial facades of change that just happens every now and then.
In reality, “elections” are no more useful than the ceremonial “change of guards” at UK’s Buckingham palace.
I mean, seriously, the politicians in the West even copy each other’s talking points and ridiculous taglines.
“The Maverick”, “the Decider,” “the Hope”, “the Hero”, etc.
*
All the political theatrics should bring a historical analogy.
that is, in Europe, most traditional Monarchies are reduced to roles of performing ancient ceremonies for the sake of the tourists.
If Democracies continue their politics as theatrics with little or no change, in time, the political parties of these countries will find themselves ceremonial and irrelevant.
In time, the corporations will likely take over with ever growing power and influence over the People. And the corporate boards will tell the Representatives what laws to pass.
May 14th, 2010 at 2:10 am
There’s been some really good discussions here lately. I’ll get back with a longer comment soon when work gets a little less busy.
@r v (#164): When you’re writing long comments, will you please put together sentences into paragraphs. It makes it much easier to read. As it is now, you might as well write everything in capital letters because it gives a similar effect.
As for filibusters, I’ve only heard about it in the US. A quick search reveals that it exists in some other countries as well – mostly an Anglo-Saxon thing, apparently. Most other systems I know of put limits on the amount of time someone can speak.
May 14th, 2010 at 3:09 am
“The several times when the CCP wasn’t united at the top were, surprise, surprise, during the Cultural Revolution and during 1989, when the masses actively got involved. And both times, the masses were wrong (economically)!”
Is the wish for a more fair and just society in term of wealth distribution go against the economy reality of creating wealth?
May 14th, 2010 at 5:27 am
Rhan,
That’s a good question, but also a separate question. A balance must be struck between social welfare on the one hand and the productive allocation of resources and avoiding moral hazard on the other. The two kind of do go against each other, unfortunately.
I won’t bore you with the usual spiel about how China tried Communism and found it didn’t work. Truth be known it’s too simplistic to see it that way. Plenty of people still long for the old days, but they’re also being overly nostalgic. We don’t live in times of absolute plenty and self-suffiency. After a time, China had to face the reality that scarce resources had to be fought over through competition and it had to engage external resources which others held, e.g. capital and technology. Equal distribution of wealth held back those who could better use it and wasted it on people who could not; worse, it made investment and self improvement pointless. But social welfare is also important. You just have to let things run toward the extremes for a while, then rebalance. The key is allowing the rebalance to take place without a revolution, but also without derailing progress.
May 14th, 2010 at 6:40 am
I would think it self-evident that situations where people completely agree are rare, whereas differences of opinion are commonplace. If the goal is to evaluate a system, then in this context, the question is how do different systems handle such inevitable differences of opinion. For any given question, in a referendum, the decision goes to the majority; in an electoral democracy, it goes to the majority choice of the elected representatives. In the CCP system, it’s been suggested that they arrive at an internal consensus. Does that mean that one system is structurally inherently better equipped to make the “proper” choice amongst the selection of opinions/options? I wouldn’t think so. Does that mean one system is simply better at resisting any and all “vested interests”? Doubt that too. In the end, I’m not sure there’s an objective metric available to definitively establish the superiority of one system over another. I’ll leave you to decide what remains in the absence of such objective measures. Suffice it to say that one system seems to tolerate the remainder better than the other. Whether that characteristic alone makes it better or worse is, not surprisingly, also in the eye of the beholder.
In a democracy, parties are formed to advocate for a set of shared beliefs/priorities. That different parties in a single society/system might represent fundamentally similar ideologies (say, for instance, “democracy”) simply means that there is probably little appetite for a diametrically different alternative. One can’t demand the presence of political parties advocating for things that apparently no one wants.
Indeed, a dissatisfied populous may well reach the point of needing to drastically overhaul the system. Hopefully, they resort to such drastic measures only after all options are exhausted. One can decide for themselves whether a multi-party system or a one-party system would offer more of such options.
It is also noteworthy to hear of reference to monarchies. In days gone by, kings (or queens) would surround themselves with their court of wise advisers, who were chosen for their apparent wisdom or loyalty. Between and amongst themselves, they would make decisions for all their subjects. And the throne would be passed down within the family, though at times not without some bickering and machinations amongst those potentially in line. In some places, this went on for quite some time. And as has been rightly pointed out, we all know where most monarchies have gone these days. I wonder if there might be a parallel in there or not.
