Fool's Mountain: Blogging for China » taiwan http://blog.foolsmountain.com A wise one knows moving mountains is beyond human power, but a fool has other thoughts... Fri, 30 Jul 2010 18:49:18 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=abc en hourly 1 Freedom in the World 2010 http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/07/06/freedom-in-the-world-2010/ http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/07/06/freedom-in-the-world-2010/#comments Tue, 06 Jul 2010 19:45:55 +0000 Steve http://blog.foolsmountain.com/?p=7365 Once per year, Freedom House releases its annual report covering the levels of freedom throughout the world. I’ve included their reports for China, Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. They issue two scores, one for Political Rights and one for Civil Liberties, along with a Freedom Status. The lower the number, the higher the rating.

China (2010)

Capital: Beijing

Population: 1,331,398,000

Political Rights Score: 7
Civil Liberties Score: 6
Status: Not Free

Explanatory Note

The numerical ratings and status listed above do not reflect conditions in Hong Kong or Tibet, which are examined in separate reports.

Overview

The Chinese government continued in 2009 to demonstrate high levels of insecurity and intolerance regarding citizens’ political activism and demands for human rights protection. Aiming to suppress protests during politically sensitive anniversaries during the year, including the 60-year mark of the Communist Party’s rise to power, the authorities resorted to lockdowns on major cities and new restrictions on the internet. The government also engaged in a renewed campaign against democracy activists, human rights lawyers, and religious or ethnic minorities, which included sentencing dozens to long prison terms following unfair trials. Repressive measures were intensified in the northwestern region of Xinjiang, especially after ethnic violence erupted there in July. Nevertheless, many citizens defied government hostility and asserted their rights to free expression and association.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power in mainland China in 1949. Party leader Mao Zedong subsequently oversaw devastating mass-mobilization campaigns, such as the Great Leap Forward (1958–61) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), which resulted in tens of millions of deaths. Following Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping emerged as paramount leader. Over the next two decades, he maintained the CCP’s absolute rule in the political sphere while initiating limited market-based reforms to stimulate the economy.

The CCP signaled its resolve to avoid democratization with the deadly 1989 assault on prodemocracy protesters in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and surrounding areas. Following the crackdown, Jiang Zemin replaced Zhao Ziyang as general secretary of the party. Jiang was named state president in 1993 and became China’s top leader following Deng’s death in 1997. He continued Deng’s policy of rapid economic growth, recognizing that regime legitimacy now rested largely on the CCP’s ability to boost living standards. In the political sphere, Jiang maintained a hard line.

Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang as CCP general secretary in 2002, state president in 2003, and head of the military in 2004. Many observers expected Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao to implement modest political reforms to address pressing socioeconomic problems including a rising income gap, unemployment, the lack of a social safety net, environmental degradation, and corruption. However, while it proved moderately more responsive to certain constituencies—especially the urban middle class—the government continued to exercise tight control over key institutions and intensified repression of perceived threats to the CCP’s authority.

In March 2008, the National People’s Congress bestowed additional five-year terms on Hu and Wen, while Shanghai party boss Xi Jinping was appointed vice president, setting the stage for him to potentially succeed Hu in 2012. In August, China hosted the Olympic Games in Beijing. Despite its pledges to ensure an open media environment and improved human rights protections surrounding the games, the government engaged in large-scale evictions, greater restrictions on freedom of movement, internet censorship for foreign journalists, and crackdowns on dissidents and minorities.

The atmosphere of heightened repression continued in 2009, as the global economic crisis, rising public protests, and the arrival of several politically sensitive anniversaries strengthened hard-liners within the CCP. The major dates included the 50th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s flight from Tibet in March, the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown in June, the 10th anniversary of the CCP’s ongoing suppression of the Falun Gong spiritual movement in July, and the 60th anniversary of the CCP’s rise to power in October. Following the model used for the Olympics, the authorities imposed anniversary-related security measures including lockdowns on major cities, increased restrictions on internet access, and systematic arrests of rights activists, petitioners, and religious and ethnic minorities. Conditions in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region deteriorated during the year, both before and after ethnic violence erupted in July.

Popular unrest was not limited to Xinjiang. Growing anger over corruption, abuse of power, and impunity fueled tens of thousands of protests, particularly in rural areas. In response, CCP leaders committed more resources to tackling corruption, spurring the investigation of hundreds of mid- and high-ranking officials and a well-publicized crackdown on organized crime, although the effort stopped short of much-needed legal and institutional reforms. The CCP also tightened political control over the judiciary, expanded the use of surveillance equipment, and established a network of extralegal taskforces to coordinate the suppression of grassroots discontent.

Despite government repression, a growing nonprofit sector continued to provide crucial social services and increase citizens’ rights awareness. In addition, bloggers, journalists, legal professionals, workers, and religious believers pushed the limits of permissible activity, sometimes effectively asserting the rights to free expression and association. Citizens managed to expose official corruption, obtain compensation for unpaid wages, and force the partial retraction of a plan to install monitoring and censorship software on personal computers. According to reports by activists and references on official websites, banned political publications continued to circulate—especially online—including the newly released memoir of ousted CCP leader Zhao Ziyang, the prodemocracy manifesto Charter 08, and the Nine Commentaries, a collection of editorials highly critical of CCP rule.

Also during the year, reconstruction continued in the wake of a May 2008 earthquake in Sichuan province that led to an estimated 70,000 deaths. The effort was marred, however, by the alleged misuse of relief funds and ongoing government attempts to cover up the disproportionate toll among children due to shoddily constructed school buildings. Under public pressure, the government published the death toll among children in May, setting the figure at 5,335, though many observers argued that the true count was probably much higher.

China weathered the global economic downturn better than many other countries, thanks in part to a $580 billion stimulus package. However, critics raised concerns that the government spending could boost large, underperforming state-owned enterprises at the expense of small and medium-sized companies that typically account for much of the country’s tax revenue and economic dynamism. Some observers also warned that the increased investment in infrastructure could stir unrest related to land disputes.

At the international level, the CCP made concerted efforts to extend its propaganda and censorship beyond China’s borders. The government invested billions of dollars in new international versions of party mouthpieces such as Xinhua News Agency, while pressuring foreign officials to silence regime critics at cultural events in Germany, Australia, South Korea, Bangladesh, and Taiwan. Chinese officials also successfully pressured Pakistan and Cambodia to repatriate Uighur asylum-seekers, who faced possible torture and execution in China. Relations between China and Taiwan continued to thaw, as new bilateral agreements facilitated transportation links, judicial assistance, and economic investment.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

China is not an electoral democracy. The CCP has a monopoly on political power and its nine-member Politburo Standing Committee makes most important political decisions and sets government policy. Party members hold almost all top posts in government, the military, and the internal security services, as well as in many economic entities and social organizations.

The 3,000-member National People’s Congress (NPC), which is elected for five-year terms by subnational congresses, formally elects the state president for up to two five-year terms, and confirms the premier after he is nominated by the president. However, the NPC is a largely symbolic body, meeting for just two weeks a year and serving primarily to approve proposed legislation, though members sometimes question bills before passing them. The country’s only competitive elections are for village committees and urban residency councils, which hold limited authority and are generally subordinate to the local CCP committees. The nomination of candidates remains tightly controlled, and many of these elections have been marred by fraud, violence, corruption, and attacks on independent candidates. Plans to expand polls to higher levels of governance, such as townships, have stalled.

Opposition groups like the China Democracy Party are suppressed, and members are imprisoned. Prominent democracy advocate Liu Xiaobo was sentenced in December 2009 to 11 years in prison for his involvement in drafting and circulating Charter 08. At least 100 other signers of the prodemocracy manifesto were reportedly summoned for questioning following its publication. Several other democracy activists received long prison sentences during the year, including Xie Changfa, sentenced to 13 years for organizing a Hunan province branch of the China Democracy Party,andGuo Quan, an online writer and professor who launched the China New People’s Party, sentenced to 10 years. In October, the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China published a partial list of over 1,200 political prisoners, while the San Francisco-based Dui Hua Foundation estimated that 1,150 new arrests for “endangering state security” were made in 2009. Tens of thousands of others are thought to be held in extrajudicial forms of detention for their political or religious views.

In February 2009, the government of the Macau Special Administrative Region, a Portuguese-ruled colony until 1999, passed legislation that stipulates long prison terms for crimes such as “secession,” “subversion,” and “association with foreign political organizations that harm state security.” Human rights groups raised concerns that, as in the rest of China, such provisions could be used to restrict freedom of expression and imprison critics of the Macau or Beijing authorities. Macau immigration officers reportedly cited the law in barring entry to several prodemocracy lawmakers and activists from Hong Kong shortly after its passage.

Corruption remains endemic despite increased government antigraft efforts, generating growing public resentment. The problem is most acute in sectors with extensive state involvement, such as construction, land procurement, and banking. While multiple bodies track and prosecute corruption, there is no independent anticorruption agency. Tens of thousands of cases were investigated at all levels in 2009, with suspects including several assistant ministers and heads of state-run conglomerates. A crackdown on organized crime in Chongqing that began in June swept up thousands of suspects, exposing criminal infiltration of key industries as well as crime bosses’ collusion with senior officers in local party committees, the police, and the judiciary. Prosecution in such cases is often selective, as informal personal networks and internal CCP power struggles influence the choice of targets. Also in 2009, censors heavily restricted reporting on a Namibian bribery probe involving a state-owned company formerly headed by President Hu Jintao’s son.

CCP officials increasingly seek input from academics and civic groups on pending legislation and occasionally hold public hearings, though without relinquishing control over the decision-making process. New open-government regulations took effect in 2008, but implementation has been incomplete. While some agencies have been more forthcoming in publishing accounting details or official regulations, courts have hesitated to enforce citizens’ information requests, and a precise accounting of economic stimulus funds had not been released by the end of 2009 despite promises of transparency. Local officials continued to hide vital information on topics including mining disasters, tainted food products, and polluting companies. China was ranked 79 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index.

Despite relative freedom in private discussion and journalists’ efforts to push the limits of permissible speech, China’s media environment remains extremely restrictive. The authorities employ sophisticated means to control news reporting, particularly on sensitive topics. This includes setting the agenda by allowing key state-run media outlets to cover events—including negative news—in a timely but selective manner, and requiring that other outlets restrict their coverage to such approved accounts. Party directives in 2009 curbed reporting related to sensitive anniversaries, public health, environmental accidents, deaths in police custody, foreign policy, and other topics. Journalists who fail to comply with official guidance are harassed, fired, or jailed. According to international watchdog groups, at least 30 journalists, mostly freelancers, and 68 cyberdissidents remained imprisoned at year’s end for disseminating proscribed information, though the actual number is likely much higher. In one prominent case, online activist Huang Qi was sentenced in November to three years in prison for publishing criticism of the authorities’ response to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Tan Zuoren, an activist who had coordinated citizen efforts to document the death toll from school collapses during the quake, was put on trial in August, and several witnesses were beaten on their way to testify. At year’s end, Tan remained in detention but had not been sentenced.

In addition to restrictions on media coverage imposed by the central government, lower-level officials also take measures to repress reports that expose shortcomings in their performance. Several journalists were assaulted during 2009 while trying to cover pollution or corruption. Others faced criminal defamation charges or were jailed on bribery charges in an apparent effort to stifle investigative reporting. Activist Wu Baoquan was sentenced in September to 18 months in prison after posting online allegations that officials in Inner Mongolia had profited from forced evictions. In December, Fu Hua of China Business News was sentenced to three years in prison for allegedly accepting bribes in relation to a story exposing safety problems in the construction of an airport in northeastern China. In November, the editor in chief Hu Shuli and other key staff resigned from the business magazine Caijing amid clashes with owners over financial matters and pressure to tone down its aggressive reporting on corruption.

Regulations have allowed greater freedom of movement for foreign journalists since 2007, but local officials continue to block, harass, and sometimes assault foreign reporters while intimidating their Chinese sources and assistants. In February 2009, the government issued a code of conduct for Chinese assistants of foreign correspondents that threatens punishment for those who engage in “independent reporting.” Some international radio and television broadcasts, including the U.S. government–funded Radio Free Asia, remain jammed. The signal of the Falun Gong–affiliated satellite station New Tang Dynasty TV remained cut off in 2009, after the French company Eutelsat, apparently under pressure from Beijing, stopped its broadcasts in June 2008.

In 2009, China was home to the largest number of internet users globally, reaching 360 million by September 2009, according to official figures. However, the government maintains an elaborate apparatus for censoring and monitoring internet use and personal communications, including via mobile telephones. The authorities block websites they deem politically threatening and detain those who post the content.In 2009, they repeatedly blocked social-networking and microblogging sites, removed political content and shut down blogs in the name of antipornography campaigns, required users to register their real identities when posting comments on news websites, and stepped up obstruction of technologies used to circumvent censorship. In May, the government announced regulations requiring the installation of censorship and surveillance software called Green Dam Youth Escort on all computers sold in China; following protests from the international business community, human rights groups, and Chinese internet users, the authorities withdrew the directive in June, but said installation would proceed for computers in schools and internet cafes. For all the government’s controls, the technology’s flexibility, circumvention tools, and the large volume of online communications have allowed many users to nonetheless access censored content, expose official corruption, mobilize protests, and circulate banned political texts.

The number of religious believers, including Christians, has expanded in recent years. Nevertheless, religious freedom remains sharply curtailed, and religious minorities remained a key target of repression during 2009. All religious groups are required to register with the government, which regulates their activities and guides their theology. Some faiths, such as Falun Gong as well as certain Buddhist and Christian groups, are formally outlawed, and their members face harassment, imprisonment, and torture. Other unregistered groups, such as unofficial Protestant and Roman Catholic congregations, operate in a legal gray zone, and state tolerance of them varies from place to place. In September, police and thugs destroyed the Linfen-Fushan megachurch in Shanxi; church leaders were subsequently sentenced to as much as seven years in prison. Unregistered Buddhist temples were similarly targeted for demolition during the year, particularly in Jiangxi province. Security forces led by the 6-10 Office, an extralegal agency created in 1999, continued to target Falun Gong adherents nationwide for surveillance, imprisonment, torture, and forced conversion, sometimes leading to deaths in custody. In January 2009, Chongqing resident Jiang Xiqing died while held at a “reeducation through labor” camp for practicing Falun Gong; lawyers seeking to investigate his death were detained and beaten.

Academic freedom remains restricted with respect to politically sensitive issues. The CCP controls the appointment of university officials, and many scholars practice self-censorship to preserve their positions and personal safety. Pressure to self-censor increased during 2009, particularly surrounding the June and October anniversaries. Political indoctrination is a required component of the curriculum at all levels of education.

Freedoms of assembly and association are severely restricted. Both central and local authorities issued regulations in 2009 aimed at preventing petitioners from traveling to Beijing to report injustices to senior officials. Local officials continued to face penalties if they failed to limit the flow of petitioners to the capital; as a result, petitioners were routinely intercepted, harassed, detained in illegal detention centers termed “black jails,” or sent to labor camps. Thousands of detained petitioners were reportedly subjected to beatings, psychological abuse, and sexual violence. Despite such repression, workers, farmers, and others held tens of thousands of protests during the year, reflecting growing public anger over wrongdoing by officials, especially land confiscation, corruption, and fatal police beatings. Security agencies and hired thugs often use excessive force to put down demonstrations; in several instances during 2009, this drove protesters to violently attack symbols of authority, such as police cars and government buildings. In June, riot police used batons to disperse an estimated 10,000 residents of Shishou in Hubei province, who had mustered after police refused to investigate the mysterious death of a 24-year-old hotel chef. At least eight people were subsequently sentenced to jail terms, including relatives of the deceased. In some cases, officials tolerate demonstrations as an outlet for pent-up frustration, or agree to protesters’ demands.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are required to register and follow strict regulations, including vague prohibitions on advocating non-CCP rule, “damaging national unity,” or “upsetting ethnic harmony.” Many groups seeking more independence organize informally or register as businesses, though they are vulnerable to closure at any time. A government crackdown on several public interest groups in 2009 generated a chilling effect among civil society activists, with many putting projects on hold. In July, Beijing authorities shut down the Open Constitution Initiative, a legal aid NGO known for defending victims of the 2008 tainted-milk scandal and commissioning a report on government policies in Tibet, and raided the offices of the Yi Ren Ping Center, an organization assisting Hepatitis B patients.

The only legal labor union is the government-controlled All-China Federation of Trade Unions. Collective bargaining is legal but does not occur in practice, and independent labor leaders are harassed and jailed. Nevertheless, workers have increasingly asserted themselves informally via strikes, collective petitioning, and selection of negotiating representatives. Such tactics repeatedly yielded concessions from employers or drew government intervention on behalf of workers in 2009. Three labor laws that took effect in 2008 were designed to protect workers, counter discrimination, and facilitate complaints against employers, while also empowering CCP-controlled unions. Initial promising signs on implementation—including a sharp rise in the number of labor-dispute cases filed by workers—were overshadowed by the economic downturn, the lack of independent arbitration bodies, and a growing backlog of complaints. Dangerous workplace conditions continued to claim lives. The official number of workplace accidents during the first three months of 2009 declined compared with the same period in 2008, but the death toll for the first quarter remained high at 18,501. Forced labor, including child labor through government-sanctioned “work-study” programs and in “reeducation through labor” camps, remains a serious problem.

The CCP controls the judiciary and directs verdicts and sentences, particularly in politically sensitive cases. Judicial autonomy is greater in commercial litigation and civil suits involving private individuals. A party veteran with no formal legal training was appointed as chief justice in 2008, and he subsequently issued a doctrine emphasizing the “Supremacy of the Cause of the Party” over the law. In 2009, the government accelerated a crackdown on civil rights lawyers, law firms, and NGOs offering legal services. In March, authorities shut down the Beijing-based law firm Yitong, known for representing victims of corruption or rights abuses. In May, over 20 lawyers were effectively disbarred when their license registrations were rejected, and several were physically assaulted during the year. In November, Wang Yonghang, a lawyer from Dalian in northeastern China, was sentenced to seven years in prison for defending Falun Gong practitioners, the harshest term given to an attorney in recent memory. Prominent lawyer Gao Zhisheng remained “disappeared” and at severe risk of torture following his abduction by security forces in February.

Despite recent criminal procedure reforms, trials—which often amount to mere sentencing announcements—are frequently closed to the public. Torture remains widespread, with coerced confessions routinely admitted as evidence. Endemic corruption exacerbates the lack of due process. Since late 2008, about a dozen senior judges have been detained on bribery charges, including the vice president of the Supreme People’s Court.Many suspects are deprived of court hearings altogether, detained instead by bureaucratic fiat in “reeducation through labor” camps. Based on interviews with recently released detainees, a February 2009 study by the Chinese Human Rights Defenders group reported that in addition to petty thieves and drug addicts, Falun Gong practitioners, Christians, and petitioners constituted a significant percentage of those incarcerated in the camps. The use of various forms of extralegal detention has increased in recent years, including secret jails and psychiatric arrest of petitioners and dissidents. Together, detention facilities are estimated to hold a total of three to five million detainees. Conditions in such facilities are generally harsh, with detainees reporting inadequate food, regular beatings, and deprivation of medical care; the government generally does not permit visits by independent monitoring groups, including the International Committee of the Red Cross. Some 65 crimes—including nonviolent offenses—carry the death penalty. The number of executions remains a state secret but was thought to be close to 5,000 in 2009. Recent reforms enabling the Supreme People’s Court to review capital cases have apparently led to a modest reduction in executions. In 2009, state-run media reported that executed prisoners “provide the major source of [organ] transplants in China”; some experts have also raised concerns over the possible use of those imprisoned for their religious beliefs or ethnic identity as sources for organs.

Security forces work closely with the CCP leadership at all levels, and special departments under the Ministry of Public Security are dedicated to maintaining the party’s monopoly on political power. Hired thugs and urban management officers also engage in intimidation and abuse of petitioners, protesters, and whistleblowers. During 2009, the CCP significantly expanded its network of extralegal “stability maintenance” offices, including at the neighborhood level and in some enterprises. As part of their mandate, these agencies are tasked with suppressing the peaceful exercise of basic civil liberties.

In April 2009, the government published its first National Human Rights Action Plan, outlining measures that, if implemented, would lead to improvements in human rights protection. However, observers questioned its likely impact given that it imposed no specific obligations or envisioned any change in trajectory from the regime’s current priorities or ongoing systemic abuses.

In the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, political indoctrination programs, curbs on Muslim religious practice, and policies marginalizing the use of Uighur language in education intensified throughout 2009. The government continued decade-old policies to alter the region’s demography, offering incentives to ethnic Han to move to the area and instituting a program to transfer Uighur laborers, sometimes by force, to work in other parts of China. In February, the government began a project to demolish most buildings in the historic core of the city of Kashgar and resettle some 200,000 Uighur residents. On July 5, police forcibly suppressed a peaceful demonstration in Urumqi by Uighurs voicing frustration over the limited investigation into the deaths of Uighur factory workers in a brawl with Han employees in southern China. The police action—which according to Amnesty International included using tear gas and shooting with live ammunition into crowds of peaceful protesters—sparked an outbreak of violence between Uighurs and Han residents. State-run media reported that 197 people were killed, but the details of events that day could not be fully verified due to tight government control of information and the intimidation of witnesses. The July 5 clashes were followed by a harsh crackdown that included large-scale “disappearances” of Uighurs, imprisonment and execution of Uighurs and some Han residents following questionable legal proceedings, and an almost complete shutdown of internet access in the region that remained in effect for several months. Among those detained were the managers of websites reporting on Uighur issues. A state propaganda campaign vilifying Uighurs and the U.S.-based Uighur activist Rebiya Kadeer fueled further ethnic tensions and increased discrimination against Uighurs throughout the country.

Minorities, the disabled, and people with HIV/AIDS or Hepatitis B face severe societal discrimination. In a positive development, a court ruled in October 2009 that mandatory Hepatitis B testing violated the 2008 Employment Promotion Law. A household registration, or hukou, system remains in place, mostly affecting China’s 150 million internal migrants. Some local governments have experimented with reforms to allow greater mobility, but citizens continue to face restrictions on changing employers or residence, and many migrants are unable to fully access social services as a result. Other restrictions on freedom of movement remained substantial during 2009, as the authorities imposed lockdowns on Beijing and neighboring provinces surrounding the Octoberanniversary. Dissidents were restricted from traveling abroad or placed under house arrest, particularly around the June anniversary and during U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit in November. Law enforcement agencies continued to seek out and repatriate North Korean refugees, who face imprisonment or execution upon return. In August, a court in Inner Mongolia sentenced two Chinese citizens to 7 and 10 years in prison for helping 61 North Korean refugees cross into neighboring Mongolia.

Despite a growing body of property rights legislation, protection remains weak in practice, and all land is formally owned by the state. Tens of thousands of forced evictions and illegal land confiscations occurred in 2009, generally to provide land for private development, state-led infrastructure projects, or upcoming international events such as the World Expo in Shanghai. Residents who resist eviction, seek legal redress, or organize protests face violence at the hands of local police or hired thugs. In May 2009, over 1,000 villagers in Hunan reportedly clashed with police after a local man was beaten to death by security guards for a company that had begun building on confiscated land. Reforms to rural land use announced at the end of 2008 were put on hold in 2009, ostensibly due to the economic downturn.

China’s policy of allowing only one child per couple remains in place, though many rural families are allowed a second child if the first is female. Although compulsory abortion and sterilization by local officials are less common than in the past, they still occur fairly frequently. According to official websites, authorities in some areas of Yunnan and Fujian mandated the use of abortion in 2009, while in other provinces officials imposed fines on families that resisted the one-child policy. These controls and a cultural preference for boys have led to sex-selective abortion and a general shortage of females, exacerbating the problem of human trafficking.

Domestic violence and sexual harassment affect one-third of Chinese families, according to statistics published in November 2008 by the CCP-controlled All-China Women’s Federation. The government has taken steps in recent years to improve the legal framework related to violence against women, but implementation remains weak. The case of female hotel worker Deng Yujiao, who killed a local official as he tried to rape her in May 2009, drew public sympathy and stimulated discussion of the need to protect women’s rights.

Tibet (2010)

Capital: N/A

Population: 5,300,000

Political Rights Score: 7
Civil Liberties Score: 7
Status: Not Free

Explanatory Note

This population figure from China’s 2000 census includes 2.4 million Tibetans living in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and 2.9 million Tibetans living in areas of eastern Tibet that were incorporated into various Chinese provinces.

Overview

Although Tibet was more accessible to tourists and journalists for parts of the year, the high level of repression established in 2008 was generally maintained in 2009, particularly ahead of politically sensitive anniversaries. There were few large-scale demonstrations, though many Tibetans resorted to passive protest tactics, such as a farming boycott and abstention from Tibetan New Year celebrations. At least 715 political and religious prisoners reportedly remained in custody as of September. In October, three Tibetans were executed, marking the first use of the death penalty in the territory since 2003. Talks between the government and representatives of the Dalai Lama did not resume in 2009. Instead the authorities continued ideological indoctrination campaigns and the vilification of the Dalai Lama through official rhetoric.

The eastern portions of Tibetan-populated areas were gradually incorporated into various Chinese provinces over several centuries. The Tibetan plateau was ruled by a Dalai Lama in the early 20th century until the People’s Liberation Army invaded Tibet in 1950, defeating the local army. In 1951, the Chinese Communist Party formally extended control over the Tibetan plateau. This territory was designated as the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in 1965.

In 1959, Chinese troops suppressed a major uprising in Lhasa in which tens of thousands of people were reportedly killed. Tibet’s spiritual and political leader—the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso—was forced to flee to India with some 80,000 supporters. During the next six years, China closed 97 percent of the region’s Buddhist monasteries and defrocked more than 100,000 monks and nuns. During the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–76), nearly all of Tibet’s estimated 6,200 monasteries were destroyed.

Under reforms introduced in 1980, religious practice was allowed again—with restrictions—and tourism was permitted in certain areas. Beginning in 1987, some 200 mostly peaceful demonstrations were mounted in Lhasa and surrounding areas. After antigovernment protests escalated in March 1989, martial law was imposed; it was not lifted until May 1990.

In the 1990s, Beijing reinvigorated efforts to control religious affairs and undermine the exiled Dalai Lama’s authority. Six-year-old Gendun Choekyi Nyima was detained by the authorities in 1995, and his selection by the Dalai Lama as the 11th Panchen Lama was rejected; he has not been seen since. Beijing then orchestrated the selection of another six-year-old boy as the Panchen Lama. Since one of the roles of the Panchen Lama is to identify the reincarnated Dalai Lama, the move was seen as a bid by Beijing to control the eventual selection of the 15th Dalai Lama. China hosted envoys of the Dalai Lama in 2002, the first formal contacts since 1993. The Tibetan government-in-exile sought to negotiate genuine autonomy for Tibet, particularly to ensure the survival of its Buddhist culture, but no progress was made during subsequent rounds of dialogue. Meanwhile, other Tibetan exile groups have increasingly demanded independence.

Under Zhang Qingli, who was appointed as secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the TAR in 2005, the authorities amplified their repressive policies. To protest religious restrictions and the previous arrest of several monks, 300 monks conducted a peaceful march in Lhasa on March 10, 2008, the 49th anniversary of the 1959 uprising; security agents suppressed the march. A riot erupted four days later, with Tibetans attacking Chinese—civilians as well as those suspected of being plainclothes police—and burning Han- or Hui-owned businesses and government offices. The authorities reported that 19 people, mostly Chinese civilians, were killed, primarily in fires. Most observers believed the protests and riots to have been spontaneous outbursts of ethnic tension. Some, including prominent Chinese human rights activists, raised concerns of official malfeasance in terms of police not taking necessary steps to prevent violence or deliberately allowing it to escalate. Over 150 other protests, most of them reportedly peaceful, soon broke out in all Tibetan-populated areas of the plateau, as well as in other provinces. The government responded with a massive deployment of armed forces and barred entry to foreign media and tourists. According to overseas Tibetan groups, between 100 and 218 Tibetans were killed as security forces suppressed the demonstrations.

Although the region was accessible to tourists and journalists under special conditions for part of 2009, the high level of repression established in 2008 was generally maintained. Security measures were especially tight surrounding a series of politically sensitive dates. These included the Tibetan New Year (Losar) in February and both the 50th anniversary of the 1959 uprising and the one-year mark of the 2008 protests in March. During this period, security forces increased their presence in Lhasa, raided homes and businesses, detained hundreds of Tibetans accused of not having permits to be in Lhasa, established roadblocks throughout the region, and restricted access for foreign tourists and journalists. Tight restrictions were imposed again ahead of the 60th anniversary of CCP rule in October.

These security efforts largely prevented major demonstrations during the year, though several Tibetans carried out one-person protests; most were immediately detained. Many Tibetans instead resorted to passive methods of protest, such as participating in a farming boycott or refusing to partake in Losar celebrations.

Talks between the government and representatives of the Dalai Lama, which had last taken place in November 2008, did not resume in 2009. Meanwhile, official statements, state-run media, and “patriotic education” campaigns continued to vilify the exiled leader. Beijing also pursued an increasingly aggressive, and often effective, policy of pressuring foreign governments to refrain from meeting with the Dalai Lama and to publicly express support for the official Chinese position on Tibet.

The government’s economic development programs have disproportionately benefited ethnic Han and a select category of Tibetans, such as businessmen or government employees. Most other Tibetans cannot take advantage of economic development and related opportunities for higher education and employment. The development activity has also increased Han migration and stoked Tibetan fears of cultural assimilation.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

The Chinese government rules Tibet through administration of the TAR and 10 Tibetan autonomous prefectures in nearby Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan provinces. Under the Chinese constitution, autonomous areas have the right to formulate their own regulations and implement national legislation in accordance with local conditions. In practice, decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of senior CCP officials; in the case of the TAR, Zhang Qingli, an ethnic Han, has served as the region’s CCP secretary since 2005. The few ethnic Tibetans who occupy senior positions serve mostly as figureheads, often echoing official statements that condemn the Dalai Lama and emphasize Beijing’s role in developing Tibet’s economy. Jampa Phuntsog, an ethnic Tibetan, served as chairman of the TAR government from 2003 through the end of 2009.

Since 1960, the Dalai Lama has overseen the introduction of a partly democratic system to the government-in-exile in Dharamsala, India. Current institutions include a popularly elected 46-member Assembly of Tibetan People’s Deputies, a Supreme Judicial Commission overseeing civil disputes, and more recently, the direct election of a prime minister. In 2001, Buddhist scholar and lama Samdhong Rinpoche was chosen as prime minister and re-elected in 2006. Participating in the polls were Tibetans in exile in India, Nepal, the United States, and Europe; an estimated 120,000 are eligible to vote, though in practice, voter turnout was reportedly 30 percent. Observers have noted that such arrangements fall short of a fully democratic system due to an absence of political parties and the ongoing role of the unelected Dalai Lama in decision-making; a significant number in the exile community have resisted proposals by the Dalai Lama to completely step down from his political responsibilities, however.