May 14th, 2010 at 2:06 pm
“One can’t demand the presence of political parties advocating for things that apparently no one wants.”
Maybe no one in the political establishment wants, but to say that “no one wants” is about as extreme as West has accused CCP of.
SOME in US have tried to blow up government building! You think they don’t want some thing closer to anarchy?
The fact is, most of the populous don’t know what they want. Thus, the entrenched political parties in a multi-party system is not much of change in “elections.”
There is no option for any kind of real change in any established political system, except for revolution.
(hence, the fore mentioned blowing up buildings incidents in US by US citizens).
May 14th, 2010 at 2:31 pm
Rhan,
I think the question of “creation of wealth” is long overdue. The fundamental question is, how is “wealth” created? Obviously, there must be some activity that is done to create wealth. Yet not activities are productive, ie. creating waste, or creating something that is too costly and not enough people want it.
One can only use historical examples to illustrate what is “wealth creation.”
(1) Activities that increases efficiency of production over time, to make cheaper and better products that more people want, faster, consuming less resources.
This is generally a large segment of wealth creation in human organized production activities. Technologies, improved methods and more efficient organizations improve the way we produce food, etc. Better resource allocation to maximize productions with less waste of resources.
(2) activities that invest in improvements in (1).
market activities that invest in new technologies, methods, serves as another kind of resource allocation, in order to achieve the improvement even faster.
(3) Questionable investment activities that are speculative.
These are relatively new trends of market trading, that I do not believe create any wealth at all. But on paper, they appear to create some wealth “bubbles”.
For example, the Dutch used to trade publicly the prices of tulip bulbs, until eventually the tulip bulbs became more expensive than gold by weight, and the market for tulip bulbs collapsed, wiping out a huge sum of “wealth”. Is the trading of tulip bulb prices “creating wealth”? I don’t think so.
What about “flipping houses” in US? Equally suspect. These types of speculative investments create “wealth” only on paper, until the market collapses.
As I said before, some things should not be openly traded in the short term. mixing of these tradings with other real investments can pollute the system and corrode it from the inside. Imagine if you will, that US’s solar energy technology market is tied in or backed by overinflated condo prices in Miami FL. The minute the condo market collapses, solar energy companies go out of business, halting real “creation of wealth.”
*The question of fair distribution of wealth has to do with the allocation of resources in creating wealth.
If a large farming corporation has better technologies and more land, would one favor the large farming corporation for water resources than the small family owned acre farms? That’s the basic question. If one favored the corporation, naturally, it would seem unfair to the family farm (and likely put it out of business). Similar equations run in virtually every sector of economy in modern times.
The balance is, I think, that resources should be allocated to the more efficient producers in a society (often it is the corporations), however, larger corporations should be taxed higher, and government should continuously provide aid to improve the efficiency of all producers across the board.
The point is, if 1 large corporation learn a new technology that’s more efficient for production, more resources should be allocated to that corporation, but after a while, the government should endeavor to propagate the technology across all the businesses in the same market (by compulsive patent licensing and government grants to adapt the new technologies).
Businesses that do not adopt new methods and new technologies should be allowed to go out of business.
May 14th, 2010 at 7:43 pm
A vivid example of where democracy falters is with these “austerity measures.” Why is Greece’s prime minister facing such a hard time doing what obviously needs to be done for his country? Why was Greece running such a large budget deficit to begin with? It was put in during good times. Well, in good times and bad, people don’t face the music in a democracy because the responsibility is decentralized. Tragedy of the commons, etc. Are the people rational? Sure, they are rational in the system set up to let them reward themselves just by voting for it.
S. K. Cheung wrote:
“It is also noteworthy to hear of reference to monarchies. In days gone by, kings (or queens) would surround themselves with their court of wise advisers, who were chosen for their apparent wisdom or loyalty. Between and amongst themselves, they would make decisions for all their subjects. And the throne would be passed down within the family, though at times not without some bickering and machinations amongst those potentially in line. In some places, this went on for quite some time. And as has been rightly pointed out, we all know where most monarchies have gone these days. I wonder if there might be a parallel in there or not.”
+++++
Monarchies do not regularly induct new members from its people and recruit advisors from the drivers of economic growth. As long as China’s political system doesn’t evolve into a closed aristocracy — and there is always that tendency that needs to be stopped — it will not be like a monarchy.