Corruption is believed to be extensive in Tibet, as in the rest of China. Nevertheless, little information was available during the year on the scale of the problem or official measures to combat it. Tibet is not ranked separately on Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index.

Chinese authorities control the flow of information in Tibet, tightly restricting all media. International broadcasts are jammed. Increased internet penetration in urban areas has provided more access to information, but online restrictions and internet cafe surveillance in place across China are enforced even more stringently in the TAR. Officials repeatedly shut down mobile-telephone networks surrounding politically sensitive dates in March 2009. Security forces have also been known to periodically confiscate mobile phones, computers, and other communication devices from monasteries and private homes, and to routinely monitor calls in and out of the region. Tibetans who transmitted information abroad often suffered repercussions, while some internet users were arrested solely for accessing banned information. In August, 19-year-old Pasang Norbu was reportedly detained after viewing online images of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan flag at a Lhasa internet cafe. In November, Kunchok Tsephel was sentenced to 15 years in prison, on charges of “leaking state secrets,” for writings posted on a literary website he had founded. In December, a Qinghai court sentenced Tibetan filmmaker Dhondup Wangchen to six years in prison; he had been detained in March after filming interviews with Tibetans for a documentary he was making titled Leaving Fear Behind.

Authorities continued to restrict access to Tibet for foreign journalists in 2009, though not as consistently as in 2008. Journalists were denied entry throughout the year, especially around politically sensitive dates. During other periods, journalists were required to travel in groups, and access was contingent on prior official permission, with Tibet being the only area of China to require such special authorization. Residents who assisted foreign journalists were reportedly harassed.

The authorities regularly suppress religious activities, particularly those seen as forms of political dissent or advocacy of Tibetan independence. Possession of Dalai Lama–related materials can lead to official harassment and punishment. CCP members and government employees must adhere to atheism and cannot practice a religion. The Religious Affairs Bureaus (RABs) control who can and cannot study religion in the monasteries and nunneries in the TAR; officials allow only men or women over the age of 18 to become monks or nuns, and they are required to sign a declaration rejecting Tibetan independence, expressing loyalty to the Chinese government, and denouncing the Dalai Lama. Regulations announced in 2007 require government approval for the recognition and education of reincarnated teachers. The government manages the daily operations of monasteries through Democratic Management Committees (DMCs) and the RABs. Only monks and nuns deemed loyal to the CCP may lead DMCs and laypeople have also been appointed to these committees. Since 2008, monasteries in Kardze (Ganzi in Chinese) have been required to have a police station within their confines.

Since March 2008, the authorities have intensified ideological education campaigns that had been conducted sporadically since 1996 and began to escalate after Zhang Qingli’s appointment in 2005. According to official statements, over 2,300 officials had been sent out to 505 monasteries across the TAR by March 2009 to carry out “patriotic education” programs among monks and nuns. The campaign had been extended beyond monasteries to reach Tibet’s general population in 2008, forcing students, civil servants, farmers, and merchants to recognize the CCP claim that China “liberated” Tibet and to denounce the Dalai Lama. Monks and nuns who refuse face expulsion from monasteries or nunneries, while others risk loss of employment, or arrest.In a move that further reinforced the CCP’s version of Tibetan history, the government designated March 28 as a new holiday called Serf Emancipation Day.

University professors cannot lecture on certain topics, and many must attend political indoctrination sessions. The government restricts course materials to prevent the circulation of unofficial versions of Tibetan history.

Freedoms of assembly and association are severely restricted in practice. Independent trade unions, civic groups, and human rights groups are illegal, and even nonviolent protests are harshly punished. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) focusing on development and health care operate under highly restrictive agreements. Domestic groups that challenge government policy on Tibet risk punishment. In July 2009, the authorities shut down the Beijing-based Open Constitution Initiative, a prominent legal-aid NGO, shortly after it published a report attributing the March 2008 protests to legitimate Tibetan grievances, thereby challenging the official line that the unrest was masterminded by external actors.

Despite the risks, Tibetans continued to seek avenues for peacefully expressing dissent in 2009. In the first large gathering since the 2008 protests, at least 100 people marched peacefully in Lhasa to assert religious freedom; six Tibetans were reportedly detained for several days for participating. Smaller or even one-person demonstrations were more common, though in most cases participants were immediately arrested. Tibetans also staged passive protests, such as a widespread boycott of Losar celebrations in February. In Kardze (Ganzi in Chinese) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, farmers expressed disapproval of the post–March 2008 crackdown by refusing to till their land. Authorities responded with eviction threats, and at least one individual reportedly died after being beaten by police for putting up posters supporting the farming boycott.

The judicial system in Tibet remains abysmal. Defendants lack access to meaningful legal representation, and trials are closed if state security is invoked. Chinese lawyers who offer to defend Tibetan suspects have been harassed or disbarred. Security forces routinely engage in detention without due process and torture. Tibetan human rights groups and Amnesty International documented at least five Tibetans who reportedly died in custody, or immediately after release, as a result of torture in 2009. In the first executions in Tibet since 2003, three people were put to death in October for their role in the 2008 protests. Widespread and arbitrary arrests continued in 2009, though not on the same scale as in 2008. Due to government restrictions on prison access for independent monitors, precise figures of Tibetan detainees were unavailable. However, a partial list of political prisoners published by the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China included 715 Tibetans as of September 2009, the vast majority of whom were arrested on or after March 10, 2008.

The deployment of an estimated 70,000 soldiers and the erection of roadblocks following the March 2008 protests exacerbated already severe restrictions on freedom of movement. Similar measures were employed sporadically during 2009, particularly surrounding the politically sensitive anniversaries. Increased security efforts kept the number of Tibetans who successfully crossed the border into Nepal at around 500 in 2009, compared with over 2,000 in 2007.

As members of an officially recognized “minority” group, Tibetans receive preferential treatment in university admissions. However, the dominant role of the Chinese language in education and employment limits opportunities for many Tibetans. The illiteracy rate among Tibetans, at over 47 percent, remains five times greater than that among ethnic Han. Private-sector employers favor ethnic Han for many jobs, especially in urban areas. Tibetans find it more difficult than Han residents to obtain permits and loans to open businesses. General discrimination increased after the 2008 riots, as television broadcasts showed footage of Tibetans attacking Han residents and burning down Han and Hui businesses.

The authorities have intensified efforts to forcibly resettle traditionally nomadic Tibetan herders in permanent-housing areas with no provisions for income generation. According to official reports, in 2008 the government relocated some 312,000 Tibetan farmers and herders to housing projects. A program to resettle a further 57,000 herders would reportedly be completed in 2010.

China’s restrictive family-planning policies are more leniently enforced for Tibetans and other ethnic minorities than for ethnic Han. Officials limit urban Tibetans to having two children and encourage—but do not usually require—rural Tibetans to stop at three children.

Hong Kong (2010)

Capital: N/A

Population: 7,037,000

Political Rights Score: 5
Civil Liberties Score: 2
Status: Partly Free

Overview

A record 150,000 people attended a candlelight vigil in June 2009 to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the massacre in which Chinese security forces crushed prodemocracy protests in Beijing and other cities. In November, the Hong Kong government proposed reforms to the electoral system. The plan included expansions of the legislature and the election committee that chooses the chief executive, but would largely preserve the existing semidemocratic system. Separately, Beijing’s growing influence over Hong Kong’s media landscape and immigration policies was evident during the year.

Hong Kong Island was ceded in perpetuity to Britain in 1842; adjacent territories were subsequently added, and the last section was leased to Britain in 1898 for a period of 99 years. In the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, London agreed to restore the entire colony to China in 1997. In return, Beijing—under its “one country, two systems” formula—pledged to maintain the enclave’s legal, political, and economic autonomy for 50 years.

Under the 1984 agreement, a constitution for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), known as the Basic Law, took effect in 1997. Stating that universal suffrage was the “ultimate aim” for Hong Kong, the Basic Law allowed direct elections for only 18 seats in the 60-member legislature, known as the Legislative Council (Legco), with the gradual expansion of elected seats to 30 by 2003. After China took control, it temporarily suspended the Legco and installed a provisional legislature that repealed or tightened several civil liberties laws during its 10-month tenure.

Tung Chee-hwa was chosen as Hong Kong’s chief executive by a Beijing-organized election committee in 1997, and his popularity waned as Beijing became increasingly involved in Hong Kong’s affairs, raising fears that civic freedoms would be compromised. Officials were forced to withdraw a restrictive antisubversion bill—Basic Law Article 23—after it sparked massive protests in July 2003.

Pro-Beijing parties retained control of the Legco in 2004 elections, which were marred by intimidation that was thought to have been organized by Beijing. In 2005, with two years left to serve, the deeply unpopular Tung resigned. He was replaced by career civil servant Donald Tsang, who China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) decided would serve out the remainder of Tung’s term before facing election. In 2007, Hong Kong held competitive elections for chief executive after democracy supporters on the 800-member election committee nominated a second candidate, Alan Leong. However, Tsang won a new term by a wide margin, garnering 82 percent of the votes in the mostly pro-Beijing committee.

Pro-Beijing parties again won Legco elections in September 2008, taking 30 seats, although few of those members were elected by popular vote. The prodemocracy camp won 23 seats, including 19 by popular vote, enabling them to retain a veto over proposed constitutional reforms.

In November 2009, the government published a consultation document on proposed electoral reforms for the 2012 polls that would ostensibly serve as a transitional arrangement until the anticipated adoption of universal suffrage in 2017 for the chief executive and 2020 for the Legco. The system outlined in the plan did not represent substantive progress toward full democracy. Observers noted that the Hong Kong government’s reluctance to make more drastic changes was partly due to restrictions imposed by several decisions of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, the most recent in 2007, and the requirement that any reforms obtain its approval. At year’s end, the proposal remained open for public consultation, and Tsang was expected to submit a draft to the Legco in February 2010.

Beijing’s growing influence over Hong Kong’s media landscape and immigration policies remained evident during 2009. However, partly in response to comments by Tsang in which he downplayed the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, a record turnout of 150,000 people joined an annual candlelight vigil in June to commemorate the incident, in which Chinese security forces had crushed prodemocracy protests in Beijing and other cities. Public events marking the anniversary were not permitted in the rest of China.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Hong Kong’s Basic Law calls for the election of a chief executive and a unicameral Legislative Council (Legco). The chief executive is elected by an 800-member committee: some 200,000 “functional constituency” voters—representatives of various elite business and social sectors, many with close ties to Beijing—elect 600 members, and the remaining 200 consist of Legco members, Hong Kong delegates to the NPC, religious representatives, and 41 members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a mainland advisory body. The chief executive serves a five-year term.

The Legco consists of 30 directly elected members and 30 members chosen by the functional constituency voters. Legco members serve four-year terms. The Basic Law restricts the Legco’s lawmaking powers, prohibiting legislators from introducing bills that would affect Hong Kong’s public spending, governmental operations, or political structure. In the territory’s multiparty system, the five main parties are the prodemocracy Democratic Party, Civic Party, and League of Social Democrats; the pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong; and the business-oriented Liberal Party.

The 2008 Legco elections were procedurally free and fair, but the semidemocratic structure of the legislature meant that the prodemocracy camp remained a minority despite winning nearly 60 percent of the popular vote. Unlike in 2004, the elections were not accompanied by overt intimidation or threats, though indirect pressure and influence from Beijing was nonetheless evident.

The consultation document on electoral reform introduced in November 2009 proposed several modest changes to the current system. The election committee for the chief executive would expand from 800 to 1,200 members, but would otherwise retain its existing composition. The Legco would expand from 60 to 70 seats, with direct elections for five of the new seats and the remaining five chosen indirectly by elected members of Hong Kong’s 18 district councils. The consultation document did not include a blueprint for adopting universal suffrage in 2017 and 2020, contravening the government’s earlier promises and heightening fears that the transition would be pushed further into the future.

Politically motivated violence is rare in Hong Kong. However, a total of 11 suspects—one in Hong Kong and ten in China—involved in a 2008 plot to shoot prominent prodemocracy politician Martin Lee and media tycoon Jimmy Lai, known for his vocal criticism of the Chinese Communist Party, received sentences of up to 18 years in prison in 2009. The plot’s alleged mastermind was said to reside in Taiwan and remained at large at year’s end.

Hong Kong is generally regarded as having low rates of corruption, although business interests have considerable influence on the Legco. In May 2009, the territory’s internationally respected Independent Commission Against Corruption reported a 23 percent increase in graft complaints during the first three months of the year compared with the same period in 2008. This was widely viewed as a result of the economic downturn, as officials were more inclined to engage in graft to compensate for personal financial losses. The right to access government information is protected by law and observed in practice. Hong Kong was ranked 12 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index.

Under Article 27 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong residents enjoy freedoms of speech, press, and publication. These rights are generally respected in practice, and political debate is vigorous. There are dozens of daily newspapers, and residents have access to international radio broadcasts and satellite television. International media organizations operate without interference. Nonetheless, Beijing’s growing influence over the media, book publishing, and film industries in recent years has led to self-censorship, particularly on issues deemed sensitive by the central government. This influence stems in part from the close relationship between Hong Kong media owners and the central authorities; at least 10 such owners sit on the CPPCC. In one incident during 2009, managers of the Hong Kong edition of Esquire magazine barred the publication of a 16-page feature about the Tiananmen Square massacre, and the feature’s author was subsequently fired. More broadly, the Hong Kong Journalists’ Association reported that “only two or three newspapers devoted significant coverage to the anniversary, while leading TV stations aired just a few special programs, with some appearing to follow [the Communist Party’s] line.”

Hong Kong journalists face a number of restrictions when covering events on the mainland. In February 2009, Chinese authorities issued regulations requiring Hong Kong journalists to obtain temporary press cards from Beijing’s liaison office prior to each reporting trip to the mainland, and to secure the prior consent of interviewees. While violence against journalists is rare in Hong Kong, reporters from the territory have repeatedly faced surveillance, intimidation, beatings, and occasional imprisonment when reporting on the mainland. In September, three journalists—a television reporter and two cameramen—were reportedly detained and beaten by police while covering unrest in Xinjiang. An official Chinese investigation concluded that the journalists had been at fault for “instigating protests,” prompting a demonstration and a petition by hundreds of Hong Kong journalists.

The Hong Kong government, rather than an independent regulator, controls media licensing in the territory. Authorities continued to obstruct broadcasts by the prodemocracy station Citizens’ Radio in 2009, after its license application was rejected in 2006. In November and December, more than a dozen prodemocracy activists and lawmakers were fined between US$125 and US$1,500 each for participating in unlicensed radio broadcasts, though one of the judges ruling on the case acknowledged the act of civil disobedience as “noble.” Separately, in September, the government rejected proposals to convert the state-owned but editorially independent Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) into a fully independent public broadcaster, or to create such an outlet. Officials instead announced the creation of a government-appointed board to advise RTHK’s director of broadcasting, potentially curbing the station’s editorial autonomy. A period for public consultation on the issue began in October and had not concluded by year’s end.

The Basic Law provides for freedom of religion, which is generally respected in practice. Religious groups are excluded from the Societies Ordinance, which requires nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to register with the government. Adherents of the Falun Gong spiritual movement remain free to practice in the territory and hold occasional demonstrations despite facing repression on the mainland. University professors can write and lecture freely, and political debate on campuses is lively.