While the ruling body needs to be inclusive, the ruling itself does not need to be. Electoral politics regretably mixes the two. What do I mean? Let’s take your point about transition. Transition is one of these things that democracy is supposed to help with. But I don’t see it as fundamental. The fundamental aspect that hides behind transition is disagreement. In elections, resolution of transition and resolution of disagreement are joined at the hip by sweeping a new set of people with different ideas into power. This is not a necessity as the two can and should be decoupled. For example, rules of succession are sufficient to ensure an orderly transition. So the more fundamental point of devolving political decisions to a larger pool of people is to prevent the danger of a disorderly resolution of disagreements at the top. However, there is an opposite danger, which is contaminating the entire country with the disorder that started at the top. Therefore, every incentive should be provided to resolve disagreements internally and have a united top. Only when there is an intractable disagreement, should a binding decision be devolved to a larger but still contained group of people, as a last resort. This is both to focus the responsibility for decisions, as well as to promote compromise at the highest levels. Without transition being involved in this process, personal ambitions are removed from a proper decision.
That’s very much how China works these days.
Seen in this light, democracy is the most terrible system of government. In good times, it provides a context for irresponsible decisions. In bad times, it risks engulfing the entire populace in discord. It’s a “throw your hands up” approach to running the country. I don’t understand how anybody could believe it should work. And let us understand that in most countries, the current level of direct and devolved democracy at the national level is a rather recent phenomenon, no more than 50 years or so, maybe less. When developed countries have survived the turmoil that a country such as China has had to muddle through in the last 100 years with various variations of governing — oftentimes unsuccessfully, let’s then talk about how well such a system holds up.
May 14th, 2010 at 11:49 pm
Democracy is much like the free market system, assuming that the “market” is often rational, and the result would thus be rational and to the best interest.
However, as recent events evidenced, the “market” was not rational, and neither were the governments that let the “market” run amok, and neither were the voters who voted for these governments.
Why? Because they ALL assumed that they were ALL rational, and relied upon each other’s imaginary “rationality.”
3 blind men leading each other toward the abyss, none of whom want to admit that any of them are blind.
* but a far more fundamental question: In the era of so many new technologies, new market strategies and methods, how can any one claim that they can be “rational” with so many unknowns?
When mortgage backed derivatives first began to trade in the market, how can anyone claim that the market will be “rational” with the derivatives?
Do you put a gun in the hand of a child, and assume he will be “rational”? That is madness.
May 15th, 2010 at 2:28 am
To Nimrod:
Obviously, the CCP is NOT a monarchy. The succession of monarchs is based on blood-lines, and while I might accuse the CCP of a lot of things, even I wouldn’t accuse them of that. However, that her succession stays “within the family” is also beyond debate. And yes, new people are “brought” into the family, rather than being “born” into it. But either way, these people have to have bought into the family way if they want a chance at the prize. Put another way, would the CCP promote someone who advocates the dissolution of the CCP’s current grip on power? So while the CCP may potentially be open to all kinds of people, I’m not so sure she has a track record to being open to all manner of ideas, especially those that strike at her raison d’etre. Is an open aristocracy that disavows challenges to her core vested interests better than a closed aristocracy? Again, to each their own.
I didn’t intend to specifically refer to transition, but I can see how you inferred that based on what I wrote. And you’ve raised good points for discussion. Whether it’s transition, or succession, the system of governance does not impact on its success. All that is required is the rule of law (give or take a constitution). That’s why China can have bloodless succession, and effective democracies can have bloodless transition. In elections, resolution of disagreement is manifested BY the transition (which was preceded by a vote where more people disagreed with the incumbent than agreed with him/her). They aren’t, and never were, coupled. Put another way, people vote on the “disagreement”; they don’t vote on the “transition”, because that just goes according to the rules. Democracy is NOT about involving more people so that the higher-ups can better get along; if anything, it’s about allowing more people to voice their opinion, even disparate ones, but providing the higher-ups with the mandate to ultimately make the decisions. You seem to be drawing the majority of your impetus from the US situation. I think it’s important to remember that the US is not Democracy, but merely one iteration thereof. And while you seem to suggest that the polarization of the halls of power affect the people, I tend to think that said polarization merely reflects the increasingly polarized nature of American society. And in a democracy, I think it more likely that a polarized electorate select polarizing representatives than the other way around.
As for the CCP, I’m sure there is plenty of incentive to resolve disputes internally. And I imagine such resolutions are to the satisfaction of those involved in the discussion. But what of the satisfaction of those not privy to the discussion? In fact, structurally speaking, what mechanism is there to assess whether peace/love/harmony at the top is mirrored by those somewhat lower in the pecking order? What prevents the situation of lock-step at the top being completely out-of-step with the bottom? If that were to occur, in the CCP system, who would win? More importantly, to a dispassionate observer, who should win? Admittedly, if the CCP has her way, there will never be a transition. But it seems naive to suggest that ambitions and vested interests, both personally and collectively, don’t come into play.
I’m not sure how far you’ll get flippantly asserting that one system of governance is the most terrible, and another is the best. At the very least, a statement like that need not be confused with an argument. Suffice it to say that people in a democracy get the government they ask for. I wonder if, and when, Chinese people can say the same thing.
May 15th, 2010 at 3:52 am
Now for some lighter fare…
Yes, some crazies in the US have blown up buildings. Is that supposed to serve as an indictment of “democracy”? Can I similarly suggest that crazy people hacking up kindergarteners is proof that the CCP doesn’t work? You know what, if you rounded up a group of folks intent on blowing stuff up, and they wanted to advance that concept to the populace at large, it’s not democracy that would stop them; it’s the law making the blowing up of stuff illegal that will stop them. But if someone just wanted to sell “anarchy” as a political goal, there is nothing to stop them in a democracy. But chances are they won’t get very much support. Political parties exist to reflect what people want. One can’t bemoan the absence of political parties which champion for things that most people don’t want.
If the populous doesn’t know what they want, then the populous has some work to do. That’s not the fault of the system. The system works if it allows people to seek what they want; it’s up to the people to determine what it is they want to seek. If you want a system that tells people what they should want, that’s when you turn to the CCP.
Here’s a point of logic:
Democracy is like the free market, if the free market is rational.
The free market is not rational.
THerefore, democracy is not like the free market.
So we’re going to need a different (and hopefully less wacky) analogy.
As for the “child” point, that might be why voters need to be adults. Granted, being an adult in age in no way guarantees one to be capable of voting (or making arguments) like one. We’ve certainly seen lots of that.
May 15th, 2010 at 4:18 am
I tend to think about things this way: if you have a general problem (say, economic depression) and can link all or an overwhelming majority of it to a cause (say, democracy), then you have a strong case. I don’t see how fiscal irresponsibility as such can be linked to democracy as a system, because then we should be seeing failed economies all over Europe and the rest of the Western world (and with failed I do not mean economies that are affected by the crisis, but weren’t a cause of it), and strong economies in China and other authoritarian systems. Do I need to provide stats to show that there is no such simple correlation?
In a sense I can understand the psychological satisfaction from seeing the failure of Greece, or the US – after all, for a long time, many analysts in the West kept saying that China would go bust in only a decade because of its lack of a democratic system. I never believed this, though – China is going through the same process as the developed countries did in their youth. There is nothing unique or unusual with the Chinese example, save the fact that China because of its sheer size will have much more political and economic clout than a smaller country would have at the same level of GDP per capita. That in itself makes for an interesting development in the years to come, but I digress.
@Nimrod: “Want to cut the army’s budget in the 1980’s? Done. Want to lay off millions of workers from SOE’s in the early 1990s and do privatization reform? Done. Want to build dams and roads and move millions of people to new towns? Done. Want to impose a 50% down payment and property taxes to stop real estate craziness? Done. Would any of this happen in electoral politics?”
I’m still waiting to see the real estate craziness stopped in China, but as for the other points I agree it’s a pretty impressive track record. It sort of reminds me, though, of what Sweden did in the 1990’s when faced with a severe banking crisis. The government and the opposition worked together on a solution in which the state took control over the “bad” banks, for a cost of 4% of the GDP. Only a couple of years later, there was an election and the former opposition formed a new government. Did it just reverse the reforms and begin wild spending to appease the electorate? No, it continued with austerity measures to streamline the welfare state.