The Basic Law guarantees freedoms of assembly and association. Police permits for demonstrations are required but rarely denied, and protests on politically sensitive issues are held regularly.  In June 2009, a record 150,000 people participated in a candlelight vigil to mark the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. Nevertheless, outside activists who planned to participate in events highlighting rights abuses in China continued to be denied entry or prevented from leaving the mainland in 2009.

Hong Kong hosts a vibrant and largely unfettered NGO sector, and trade unions are independent. However, there is limited legal protection for basic labor rights. Collective-bargaining rights are not recognized, protections against antiunion discrimination are weak, and there are few regulations on working hours and wages. While strikes are legal and several occurred in 2009, many workers sign contracts stating that walkouts could be grounds for summary dismissal.

The judiciary is independent, and the trial process is fair. The NPC reserves the right to make final interpretations of the Basic Law, effectively limiting the power of Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeals. While the NPC has not directly intervened in court cases for a number of years, several recent incidents raised concerns about growing influence from Beijing over law enforcement matters. In 2008, U.S.-based Tiananmen Square activist Zhou Yongjun was detained while visiting Hong Kong on a fake Malaysian passport, and in an unusual move, he was handed over to authorities on the mainland. He was tried there on bank fraud charges in 2009, although it remained unclear whether he or the person named on the fake passport was wanted by the authorities; a verdict was pending at year’s end. Also in 2009, Hong Kong officials decided not to prosecute family members and acquaintances of Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe, a close Beijing ally, after they physically assaulted several foreign journalists. Chief justice Andrew Li Kwok-nang, who has headed the judiciary since the handover, announced his retirement in September 2009; at year’s end, observers were watching to see who would be his successor and whether that individual would uphold the same standards of independence.

Police are forbidden by law to employ torture and other forms of abuse. However, official figures indicated that police conducted over 1,600 strip searches in 2008, leading to the adoption in February 2009 of additional measures to monitor and limit the use of such searches. Arbitrary arrest and detention are illegal; suspects must be charged within 48 hours of their arrest. Prison conditions generally meet international standards.

Citizens are treated equally under the law, though Hong Kong’s population of 200,000 foreign domestic workers remains vulnerable to abuse, and South Asians routinely complain of discrimination in employment. Since foreign workers face deportation if dismissed, many are reluctant to bring complaints against employers. A Race Discrimination Ordinance that took effect in July 2009 created an independent Equal Opportunities Commission to enforce its protections. However, in September the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination criticized the ordinance for failing to cover certain government actions, neglecting the issue of indirect discrimination, and effectively excluding immigrants.

The government does not control travel, choice of residence, or employment within Hong Kong, although documents are required to travel to the mainland, and employers must apply to bring in workers from China; direct applications from workers are not accepted. Hong Kong maintains its own immigration system. In September 2009, an appeals court criticized the government for lack of candor and destruction of relevant documents in a lawsuit challenging the denial of entry to four Taiwanese Falun Gong practitioners in 2003; however, the court was reluctant to conclude that the immigration department had acted in an unlawful fashion in denying the plaintiffs’ entry. FiveLegco members and several human rights activists from Hong Kong were barred entry to Macau in March 2009, shortly after that territory passed new national security legislation; many of those affected are regularly barred from the mainland as well.

Women are protected by law from discrimination and abuse and are entitled to equal access to schooling, as well as to property in divorce settlements. However, women continue to face discrimination in employment opportunities, salary, inheritance, and welfare. Despite robust efforts by the government, Hong Kong remains a point of transit and destination for persons trafficked for sexual exploitation or forced labor.

Taiwan (2010)

Capital: Taipei

Population: 23,079,000

Political Rights Score: 1
Civil Liberties Score: 2
Status: Free

Ratings Change

Taiwan’s political rights rating improved from 2 to 1 due to enforcement of anticorruption laws, including the prosecution of former high-ranking officials. However, the country’s civil liberties rating declined from 1 to 2 due to flaws in the protection of criminal defendants’ rights and limitations on academic freedom, including passage of a law restraining scholars at public educational facilities from participating in certain political activities.

Overview

Former president Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party was sentenced to life in prison on corruption charges in September 2009, though some observers raised concerns over flaws in the handling of his and other corruption cases. Following criticism of the government’s response to Typhoon Morakot, Prime Minister Liu Chao-shiuan resigned in September. The Kuomintang government continued to improve relations with China during the year, leading to Taiwanese participation in UN-affiliated institutions for the first time since 1971. However, there were also growing concerns over restrictions on free expression, including limitations on academic freedom and pressure to limit criticism of Taiwanese and Chinese government policy.

Taiwan, also referred to sometimes as the Republic of China (ROC), became home to the Chinese nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) government-in-exile in 1949. Although the island is independent in all but name, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) considers it a renegade province and has threatened to take military action if de jure independence is declared.

Taiwan’s transition to democracy began in 1987, when the KMT ended 38 years of martial law. In 1988, Lee Teng-hui became the first native Taiwanese president, breaking the mainland emigres’ stranglehold on politics. The media were liberalized and opposition political parties legalized in 1989. Lee oversaw Taiwan’s first full multiparty legislative elections in 1991–92 and the first direct presidential election in 1996.

Chen Shui-bian’s victory in the 2000 presidential race, as a candidate of the proindependence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), ended 55 years of KMT rule. Chen narrowly won reelection in March 2004, but the KMT-led opposition retained its majority in the Legislative Yuan (LY) in parliamentary elections later that year, and political gridlock between the executive and legislative branches continued.

The KMT secured an overwhelming majority in the January 2008 legislative elections, taking 81 of 113 seats. The DPP took 27, and the remainder went to independents and smaller parties. The polls were the first to be held under a new electoral system. The fact that the KMT and DPP respectively secured 72 percent and 24 percent of the seats after winning 51 percent and 37 percent of the votes prompted some calls for a reexamination of the reforms. Taipei mayor Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT won the March presidential election, defeating the DPP’s Frank Hsieh by a 16-point margin. Both elections were deemed generally free and fair, and an improvement over the 2004 polls, by international observers. They also marked the island’s second peaceful, democratic transfer of power. The DPP’s poor showing was attributed to voters’ economic concerns, frustration at political gridlock, wariness of the DPP’s proindependence policies, and recent corruption scandals involving Chen and other top officials.

Chen was indicted in December 2008, after his immunity had expired, and in September 2009 he was sentenced to life in prison for embezzlement, money laundering, and bribery. Some observers viewed the case as a milestone for the rule of law. However, there were also concerns raised over irregularities and possible political bias, including Chen’s detention before and during trial, prosecutorial leaks to the media, and disciplinary charges against his defense counsel.

The KMT government’s popularity was hurt during 2009 by the effects of the global economic downturn, although the economy had begun to recover by year’s end. Separately, Prime Minister Liu Chao-shiuan was replaced by former KMT secretary general Wu Den-yih in September amidst a broader cabinet reshuffle after the government drew criticism for its slow response to Typhoon Morakot. The natural disaster caused over 500 deaths and hundreds of millions of dollars in damage in August.

The DPP won an important parliamentary by-election in September, giving it a quarter of the LY and increased oversight powers, including the ability to petition the Constitutional Court for interpretations of the validity of official policies and actions. The KMT retained a majority of the contested posts in December local elections, but the DPP made notable gains.

The Ma administration continued its policy of establishing closer relations with the PRC government in 2009. Bilateral talks led to agreements on mutual judicial and law enforcement assistance, loosened Taiwanese restrictions on mainland investment, and the removal of PRC objections to Taiwan’s participation—with observer status under the name “Chinese Taipei”—in the World Health Assembly. This enabled Taiwanese representatives to partake in a UN specialized agency event for the first time since 1971.

Though many Taiwanese supported improved economic ties with China, critics argued that the administration was conceding elements of Taiwan’s sovereignty, moving too quickly, and acting with minimal transparency. Several incidents during 2009 stoked fears that growing economic and diplomatic reliance on the PRC would increase pressure to self-censor on issues Beijing deemed sensitive or important. For example, the government in September refused to issue a visa to Rebiya Kadeer, a prominent advocate for the rights of China’s Uighur minority. Meanwhile, Beijing maintained an aggressive legal and military stance on the prospect of eventual Taiwanese independence; an estimated 1,300 missiles remained aimed at the island at year’s end.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Taiwan is an electoral democracy. The 1946 constitution, adopted while the KMT was in power on the mainland, created a unique structure with five branches of government (yuan). The president, who is directly elected for up to two four-year terms, wields executive power, appoints the prime minister, and can dissolve the legislature. The Executive Yuan, or cabinet, consists of ministers appointed by the president on the recommendation of the prime minister. The prime minister is responsible to the national legislature (Legislative Yuan), which, under constitutional amendments that took effect in 2008, consists of 113 members serving four-year terms; 73 are elected in single-member districts, and 34 are chosen through nationwide proportional representation. The six remaining members are chosen by indigenous people. The three other branches of government are the judiciary (Judicial Yuan), a watchdog body (Control Yuan), and a branch responsible for civil service examinations (Examination Yuan).

The two main political parties are the proindependence DPP and the Chinese nationalist KMT, which hold a combined 108 of 113 legislative seats and dominate the political landscape. Opposition parties are generally able to function freely, as indicated by the DPP’s relatively strong performance in the December 2009 local elections. Nevertheless, there were credible reports during the year of increased political pressure on government critics and individuals whose activities could displease the Chinese authorities.

Though significantly less pervasive than in the past, corruption remains a feature of political life and an ongoing problem in the security forces. In 2009, the authorities took additional measures to enforce anticorruption laws, resulting in the prosecution of former top officials and the removal of four legislators from office due to vote-buying. Former president Chen Shui-bian and his wife were sentenced in September to life in prison on charges of embezzlement and money laundering; an appeal was pending at year’s end.The authorities also launched investigations of over 200 candidates for alleged vote-buying in the December local elections. Though several KMT members were investigated or punished during the year, some observers raised concerns about selective prosecution of DPP politicians. Among other high-profile cases, a retired high-ranking military officer was indicted in April on bribery and blackmail charges, and five police officers were convicted in December of accepting bribes from casino operators, receiving terms ranging from 12 to 20 years in prison.Taiwan was ranked 37 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index.

In March 2009, Taiwan ratified two UN human rights treaties—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights—and passed an implementing law allowing two years to bring relevant regulations and practice into line with the treaties. The United Nations in June refused to formally accept the ratifications, citing the PRC as the only recognized representative of China.

The Taiwanese media reflect a diversity of views and report aggressively on government policies and corruption allegations. Given that most Taiwanese can access about 100 cable television stations, the state’s influence on the media is, on balance, minimal. However, reforms and personnel changes at publicly owned media since 2008 have raised concerns about politicization. A former spokesperson for President Ma Ying-jeou’s electoral campaign was appointed as deputy president of the Central News Agency (CNA) in late 2008, and CNA staff reported receiving directives to alter certain content. Local and international observers noted that criticism of the government in subsequent CNA coverage was markedly toned down. In 2009, legislation requiring government approval of Public Television Service programming was dropped after public protests. However, local press freedom advocates and the Control Yuan criticized subsequent government measures to expand the service’s board and replace its management.

Actions by private media owners, economic pressures resulting from the global financial crisis, and potential PRC influence on free expression were also of concern in 2009. Most private news outlets are seen as sympathetic to one of the two main political parties. Observers reported an increase in paid news placements in print and electronic media during the year. After a businessman with mainland commercial interests purchased the China Times Group in late 2008, several incidents raised concerns of increased editorial pressure to soften criticism of the Ma administration and Beijing; in June 2009, the company threatened to sue several journalists and press freedom advocates for defamation over criticism of its actions in a dispute with the National Communications Commission. In September, the Kaohsiung Film Festival came under pressure—albeit unsuccessful—to not screen a documentary about exiled Uighur rights activist Rebiya Kadeer for fear that it could indirectly harm growing tourism from the mainland. There are generally no restrictions on the internet, which was accessed by over 65 percent of the population in 2009.

Taiwanese of all faiths can worship freely. Religious organizations that choose to register with the government receive tax-exempt status. Despite pressure from Beijing, the government in September 2009 allowed the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, to visit the island and participate in memorial services for victims of Typhoon Morakot.

Although Taiwanese educators can generally write and lecture freely, the ability of scholars to engage in political activism outside the classroom came under pressure in 2009. The LY in July 2009 passed the Act Governing the Administrative Impartiality of Public Officials, which contained provisions restraining scholars at public academic facilities from participating in certain political activities. In addition, two professors known for their involvement in human rights groups faced prosecution for organizing peaceful protests surrounding the 2008 visit of a Chinese envoy; the cases were still pending at year’s end.

Freedom of assembly is generally respected, and several large-scale demonstrations took place during 2009. Nevertheless, adherents of the Falun Gong spiritual movement, which is persecuted in China, occasionally faced pressure from local authorities to limit their protests at sites frequented by Chinese tourists. Unlike during his 2008 visit, demonstrations during Chinese envoy Chen Yunlin’s December 2009 trip to Taiwan passed without significant violence between police and protesters. In May, the Control Yuan urged disciplinary measures against Taipei’s police chief and precinct captain for police misconduct during the 2008 clashes, but some observers criticized the body’s decision not to impeach any officials.The Parade and Assembly Law includes restrictions on demonstration locations and permit requirements for outdoor meetings. Although permits are generally granted, at least 26 people were under investigation in 2009 for allegedly failing to obtain a permit or obey police orders to disperse. All civic organizations must register with the government, though registration is freely granted. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) focusing on human rights, social welfare, and the environment are active and operate without harassment.

Trade unions are independent, and most workers enjoy freedom of association. However, government employees and defense-industry workers are barred from joining unions or bargaining collectively. According to the U.S. State Department’s 2009 human rights report, unions may be dissolved if their activities “disturb public order,” while other restrictions undermine collective bargaining and make it difficult to strike legally. The number of labor disputes increased in 2009 amid the economic downturn. Taiwan’s 350,000 foreign workers are not covered by the Labor Standards Law or represented by unions, and many decline to report abuses for fear of deportation.

The judiciary is independent and trials are generally fair. However, prominent cases in 2009 exposed flaws in the protection of criminal defendants’ rights. Several suspects were detained for extended periods prior to conviction, including former president Chen, who was held in custody throughout the year as his trial proceeded. Legal experts also noted other irregularities in Chen’s case, including government efforts to pursue disciplinary measures against his counsel for comments to the media. Prosecutorial leaks to the media continued during the year, sullying defendants’ reputations before trial and conviction. The legal system partially responded to shortcomings in Chen’s case, as the Grand Council of Justices ruled in January that prosecutors’ recording of meetings between the defendant and his counsel was unconstitutional.

Police largely respect the ban on arbitrary detention, and suspects are allowed attorneys during interrogations to prevent abuse. However, three defendants in the high-profile Lu Cheng murder case, who were allegedly tortured in the 1980s to extract a confession, continued to be detained after 22 years as appeals proceeded. They remained in custody at year’s end following a May 2009 High Court ruling. An estimated 187 criminal cases in Taiwan have lasted over 10 years. Although no executions have been carried out since 2005, 44 people remained on death row at year’s end. Searches without warrants are allowed only in particular circumstances, and a 1999 law imposes strict punishments for illicit wiretapping.

The constitution provides for the equality of all citizens. Apart from the unresolved issue of ownership of ancestral lands, the rights of indigenous people are protected by law. Six LY seats are reserved for indigenous people, giving them representation that exceeds their share of the population. Thousands of indigenous people were left homeless by Typhoon Morakot, leading to their resettlement in nearby areas.