Ultimately I think it boils down to the level of trust a people has in its government and the understanding on what needs to be done at a national level. Sweden will have an election this fall, and I watched part of the debate between the leaders of the opposition and the government. What struck me was the lack of wild promises (as would be mandatory in the electoral process, right?) and the way both sides wanted to show a balanced budget. The leader of the opposition even said that they can’t make too much promises in light of the current situation. This seems very different to Greece where there’s a lot of corruption, little trust in the government and apparently a vocal part of the populace that has no understanding for the crisis the country is in. I’m not sure the population of Greece was “rational” – at least that’s not what a lot of Europeans think.
“After a time, China had to face the reality that scarce resources had to be fought over through competition and it had to engage external resources which others held, e.g. capital and technology. Equal distribution of wealth held back those who could better use it and wasted it on people who could not; worse, it made investment and self improvement pointless.”
I’m not sure China faced the reality so much as the fact that the country lay in shambles after the Cultural revolution, and that they were lucky to get Deng Xiaoping instead of Hua Guofeng. The latter intended to return to a planned system similar to the Soviet Union in the 1950’s. I know Deng wasn’t the only one to believe in these ideas, but I do believe China would have been very different (and probably not as successful) without him.
“Seen in this light, democracy is the most terrible system of government. In good times, it provides a context for irresponsible decisions. In bad times, it risks engulfing the entire populace in discord. It’s a “throw your hands up” approach to running the country. I don’t understand how anybody could believe it should work.”
Well, some people have been known to doubt that bumble bees can fly. 😉 How is this description different from an authoritarian system? Obviously CCP and the populace have been thrown in discord worse than any democratic country when there’s been disunity at the top. And as for the most terrible system… Do people even remember what happened in the 20th century?
I don’t want to give the impression, though, that only democracy works and authoritarian systems are inherently bad. I attribute results more to education, public trust and understanding of the big picture (which seems to be very different from country to country) as well as getting the right leader. This isn’t so much about transition as how to be able to make the meritorious to the top, rather than those hungry for power. In short, I attribute it to the “national situation,” as it’s called in China.
Monarchy… That will have to wait to a future post. 🙂 Certainly there is a budding aristocracy in the CCP – Xi Jinping and Bo Xilai are both famous examples, but there are many more, and it’s based on kinship.
May 15th, 2010 at 5:30 am
@r v #158
Japan in 1985 was in a much better fiscal shape than your numbers indicate, because it was the gross national debt. In the case of Japan, if you look at the asset side of the ledger, the government owns Japan Post, which owns a big chunk of the Japanese treasury debt; and don’t forget the foreign reserves Japan owns. The net national debt of Japan in 1985 was far lower than 60% of its GDP.
Go by gross national debt today, the US is closing in 90% of its GDP fast and is projected to breach 100% at the end of Obama’s first term (not including the “asset” in Social Security Trust Fund). Major European countries are all far above the 60% magic mark now.
Go by net national debt, the Chinese government actually owns quite a bit more than what it owes — not even counting the majority ownership of most of its SOEs.
If you wonder what’s the other side of the rainbow and how low a nation can drop, look no further than Japan. Today Japan’s gross national debt is closing in 250% of its GDP. It’s so screwy that in 2009 its government tax revenue (around 40 trillion yen) was quite a bit smaller than the new debt it issued (near 50 trillion yen) — you may want to reread that and let it sink it. A major economy, not at war mind you, spent more than twice of what it took in last year.
Moreover, GDP isn’t a good benchmark to measure a nation’s debt payment capability. To slip under the 3% fiscal deficit/GDP eurozone rule, which at least once was a pretentious goal, countries such as Greece, Spain & Italy all inflated their GDPs. To gauge debt payment capability of a nation, for domestic debt, a far better benchmark is a government’s tax revenue base; for foreign debt, it’s the volume of a nation’s exportable goods and services.
May 15th, 2010 at 7:01 pm
A system of multi-accountability that gives no accountability of any voters doesn’t promote any “work” by the populous to know what they “want”.
That is the fault of the design of the system.
Obviously, the populous would logically become lazy. That is predictable.
If the system didn’t recognize that predictability, the system is again IRRATIONAL.
Enough said about “Democracy”.
*As for the “child” point, adults who pretend that they are “rational” in situations they have never experienced, ARE like “children”!
A 1st time home buyer is hardly “rational” actor in the housing market. He is easily influenced by what he believes is the market behavior. (Which is usually based upon some elementary misconception.)
Wall Street is irrational when trading mortgage backed derivatives, because the collective of traders have no experience with the new financial instrument, know none of the potential problems and risks.