Taiwanese law does not allow for the granting of asylum or refugee status. However, amendments to the Immigration Act in 2009 facilitated the granting of residency certificates to over 100 Tibetans and 400 descendants of soldiers left behind in Thailand and Burma in 1949. In December, the Executive Yuan passed a refugee draft bill; it had yet to be debated by the legislature at year’s end.

With the exception of civil servants and military personnel traveling to China, freedom of movement is generally unrestricted. Direct cross-strait air travel has expanded significantly since 2008, though PRC tourists are required to travel in chaperoned groups within Taiwan.

Taiwanese women face private-sector job discrimination and lower pay than men on average. After the 2008 elections, women held 30 percent of the LY seats. Rape and domestic violence remain problems despite government programs to protect women and the work of numerous NGOs to improve women’s rights. Although authorities can pursue such cases without the victims formally pressing charges, cultural norms inhibit many women from reporting the crimes. Taiwan is both a source and destination for trafficked women.In January 2009, the legislature passed a law that specifically criminalized sex and labor trafficking while increasing penalties for such offenses.

Singapore (2010)

Capital: Singapore

Population: 5,113,000

Political Rights Score: 5
Civil Liberties Score: 4
Status: Partly Free

Overview

The authorities continued to restrict freedoms of speech and assembly in 2009. In April, Singapore’s legislature passed a measure that would require police permission for public assemblies of all sizes, removing a previous threshold of five or more people. In October, the Far Eastern Economic Review lost an appeal in a defamation case brought by the prime minister and his father; the magazine agreed to settle the case in November and was shuttered by its owners in December.

The British colony of Singapore obtained home rule in 1959, entered the Malaysian Federation in 1963, and gained full independence in 1965. During his three decades as prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew and his People’s Action Party (PAP) transformed the port city into a regional financial center and exporter of high-technology goods but restricted individual freedoms and stunted political development in the process.

Lee transferred the premiership to Goh Chok Tong in 1990 but stayed on as “senior minister,” and the PAP retained its dominance. Lee’s son, Lee Hsien Loong, became prime minister in 2004, and the elder Lee assumed the title of “minister mentor.” In 2005, President Sellapan Ramanathan began a second term as the largely ceremonial head of state.

Despite his expressed desire for a “more open society,” Lee Hsien Loong did little to change the authoritarian political climate. He called elections in May 2006, a year early, to secure a mandate for his economic reform agenda. With a nine-day campaign period and defamation lawsuits hampering opposition candidates, the polls resembled past elections in serving more as a referendum on the prime minister’s popularity than as an actual contest for power. The PAP retained 82 of the 84 elected seats with 66 percent of the vote, although the opposition offered candidates for a greater number of seats and secured a larger percentage of the vote than in previous years. The opposition Workers’ Party and Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA) each won a single seat despite receiving 16.3 percent and 13 percent of the vote, respectively.

Over the next three years, Lee continued to pursue his economic agenda while using the legal system and other tools to keep the opposition in check. The government also maintained that racial sensitivities and the threat of Islamist terrorism justified draconian restrictions on freedoms of speech and assembly. Such rules were repeatedly used to silence criticism of the authorities. Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) leader Chee Soon Juan faced multiple convictions and heavy fines for defamation and other crimes in 2007 and 2008, while the Far Eastern Economic Review, a 63-year-old magazine owned by the U.S.-based News Corporation, was forced to pay some US$300,000 in November 2009 to settle a defamation case brought by the Lees.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Singapore is not an electoral democracy. The country is governed through a parliamentary system, and elections are free from irregularities and vote rigging, but the ruling PAP dominates the political process. The prime minister retains control over the Elections Department, and the country lacks a structurally independent election authority. Opposition campaigns are hamstrung by a ban on political films and television programs, the threat of libel suits, strict regulations on political associations, and the PAP’s influence on the media and the courts.

The largely ceremonial president is elected by popular vote for six-year terms, and a special committee is empowered to vet candidates. The prime minister and cabinet are appointed by the president. Singapore has had only three prime ministers since independence. Of the unicameral legislature’s 84 elected members, who serve five-year terms, 9 are elected from single-member constituencies, while 75 are elected in Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs), a mechanism intended to foster minority representation. The winner-take-all nature of the system, however, limits the extent to which GRCs actually facilitate minority representation and, in effect, helps perpetuate the return of incumbents. Up to nine additional, nonpartisan members can be appointed by the president, and up to three members can be appointed to ensure a minimum of opposition representation.

Singapore has traditionally been lauded for its relative lack of corruption. There is no special legislation facilitating access to information, however, and management of state funds came under question for the first time in 2007. Critics lamented the state’s secret investment of national reserves, and investigations into the state investment arm, Temasek Holdings, were launched by Indonesian and Thai watchdog agencies. Singapore was ranked 3 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index.

Singapore’s media market remains tightly constrained. All domestic newspapers, radio stations, and television channels are owned by government-linked companies. Although editorials and news coverage generally support state policies, newspapers occasionally publish critical pieces. Self-censorship is common among journalists. The Sedition Act, in effect since the colonial period, outlaws seditious speech, the distribution of seditious materials, and acts with “seditious tendency.” Media including videos, music, and books are sometimes censored, typically for sex, violence, or drug references.

Foreign broadcasters and periodicals can be restricted for engaging in domestic politics, and regulations in place since 2006 require all foreign publications to appoint legal representatives and provide significant financial deposits. The leadership’s practice of using defamation suits and license revocations to silence critical media is often applied to foreign-owned outlets. In October 2009, the Far Eastern Economic Review lost its appeal of an earlier judgment finding that it had defamed Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and his father, Lee Kuan Yew, by publishing a 2006 interview with an opposition figure. The magazine agreed to settle the case for about US$300,000 in November, and it was discontinued as of December 2009 by its owner, the U.S.-based News Corporation, which cited falling revenues and readership. The Lees have never lost a defamation case in Singapore.

The internet is widely accessible, but the authorities monitor online material and block some content through directives to licensed service providers. In 2008, lawyer and blogger Gopalan Nair was sentenced to three months in jail for insulting judges on his blog and in an e-mail message.

The constitution guarantees freedom of religion as long as its practice does not violate any other regulations, and most groups worship freely. However, religious actions perceived as threats to racial or religious harmony are not tolerated, and unconventional groups like the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Unification Church are banned. All religious groups are required to register with the government under the 1966 Societies Act. In October 2009, five adherents of the Falun Gong spiritual movement, including Singapore nationals and mainland Chinese, were arrested and briefly detained after putting up posters in a public park that described the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners in China; the case was pending at year’s end.

All public universities and political research institutions have direct government links that bear at least some influence. Academics engage in political debate, but their publications rarely deviate from the government line on matters related to Singapore.

The Societies Act restricts freedom of association by requiring most organizations of more than 10 people to register with the government, and only registered parties and associations may engage in organized political activity. Political speeches are tightly regulated, and public assemblies must be approved by police. Legislation passed in April 2009 eliminated a previous threshold requiring permits for public assemblies of five or more people, meaning political events involving just one person could require official approval. Permits are not needed for private, indoor gatherings as long as the topic of discussion is not race or religion.

Unions are granted fairly broad rights under the Trade Unions Act, though restrictions include a ban on government employees joining unions. A 2004 amendment to the law prohibits union members from voting on collective agreements negotiated by union representatives and employers. Strikes are legal for all except utility workers, but they must be approved by a majority of a union’s members as opposed to the internationally accepted standard of at least 50 percent of the members who vote. In practice, many restrictions are not applied. All but five of the country’s 64 unions are affiliated with the National Trade Union Congress, which is openly allied with the PAP. Singapore’s 180,000 domestic workers are excluded from the Employment Act and regularly exploited. A 2006 standard contract for migrant domestic workers addresses food deprivation and entitles replaced workers to seek other employment in Singapore, but it fails to provide other basic protections, such as rest days.

The government’s overwhelming success in court cases raises questions about judicial independence, particularly because lawsuits against opposition politicians and parties often drive them into bankruptcy. Many judges have ties to PAP leaders, but it is unclear whether the government pressures judges or simply appoints those who share its conservative philosophy. The judiciary is efficient, and defendants in criminal cases enjoy most due process rights.

The government generally respects citizens’ right to privacy, but the Internal Security Act (ISA) and the Criminal Law Act (CLA) permit the authorities to conduct warrantless searches and arrests to preserve national security, order, and the public interest. The ISA, previously aimed at communist threats, is now used against suspected Islamist terrorists.Suspects can be detained without charge or trial for an unlimited number of two-year periods. A 1989 constitutional amendment prohibits judicial review of the substantive grounds for detention under the ISA and of the constitutionality of the law itself. The CLA is mainly used to detain organized crime suspects; it allows preventive detention for an extendable one-year period. The Misuse of Drugs Act empowers authorities to commit suspected drug users, without trial, to rehabilitation centers for up to three years.

Security forces are not known to commit serious abuses. The government has in recent years jailed police officers convicted of mistreating detainees. The penal code mandates caning, in addition to imprisonment, for about 30 offenses; it is discretionary for certain other crimes involving the use of force. Caning is reportedly common in practice.

There is no legal discrimination, and the government actively promotes racial harmony and equity. Despite government efforts, ethnic Malays have not on average reached the schooling and income levels of ethnic Chinese or ethnic Indians,and they reportedly face discrimination in private-sector employment.

Citizens enjoy freedom of movement, although the government occasionally enforces its policy of ethnic balance in public housing, in which most Singaporeans live, and opposition politicians have been denied the right to travel.

Women enjoy the same legal rights as men in most areas, and many are well-educated professionals, though relatively few women hold top positions in government and the private sector. Of the current Parliament’s 84 elected seats, 17 are held by women, all of whom belong to the PAP. In 2007, Parliament voted to maintain provisions of the penal code that make acts of “gross indecency” between men punishable by up to two years in prison.
]]> http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/07/06/freedom-in-the-world-2010/feed/ 176 The ECFA – where next for China and Taiwan? http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/06/26/the-ecfa-where-next-for-china-and-taiwan-2/ http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/06/26/the-ecfa-where-next-for-china-and-taiwan-2/#comments Sat, 26 Jun 2010 11:59:58 +0000 Raj http://blog.foolsmountain.com/?p=7320 The ECFA trade agreement between China and Taiwan looks like it will be signed in the near future.

It is hard at this point to be sure of who will benefit the most from it economically. There are concerns in Taiwan that there will be a net loss of jobs as a result of the agreement. Whilst Taiwan will be able to ship goods to China with fewer trade barriers, this does not mean that increased trade will employ more Taiwanese than lose their jobs due to an increase in Chinese imports. After all, some Taiwanese bosses may just pocket increased profit, though others will see increased demand and need to employ more workers. It will be easier to consider the impact of the agreement after it has been in place for a year or two.

But now that the ECFA has been agreed upon, where do Sino-Taiwanese relations go from here? The Wall Street Journal has a suggestion.

Leaders from both sides have wagered their personal legacies on the outcome of the trade talks. For Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou, whose approval ratings have slumped over the past several months, it is a chance to integrate Taiwan more deeply into the regional economy and accelerate the island’s lackluster growth. For Chinese President Hu Jintao, the pact could be a stepping stone for political dialogue, and even a peace accord, with Taiwan before he retires in 2012.

China clearly will want to launch into political discussions at the first opportunity. Ma Ying-jeou is less worried about his legacy and is more concerned about getting re-elected in 2012. But Hu Jintao wants to be remembered for doing something that none of his predecessors could – firmly putting Taiwan on the path of unifying with China, even if this will require further agreements to take place. A “peace agreement” is possible before 2012, even if it is currently not likely.

There is a question as to whether such a new agreement would be suitable. The Chinese Civil War was between the CCP and KMT, not China and Taiwan. The skirmishes between China and Taiwan after 1950 were not a formal declaration of war. If the respective political parties wanted to, they could formally sign a peace agreement between themselves and leave their respective countries out of it. Of course China wants the agreement to include China and Taiwan in some way as a means of making Taiwanese unification more likely.

However, even if a “peace agreement” between China and Taiwan would be suitable, Ma will be reluctant to force one through before the 2012 presidential election, unless it’s clear it would be very popular. Even if Taiwanese would clearly welcome it, most would want a referendum on it – especially as Ma previously promised not to sign political agreements with China before 2012.

But there is one very important question that needs to be considered. After the ECFA, what are China and Taiwan going to do next? As hard as it was to get the ECFA agreed, it was relatively easy compared to the sorts of political agreements that will need to be considered to resolve once and for all Taiwan’s status in a way that is acceptable to both China and Taiwan. Even a “peace agreement” would be highly controversial due to how it referred to Taiwan, but even that would not do much to resolve the China-Taiwan divide. Coming up with ways to bring China and Taiwan together politically and legally, as Beijing wants, would be a horribly complex and divisive process even if it took place over decades. Most Taiwanese do not want unification, and as older Taiwanese who were born in China die off there will be even less support for it. Many Taiwanese will still vote KMT, but as an alternative to other political parties like the DPP, TSU and PFP. They will not do so out of a desire to see unification. China also cannot rely on the KMT staying in power definitely, short of the current ruling party sabotaging the electoral system and ending democracy in Taiwan. The DPP will at some point form a government, which would put the breaks on unification (assuming the process had already started), if not necessarily political rapproachment.

On top of all of that there will be further demands from Taiwan for China to give it more international space, with greater meaningful representation in international bodies, dropping its opposition to Taiwan signing free trade agreements with other countries, agreeing to other economic changes such as fifth freedom rights, etc. Beijing may be reluctant to do this for fear that this will make Taiwan more economically and diplomatically independent and then have no reason to want to unify with China. However, Taiwan will say that economic and other matters cannot rest with the ECFA, especially if political agreements are pushed by China.

Hu should be glad that he is retiring in 2012 – all these headaches will have to be dealt with by his successor.

]]> http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/06/26/the-ecfa-where-next-for-china-and-taiwan-2/feed/ 93 Mainland Chinese students can’t attend Universities in Taiwan? http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/04/22/mainland-chinese-students-cant-attend-universities-in-taiwan/ http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/04/22/mainland-chinese-students-cant-attend-universities-in-taiwan/#comments Thu, 22 Apr 2010 03:24:21 +0000 pug_ster http://blog.foolsmountain.com/?p=7065 http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20100421/wl_asia_afp/taiwanchinapoliticseducation

Taiwanese Students studying in China is hardly a controversy, so much so that China doesn’t consider them as well as Hong Kong Students as “foreign.” So as a goodwill gesture between KMT and Beijing to allow Students from the Mainland to go to China, it has been met with some opposition from the DPP. Considering that there is such a shortage of students in Taiwan that they are considering to shut down some universities and this will help with Taiwan’s economy, this move by the DPP is like shooting themselves in the foot.

This post was submitted by pug_ster.

]]> http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/04/22/mainland-chinese-students-cant-attend-universities-in-taiwan/feed/ 0 Taiwanese Pop Music http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/04/12/taiwanese-pop-music/ http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/04/12/taiwanese-pop-music/#comments Mon, 12 Apr 2010 02:04:34 +0000 Steve http://blog.foolsmountain.com/?p=6960 In the past, I’ve written posts about indie music in China, Taiwan and other Asian countries but I haven’t spent much time on pop music since it isn’t really my thing. But I feel it is time to include what is most popular in these countries and I’ll start off with Taiwan. What inspired me to do this? Well, I recently discovered that my brother-in-law’s wife’s cousin (Wen Shang Yi 溫尚翊 also known as Monster) is the lead guitarist and leader of a band called Mayday 五月天 that is quite popular in Taiwan. So as a loyal brother-in-law, I needed an excuse to feature them!