*Along the same line, Voters cannot know rationally what they want, since their experiences are limited to a set of their own political assumptions.
How can they know what “else” might or might not work?
Thus, they are also irrational when confronted with new problems that the existing policies cannot deal with.
May 15th, 2010 at 7:14 pm
jxie,
I have no doubt that some additional factors may make the numbers look a little better or worse for Japan.
My point was, China today is in slightly better shape than Japan in 1992.
I also cannot believe how bad financial shape Japan is today.
It makes me wonder how Japan can conceivably recover.
May 15th, 2010 at 9:17 pm
Open call for assistance: would someone be so kind as to translate the first sentence of #177 into English? I recognize the individual words, but they seem to be put together kinda funny. Many thanks in advance! Once that is accomplished, if I may be so forward, may I then seek the assistance of someone to explain how one can start with the first sentence and culminate in the fourth sentence. I’m not sure if they’re supposed to so culminate or not, since it’s difficult to discern any train of thought when each sentence is a paragraph unto itself. But I figure there’s no harm in asking.
If one is to speak of laziness, I can think of 2 reasons: (1) human nature; (2) previous experience indicating that the work they do doesn’t affect the outcome. In order to overcome (1), I would submit that it’s better to have a system where people can affect the outcome, to give ample incentive for people to put in the effort. In the CCP system, people can’t affect the outcome, so one might ask why they would even bother…and perhaps that’s exactly what the CCP is banking on.
And now, for plumbing the ever-increasing dearth of logic, we have ‘people can’t be rational in things they’ve not experienced’. If that were the case, then I imagine the guy who has never swam before will do so for the first time by jumping into the deep end. If nothing else, that would be an example of Darwinian natural selection. Now, I can understand that lawyers, perhaps by training, are constrained by the concept of precedence, such that it seems to be a big deal to do something that’s never been done before. But for most of the rest of the world, I think the power of human imagination and innovation should not be underestimated. If people can’t rationally know what they want without previously having tried it, there wouldn’t be a “first time” for anything. Once again, perhaps that’s a mode of thinking that the CCP is also trying to sell…and evidently some people are buying.
May 15th, 2010 at 9:40 pm
I don’t know what “plumbing” has to do with any topic at hand.
“first time for anything” is not a rational act. Obviously, some people assume rationality in other people/bank’s “first time”.
No one is suggesting that people shouldn’t try new things. But obviously, we have people/banks who JUMP into new things like Lemmings, ie. mortgage backed derivatives.
Evidently, some are trying to sell these “first time” as rational nature of Democracy and the Free Market.
Obviously, they are wrong.
May 15th, 2010 at 9:51 pm
Sigh. Forest. Trees. Keep trying, folks, it’ll be worth it someday. At the very least, one has to believe that in order to sustain oneself.
Just so we’re clear, are we talking “voters”, or “banks”? Cuz people seem to be using them somewhat interchangeably. And just so we’re also clear, banks does not equal voters, or democracy.
I’m getting hungry. But I’ll have to wait for Nimrod to get more food for thought, it seems.
May 15th, 2010 at 10:16 pm
“voters” for Democracy, “banks” for the Market.
Apparently, reminders are needed for some people on what has been discussed already.
“Rational” equates to not trying things for the “first time”? What sort of forest conjured up that kind of logic?
May 15th, 2010 at 11:14 pm
Instructions for use: take the first paragraph of #181, and liberally apply onto the first sentence of #180. Repeat as required until clarity is achieved (disclaimer: effectiveness may vary depending on the user).
Now, what have we here…
“some people assume rationality in other people/ (MARKET)’s “first time”.”
“we have people/ (MARKETS) who JUMP into new things like Lemmings, ie. mortgage backed derivatives.”
“some are trying to sell these “first time” as rational nature of (VOTERS) and the Free (BANKS).”
Ummm, I’d like to take this opportunity to repeat my Open Call for Assistance, first issued in #179. Once again, my thanks in advance. Admittedly, the second sentence suffices as a comprehensible sentence. However, since the topic of discussion with Nimrod and others has been of political systems, perhaps clarification of how those “sentences” relate to the topic would be useful.
May 16th, 2010 at 12:10 am
#183 does not qualify as English.
perhaps you are alone in your quest for learning English, hence nobody “assist” you for #179.
Good luck on your “Open Call for Assistance”! This isn’t English class.