Here’s another song from Mayday that features a ballad, and ballads are very, very, very popular over there!

Another band I’d like to feature that is also popular in Taiwan is Sodagreen 蘇打綠, with something more upbeat. They have been popular since 2004.

Mavis Fan 范曉萱 is another popular singer from Taiwan. She’s also known as ‘Bo Bo’ or ‘Little Witch’ and has been around since the mid ’90s. This song is simple and sweet.

…while this one has a pretty interesting video…

For something with a bit more edge, here’s Tizzy Bac. They were awarded the No.1 prize in the 2002 Hohaiyan Rock Festival, the biggest battle of bands in Taiwan at that time.

I had featured Crowd Lu 盧廣仲 in a previous post but since he’s still pretty popular, here’s another happy, goofy video as only he can do them.

OK, let’s get back to pure pop. Here’s Fahrenheit 飛輪海 featuring vocals by S.H.E.’s 女朋友 Hebe Tien.

For a change of pace, Korea’s Super Junior 슈퍼주니어 has a more derivative style. They were formed by an entertainment company after auditions, so not a “home grown” band like Mayday.

Cheer Chen 陳綺貞 reminds me a bit of Sweden’s Melpo Mene, even to the style of video. She started off as a mostly acoustic, folk based performer but as her career progressed, she’s added more rock influences.

Apei has a strong voice and a certain appeal.

Now we’ll go acoustic with Deserts Chang 張懸, one of the leading alternative musicians in the Chinese music industry.

Keeping it mellow, here’s carrchy.

F.I.R. 飛兒樂團 is another very popular Taiwanese band. They are well known throughout Asia with their hit “Lydia,” which was the theme song for the Taiwanese TV drama “The Outsiders(鬥魚).” The drama was aired in Taiwan without revealing the singer of the theme song. The song attracted many fans, which led to F.I.R.’s big success when they finally debuted in 2004.

Here’s your morning Milk & Coffee.

China’s Huer started out as a retro punk band as featured here, then totally sold out, copied some Japanese song and is now an embarrassment. But in the beginning, they were fun!

They’re relaxed, they’re jazzy, they’re Sticky Rice.

I get a kick out of Yu Zhou Ren 宇宙人.

I’d like to compare three very popular female pop bands, starting with Taiwan’s S.H.E. 女朋友.

As a contrast, this is Korea’s Jewelry.

How about some technopop from Japan? Here’s Hiroshima’s Perfume with a song from their newest album.

Finally, a last song from Mayday. Support my relatives!! ;)

]]> http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/04/12/taiwanese-pop-music/feed/ 51 Taiwan’s Version of Whitney Houston http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/04/09/taiwans-version-of-whitney-houston/ http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/04/09/taiwans-version-of-whitney-houston/#comments Fri, 09 Apr 2010 16:46:50 +0000 Steve http://blog.foolsmountain.com/?p=6990

Lin Yu Chun is a contestant on Taiwan’s version of American Idol called Super Star Avenue. He’s quite young, a bit chubby with a bowl haircut, not the most likely candidate for stardom. But he does a dead on impersonation of Whitney Houston and has gone viral on You Tube with over 2 million…  5 million hits.

]]> http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/04/09/taiwans-version-of-whitney-houston/feed/ 20 Happy New Year, Chen Shui-Bian? http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/02/08/happy-new-year-chen-shui-bian/ http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/02/08/happy-new-year-chen-shui-bian/#comments Mon, 08 Feb 2010 07:34:18 +0000 Allen http://blog.foolsmountain.com/?p=6680 As the Chinese New Year approaches, I think I should write some lighter posts.  So here is something funny I stumbled across on WSJ’s China Realtime Report:

With the Lunar New Year approaching, Chinese from the around the world are hoping to head home and spend time with their family. That’s true even of Taiwan’s former president, Chen Shui-bian, even though he’s in jail on charges of embezzling state funds.

So Chen has started a letter-writing campaign asking the public to lobby his successor, Ma Ying-jeou, for a chance to go home. Chen, who was Taiwan’s president from 2000 to 2008, has been imprisoned since November 2008 and was officially sentenced to life in prison on charges of corruption last September.

Chen is still appealing his sentence, which means that under Taiwanese law he is eligible for parole until the appeal is heard. But so far, the court has kept him in prison on the grounds that his crimes are serious, reasoning that he might tamper with evidence and could try to escape.

So far, there’s no sign of mass support for Chen’s campaign, but his office says it has received quite a few positive responses. Chen remains popular among Taiwan’s pro-independence groups.

Some human-rights watch groups have raised concerns about the Taiwan government’s handling of Chen’s case. They say that the prosecution’s case against Chen and his family members might be politically motivated.

Cheng Wen-lung, Chen’s lawyer, said the campaign might not work, “but not trying means no chance at all.” The lawyer added that Chen’s legal team has applied for his release eight times.

The Presidential Office’s spokesman did not return calls for comment.

So far the prospects for parole don’t appear good. On Wednesday, the day after Chen’s office initiated the campaign, Chen’s wife, Wu Shu-jen, was sentenced to nine months in prison for abetting false testimony. Chen’s son Chen Chih-chung, his daughter Chen Hsing-yu and son-in-law Chao Chien-ming also each received a three-month sentence for giving false testimony.

So it looks like Chen wants to be home for the holidays.

Chen’s lawyers have actually made appeals for some kind of parole many times already, but each time it has been denied. So Chen now wants to organize a letter writing campaign to apply some political pressure for his release.

Does Chen deserve to be home for the holidays?  Should Ma show some mercy on KMT’s former political foe?

My advice to Ma is no.  Don’t do anything so foolish.  Let the judicial process take its course.  Taiwanese politics is polarized enough the way it is.  To politically interfere so crudely in such a sensitive judiciary process would not bring anyone any good.  To do so helping a convicted crook like Chen would be suicidal to your political career.

Ma, I know your approval rating has been abysmally low.  But when even Rock Star President Obama is having trouble with approval ratings, you should take some heart. Hurricanes, the economy, beef imports all have taken their toll. But things should be turning around soon. With a free trade agreement with Mainland on the table, and signs that the U.S. economy is turning the corner, there should be much to look forward to in the coming new year.

The coming year is the year of the Tiger, an animal endowed with vigor and power. Let’s toast that the coming year will bring re-invigoration and prosperity to people on both sides of the strait!

As for Chen? I wish him good health and good life, too – so long as he does not use illicit or underhanded means to bring more pain and hurt to the people of Taiwan.

]]> http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/02/08/happy-new-year-chen-shui-bian/feed/ 99 Public Opinion in Taiwan http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/01/07/present-attitudes-in-taiwan/ http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/01/07/present-attitudes-in-taiwan/#comments Thu, 07 Jan 2010 03:33:53 +0000 Steve http://blog.foolsmountain.com/?p=6445 I recently came across an opinion poll from the Global View Survey Research Center concerning present public opinion in Taiwan on a range of subjects. In the past, many of us have commented on the state of affairs in Taiwan, not only in terms of her relationship to China but also involving the political thought within the nation. Rather than draw any conclusions, I thought I’d make this same data available to our blog members and see what you think.

The entire report can be found at the Global Survey Research Center website. The main points are as follows, with far more information and graphs contained in the survey itself:

Survey on President Ma Ying-jeou’s Performance after Assuming KMT Chairpersonship, Ma-Hu Meeting, and Taiwanese People’s views on Unification with China and Independence

A. In response to President Ma’s returning to the helm of the KMT, 51.7 percent of the respondents did not think it would create a clean image for the KMT and 41.7 percent said Ma was not competent to promote democratic reforms within the party.

B. 43.9 percent said it was appropriate if President Ma Ying-joue and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao met as leaders of ruling parties across the Strait while 36.5 percent said inappropriate.

C. Taiwanese people’s views on independence-unification issue: 51.7 percent favored status quo, 29.3 percent independence and 8.3 percent unification. People’s stance on ultimately independence-unification issue: 47.2 percent of people were supportive of ultimate independence while 34.1 percent were not. 15.7 percent backed ultimate unification with China while 69 percent voiced opposition.

D. President Ma Ying-jeou’s approval rating is 29.5 percent and disproval rating is 58.6 percent this month. 41.8 percent trusted him but 42.4 percent not.

E. KMT lawmakers’ approval rating is 21.9 percent and disapproval rating is 58.5 percent.

I also found data from the same source in this Kuomintang News Network website:

Global Views Survey Research Center

Survey: Signing of an ECFA and cross-Strait exchanges, views on reunification and independence, President Ma’s approval ratings

1.      Do you think signing a cross-Strait ECFA is important to Taiwan’s economy?

Yes: 54.4%            No: 19.2%          No opinion/Don’t know: 26.4%

2.      Do you think that signing an ECFA with the Mainland is tantamount to reunifying with the Mainland under the PRC?

Yes: 30.7%           No: 49%              No opinion/Don’t know: 20.3%

3.      Do you think that the government would minimize the negative impact and protect people’s rights when signing an ECFA with the Mainland?

Yes: 28.1%           No: 55.3%           No opinion/Don’t know: 16.6%

4.      For Taiwan’s economy to improve, do you think cross-Strait economic exchanges should increase or decrease?

Increase: 44.6%       Decrease: 27.8%      No opinion/Don’t know: 27.6%

5.      Do you think the DPP supports increasing the scale of cross-Strait exchanges?

Yes: 17.9%            No: 59.8%          No opinion/Don’t know: 22.3%

6.      If DPP increased its cross-Strait exchanges with the Mainland, do you think it would help Taiwan in striving for its overall interests?

Yes: 49.1%           No: 32.4%           No opinion/Don’t know: 18.5%

7.      Over the next two years, do you think that the DPP needs to adjust its Mainland policy and the way they deal with the Mainland?

More open: 51.2%  More conservative: 11.9%   No need to change: 8.6%   No opinion/Don’t know: 28.3%

8.      What is your current stance on reunification versus independence?

Maintain the status quo for now, then see what happens later: 42.5%                                                                                  Support Taiwan independence: 23.9%                                                                                                                               Maintain the status quo forever: 7.6%                                                                                                                             Reunify with mainland China: 7.4%                                                                                                                                         Decline to respond: 18.69%

9.      Do you think that both sides of the Strait should reunify in the end?

Yes: 18.9%         No: 54.7%       No opinion/Don’t know: 26.3%

10. Do you think that Taiwan should become independent in the end?

Yes: 42.1%         No: 30.2%       No opinion/Don’t know: 27.7%

11. President Ma Ying-jeou’s approval and trust ratings (December 2009):

Satisfied: 23.5%        Dissatisfied: 62.2%

Trust: 38%                 Distrust: 46.4%

12. If you were to vote again in a Presidential election now, would you vote for KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou or the DPP?

KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou: 39.8%     DPP: 28.4%    Don’t know/No opinion: 31.8%

13. Figures showing satisfaction ratings of the KMT legislators in the Legislative Yuan (December 2009):

Satisfied: 20.3%        Dissatisfied: 59.8%

Note: This poll was conducted from 18:20 pm to 22:00 pm between December 14 and 16 with 1,022 people over 20 years of age surveyed. The margin of error associated with this sample is plus or minus 3.1 % with a 95 % confidence interval.

Source: Global Views Magazine Public Opinion Poll Center

There is far more information in the Global View Survey Research Center article, so be sure to check it out. The KMT information has other dates in the survey that might be of interest. I only listed the numbers as of December 2009 but you can see the trends if you look at the surveys themselves.

Any surprises?

]]> http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2010/01/07/present-attitudes-in-taiwan/feed/ 45 Films are Powerful Connector Among Culturally Different People – AMBASSADOR OF TAIWAN http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/11/09/films-are-powerful-connector-among-culturally-different-people-%e2%80%93-ambassador-of-taiwan/ http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/11/09/films-are-powerful-connector-among-culturally-different-people-%e2%80%93-ambassador-of-taiwan/#comments Mon, 09 Nov 2009 16:06:16 +0000 sanjeev http://blog.foolsmountain.com/?p=5907 The Ambassador of Taiwan His Excellency Mr. Wenchyi Ong said that beside its unifying force a good film can easily strike a chord in the viewer. He was formally inaugurating the festival of films from Taiwan at Asian Academy of Film & Television. Family value, respect for the elderly, belief in democracy and diversity, working as a team and attaching importance to spiritual life are the dominant commonalities between the people of Taiwan and India he added. In his introductory remarks Prof. Sandeep Marwah said that watching films from Taiwan would indeed be a refreshing experience for the students. The Ambassador disclosed that he has invited the well known Taiwanese Director Ang Lee to make his next film in India and hoped that collaboration with Indian film producers will lead to making great films to tell the world remarkable stories of both India and Taiwan. The Ambassador of Taiwan accepted the life membership of International Film & Television Club on this occasion. Later he spoke to Noida people through Radio Noida 107.4 FM.

This post was submitted by sanjeev.

]]> http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/11/09/films-are-powerful-connector-among-culturally-different-people-%e2%80%93-ambassador-of-taiwan/feed/ 0 【风华国乐】:阿里山的姑娘 (Girls of Ali Mountain) http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/10/05/%e3%80%90%e9%a3%8e%e5%8d%8e%e5%9b%bd%e4%b9%90%e3%80%91%e9%98%bf%e9%87%8c%e5%b1%b1%e7%9a%84%e5%a7%91%e5%a8%98-girls-of-ali-mountain/ http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/10/05/%e3%80%90%e9%a3%8e%e5%8d%8e%e5%9b%bd%e4%b9%90%e3%80%91%e9%98%bf%e9%87%8c%e5%b1%b1%e7%9a%84%e5%a7%91%e5%a8%98-girls-of-ali-mountain/#comments Mon, 05 Oct 2009 07:16:41 +0000 dewang http://blog.foolsmountain.com/?p=5630
Mind as well dress all these musicians in panda costumes. :)

]]> http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/10/05/%e3%80%90%e9%a3%8e%e5%8d%8e%e5%9b%bd%e4%b9%90%e3%80%91%e9%98%bf%e9%87%8c%e5%b1%b1%e7%9a%84%e5%a7%91%e5%a8%98-girls-of-ali-mountain/feed/ 1 Chen Shui Bian Gets Life http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/09/12/chen-shui-bian-gets-life/ http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/09/12/chen-shui-bian-gets-life/#comments Sat, 12 Sep 2009 08:51:53 +0000 Allen http://blog.foolsmountain.com/?p=5335 In the continuing saga that is Chen Shui Bian’s colorful life, a trial court in Taipei sentenced Chen to life in prison yesterday as the first phase of his dramatic corruption and embezzlement trial came to an end. Chen’s wife, Wu Shu-chen, received a life sentence on corruption charges. Their son and daughter-in-law, convicted of money laundering, received relatively lenient 2 1/2 – and one-year terms.

Chen and his family have been charged with siphoning millions from government funds and for receiving bribes of at least $9 million involving use of  Swiss bank accounts to conceal their crimes. Chen and his family were not cooperative throughout most of the trial, but in the end, too many people stepped forward, and too much evidence were offered.

Chen and many of his supporters continue to hold that Chen is innocent and is a victim of political persecution. For more details on this story see this WSJ report, ATimes report, Time report, SF Chronical report.

What is your opinion of the case?

In the view of Chen’s supporters, this nightmarish trial has always been more about political persecution than anything else. The investigation into Chen’s affairs began almost immediately after Ma came to power and Chen left office. Ma’s administration seemed at times too eager to share documents with the prosecution. For most of this past year, Chen has been inexplicably held in jail even when he had had little hope of escaping.

Politics in Taiwan has always involved various forms of gift giving and favor culling. Rules regarding political expense funds and donations were never very clear. Supporters believe that as the former leader of Taiwan, Chen deserves some deference. Chen is the heart and soul of the Taiwanese independence movement. To hold Chen strictly to the law in a court of law under this context is unfair and smack of political sham.

On the other hand, this case can also be viewed as a seminal moment in Chinese history.

Never in a Chinese society has a leader in as high a position as Chen been brought down so low so fast and through purely legal means. Chinese society had always been ruled by fiat. High ranking leaders were considered above normal laws that were intended to have effect only upon the common people.

Has the rule of law in Taiwan finally developed enough teeth to bite even a president? Has democracy – which would just be mob rule without rule of law – been advanced to the next level in Taiwan?

One thing that has impressed me about this case is how relatively independent the judicial process has been allowed to run its course. There has been no evidence that Ma’s administration – or the KMT dominated legislature – exerted any influence on the judicial process. Ma – a lawyer himself – made sure he himself personally stayed away as far away from the trial as possible.

Even if you believe Chen were a sacrificial lamb – i.e. the only thing Chen did wrong was to get caught – is Chen’s sentence such a bad thing in the big scheme of things?

This trial, if nothing else, has the potential to set a precedence and send a strong message to all future Taiwanese politicians that corruption and embezzlement will no longer be tolerated. All leaders who wish to continue to practice corruption will be doing so taking their own chances.

So – is Chen’s trial a political plot orchestrated by the KMT to sabotage future opposition or is it proof that the rule of law has finally come of age in Taiwan?

Has the law in this case been politicized to strike down a political foe or has it been a tool to fight for justice and good governance?

Should leaders like Chen be given presidential deference … perhaps even a pardon – or should leaders like him be treated like any other common citizen and be held accountable to the fullest extent of the law?

Do you think this case will have a positive effect on governance in Taiwan or will it be business as usual – where those in favor or well connected will remain shielded from the law and where only those politically disfavored will be tried?

]]> http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/09/12/chen-shui-bian-gets-life/feed/ 181 Opinion:On Dalai Lama’s Upcoming Visit to Taiwan http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/08/28/opinionon-dalai-lamas-upcoming-visit/ http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/08/28/opinionon-dalai-lamas-upcoming-visit/#comments Fri, 28 Aug 2009 20:58:06 +0000 Allen http://blog.foolsmountain.com/?p=5167 Dalai Lama is set to visit Taiwan next week. The Dalai Lama has been invited a group of local DPP officials representing several southern counties – where DPP support is especially strong.

The Dalai Lama has visited Taiwan twice, once in 1997 and 2001. However, soon after Ma took office on a platform promising to amend ties with the Mainland, a request for the Dalai Lama to visit was turned down by Ma, citing the timing as not proper. A Dalai Lama visit then could have derailed Ma’s plan for closer ties with the Mainland – and still has the potential to do so the same.

I have commented before that these latest developments smack of political jockeying by opportunistic politicians (i.e. local DPP politicians), and I still stand by that statement. Annecdotal evidence suggest that while most Taiwanese do not object to the visit, the people on the ground – the true victims of the storm - appear only lukewarm. As is with the political circus that has developed in the aftermath of the storm, efforts are directed toward political jockeying rather than to helping people on the ground.

I am satisfied that Beijing clearly sees what is going on in Taiwan and has refrained from wholesale condemnation of the Taiwanese government. Personally, I think that as long as the Dalai Lama’s visit does not chill cross-strait relations, this visit may turn out to be a blessing … after all.

How???

Well – hopefully this high profile visit will debunk a few myths.

Over the years, many in the West seem to have come to believe that Tibetan culture and Han culture are mutually incompatible. This is far from the truth. The Dalai Lama is relatively popular in Taiwan, where the demographics / culture is predominantly Han. Most Taiwanese are Buddhists, and many look to the Dalai Lama as a well respected spiritual teacher. Both my mom and my uncle personally attended ceremonies held by the Dalai Lama both times the Dalai Lama visited Taiwan before. The temple I go to have many books by current Buddhist teachers, including many by the Dalai Lama. Han culture would not be Han without Buddhism. To the extent that we are talking about religion, Han culture is definitely not incompatible with Tibetan culture.

Some in the West believe that Han Chinese do not care about Tibetan culture. That is also far from the truth. Tibetan mysticism, Tibetan Buddhist teachings, and Tibetan art are wildly popular in Taiwan (as well as among the growing middle class all throughout the Mainland I hear). The last time I perused a bookstore in Taipei, books about Tibet – its history, its culture, its people, its religion – occupied two entire walls. Tibetan art motives and themes can be found in almost every temple you visit in Taiwan (and throughout the Mainland, including the ones that are being reconstructed). Tibetan art artifacts are popular in museums, art stores, and art shows and fairs in Taiwan.

Some in the West believe that Han Chinese and Tibetans cannot live peacefully side by side. This can be easily debunked by history – even without going to Taiwan. The Dalai Lama has stated many times that Tibetan and Han Chinese history are intermixed, and that most of this history can be characterized as one of peace and mutual cooperation rather than one of conflict. In Qinhai and Sichuan, Tibetans and Han Chinese – as well as other ethnic groups – have lived peacefully amongst each others for centuries if not millenia. If we must go to Taiwan, we will find that Tibetans in Taiwan (there are many) live their daily lives immersed with other Taiwanese people.

What this trip hopefully will reveal is that the controversy about the Dalai Lama is political – not cultural … or religious. There is nothing fundamentally incompatible about Tibetan or Han culture. Of course, this does not mean that Han and Tibetan culture are - or need to be - one and the same. But they can both represent important elements in the great tapestry making up the Chinese tradition.

The Dalai Lama has asserted many times that he intends to reach out more to all Chinese people – not just Westerners – or ethnic Tibetans. Taiwan can be a stepping stone. I hope the Dalai Lama will follow through by reaching out to Beijing and the people on the Mainland as a whole. The Dalai Lama is an important part of Tibetan – and more broadly Chinese – culture.  Taiwan, as part of the ROC, can provide a sort of home welcoming. But the real destination is Tibet. To get there, the Dalai Lama must learn to reach out to Beijing, not just the DPP, or the KMT…

]]> http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/08/28/opinionon-dalai-lamas-upcoming-visit/feed/ 65 Hu Jintao meets with delegation of Taiwanese minorities, pledges further disaster support http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/08/20/hu-jintao-meets-with-delegation-of-taiwanese-minorities-pledges-further-disaster-support/ http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/08/20/hu-jintao-meets-with-delegation-of-taiwanese-minorities-pledges-further-disaster-support/#comments Thu, 20 Aug 2009 19:15:53 +0000 Allen http://blog.foolsmountain.com/?p=5094 President Hu recently met with a delegation of ethnic minorities from Taiwan, and pledged further support from the mainland for whatever help Taiwan may need.  Ethnic minorities in southern Taiwan, living often in remote villages, were the hardest hit group in Taiwan by the recent typhoon. Here is a translation of a story on the People’s Web by China News Wrap:

Hu meets delegation of ethnic minorities from Taiwan

Hu meets delegation of ethnic minorities from Taiwan

“Hu Jintao, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, met with members of a delegation of Taiwan’s ethnic minorities in the Great Hall of the People and delivered a speech on the afternoon of 19 August.”

“Hu Jintao firstly gave a warm welcome to this delegation of  Taiwan’s ethnic minorities on their visit to the mainland, as well as gave his condolences to these Taiwanese ethnic minority compatriots.”

“Hu Jintao said, ‘Taiwan recently suffered from a typhoon of a size that is rarely seen in history, and the lives and property of our Taiwanese compatriots have suffered great damage – Taiwanese ethnic minority compatriots in particular had endured acute hardship during the disaster. We share their pain, and are extremely concerned about their welfare. At this point, I would like to represent your compatriots on the mainland, and send our sincere and deep condolences to Taiwanese who have been affected by the typhoon.”

‘Hu Jintao said that the peoples of China have always possessed an outstanding tradition of overcoming adversity and providing each other with mutual support. Compatriots on either side of the Taiwan strait are a single family sharing ties of blood. The difficulties that our Taiwanese compatriots endure are also our own difficulties, and we will continue to provide our Taiwanese compatriots with aid and support, and support them in their recovery work.”

“Hu Jintao pointed out that Taiwanese ethnic minority compatriots are important members of the great family of the peoples of China, and that ‘for a long period of time, you have engaged in an unwavering struggle to resist foreign aggression and preserve national dignity, and have worked tirelessly for the development of the peoples of China and the development of Taiwan, making a great contribution to the improvement and development of cross-strait relations. Your own actions prove that compatriots on either side of the strait only need to unite their hearts and work in unison, in order to be capable of properly protecting and establishing our common homeland, and create a new era for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations.”

“Hu Jintai said that in the past year cross-strait relations had achieved historic improvements, resulting in a series of major accomplishments. This is in the fundamental interests of compatriots on both sides of the strait, and is what the hearts of the people long for. ‘I sincerely hope that that compatriots on both sides of the strait will join hands together even more closely, to achieve the great revival of the people’s of China.”

The trip by the delegation was planned long before Morakot became news – as part of the increasing culture ties between the Mainland and Taiwan. The delegation was headed by May Chin, a popular Taiwanese entertainment star. Besides visiting Beijing, the group will also be visiting southwestern Yunnan Province, a place home to some 20 ethnic minorities on the Mainland.

Personally, I am very satisfied at the increasing economic and cultural exchange between the Mainland and Taiwan. I am pleased to see the Mainland offer help in so many ways (see, e.g., here, here or here) – in ways reminescent of the way so many Taiwanese reached out to help the people of Sichuan after the Wenchuan quake struck more than a year ago.

While there are few still to be rescued from being trapped now, much help is still needed to provide for the victims on the ground.  I sincerely hope that whatever help Taiwan needs, politics will not cause the government in Taiwan to flinch or refrain from asking the Mainland for any help it needs.

]]> http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/08/20/hu-jintao-meets-with-delegation-of-taiwanese-minorities-pledges-further-disaster-support/feed/ 20 Typhoon Morakot – A More Objective Report http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/08/20/typhoon-morakot-a-more-objective-report/ http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/08/20/typhoon-morakot-a-more-objective-report/#comments Thu, 20 Aug 2009 18:43:36 +0000 Allen http://blog.foolsmountain.com/?p=5091 I have been critical of a previous post by Steve, which (from my perspective) seemed sympathetic to those who may be jockeying for political gain on the back of people’s misery in the wake of the recent Morakot tragedy in Taiwan. I don’t have time to translate all the reports I read or see on T.V., but here is an article by Cindy Cui that offers a more balanced perspective regarding both situation on the ground and current political fallout (Cindy has written many DPP leaning articles in the past, by the way).  I am quoting her article published today in Asia Times in full:

Typhoon turns into a political storm
By Cindy Sui

TAIPEI – It was just a routine viewers’ survey, but a CNN online “poll” on whether Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou should step down over his administration’s response to Typhoon Morakot made headlines in newspapers and top-of-the-hour TV news in Taiwan, with traditionally anti-ruling party outlets running wild with it.

“CNN poll shows 80% people want Ma to step down,” shouted a front-page headline on Liberty Times. Even television stations typically partial towards Ma played up the story.

The killer typhoon that caught everyone by surprise with its extraordinarily destructive power, pounding Taiwan with record rainfall from August 6 to 10 and causing massive mudslides which killed an estimated 500 people, is turning out to be Ma’s biggest challenge yet as president.

Since taking office in May 2008 after winning 58% of the votes in the presidential election, his approval ratings have slid due to the economic downturn and concerns about his China policy, but now they are at a near record low of 29%.

The hardest-hit areas – Kaohsiung, Pingtung and Tainan counties, are all headed by officials from the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Little focus, however, has been placed on mistakes made by local officials, despite the argument that they should have been the most aware of the local rainfalls, flooding and the potential risk of landslides affecting villages in their areas.

That’s not surprising, said Andrew Yang, secretary general of the Taipei-based Council of Advanced Policy Studies and a former government advisor under ex-president Lee Teng-hui.

“People had already experienced inefficiency and incompetence at the lower levels, so they were looking to Ma Ying-jeou for leadership,” said Yang. “One way or another, the system should’ve worked to reduce damages and loss of lives, but it didn’t. That’s why people are targeting Ma Ying-jeou. They want to get the problem solved. People want results.”

It’s still unclear what went wrong. Ma and the Executive Yuan, his cabinet, have only been in office a little over a year and they did not create the disaster response system – it was already there.

Information revealed since the typhoon hit indicates that the Central Weather Bureau initially predicted low rainfalls for the south and had no idea the typhoon would bring about 2,800 mm of rainfall in just four days – half or two-thirds of the total amount of annual rainfall in the areas. Only when rains started falling hard did the bureau steadily upgrade its rainfall forecast.

But it is unclear whether officials at the National Fire Agency’s disaster relief center were informed and if they had been informed, why they had not reacted promptly to alert local officials to evacuate residents.

With so many agencies that could’ve and should’ve done something, it was unclear why everyone dropped the ball.

Ma himself gave the impression in a recent news conference that he himself is not clear about the chain of command that should have been followed in these situations. He repeatedly pointed out that in the seven hardest-hit areas, thousands of lives were saved in three or four of these areas because the village or township chiefs there had had the smarts to evacuate their residents, some of them having undergone training in this.

But this raises the question – why was it left to local officials, some of whom might not be fully aware or informed, to decide whether or not to evacuate people?

The Ministry of National Defense has been roundly blamed for not sending out troops until the third day of the typhoon, and then for not sending enough.

In the worst-hit village of Siaolin, where nearly 400 people are believed to have been buried by a mudslide, it would not have made much difference. Sides of mountains near the remote village located in a narrow valley at the foothills of Alishan came crashing down on the village shortly after dawn on Sunday, August 9. Residents said that due to damaged telecommunications lines, no one outside knew, and help did not come until the next day.

Despite repeated questions from the media about what Ma was doing during the days of the typhoon disaster, he has not answered them or revealed how much information he was given.

“He didn’t receive abundant information,” said Yang.

But that remains unclear.

“Did they [the government] have sufficient information? Or did they have the necessary information but made wrong judgments?” asked Ethan Tseng Yi-ren, a political scientist from the National Sun Yat-sen University in southern Taiwan’s Kaohsiung City, traditionally a DPP stronghold. “If we have such types of civil servants who have the necessary information but still failed to act accordingly, then that’s bad.”

While Ma has vowed to launch a thorough investigation and punish those found guilty of dereliction of duty, the media have also questioned whether he will punish himself, with some people calling for his resignation.

People, perhaps long frustrated by a government system notorious for being bureaucratic and unresponsive, are venting their frustration. Perhaps because Ma tends to apologize easily and appears to be caring, he is getting an earful.

“What’s interesting is that people who are traditionally critical of the [ruling] Kuomintang (KMT) and don’t watch TVBS, which traditionally supports Ma Ying-jeou, are now watching TVBS instead of the TV channels that tend to criticize Ma. They are interested in seeing how TVBS is scolding Ma Ying-jeou,” said Tseng.

The fallout from the typhoon would have an impact on elections in December for county and city leaders, Tseng said. “It will definitely have a negative impact on the KMT,” said Tseng. “But it’s unclear how great the impact will be because people are also upset at local officials in the south.”

At play in the unfettered criticism of Ma’s government are lingering suspicions about his intentions in building closer economic and trade ties with China, Tseng said. Since taking over as president, Ma and the KMT have adopted unprecedented measures to improve cross-strait ties, including launching direct flights, shipping and postal links, allowing thousands of Chinese tourists to visit each day, and opening the door to Chinese investment in about 100 sectors, including public infrastructure.