May 16th, 2010 at 5:38 am
…says the guy who couldn’t spell “surely”. Yes, that guy would be the perfect metric for “English”.
Hey, maybe that guy can translate #179 into something that resembles “English”. Whatever that was, English it wasn’t. After that, maybe that guy can enlighten us on how those statement in #182 relate to the discussion of political systems. And don’t get me started on paragraphs…
May 16th, 2010 at 4:20 pm
you are the crying for help.
Obviously, knowing “surely” didn’t help you much.
May 16th, 2010 at 5:46 pm
LOL. “knowing ‘surely’ didn’t I much” what, exactly? “I am the crying for help”? Here’s another question among the many over which I’ve left you to ponder – speak English much?
Admittedly, one does need help with deciphering the version of “English” that some choose to speak, or with making sense of the “logic” that some choose to employ.
May 16th, 2010 at 5:59 pm
LOL. You are still crying for help on your English? No help coming your way?
What happened to your “open call”? *Yawn.
May 16th, 2010 at 6:09 pm
Poor SKC, always coming back to the same old whining comments about English and logic. Tsk, tsk. And still no one cares. Perhaps another round of “open call” will actually have a point beyond the usual tangential whining. 😛
May 16th, 2010 at 6:17 pm
Sadly, no answer to the Open Call as yet. It would appear that I’m not the only one who can’t comprehend your version of “English”, or your unique grasp of “logic”. More to the point, it seems no one else can either. So congratulations, it seems you are fairly “unique”.
But here’s another thing: why haven’t you been able to clarify your own points? ‘Surely’ you knew what you were trying to say, no? Even if you couldn’t get it out coherently the first time.
May 16th, 2010 at 6:45 pm
You are the only one with the “open call”, twice. I called no one for validation. You need the help, not I.
Clarifying my points for you?! You know “surely” well enough, don’t you? You obviously want to talk about your study of English. That’s irrelevant to the subject of this thread. Why should I waste my time, (you will just habitually turn my clarifications into your irrelevant discussion of English)! No thanks.
Your inability to comprehend English is not my problem. This is not English class.
May 16th, 2010 at 6:55 pm
Your inability to ‘get it’ is inspirational. It is obvious that I’m the one who needs help in deciphering your incomprehensible “English” and mind-numbing “logic”, which is why I asked for help. Is that too hard for you to understand too?
Yes, I am indeed quite familiar with ‘surely’. I am glad that you have also made its acquaintance. I have no interest in talking about my study of English, which wasn’t my area of study anyway. But your “English” was getting in the way of my comprehending your logic…and your “logic” seems to get into its own way sometimes too.
I have no difficulty comprehending English. But some of what you write doesn’t qualify as such. If you don’t feel the need to clarify your own points when someone else asks for clarification, that’s your call.
May 16th, 2010 at 7:01 pm
You are the one who doesn’t “get it”. If your repeated begging for “help” is your commentary on my English, that’s your logical fallacy. You are the one begging for “help” repeatedly. I didn’t ask for “help”, nor did I offer any.
Your need for “help” is just that, your own need. Clearly, your needs are great according to your own admission. Sadly, this is not the first time you end up whining about your personal needs here. But that is irrelevant to this thread.
🙂
May 16th, 2010 at 7:24 pm
“I didn’t ask for “help””
—did I say you did? Maybe you should, but that’s a different matter.
“Your need for “help” is just that, your own need. Clearly, your needs are great according to your own admission.”
—indeed. I have substantial need for help in understanding what YOU wrote. IF you feel what YOU wrote in #177 is relevant to the discussion, THEN I seek help in understanding it. But since you don’t feel the need to clarify, then I guess it was probably not important anyway. If that’s the case, I’m happy to ignore it. Instinctively, that was my first response…but I was gonna give it the benefit of doubt. Maybe next time, you can tell me in advance when I should just ignore what you write. Thanks!
May 16th, 2010 at 8:30 pm
It’s all different matter, irrelevant matter from you. Maybe next time, you finally “get it” that I’m not interested in clarifying myself to you to satisfy your habitual tangential studies of English, and stopped the whining and begging. But I guess NOT! (If you are that habitually interested in English, you are obviously in the wrong thread. The rest of us can ignore your need for help, and move onto the actual point.)
Good luck on your quest for help, once again. Lord knows, it won’t be long before you whine some more.