What he plans to do next is actually what most worries Taiwanese suspicious of China – negotiations on an “economic cooperation framework agreement” (ECFA). Similar to a free-trade agreement, talks will begin with China in October over the ECFA and Ma hopes to reach agreement by next year.

Ma believes this is important so that Taiwan does not lose out as China signs free-trade agreements with other countries, giving them a competitive edge in lower tariffs or tariff-free trade with Beijing. But critics worry it will not only hurt Taiwanese local industry but also harm the island’s sovereignty.

“Politics is involved in some of the criticism against Ma Ying-jeou. Taiwanese people won’t say ‘It’s because I’m unhappy with your China policy’, but of course in the back of their mind, they think this,” Tseng said. “Come October, when ECFA negotiations begin, the opposition party will use this opportunity to say this government is not worthy of trust.”

The DPP and its chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen have been conspicuously absent in the typhoon debates. That’s intentional, said Tseng, as they do not want the public to view the criticisms against Ma as the two parties going at each other’s throat again.

What’s missing in the debate, analysts said, is an honest, objective look at what is wrong with a system that allowed hundreds of villagers to be buried in a mudslide during a major typhoon. Even China, which Taiwan often looks down on in terms of its standards of governance, routinely evacuates as many as a million people when typhoons approach.

To be fair, this typhoon was extraordinary. It was slow-moving, staying three to four days, unlike most typhoons which leave within a day or two. And while it was not considered a powerful typhoon, it brought much more rain than most typhoons.

Still, unless the public and the government look at the root of the problem, instead of just calling for resignations of this or that official, the problem could reoccur, analysts said.

Tough questions will also have to be answered – including whether Taiwan will suffer more such extreme weather conditions due to climate change and whether it should allow people to live in dangerously located mountain villages.

“Everyone is criticizing Ma’s ability, but by not analyzing why this typhoon caused so much damage, the people at the grassroots will suffer again,” said Tseng.

The media focus of late is allegations that Premier Liu Chao-shiuan had the nerve to get a hair cut or have his hair dyed on August 11, at the height of the rescue effort, and that the Executive Yuan’s secretary general Hsueh Hsiang-chuan, who is responsible for coordination between ministries, had a Taiwanese Father’s Day dinner with his father-in-law on August 8 when the typhoon brought flooding to the south. Hsueh’s initial defensive remarks were, “It was Father’s Day! And we only ate yam porridge.”

Defense Minister Chen Chao-min was criticized for not dispatching soldiers in time and dispatching too few troops to rescue typhoon victims, while Vice Foreign Minister Andrew Hsia was slammed for initially rejecting international aid.

Hsueh, Chen and Hsia have all tendered their resignations, but the premier has not accepted them yet.

President Ma said he will not resign, insisting his duties were needed at this time. He has promised the results of an investigation into wrongdoings in the disaster-relief fiasco will be revealed next month, and that for now, the focus should be on resettlement and reconstruction.

Analysts said it’s unlikely that Ma will step down. According to Taiwan’s constitution, he must serve his full term. And if the opposition party were to try to recall him, it would need a majority in the Legislative Yuan, which it does not have as Ma’s KMT party controls more than two-thirds of the seats.

What Ma will have to do in the coming days is take a hard look at his cabinet, including the premier, and see if changes need to be made, analysts said. From the beginning, his team has been criticized as being inexperienced. Liu, while reputed as a clean official, has only served a short stint as transportation minister in the 1990s. Coming from a chemistry background, almost all his experience is in academia, where he headed two universities.

According to the constitution, the president is in charge of defense and foreign affairs, while the day-to-day running of the government is left to the premier. Ma, a trained lawyer, has been strict about following this formula, but time and again he has shot himself in the foot for doing so, taking criticism afterwards for not being on hand and involved at a time when the highest-ranking leader was needed.

What Ma has done the most since the typhoon disaster struck is to apologize. He has also met with many bereaved family members, not shying from their cries of anger and complaints, and is promising a variety of assistance, including living stipends, temporary housing, rental subsidies and school meals. It seems to be making a difference, at least to some people, even though the media continue to be tough on him.

The host and guests speakers of a local TV station’s on-air panel discussion on Wednesday to criticize Ma were surprised when the first of several incoming calls from the audience criticized the media, not the president. “All you do is spend all day scolding Ma Ying-jeou. Let’s unite and not differentiate between blue [KMT] or green [DPP],” said one woman on the phone.

Ultimately, Ma’s survival will depend on whether he can meet people’s demands and fix the problems in Taiwan’s disaster response system, said analysts. “I think he is capable of doing this,” Yang said. “He’s putting his ears to the ground.”


[Note: My opinionated introduction was slightly revised in light of Steve and my discussion in comments #1-#6. Specifically, in the first version, I may have implied that Steve took pleasure out of political jockeying off of the misfortunes of others - which was incorrect, and which wasn't my intent.]

]]> http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/08/20/typhoon-morakot-a-more-objective-report/feed/ 26 Can Ma Ying-jeou Weather the Storm? http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/08/17/can-ma-ying-jeou-weather-the-storm/ http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/08/17/can-ma-ying-jeou-weather-the-storm/#comments Mon, 17 Aug 2009 23:30:40 +0000 Steve http://blog.foolsmountain.com/?p=5067 From August 6-9, southern Taiwan was hit with the worst typhoon in 50 years. Per the Associated Press story:

“Morakot dumped more than 80 inches (two meters) of rain on the island last weekend and stranded thousands in villages in the mountainous south. A total of 15,400 villagers have been ferried to safety, and rescuers are working to save another 1,900 people. The storm destroyed the homes of 7,000 people and caused agricultural and property damage in excess of 50 billion New Taiwan dollars ($1.5 billion), Ma told the security conference.”

Since that time and with hundreds of victims still buried in the rubble of mudslides throughout mountain villages in Southern Taiwan, President Ma’s response has been inadequate at best, even among his own supporters.

“Criticism of Ma’s handling of the Morakot disaster is rising quickly — even within Ma’s own party and in media outlets normally friendly to the president. Much of the criticism focused on comments he made Thursday to Britain’s Independent Television News in which he appeared to blame Morakot victims for their own fate. “They were not fully prepared. If they were, they should have been evacuated much earlier,” Ma told an ITN reporter. “They didn’t realize how serious the disaster was.”

Taiwan’s normally pro-Ma China Times newspaper lambasted the president for the remarks, saying they were badly out of place. “It is not presidential to tell international media that the blame falls on people who would not evacuate in order to safeguard their own homes,” the newspaper said.

Ma also has come under fire for his handling of government efforts to save storm victims and help the island’s hard-hit south recover. “If we expect the people to do everything themselves, what do we need a government for?” chided lawmaker Lo Shu-lei of Ma’s ruling Nationalist Party. Ma “seems to be out of the loop and doesn’t understand the way the relief system works,” she said.

The criticism of Ma is reminiscent of the hostile reaction to former President George W. Bush’s handling of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 — criticism that played a major role in turning public opinion against the U.S. leader.”

However, help is on the way. After initially turning down direct aid from the United States and Japan to assist in relief efforts, the KMT government has changed its mind and asked for that assistance. From Bloomberg:

“Four U.S. helicopters that can airlift earth-moving equipment may help with relief efforts as early as tomorrow in Taiwan, where hundreds of people are believed buried under mudslides caused by Typhoon Morakot.

A U.S. coordination team arrived in Taiwan today, with two CH-53 heavy-lift helicopters and two SH-60 medium-lift models to be deployed, said Chris Kavanagh, a spokesman for the American Institute in Taiwan, which represents U.S. interests on the island.

The first aircraft to arrive, a CH-53, was from the Naval squadron, which helped relief work after Hurricane Katrina struck the U.S. Gulf Coast in 2005. All four helicopters will be based on the USS Denver, which is usually stationed in Japan and is to be positioned off Taiwan’s southern coast to assist with the relief mission.”

My wife has talked to family members in Taiwan who were previous supporters of Ma during the election but are now furious over his handling of the disaster and remarks made to the public, and swear they will no longer support him. It’s common in Taiwan these days to refer to the storm as “Katrina” and not “Morakot”.

Do you think Ma’s current unpopularity on the island will affect the reconciliation between the Chinese and Taiwan governments? Will he have enough time to repair the damage before the next election, or will this crisis affect his popularity the way Hurricane Katrina affected George Bush’s?

]]> http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/08/17/can-ma-ying-jeou-weather-the-storm/feed/ 50 Cross Cultural Dating http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/08/13/cross-cultural-dating/ http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/08/13/cross-cultural-dating/#comments Thu, 13 Aug 2009 19:05:15 +0000 Steve http://blog.foolsmountain.com/?p=5001 17m Now that many non-Chinese have moved to China and many native Chinese live throughout the world, cross cultural dating has become far more common. For someone leaving mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong or Singapore and moving to a western country, what are some of the cultural pitfalls and traps you need to avoid and adjustments you need to make? For someone moving to any of those four areas, the same questions apply. Are the “rules” different for Chinese women dating outside their culture as compared to Chinese men doing the same?

My direct experience isn’t too pertinent since I met my wife in Phoenix and she had already been living in the States for nine years, but there were still many adjustments we (mostly I) had to make. She was the first Asian woman I had ever dated so I didn’t fall into the “yellow fever” category. However, when I was living in mainland China and Taiwan, I had a chance to observe, ask questions and learn more from others involved in cross cultural relationships.

asian-interracial-datingI am hoping this is more of a “reader contribution” forum rather than just one man’s opinion, so feel free to chime in with your own experiences and observations. I was able to find this reference paper online, studying the “cultural impact upon the dating scripts, perceptions, and behaviors of college students from the United States and Taiwan in their cross-cultural romantic relationships”. Click on the green link for the Adobe Acrobat file.

It’s important to note here that I am talking about true cross cultural relationships, not people from different ethnic groups within the same country.

Here are a few things I noticed:

1. Both parties had better like and respect each others culture, because we are all a product of our cultures and we can’t expect the other to become like us. A successful cross cultural relationship meets in the middle, not on one extreme.

2. There are cultures within cultures. I’ve noticed that couples who are from more educated, successful families tend to have an easier time adjusting to another culture. On the upper level, it’s really one world culture with subtle variances. Taking someone from a very poor family and moving them to another country can be extremely tough on that person and they tend to pick up the worst habits of the new culture. I’ve observed that there are exceptions to this rule but not many.

3. Learn each others cultural nuances. When I began to date my wife, I was kicked under the table more times than I can remember as she wanted my Chinese manners to be perfect when I was in Chinese company. I tried my best and picked it up pretty quickly. It has proven very beneficial over the years, in both business and social situations. Yet I have seen expats in China who have lived there for years, speak the language reasonably well, are in a relationship with a Chinese person yet routinely commit cultural faux pas. They have lived not in China but in expat China, and expected their Chinese mate to adapt to their situation and not the other way around. This can later cause problems in the relationship when dealing with in laws and other Chinese in social situations. As a spouse, you are expected to know Chinese mores and folkways and will embarrass your spouse if you do not. It’s not hard, just watch and imitate.

4. You don’t have to “go native” but you do have to respect the native traditions. The fact that you are from another culture gives you some leeway when it comes to certain subjects. But it’s still best to just plunge in and not worry too much about how you’d look to your friends back home. I’ve been in situations that would have been impossible to conceive in my younger days.

5. When things get a little crazy, don’t condemn! Just because its “wrong” to you doesn’t mean it’s wrong in that culture. I used to pull a little trick where in those situations I’d say to myself, “That’s very interesting!” Sometimes I’d have to say it three or four times but it kept me from passing judgment on a different culture. Eventually, I’d get used to it and it wouldn’t be such a big deal.

6. Never compare cultures. If you do, you won’t be happy and he/she won’t either. Always accept a culture as an intrinsic whole. There are heads and tails on a coin but in the end, there is only one coin and you can’t have just the heads or the tails. Cultures are the same, you accept them as a whole and not in parts. In fact, that applies not just to cultures but also to relationships; there are no “good” and “bad” points to another person, just different manifestations of the same intrinsic qualities. Splitting a person or a culture into parts makes for eventual disappointment.

7. Revel in rather than complain about the differences. My wife has an accent; she’ll always have an accent since she came here as an adult. She has a huge English vocabulary and is easy to understand, but for me her accent is charming and I could not imagine her without it. Plus, I always feel that her English compared to my Chinese is so superior that I would be an idiot to find fault with her.

8. Parents: This can be a tough one. Many times couples will have problems with either set of parents not approving of the relationship. I never had this problem but it can be pretty common with some. Some are into the “pure blood” grandchildren idea, while others feel the cultures are just too different for a successful marriage. I know in Taiwan, many women there have complained about marrying the firstborn son and being poorly treated by their in-laws, since that son is supposed to take care of his parents. I know quite a few divorces that later took place because of this situation.

When I lived in Shanghai, many of the women in my office were curious about my marriage and how my wife and I got along, being from different cultures. As it turns out, we have more in common in terms of attitude, lifestyle and outlook than anyone I’ve ever met, so it’s been pretty easy in terms of adjustment. But I also asked them about what they expected in a boyfriend/spouse and what they thought of foreign men they had met. Their answers were interesting. It’s important to note that these women were from excellent universities and very intelligent.

They didn’t date in high school, they studied in high school. They didn’t date in college, they studied in college. Dating begins after college and most importantly, they didn’t believe in casual dating. What I mean by that is that they expected to be friends first until they knew each other well, then the man would ask the woman to be his girlfriend and if she accepted, they were not only dating but seriously dating. I remember one friend telling me she had accompanied an American work colleague shopping and when they were done, he asked her if she considered this a date. She said “of course not” and was surprised he had even considered it so. The older generation was more conservative in terms of sexual mores while the younger generation (one child) went from their first kiss to well beyond in a relatively short period. Marriage was expected to occur and several told me that if they dated two different people and neither worked out, they would let their parents find a spouse for them.

This was where a lot of westerners got confused. They expected the dating rules to be the same as home, and would try to “pick up” girls at bars and when successful, would wonder why the girl was a ‘gold-digger’. They’d also wonder why many girls would get annoyed when they asked them to dance at a club. I was told that nice girls don’t dance with strangers and to ask them is kind of an insult. When some of these western guys would ask me where they could meet nice girls, I always told them, “anywhere but in a bar or club”. I constantly heard the women in my office describe others as either “good girls” or “bad girls”.

I was told by a younger lady in Shenzhen that the rules were different there and that most girls in high school were already dating. Different parts of China might have different cultural standards so again, this is just what I heard from others when there. Standards might have changed since that time so today’s world is probably a little different.

I once ran into an interesting situation that showed me the difference between polite behavior in Taiwan vs. China. I was with a group of Shanghainese men and women, and it started to rain. I had brought a very large umbrella with me so I was sharing it with one of the women. As we got to a busy intersection, without thinking I extended my elbow since this is considered polite in Taiwan. She took it but when we had crossed the intersection, she immediately let go and said that she didn’t want others to think she was a “bad girl”. I was confused and asked why. Well, she was a “poor” Chinese girl and I was a “rich” foreigner so they’d see her taking my elbow and assume she was a “bad girl”, since that was the stereotype. I’m not sure if her attitude was widespread but after that I was more hesitant to do something that would have been considered impolite NOT to do in Taiwan.

So in the end, it is important to understand that there are cultures within cultures and it’s best to observe and imitate. But remember to protect your shins. :P

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